Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Andrew Cates

Andy Cates joined Haver Analytics as a Senior Economist in 2020. Andy has more than 25 years of experience forecasting the global economic outlook and in assessing the implications for policy settings and financial markets. He has held various senior positions in London in a number of Investment Banks including as Head of Developed Markets Economics at Nomura and as Chief Eurozone Economist at RBS. These followed a spell of 21 years as Senior International Economist at UBS, 5 of which were spent in Singapore. Prior to his time in financial services Andy was a UK economist at HM Treasury in London holding positions in the domestic forecasting and macroeconomic modelling units.   He has a BA in Economics from the University of York and an MSc in Economics and Econometrics from the University of Southampton.

Publications by Andrew Cates

  • For much of the past decade, the working assumption was that interest rates, having collapsed after the financial crisis, would eventually fall back once the latest disturbance had passed. Events are now overturning that assumption—and not only in the United States. Both consensus forecasters and the Federal Reserve's model for estimating the equilibrium rate across advanced economies point to the same conclusion: the real rate of interest—the price of capital after inflation is stripped out—has risen and is likely to remain higher. The question is no longer whether this shift has occurred, but why so much of the financial system is still configured for a world we have left behind.

    The evidence is clearest in the United States. The driver is the demand for capital: an investment cycle in artificial intelligence, defence and the reshoring of supply chains is competing for scarce savings, capacity and labour, and that raises the return the economy has to offer to fund it. It now shows up in the forecasts. Over the past six months the Blue Chip consensus for the US policy rate one year ahead has risen by about 44 basis points, while the consensus for inflation over the same horizon has barely changed; only around ten of those basis points reflect higher expected inflation. The remaining 34 are a higher expected real rate. Forecasters are not marking up the price outlook so much as the return on capital the economy can sustain.

  • The Federal Reserve left its policy rate unchanged at the conclusion of last night’s meeting, a decision that had been widely expected — the futures market went in pricing only around a one-in-three chance of a hike — but one that split the committee unusually sharply, with three of its members dissenting in favour of an increase to counter inflation that has now run above target for more than five years (chart 1). Yet whatever the near-term path of official rates, the real cost of capital has already moved decisively. The real ten-year yield has climbed to around its highest in two decades, and it has done so in step with a run of firmer-than-expected economic data (chart 2). Behind that resilience lies an investment cycle that is quietly gathering pace. The July flash surveys show the upturn led, unusually, by manufacturing rather than services (chart 3), and the hard data are beginning to agree, with manufacturing orders across many major economies turning firmly higher (chart 4). Equity markets, for their part, have taken elevated real rates in their stride, the bond–equity relationships that fractured in 2022 having since been restored (chart 5) — the signature of a market that believes it has entered a higher-return, investment-led regime. The optimism is not unqualified. A fresh round of US tariffs and a sharp sell-off in chip stocks, led by South Korea, are reminders that the payoff from all this spending is far from assured. And the boom is colliding with a physical constraint: since the breakdown of the US–Iran understanding, Baltic tanker and gas freight rates have surged even as dry-bulk rates have stayed calm (chart 6), a pointed warning about the security of the world’s energy arteries.

  • The world is investing on an extraordinary scale. The question is whether that investment expands productive capacity or merely offsets a more constrained world.

    The global economy is entering its strongest investment cycle for a generation. Artificial intelligence, the energy transition, geopolitical fragmentation and higher defence spending are all driving capital expenditure. Unlike previous cycles, however, these forces increasingly compete for the same scarce inputs: energy, grids, critical minerals, water and skilled labour.

  • Global financial markets have retained a notably composed tone this week, even as the geopolitical backdrop turned more unsettled once again. News of renewed skirmishes between the United States and Iran reintroduced a risk premium that investors had only lately begun to set aside, yet equities held firm and volatility stayed low. Last week's US inflation and Chinese GDP releases did little to disturb that calm, though the Chinese figures laid bare how soft domestic demand there has become. That composure is an enduring - and notable - feature. Measures of policy uncertainty remain elevated by historical standards, yet market volatility has sunk to the low end of its range — a divergence that says a good deal about the prevailing mood (chart 1). A new risk-appetite gauge from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, now carried on the Haver platform, points the same way, with investors still firmly disposed to take on risk (chart 2). Beneath the surface, though, evidence of supply-side stress is mounting, with freight rates and suppliers' delivery times pointing to renewed strain (chart 3) — a theme of this week's podcast with the Baltic Exchange. Nor is the pressure confined to manufacturing: firmer grain prices raise the question of whether a developing super El Niño is at work (chart 4). On the demand side, Haver's calculation of China's credit impulse helps to account for the softness in last week's growth figures (chart 5). And beyond the cycle lies the structural, as Britain welcomes a new prime minister in Andy Burnham to a persistent growth problem in which the cost of energy looms large (chart 6).

  • Global markets head into this week’s closing stages digesting a mixed set of signals. Last week's US non-farm payrolls report undershot expectations, adding to questions about the durability of the US labour market even as broader activity data have continued to hold up well. Compounding that picture, news broke today of renewed instability in the Middle East, reintroducing a geopolitical risk premium into markets just as investors had begun to look past it. Global equity markets have nonetheless remained resilient, continuing to track the broadly encouraging tone of incoming activity data (chart 1). That resilience was reinforced by a solid set of global PMIs across most major economies over the past few days (chart 2). Haver's surprise indices tell a similar story of positive growth momentum in the US, but with an important caveat: incoming inflation data have also been surprising to the upside, driven largely by higher oil prices (chart 3). These inflation risks could persist moreover, as global supply chain pressures have picked up in recent months and today's flare-up in the Middle East threatens to add further strain (chart 4). The world economy remains vulnerable to other supply-side shocks too, such as the extreme heat gripping much of Europe this week (chart 5). Still, on the other side of the ledger the enormous scale of investment now flowing into artificial intelligence could be a genuine source of supply-side potential (chart 6).

  • Global financial markets have had a more settled feel this week, reflecting the continued unwinding of the geopolitical risk premium that had built up during the worst of the US-Iran conflict. Oil prices have fallen further, equity markets have been broadly supported, and incoming inflation data — notably the euro area’s June flash CPI estimate — have come in below expectations. The US holiday-shortened week ahead, with Independence Day on Friday, is likely to keep volumes thin and activity subdued. The bigger picture, however, remains one of tension between a more benign near-term inflation trajectory and central banks that may not yet be ready to stand down. In the charts below we look first at what the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) survey reveals about the expected change in and timing of policy rates across the major economies (charts 1 and 2), then at the divergence between headline and core inflation across the advanced economies (chart 3), and at what euro area consumers are more specifically expecting about inflation in the period ahead (chart 4). We turn next to Japan and the yen’s slide this week to 40-year lows (chart 5), and finally to the BCFF survey’s special questions on artificial intelligence and asset valuations (chart 6).

  • The mood in global financial markets this week is more settled, though “settled” should not be confused with resolved. The US-Iran memorandum of understanding, signed last week, has continued to do its work: oil prices have fallen further, Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic has picked up measurably, and the risk premium that had been embedded in energy markets since the conflict escalated in March is now visibly unwinding. That is a material development for the inflation outlook, and central bankers will be watching carefully. Yet the picture is not without its complications. Technology stocks — the most conspicuous beneficiary of the prevailing low-rate, high-growth narrative — have been subject to renewed jitters this week, as investors grow more attentive to stretched valuations and the implications of a Federal Reserve that, under new chair Kevin Warsh, is no longer signalling the easing cycle previously priced into markets. Against this backdrop, this week’s charts draw on the latest data to assess where the global economic cycle stands. Equity momentum outside the United States has tracked closely with global growth and inflation surprises, a correlation that tells us something important about how activity is being perceived (chart 1). Meanwhile, the breakdown of the previously tight relationship between oil prices and US two-year yields is arguably one of the more telling market signals of recent weeks (chart 2). June’s flash PMI surveys point to easing supply chain stress and softer output price inflation in manufacturing — a finding that chimes naturally with lower crude prices and the resumption of Hormuz flows (chart 3). The Strait of Hormuz itself deserves a closer look: traffic data and the mechanics of the oil price pullback are telling a coherent story that supports the PMI picture (chart 4). South Korea’s trade data, including semiconductors, offer a slightly softer read on global demand momentum at the margin (chart 5). And looming on the horizon, one new risk is drawing the attention of meteorological authorities: a Super El Niño event whose probability has been rising, with potentially significant implications for food commodity prices and Asian agriculture (chart 6).

  • The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran earlier this week has offered financial markets their most significant moment of geopolitical relief since the Middle East conflict escalated in early March. Oil prices fell sharply on the news, short-dated bond yields moved lower across several major economies, and risk assets recovered ground. But relief, as investors have learnt repeatedly over the past three months, is arguably not the same as resolution. The MoU sets a framework for negotiations rather than a final settlement, and the history of US-Iran diplomacy is not one that encourages complacency. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve — concluding its June meeting yesterday under new chair Kevin Warsh — held rates steady but delivered a distinctly hawkish dot plot that shifted the median year-end projection from a cut to a hike, a reminder that the easing cycle the market had been pricing is no longer the base case. Against this backdrop, this week's charts take stock of where the global economy presently stands — and what the underlying data, beneath the geopolitical noise, are telling us. The picture that emerges is one of divergence. The United States continues to outperform consensus growth expectations while Europe and China disappoint (chart 1). UK short-dated yields have tracked oil prices with unusual consistency this year, and today's softer-than-expected CPI print for May — arriving just as the MoU has knocked crude lower — potentially changes the policy calculus for the Bank of England (chart 2). Global semiconductor sales, meanwhile, are storming ahead regardless of the geopolitical noise, powered by AI infrastructure spending that shows no sign of fatigue (chart 3). A cross-section of commodity prices tells two stories simultaneously: the geopolitical risk premium is draining out of oil, but the metals and materials the AI economy actually needs — copper, uranium, critical minerals — are holding firm (chart 4). Meanwhile a cross-country scatter of electricity generation and GDP growth over the past five years raises a question that deserves more attention than it typically gets: is energy availability a constraint on growth, or merely a consequence of it? The evidence, we would argue, points firmly in one direction (chart 5). And finally, for all the comparisons being drawn between the current investment boom and the late 1990s, the financial balance of the US corporate sector tells a rather different story — one that matters for how any correction might unfold (chart 6).

  • The comparisons are hard to avoid. Soaring valuations, massive capital expenditure on data centres and AI infrastructure, and near-universal conviction that a transformative technology is about to reshape the economy. To many observers, today looks uncomfortably like the late 1990s.

    The parallel is understandable. It is also, on the most important dimension, wrong — and Haver data help explain why.

    The critical variable: who holds the debt

    Investment booms become dangerous when they are financed by leverage. The late 1990s are a textbook case. As internet enthusiasm intensified, US corporations borrowed heavily to fund infrastructure buildout. By 2000, the non-financial corporate sector was running a financial deficit approaching 4% of GDP — spending substantially more than it earned. When expectations proved too optimistic, investment collapsed, and corporate deleveraging deepened the downturn.

  • Global financial markets have been unsettled in recent days. Last week’s stronger-than-expected US employment report wrong-footed investors positioned for a more accommodative Federal Reserve, triggering a sharp reassessment of rate expectations and a notable sell-off in technology stocks — a sector that had been among the primary beneficiaries of the prevailing low-rate narrative. Persistent instability in the Middle East, in the meantime, has continued to keep energy markets on edge, with Brent crude remaining elevated and supply disruption risks showing little sign of abating. Against this backdrop, this week's charts draw on the latest Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey to assess where the global growth and inflation outlook now stands. The headline finding is sobering: GDP growth forecasts have been revised lower across most major economies over the past three months, with the energy shock doing real damage to the outlook in Europe— even as Taiwan's AI-driven semiconductor boom delivers the largest upward forecast revision of any economy in the survey (charts 1 and 2). Inflation expectations tell an equally uncomfortable story, with consensus forecasts for CPI in 2027 now sitting above most central banks' 2% target — a sign that the current shock may be leaving a more persistent scar than policymakers would like. Beneath the headline noise, however, recent US unit labour cost data offer a modestly reassuring signal (chart 3), even as renewed supply chain stress threatens the PPI pipeline (chart 4). We also revisit a structural energy argument made in previous editions of our Charts of the Week document (chart 5), before closing with China's trade data, where a normalisation in export flows to the United States has been quetly unfolding (chart 6).

  • The global macro backdrop continues to evolve in ways that would have surprised many investors at the start of the year. Expectations of widespread monetary easing have steadily receded as inflation has proven more persistent and economic activity more resilient than anticipated. The latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts point to a growing bias towards policy tightening rather than loosening in several major economies (chart 1), while rising US job opening rates suggest labour demand remains firmer than expected (chart 2). At the same time, ongoing instability in the Middle East continues to generate supply-side inflation risks and lengthier delivery times (chart 3). There are, however, also reasons for optimism. Manufacturing activity appears to be finding some support from a reduction in effective tariff rates facing many major US trading partners (chart 4). More importantly, the AI investment boom continues to gather momentum. South Korea's semiconductor exports surged by an extraordinary 169% year-on-year in May, highlighting the strength of global demand for AI-related hardware (chart 5). Unsurprisingly, investors continue to direct capital towards those markets most exposed to these trends, with Taiwan and South Korea attracting substantial equity inflows (chart 6). The bottom line is that inflation concerns and higher-for-longer interest rates remain important risks, but they are increasingly being offset, for now, by a combination of improving economic conditions and one of the strongest technology-driven investment cycles in modern history.

  • The global macro backdrop remains dominated by instability in the Middle East and the lingering inflation concerns associated with elevated energy prices. Yet recent days have at least offered some tentative relief. Oil prices have softened amid heightened hopes that negotiations between the US and Iran could eventually ease tensions and help stabilise energy markets, even if the broader geopolitical situation remains fragile and key shipping routes continue to face disruption. Against this backdrop, the latest survey data continue to highlight an uneven global economy, with Europe looking particularly vulnerable given its greater sensitivity to higher energy costs and its weaker links to the global AI investment boom (chart 1). At the same time, rising gasoline prices continue to weigh heavily on US household confidence (the Michigan measure), raising concerns about the resilience of consumer demand (chart 2). An important question confronting markets in the meantime is whether inflation fears are now becoming overstated. Unlike during the post-pandemic inflation shock, central bank balance sheets are now shrinking rather than expanding aggressively, while money supply growth remains relatively weak across many major economies (charts 3 and 4). Meanwhile, the extraordinary boom in AI-related infrastructure spending — spanning data centres, utilities, water systems and semiconductors — continues to provide a major offset to broader macroeconomic weakness and remains a key pillar supporting global equity markets despite elevated geopolitical and inflation concerns (charts 5 and 6).