Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Economy in Brief

  • Energy prices surged in March, but most other items showed modest changes.
  • Tame readings were a relief from hints of upward pressure in prior months.

More Commentaries

    • Factory orders virtually unchanged (+3.7% y/y) in Feb. for second straight month; still 7.6% above the Jan. ’24 low.
    • Durable goods orders (-1.3%), fourth m/m fall in five mths.; nondurable goods orders (+1.5%), largest of three successive m/m gains; shipments (+1.4%), fourth m/m rise in five mths.
    • Transportation orders -5.3% m/m, led by a 28.6% plunge in nondefense aircraft orders.
    • Unfilled orders +0.1%, smallest of seven straight m/m increases.
    • Inventories +0.1%, holding within a narrow 0.1%-0.2% range for four consecutive mths.
  • Amid further tentative signs of de-escalation—most notably President Trump’s decision on April 7th to step back from further escalation—financial markets have stabilised somewhat, but the macroeconomic implications of the Middle East crisis remain highly uncertain. As our charts show, the global economy entered this shock from a position of relative strength, with positive growth surprises and easing inflation pressures still evident in the data (chart 1). However, that benign backdrop now looks vulnerable. Central banks are already reassessing the outlook, with expectations for policy easing being pared back (chart 2) and a growing consensus that any response to persistent energy-driven inflation will likely involve delaying cuts rather than tightening aggressively—albeit with significant regional divergence (chart 3). Financial markets, for their part, are not yet signalling a loss of inflation control, but the rise in real yields suggests increasing concern around the broader policy mix, particularly fiscal pressures (chart 4). Finally, the adjustment to the shock is unlikely to be uniform. Structural differences in domestic energy capacity are already driving wide divergences in electricity prices, leaving more import-dependent economies exposed to higher costs and sharper trade-offs between growth and inflation (charts 5 and 6). Taken together, the message is clear: even if geopolitical tensions ease, the economic aftershocks are likely to be uneven, persistent and increasingly shaped by structural constraints.

    • The energy component contributed to a high-side reading on the price index for personal consumption expenditures; the core component was firm as well.
    • Consumer spending showed signs of slowing.
    • Q4 GDP growth revised to 0.5% q/q saar from 0.7% in the first revision and 1.4% in the advance report.
    • The shutdown of the federal government still played a critical role in the slowdown, subtracting 1.0%-point from Q4 growth.
    • Domestic demand slowed further with final sales to private domestic purchasers revised down to 1.8% from 1.9% in the first revision and 2.4% in the advance report.
  • Germany
    | Apr 09 2026

    German IP Is Weak in February

    Germany’s industrial production slipped in February, driven lower by dropping output of consumer goods. Sequential growth rates over 12 months, six months, and three months show a confusing array of patterns, except for intermediate goods, where annualized growth rates for output sequentially weaken and show declines on each horizon. All German sector growth rates for the quarter-to-date are showing declines, and the growth rankings by sector are below 50% across the broad, indicating below median performance across German sectors. It’s a very unimpressive report.

    Real manufacturing orders rose modestly in February against the backdrop of a very sharp drop in January. Real manufacturing sales have been erratic.

    German output and industrial gauges, ranked on annual sales growth against historic norms, have been very weak. Only real orders post a standing above 50%, which represents the median.

    France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway provide some perspective on European growth. The northern European non-EMU member countries are much stronger than the EMU reporters, two of which have standings below their median levels (rankings below 50).

    • Signs of stabilization in mortgage applications emerged in the latest week.
    • Applications for loans to purchase posted a small increase, while applications for loan refinancing posted a small decline in the latest week.
    • Interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate loans eased 8bps to 6.68%.
    • Average loan size edged up.
  • Chaotic trends Producer price trends for the European Monetary Union in February show great deal of weakness. The headline measure in February for total PPI prices (excluding construction) fell 0.5% after rising 0.5% in January. The three-month annualized change was -1.3%, over six months it was -0.7%, and year-over-year it was -3.1%. The trend is not particularly conclusive although the table also produces the trend for the HICP-core on the same timeline where there is acceleration in train. Despite this report and any trends, it may show that the risk to inflation in the PPI is now through elevated Brent crude prices, which we see in the chart has been historically well correlated with changes in the PPI.

    The past may not be prologue The chart offers some insight into this matter as we see that recently the spike in Brent crude is substantial—and the chart doesn't even take us up-to-date to what we're dealing with in the markets today! We can see that in 2021 when all prices went up sharply, that preceded a spike in the PPI as well. However, in 2017 when there was a short-lived spike, there wasn't much impact on producer prices at all. Then, later in 2018, when prices spiked not quite so high or suddenly, but had a bit more sustained growth, there also was a very small knock-on impact on producer prices. One of the key features for whether the Brent rise gets into producer prices or not is how long-lived the spike remains in force and how people perceive it. In this case, there's closing of the Strait of Hormuz and a war in place; there's a good chance that investors are going to treat this as a real event and one with potential longevity. That means that this spike will elevate producer prices.

    Overall PPI is tempered but, by country...not so much However, the table is based on data through February, and so oil spiking prices really haven't entered the picture as far as the table is concerned. On that basis, we're seeing a lot of price declines: an annualized three-month decline of 7.9% in Spain, 7.3% in Portugal, 3.6% in Germany, and so on. These figures clearly do not reflect what will be the lasting effect on oil prices as we get deeper into 2026. Even despite this weakness in headline inflation across countries in the monetary union, and in Europe generally, inflation is tempered year-over-year where it only rises compared to a year earlier for 7.7% of the reporters, but then over six months inflation accelerates for all of the reporters compared to its 12-month pace, and then, over three months it accelerates for about 70% of the reporters compared to the six-month pace.

    PPI headline vs. core... where available There are two observations at the bottom of the table for the PPI excluding energy—for France and Germany. In both cases, the difference between the excluding energy price and the headline price is remarkable. For Germany, the ex-energy price is rising and clearly accelerating; in contrast, the headline trends show prices declining or a tendency toward deceleration. For France, the ex-energy prices are rising and sustaining larger increases over six months and three months than over 12 months. However, for France, in the table, the total PPI headline inflation rate declines on all horizons although the pace of decline is undergoing erosion. Once we set aside the weighting scheme for the monetary union, the PPI is looking instead at the average result of the countries in the table (an average that includes some non-monetary union members) where the inflation rate is clearly headed higher, not lower.

    • Headline orders -1.4% (+7.3% y/y) in Feb., fourth m/m decline in five mths.
    • Nondefense aircraft & parts -28.6% m/m following January’s -1.7%.
    • Transportation orders -5.4%, down for the fourth time in five mths.; orders ex transportation +0.8%, 10th straight m/m rise.
    • Core capital goods shipments +0.9%, fifth m/m gain in six mths.
    • Durable goods shipments +1.3%; unfilled orders +0.1%; inventories +0.1%.