Haver’s data services are provided through the DLX platform; delivering tools for data management, visualization, modeling and publishing. DLX is designed to increase productivity and integrates with Excel, PowerPoint, and major statistical software packages; MatLab, R, Python, SAS, E-views and Stata. DLX component application DLXVG3 offers precision graphics, publishing, analytic tools, and easy navigation for all Haver databases.

icon-chart.png

Chart and compare multiple data series with accompanying data table of values

Advanced functions (growth rates, moving averages, aggregation, seasonal adjustment)

Analytical tools (cycle charts, scatterplots, trend lines, and recession shading)

Complete graph customization (axis scaling, sizing, formatting, styles)

Excel and PowerPoint direct export and complete integration (dynamic spreadsheets and presentations update on a click)

DLXVG3

icon-db.png

DLX Add-ins for all versions of Excel provide instant data updates of entire workbooks

Use DLXVG3 to locate data series codes from within any file, easily creating new spreadsheets for analysis

Edit date ranges, archive data, apply functions

Excel Spreadsheet Add-ins

icon-time.png

Haver offers timely, accurate, and professionally supported data via an update service, meeting the strictest demands of the institutional research community

AutoUpdate provides fast and reliable data updates within seconds of source releases

Timer service runs continuously on an hourly basis when DLX is running

Manual updates offer clients the independence to update data retrievals on any desired schedule

All database updates retrieve only the data series that have changed and send only the data points that have been updated; including revisions

Timely Updates

DLX software tools to convert data into many different formats needed for diverse analytical frameworks

Haver supports a DLX API permitting clients to leverage and build processes with DLX data

Database Compatibility

products-dlx.svg

Data Link Express

Platform Independent site delivering DLX Databases across any workstation or device.

products-haverview.svg

HaverView

[Matlab](http://matlab.com) by The MathWorks lets you access, visualize, and analyze historic time-series data to identify patterns or uncover complex relationships. From within a single environment you can:

- Access data from multiple sources including files, spreadsheets, databases, data providers, and the Web
- Store data in financial time-series objects to simplify data management, data transformation, missing-data handling, and date-math calculations
- Perform technical analysis with moving averages, oscillators, stochastics, and indices
- Create custom analysis routines and visualizations or animations to capture, present, and share your analysis processes and discoveries
- Customize your analysis environment with advanced functionality from signal processing, statistics, or econometrics

products-matlab.svg

MATLAB

[Stata Data Analysis and Statistical Software](https://www.stata.com) by StataCorp LP is an integrated statistical package designed for researchers of all disciplines. It provides the ability to do data analysis, data management and graphics and has features such as multiple imputation, factor variables, GMM, competing-risks regression, state-space modeling, predictive margins, and more.

products-stata.svg

Stata

[SAS](https://www.sas.com) provides an integrated environment for predictive and descriptive modeling, data mining, text analytics, forecasting, optimization, simulation, experimental design and more. From predictive analytics to model deployment and process optimization, SAS provides a range of techniques and processes for the collection, classification, analysis and interpretation of data to reveal patterns, anomalies, key variables and relationships, leading ultimately to new insights and better answers faster.

[SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) is a seamless interface between Haver and SAS data processing that enables SAS users to read economic and financial time series data that reside in a Haver Analytics DLX (Data Link Express) database. [SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) requires both SAS/ETS and Base SAS Software.

products-sas.svg

[RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) Econometric Software](https://estima.com) by Estima is a leading econometrics and time-series analysis software package. It provides ability to do linear and non-linear least squares, forecasting, SUR and ARIMA models and in addition, supports advanced techniques such as GMM, ARCH and GARCH models, state space models, and more.

products-rats.svg

RATS

Session 1: Bootcamp Part 1

Visualization with GGPlot2 and data analysis

Session 2: Bootcamp Part 2

Session 3: Univariate Models Part 1

Session 4: Univariate Models Part 2

Session 5: Vector Autoregressions

Session 6: Cointegration and error-correction models

A popular open source option for statistical computing and graphics that is available on many UNIX platforms, Windows and MacOS

Estimating, evaluating, and forecasting ARIMA models

Understanding the concept of non-stationarity and testing for unit roots

Estimating autoregressions, granger causality tests, and impulse response functions

Understanding the concept of cointegration and testing using the Enger-Granger test

Estimating and forecasting with vector error correction models

products-r.svg

Teaches econometrics and forecasting at the University of Colorado Denver. He has over 15 years of econometric experience in both the private and public sector.

Daniel L. Jerrett, Ph.D.

Abdel M. Zellou, Ph.D.

Bootcamp and Econometric Tools 1 & 2

Econometrics Training: Applied Time Series in R

Session 5: Multivariate Models Part 1

Session 6: Multivariate Models Part 2

Haver partners with SmartMacro Labs to offer a two week immersive online course introducing participants to the power of the Python programming language. This applied hands-on training develops statistical economics skills with a concentration on economics and finance.

Gain proficiency in building modern time-series models in Python through real-world applications. Designed for professionals in both the public and private sector, the course does not require prior experience, assuming only that participants have a basic understanding of regression and statistical concepts.

Proficiency working in Jupyter notebooks and the Python environment

products-python.svg

Remote Training: Applied Time Series in Python

Decades high real price of copper posing physical challenge to investment boom

Robert Brusca

260805E.jpg

The total or composite PMIs in July released by S&P showed mixed performance although the average and median readings for the 25 reporters improved slightly month-to-month. The average reading rose to 52 in July from 51.3 in June, and the median reading rose to 52.2 from 50.8.

**Contraction is mostly avoided, but not rare**
In July, seven of the reporters showed total PMI gauges below 50, indicating that those economies are contracting. The seven economies with that characteristic are France, Russia, Brazil, Zambia, Ghana, Egypt, and Qatar. For the most part, these are smaller economies. France, of course, is a large European economy; Russia is engaged in its ongoing war with Ukraine, which is taking a toll on its economy; and Brazil is one of the large BRIC economies.

**The contracting count worsened, then stopped**
In June, nine countries had PMIs below 50, the same as in May. Over broader periods, such as three months, 10 countries show PMI values averaging below 50. That compares to seven over six months and six over 12 months. The slippage has actually progressed from 12 months to six months to three months, then improved on monthly data.

**Contraction seems more structural than cyclical**
The shaded parts of the table correspond to PMI values below 50. We see that there's a long string of those readings in France, Russia, Egypt, and Qatar. For those countries, the one-month appearance of a below-50 reading in July was not episodic; it was structural. Germany has had two months in a row and a three-month average below 50; however, Germany turned stronger in July. The European Monetary Union as a whole had two months below 50 as well as very weak three-month and six-month averages, but it also turned higher in July. Zambia has a recent string of ongoing weakness; Ghana has a nearly unbroken streak of values below 50 as well. Brazil’s signal is like a flashing light.

**There is good news**
However, the good news is that only eight of the reporting areas actually got weaker month-to-month in July, compared to nine in June and 11 in May. Over three months, we see 13 areas reporting PMIs that have weakened month-to-month. That compares to 21 that weakened over six months. On year-over-year comparisons, only 11 are weaker period-to-period. The weakening trend is much reduced in the recent monthly data.

**Lingering weakness**
PMIs chronicle a great deal of lingering weakness, although for the most part conditions aren't worsening month-to-month over the past two months. However, there are a number of areas where activity, as designated by the PMI values, is declining. The sequential readings confirm that the growing weakness is a real factor and has only reversed in the last two months, if that result can be durable. How much of this weakness and subsequent rebound is linked to the war in Ukraine and the new deterioration and stalemate in the Middle East; those up-and-down dynamics are going to be hard to puzzle out.

**Activity and performance assessments**
The queue percentile standings show that 12 of the 25 reporting entities have standings below their medians on data back to January 2021. That means nearly half are weaker in July than they have been on readings back to January 2021. On that timeline, conditions have not been strong, with an average diffusion (PMI) reading across the board of 52.3 and a median of 51.4. It has been a low-growth period in general.

**The rich get richer? Even if only slowly...**
The large, developed economies, for the most part, have PMI rankings and queue standings above their 50th percentiles. The exception is the United Kingdom, with a 47.8 percentile standing. The exceptions also include the BRIC countries: Russia having a 26.9 percentile standing, India with an exceptionally low 9.0 percentile standing, Brazil with an 11.9 percentile standing, and China with a 22.4 percentile standing.

260805.jpg

**The future remains chaotic**
There's been some flirtation with better numbers and some improved data, especially in manufacturing. The global economy, battling through its recovery from COVID, dealt with an inflation problem that developed. While avoiding a significant recession (just suffering an induced short one), it is still dealing with special factors that have emerged since COVID ended, including U.S. tariffs, war in Ukraine, war in Iran, and the knock-on effects on oil and commodities markets.

Total PMIs Show Confused Trends

Jonathan Basile

260804X2.jpg

260804Y2.jpg

The June Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) portrayed less optimism for the U.S. labor demand picture as the second quarter came to an end. After running up to a two-year high in April, total nonfarm job openings fell 178,000 in June after May’s 48,000 decline. This left the current level of 7.359 million up a modest 2.2% compared to a year ago. Looking farther back, job openings loosely traveled in the 7.0-7.5 million range since June 2024. The latest showing reinforced the sideways track for labor demand.

Total nonfarm hires had the same feel to them. Back-to-back moderate gains in May (37,000) and June (96,000) saw hires come in at a 5.348 million rate at second quarter’s end. Hires stood just 0.4% above the June 2025 figure. Relative stability in hires goes as far back as late-2023. The current figure fits within the 5.1-5.6 million range since that point.

Total nonfarm quits rose 79,000 to 3.232 million in June, up from a downwardly revised 3.153 million in May. The current job openings level is nearly in line with readings from six months ago (December’s 3.225 million) and twelve months ago (June 2025’s 3.254 million). The year-over-year (YoY) rate of -0.7% was still in the red, though.

To be sure, since September 2022, quits have posted 43 YoY declines over a 46-month span. The compression streak continues to stand figuratively above (but literally below) the other two longest since the December 2000 inception of the series: 26 of 27 months from December 2001 to February 2004 and 33 straight from June 2007 to February 2010. Quits’ persistent compression translates to persistent wage disinflation impulses from this cyclical money grab dynamic.

Nonfarm layoffs were little changed in June, rising a mere 5,000 following May’s 94,000 advance. This left the YoY comparison at -4.2% in June. For perspective, the current 1.766 million level of layoffs nearly bisected the 1.6-1.9 million range that has been in place since July 2024. Since bottoming in 2022, nonfarm layoffs have moved in a similar manner to the higher frequency series, weekly continuing claims. JOLTS layoffs lag continuing claims, but the sideways movement at least through June is not suggestive of a notable improvement in the news from pink slips anytime soon.

260804Z2.jpg

The nonfarm hires-separations spread acts as a channel check for the monthly change in nonfarm payroll employment (NFP). The JOLTS report implies that NFP revisions for May and June could disappoint significantly to the downside. The hires-separations spread in May and June was -8,000 and -3,000, respectively. This compares with respective monthly NFP gains of 129,000 and 57,000.

Were this risk realized, it would be the first back-to-back net NFP downward revisions since November and December 2025. This would change the tone of recent revisions back to pessimism from optimism as three of the four months from January to April saw net upward adjustments. In every month of 2025, NFP monthly changes were revised down from the first print to the third print. This would makes the January to April 2026 stretch look more like an aberration than a trend.

The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database.

- Sideways tracks reinforced for job openings and hires.
- Quits continue to signal wage disinflation.
- Hires-Separations point to May and June downward nonfarm payroll revisions.

U.S. JOLTS: Labor Demand Takes a Breather in June

Winnie Tapasanun

260804F55.jpg

260804G55.jpg

Total factory orders unexpectedly fell 0.3% m/m in June following a 1.1% decline in May and a 5.3% advance in April, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected a 0.4% m/m June increase. The year-on-year growth rate accelerated to 7.4% in June from 2.5% in May (+5.6% in June 2025), while remaining far below the April 2021 peak of 39.6%. Factory orders excluding defense fell 0.4% (+6.5% y/y) following a 1.1% May decline and four successive m/m gains. Factory orders excluding the transportation sector slid 0.4% (+8.8% y/y), the first m/m slide in eight months, after a 2.0% May increase.

Notably, orders for mining, oil field & gas field machinery plunged 27.2% (+27.1% y/y) in June, the first m/m fall in three months and the deepest since April 2016, reversing an 11.0% gain in May. Orders for defense aircraft & parts dropped 7.2% (+46.9% y/y) in June after increasing 8.9% in May and 2.4% in April, and orders for ships & boats fell 3.9% after rising 3.5% and 5.0% in the prior two months, while orders for nondefense aircraft & parts rose 3.7% following a 51.1% May plunge and a 167.4% April surge.

Durable goods orders rose 0.5% (7.6% y/y) in June after a 4.0% drop in May (revised up slightly from +0.3% m/m in the advance report on July 27), marking the third m/m gain in four months. The June m/m rise was led by a 3.2% advance (16.8% y/y) in computers & electronic products, followed by increases of 1.6% (7.6% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components, 1.3% (17.8% y/y) in primary metals, and 0.3% (14.8% y/y) in machinery. In contrast, durable goods orders for fabricated metal products (-0.6%; +10.7% y/y), furniture & related products (-0.4%; +1.1% y/y), and transportation equipment (-0.1%; +1.2% y/y) declined m/m in June.

Nondurable goods orders, which equal nondurable goods shipments, fell 1.2% (+7.1% y/y) in June, the first m/m fall since November, after a 2.2% increase in May. The June m/m decline was led by a 6.3% drop (+21.8% y/y) in petroleum & coal products, followed by decreases of 1.6% (+0.7% y/y) in textile products, 0.8% (+8.8% y/y) in apparel, 0.4% (-3.3% y/y) in textile mills, and 0.1% (-2.9% y/y) in printing. To the upside, the following nondurable goods shipments rose m/m in June: leather & allied products (+4.9%; -2.7% y/y), plastics & rubber products (+0.7%; +3.6% y/y), food products (+0.4%; +1.4% y/y), paper products (+0.3%; +2.4% y/y), beverage & tobacco products (+0.1%; +2.0% y/y), and chemical products (+0.1%; +8.3% y/y).

Total shipments fell 0.2% (+8.2% y/y) in June, the first m/m decline since November, after increases of 1.6% in May and 1.3% in April. Excluding transportation, shipments fell 0.3% (+7.6% y/y), the first m/m fall since October, following a 1.6% May gain. Shipments of durable goods industries rose 0.8% (9.1% y/y), the seventh straight m/m increase, after a 1.1% May rise. This reflected m/m gains in almost all durable goods shipments categories, led by a 2.5% advance (9.6% y/y) in computers & electronic products, alongside rises of 1.8% (10.0% y/y) in machinery, 1.0% (7.2% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components, 1.0% (6.5% y/y) in miscellaneous durable goods, 0.8% (15.5% y/y) in primary metals, 0.6% (7.8% y/y) in fabricated metal products, 0.4% (10.8% y/y) in transportation equipment, and 0.4% (2.2% y/y) in wood products. In contrast, durable goods shipments for furniture & related products (-0.5%; +1.0% y/y) and nonmetallic mineral products (-0.5%; +2.7% y/y) fell m/m in June.

Unfilled orders rose 0.6% (8.3% y/y) in June, the 11th consecutive m/m rise, following a 0.7% increase in May. Excluding transportation, unfilled orders climbed 0.9% (5.4% y/y), also up for the 11th straight month, after a 1.1% May rise. Backlogs of durable goods grew 0.6% (8.3% y/y) in June, driven by gains of 1.6% (6.5% y/y) in primary metals, 1.1% (6.0% y/y) in machinery, and 1.0% (5.0% y/y) in computers & electronic products, partially offset by a 0.4% decline (-2.1% y/y) in furniture & related products.

Inventories edged up 0.1% (1.8% y/y) in June, the eighth successive m/m increase, after a 0.2% rise in May. Excluding transportation, inventories were virtually unchanged m/m (+1.9% y/y) following four consecutive m/m gains. Durable goods inventories rose 0.3% (2.2% y/y) in June, the ninth straight m/m rise, after a 0.1% uptick in May, while nondurable goods inventories fell 0.3% (+1.1% y/y), the first m/m decrease since January, following a 0.4% May increase.

The factory sector data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics Forecast Survey is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

260804FH5.jpg

260804I55.jpg

- Factory orders -0.3% (+7.4% y/y) in June, second straight m/m decrease; still 14.0% above the Jan. ’24 low.
- Durable goods orders +0.5%, third m/m gain in four mths.; nondurable goods orders -1.2% and shipments -0.2%, first m/m declines since Nov.
- Mining, oil field & gas field machinery -27.2%, steepest m/m drop since Apr. ’16.
- Transportation orders -0.1%, led by m/m falls of 7.2% in defense aircraft orders and 3.9% in ships & boats.
- Unfilled orders +0.6%, 11th straight m/m rise.
- Inventories +0.1%, eighth consecutive m/m increase.

U.S. Factory Orders Unexpectedly Decline in June

Michael J. Moran

260804A.jpg

260804B.jpg

The US trade balance improved slightly in June, as a drop in imports exceeded a dip in exports. The declines represented partial offsets to strong performances in the early months of the year. Exports posted average monthly gains of 3.6% (not annualized) in the first four months of 2026 before giving back a good portion of the gains in May and June (off 3.2% and 0.9%, respectively). Imports rose an average of 2.8% per month from February to May, with these gains sandwiched between drops of 2.0% in January and 1.8% in June.

The ups and downs in exports and imports have left a largely flat trend in the US trade balance, with the monthly deficit in line with the results seen before the tariff-induced noise in 2025. However, results this year have moved within a noticeably wider range, suggesting that the frequently changing tariff regime is generating noise in the monthly trade flows.

The breakdown of trade flows between goods and services reinforces the view that markets have not settled into an equilibrium in a world of higher US tariffs. Exports and imports of services (generally not subject to tariffs) have changed modestly and moved along generally smooth paths. Exports and imports of goods, in contrast, have shown sizeable monthly changes (charts below).

The effect of international trade on US GDP growth in the past year has resembled the flat trend in the trade deficit. Net exports have made no net contribution to GDP growth in the past four quarters, but the quarterly results have ranged from a contribution of 1.6 percentage points in 2025-Q3 to -1.0 percentage point in 2026-Q2 (and contributions of -0.2 percentage point in 2025-Q4 and -0.4 percentage point in 2026-Q1).

The international trade data can be found in Haver’s **USECON** database. Detailed figures on international trade are available in the **USINT** and **USTRADE** databases. The expectations figures are from the Action Economics Forecast Survey in **AS1REPNA**.

260804C.jpg

260804D.jpg

- Both exports and imports cool after strong performances in early 2026.
- The US trade balance is moving sideways within a wide range.

US International Trade in June: Searching for Normal

260804E.jpg

Swiss HICP inflation in July was zero month-to-month. In June, it was zero month-to-month. In May, it was 0.1% month-to-month. Year-over-year HICP inflation is 0.7%, compared to a year ago when it was 0.1% over 12 months.

The same metrics viewed through the domestic measure of Swiss inflation are even lower. In July, domestic prices rose 0.1%; in June, they fell by 0.1%; and in May, they were unchanged. The 12-month inflation rate for the Swiss CPI in July was 0.4%; a year ago the 12-month change was 0.2%. Pinch me! Am I dreaming?

And yes, Switzerland is on the same planet as the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom.

Swiss inflation going back to 2020 has a peak year-over-year rate in its core of 2% based on monthly data. The headline 12-month rate at its peak was 3.4%. Excluding administered prices, the peak inflation rate in Switzerland was 2.7%. One of the main things that Switzerland has going forward is that the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has incredible credibility. It waited as long as the Fed did to raise interest rates, but it raised rates quickly up to the level of the core inflation rate. Once inflation began to fall, the SNB continued to raise rates until it became clear that the policy rate had begun to hover above the inflation rate. At that point, the bank flattened out its rate profile, then turned into a rate-cutting mode.

Once again after the inflation rate had been arrested and fell below 1%, the SNB continued to cut rates until inflation was at zero and so were rates.

The U.S. has not had the same experience with inflation. U.S. inflation has lingered and the Federal Reserve has continued to hold its policy rate above the 12-month trailing inflation rate.

Swiss performance is unique, suggesting that monetary policy right now is not needed to control inflation, at least not in Switzerland. But this undoubtedly has a lot to do with expectations about the behavior of the SNB and the dynamics of the Swiss economy and capital markets.

Swiss inflation began to track the 1% mark in early 2024. The core rate fell into line at the same time, with very little lag. This also is very unlike the U.S. experience.

260804.jpg

The Federal Reserve likes to tout its credibility. However, it's hard to see a central bank crowing about its credibility when it's missing its inflation target for five years; it continues to miss its inflation target as it observes inflation is still stubborn and possibly accelerating, and yet doing nothing about it.

The Federal Reserve makes policy in a way that is deeply rooted in the concepts of modern neo-Keynesian theory, policies that have completely embraced to the point of smothering the concept that expectations matter. Treasury Secretary Bessent has authored an article in _The International Economy_ magazine entitled “The Fed’s ‘Gain of Function’ Monetary Policy” in which he is critical of this idea that by talking to markets the Fed can change expectations and control inflation. While this is a precept of modern monetary economics, it only works if the central bank is as good as its word and the Fed has been far from that. So, it's unclear how a central bank, with an inflation target that it is (or has been) ambivalent about hitting, carries the credibility to hit it in the future when it's only willing to put forth a de minimis effort.

Switzerland is an example of how well monetary policy can work and how well expectations can work when the central bank really has credibility. The Federal Reserve knows how important credibility is and so it tries to assert that it has it. However, credibility is not the kind of thing that you can assert. It's the kind of thing that a central bank has to earn. When Powell was Fed Chair, he tried to harken back to the days of Paul Volcker and say, “see what we can do.” However, it was clear to everyone that Powell was not Volcker, and he was unwilling to do any of the things that Volcker did.

As that played out, Powell eventually took this system of inflation targeting that Bernanke had put in place and turned it into a system of unemployment rate targeting and began a process of missing the inflation target for five years running. At some point, the Fed pays the price for that, and the price it pays is an erosion of its credibility. But that is something the Fed is never going to admit that it has lost. Switzerland is the perfect example of what it looks like when a central bank has that credibility. Monetary policy works much better and is almost effortless.

Switzerland

Swiss Inflation: Nonexistent; Switzerland: Existent!

260803A1.jpg

260803B1.jpg

The ISM U.S. manufacturing PMI rose to a higher-than-expected 55.6 in July following a 0.7-point decline to 53.3 in June, according to data from the Institute for Supply Management. The July reading, above the 50 expansion-contraction threshold, indicated the U.S. manufacturing sector expanded for the seventh consecutive month and at the fastest pace since May 2022. A reading of 53.8 for July had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. The latest manufacturing PMI, while above a contraction-level 48.4 in July 2025 and a low of 47.0 in October 2024, remained below a peak of 63.8 in March 2021.

The production index rebounded to 58.5 in July from 52.2 in June, indicating production expanded for the ninth straight month and at the strongest pace since November 2021. The index was above a low of 44.8 in April 2025 but below a peak of 66.5 in March 2021. In July, 25.1% (NSA) of respondents reported higher production while 10.4% reported lower production. The new orders index increased to 56.7 in July from 56.0 in June, signaling new orders grew for the seventh consecutive month following four successive months of contraction. The index remained well above a low of 41.8 in January 2023 but below a high of 67.0 in May 2021. In July, 25.6% (NSA) of respondents reported higher new orders while 14.2% reported declines. The inventories index slipped to 51.2 in July from 51.4 in June, marking the second month of expansion following 13 months of contraction. The index was slightly below a high of 52.7 in March 2025 but above a low of 43.8 in October 2024. Meanwhile, the supplier deliveries index rose to 58.9 in July from 57.4 in June, indicating slowing delivery performance for the eighth straight month after faster deliveries in November 2025. In July, 21.3% (NSA) of respondents reported slower delivery speeds while 3.5% reported faster speeds.

On the labor front, the employment index advanced to 52.8 in July from 49.7 in June, showing employment expanded for the first time since September 2023 and at the highest level since August 2022. The index was above a low of 44.1 in November 2025 but below a high of 56.5 in March 2022. In July, 16.3% (NSA) of respondents reported higher employment while 13.3% reported lower hiring.

On the pricing front, the prices paid index declined to a still-high 71.1 (NSA) in July following a 9.1-point drop to 73.0 in June, indicating raw materials prices rose for the 22nd consecutive month but at the slowest rising pace since February. The index remained well above a low of 39.4 in December 2022 but below a high of 87.1 in March 2022 and a peak of 92.1 in June 2021. In July, 50.2% (NSA) of respondents reported higher prices while 8.1% reported price declines.

In other ISM series not included in the composite index, the new export orders index rebounded to 53.0 in July from 48.5 in June, indicating new export orders grew for the second time in three months and at the highest level since March 2022. The index was up from a low of 40.1 in May 2025 but down from a peak of 57.1 in February 2022. The imports index climbed to 55.7 in July from 52.9 in June, suggesting imports expanded for the sixth successive month and at the strongest rate since June 2021. The index was above a low of 39.9 in May 2025 but below a peak of 61.0 in June 2021. The order backlog index increased to 55.0 (NSA) in July from 50.5 in June, showing backlog levels grew for the seventh straight month and at the fastest pace since February. The index was below a high of 56.6 in February and a peak of 70.6 in May 2021 but well above a low of 37.5 in May 2023.

The ISM figures are based on responses from over 400 purchasing and supply executives from 18 industries, which are weighted according to each industry’s contribution to GDP. These data are diffusion indexes where a reading above 50 indicates expansion; below 50 indicates contraction. The ISM Manufacturing PMI is a composite index based on the diffusion indexes of five of the indexes (seasonally adjusted) with equal weights: New Orders, Production, Employment, Supplier Deliveries, and Inventories. The figures from the Institute for Supply Management can be found in Haver’s **USECON** database; further detail is found in the **SURVEYS** database. The expectations number is available in Haver’s **AS1REPNA** database.

260803C1.jpg

260803D1.jpg

- ISM Mfg. PMI up to 55.6 in July; seventh straight month above 50.
- Production (58.5) reaches highest level since Nov. ’21 and expands for the ninth consecutive mth.; new orders (56.7) for the seventh successive mth.
- Employment (52.8) above 50 for the first time since Sept. ’23; at highest level since Aug. ’22.
- Prices Index (71.1) at a five-month low, still indicating prices rising for the 22nd straight mth.
- Exports (53.0) highest since Mar. ’22; imports (55.7) highest since June ’21.

U.S. ISM Manufacturing PMI at Highest Level Since May ’22; New Orders, Production, and Employment Growing

260803E.jpg

The S&P manufacturing PMIs for July show a group of 17 countries plus an aggregate for the European Monetary Union. Across these 18 observations, there is broad, but uneven, improvement on a month-to-month basis.

The median reading for July increases slightly to 51.9, a gain of 0.5 diffusion points on a month-to-month basis.

44.4% of reporters are improving on a month-to-month basis. Measured over three months compared to six months, 33.3% are improving; over six months compared to 12 months, 66.7% are improving; and over 12 months compared to 12 months ago, 83.3% are improving. Despite the monthly statistics showing a mixed performance and evidence of some soft spots, the general trend for manufacturing is to show that improvement is in place.

The percentile standing for the July diffusion indexes on data back to 2021 shows an average standing of the 69th percentile across the 19 reporters. That means since 2021 the observations have generally been stronger than this only about 30% of the time, marking this as an ongoing improving situation for manufacturing.

The reporting countries with percentile standings below their medians (below a 50% standing on a queue basis) are China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey.

The strongest countries on a queue percentile standing basis are Japan with a 91.0 percentile standing and Mexico with an 88.1 percentile standing. In addition, South Korea has an 85.1 percentile standing and Malaysia has an 83.6 percentile standing.

At the bottom of the table, we have groupings of countries by various areas or characteristics. The developed group—which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Monetary Union, Canada, and Japan—has an average queue standing in its 72.5 percentile. The BRIC countries have a standing in their 21.6 percentile and the average for Asia is in its 64.7 percentile. While the BRIC countries are lagging, generally speaking they had been performing better during the past; as of July, China has a diffusion reading for its manufacturing sector at 49.2, Brazil at 47.5, Russia at 50.7, and India at 53.5. The BRICs generate a low percentile standing, but their July diffusion readings are more centrist than the rankings might seem to imply.

This report shows manufacturing engaged in some amount of recovery. However, there's still a lot of unevenness in the global economy, still a lot of work left to do, and still a lot of geopolitical risks in play.

260803.jpg

S&P Global Manufacturing PMIs Are Mixed But Improved

Tian Yong Woon

In this week's Letter, we dive into the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecast (BCFF) survey results in light of key developments around Asia and the broader world economy. We find that, despite the recent flare-up in US-Iran tensions, panellist expectations for policy rates remain little changed, bar the US (chart 1). Central banks are still seen as likely to continue diverging significantly across regions in response to the volatility in global oil prices (chart 2). The latest on the US-Iran conflict brings hopes of another deal on the horizon, as part of a broad on-again, off-again pattern. Those hopes have sent crude oil prices lower, albeit with flows through the Strait of Hormuz remaining at a trickle (chart 3). As global oil supply remains constrained, one key area to watch is Chinese crude oil imports (chart 4), which have slumped since the conflict broke out. There is no telling when Chinese buying will recover, if ever, and if so, by how much. Moving to Japan, and taking these developments into account, the Bank of Japan held its policy rate steady at its recent meeting. Inflation risk is still flagged as being tied to the upside (chart 5). That may threaten to upend real wage gains this year, should a price flare-up materialise extensively enough. Yen intervention talk has also returned to the fore, with the US and Japan confirming recent intervention moves. Both have signalled that more may come if needed, although the yen remains squarely within its longer-term weakening trend (chart 6).
 
**Blue Chip Financial Forecasts**
Last week, we published the August 2026 Blue Chip Financial Forecast survey results. Despite the flurry of recent headline developments around the world, we found panellist expectations only modestly changed from last month. In particular, views of 12-month ahead policy rates were little changed or unchanged for every economy bar the US (chart 1). US expectations now point to slightly higher policy rates than a month ago. Among the economies covered by the survey, the highest expected 12-month ahead policy rates still relate to Australia, followed by the US and the UK. At the other end, the lowest expected rates relate to Japan and Switzerland. The slightly higher expected US policy rate may well incorporate, among other factors, the recent re-escalation in US-Iran tensions and the inclinations of new Fed Chair Warsh. We return to those tensions in a later section below.

260803T1.jpg

Touching further on the recent oil price volatility, the survey also gauged how panellists expect central banks to respond. Half of panellists (50%) thought no generalisation was possible, since central bank responses are likely to continue diverging significantly across regions. A sizeable minority (30%), however, expected central banks to stay on hold for longer until underlying trends become clearer. The US-Iran MoU has recently broken down, with an associated rebound in energy prices. Even so, most panellists (55%) reported no change this month in how they assess the balance of risks between employment and inflation. In both the US and the rest of the world, a majority saw upside risks to inflation as the greater concern (US: 67%; ex-US: 60%). Only a small minority pointed to downside risks to employment (US: 10%; ex-US: 12%), with the remaining 25% or so viewing the risks as broadly balanced.

260803T2.jpg

**Energy**
Digging deeper into the Strait of Hormuz situation, the latest position at the time of writing is that the US is holding off additional military strikes on Iran. A deal on the Strait with Iran is reportedly close, with negotiations set to resume today. All of these developments came after the latest BCFF survey period. In the meantime, US-Iran hostilities have been on-again, off-again, and with them the accessibility of the crucial Strait as a trade waterway. That pattern has left crude oil prices whipsawing of late (chart 3), underscoring how fluid the Middle East situation remains. Beneath all the oil price movements, shipping flows remain reduced to a trickle, a small fraction of pre-conflict levels.

260803T3.jpg

Against this backdrop one key factor worth some discussion is China's crude oil imports. These slumped following the outbreak of the conflict, though part of that slump may have been involuntary, with the Strait closure limiting available supply. An animated map tracks the evolution of Chinese crude imports over time (chart 4). Among other things, it shows the slump in recent months, denoted by the fading red shading over China. It also shows the rise of Russia as a key source of imports over the past decades. More recently, Brazil has risen as a source, as supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, and by extension from much of the Middle East, got choked off. It remains to be seen whether Chinese imports will recover any time soon, and if so, by how much. There is also an interplay between crude oil prices, Chinese importers' sensitivity to those prices, and eventual Chinese imports.

260803T4.gif

**Japan**
Moving to Japan, and taking the above developments into account, we also saw last week that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) held its policy rate at 1% (chart 5). The hold came with some warnings about the possible rate of future inflation, leading some investors to infer that another policy rate hike may well be on the horizon. Specifically, the BoJ warned in its updated outlook report that underlying CPI inflation risks deviating above the price stability target of 2%. The central bank's updated forecasts echo that sentiment, with CPI inflation less fresh food now seen at 2.5% for fiscal 2026, albeit down from 2.8% in April. CPI inflation less fresh food and energy is also seen at 2.5% for fiscal 2026, slightly down from 2.6%. However, another positive development has taken place despite the latent upside risks to inflation, in the form of wages. Real wages have grown consistently this year, although that may be upended if the inflation rate accelerates to outpace wage growth.

260803T5.jpg

Last but not least is the recent talk about intervention in the Japanese yen market. Japan's Ministry of Finance, in a rare admission, confirmed earlier today that Japan and the US jointly conducted yen intervention to support the currency on Friday. The ministry added that the two countries will not hesitate to jointly intervene again. Additionally, US Treasury Secretary Bessent said the US will consider increasing the size of the Fed's Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) repo facility in coming months. The facility provides temporary dollar liquidity, allowing Japan to raise dollars without outright sales of US Treasuries and easing funding pressures for intervention needs. As shown on chart 6, the yen has embarked on a depreciating trend since early 2025 against a basket of trading partner currencies. That weakening has come even despite a broad narrowing of policy yield differentials between the BoJ and its major central bank peers. The BoJ has persisted with gradual rate hikes, whilst major peers mostly stood pat.

260803T6.jpg

Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: On Again, Off Again

large_260806A.jpg

medium_260806A.jpg

small_260806A.jpg

thumbnail_260806A.jpg

260806A.jpg

large_260806B.jpg

medium_260806B.jpg

small_260806B.jpg

thumbnail_260806B.jpg

260806B.jpg

Productivity in the nonfarm business sector rose 1.4% in the second quarter, better than the expected increase of 0.7% but trailing average gains of more than 2.0% in both 2024 and 2025. Results in the prior two quarters also were below 2.0%. In all of the past three quarters, the easing in productivity growth reflected slow advances in output: 1.7% in Q2 and an average of 1.4% in the prior two quarters. Output growth in both 2024 and 2025 averaged 3.0%. Growth of labor input in recent quarters has remained comfortably within the range of recent observations. Productivity growth is approximately equal to output growth less growth of labor hours.

The slowdown in productivity growth in the past three quarters might raise concern about the underlying pace of growth. However, the recent easing is not especially alarming, as productivity often moves erratically; soft patches have occurred in the past only to revive in subsequent quarters. Still, the past three quarters have generated a downward drift in the eight-quarter moving average of growth, which is intended to smooth the random changes in productivity. Despite this drift, it is too early to conclude that productivity growth is fading. The softening in recent quarters should be viewed as disappointing only to those expecting a burst in efficiency gains from artificial intelligence. AI, thus far, does not seem to have generated miracles.

Unit labor costs—hourly labor compensation relative to productivity—rose 1.3% in Q2, matching the increase in the prior quarter and trailing the average results in the prior few years. Labor compensation grew moderately in Q2, at 2.7%, and the offset from 1.4% productivity growth left a restrained advance in unit labor costs.

Fed officials have argued in recent months that the labor market is not a factor pushing inflation above the target of 2.0%. The results on unit labor costs support this view. If labor costs were the only factor driving price changes, the 1.3% growth of unit labor costs would suggest an inflation rate below 2.0%.

The productivity and labor cost data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

- Productivity gains, while still respectable, have lost a bit of vigor in recent quarters.
- Unit labor costs rose moderately, suggesting little inflation pressure.

Productivity: Moderate Growth in Q2

Our global data offering is unparalleled in terms of coverage, quality, and organization. We offer 290+ databases from 2500 government and private sources, a wealth of key survey and forecast data covering the world’s economies, and a robust offering of archive databases that drive machine learning for big data applications.

Optimized for precision analytics, our data is seamlessly integrated with Microsoft Office and all leading statistical packages through our DLX® software and platform independent HaverView™ website. We further offer direct database feeds, client server or cloud-based delivery, and RESTful API.


Privacy Policy

Disclaimer

Contact us

Service Health

A premier time series data platform for the global strategy, research, and quant communities. 

New York

Tokyo

London

Singapore

Economy in Brief

Viewpoints

Contact Us

Our Data

Our Products

What We Do

Our Authors

About Us

Data News

Featured Data Additions

Resources

Release Calendars

Training Center

Webinars

Newsletters

Download Software

For Clients

Live Updates

#### World Economy Tracked for You 
Haver's worldwide economic data coverage provides a productive resource for analysts, strategists, and risk managers alike. With 45+ years as the industry leader, our breadth of data is unmatched.


#### Diverse Data Sources
From international banks to the farthest reaches of emerging markets, our coverage meets the needs of the global research community.

#### Driven By Quality
Committed to quality and transparency, all data sourced and delivered is continuously monitored and validated to ensure the highest level of accuracy. 

#### Global Data 
From archives to forecasts, primary-sourced from around the globe, we offer 290+ time-series databases.

#### Speed Matters
Delivering precise data as quickly as possible is our priority, which we accomplish in about one minute of release.

Data

#### Comprehensive Solutions
Effortlessly navigate, analyze, and visualize data with our broad array of tools and seamless integration with industry leading statistical and econometric packages. Gain insight and share your perspectives with ease.

#### Secure Data Access 
Effortlessly manage and work with data — delivered to your network or via our cloud services. The choices are easy, and the results are the same, fully secure and consistent access.

#### HaverView™
With a commitment to making data accessible for any work environment, our HaverView web application offers a flexible and productive resource for the dynamic research markets we serve. 

#### Data Exports and Workflow Management
Our DLX software integrates with MS Office allowing seamless publication in PowerPoint and Word as well as intuitive data management in Excel. Flexible data feeds are also supported by a variety of methods. 

Software

#### Econometric Software Support
Use our various integration tools to access our data in popular econometric software such as SAS, Stata and MatLab.

#### Designed for Programming
Access our data using multiple programming languages including Python, R, C and C++.

#### RESTful API
Restful API access to all DLX databases, supporting quant and machine learning applications. Big data rejoice!

Connectivity

#### Commentaries, Charts and Webcasts
Our team of noted economists produce a daily offering of commentaries supported by our data and analytics. Our charts and webcasts offer a fresh perspective on the state of world economy.

#### Value Added Calculations
World and regional aggregates and many other value added calculations for individual countries including seasonal and holiday adjustments. We love math!

#### Blue Chip Consensus Forecasts
Survey of America's leading business economists for their forecasts of economic and financial data. Results in two monthly publications, the Blue Chip Economic Indicators and the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, published by Wolters Kluwer.

#### Curated Navigation
Intuitive menus designed and reviewed by our economists for easy navigation of Haver's expanding ocean of data.

Research

#### Data for Colleges and Universities
Customized data available through HaverView providing access to over 120,000 economic and financial time series for the US and UK.

#### Academic Data Scope
National Account (GDP), Production, Labour Market, Inflation, Monetary/Fiscal Policy & International Trade. High-frequency data covering financial variables and drivers of the real economy, and key ESG environmental indicators. Plus, time series from the IMF on 190+ countries to aid cross comparison.

University

#### Move Back through Time
Terabytes of time series from primary sourced databases available in monthly snapshots as early as 2000, in weekly snapshots as early as 2007 or the point of inception of the database. 

#### True DLX Database Snapshots
The data are true snapshots of DLX databases unrevised from the point in time of update.  Easily view our archive data in HaverView with thousands of monthly archives currently available for over 60 unique databases. 

260805DA1.jpg

<br></br>

**EMERGECW** → **Lithuania** → Financial → Debt (Domestic and Foreign) → Net External Debt

Net external debt statistics for Lithuania were added to the **EMERGECW** database. Seventy-four series are included on this table which displays the same level of detail as the existing gross external debt table. Quarterly data are sourced from the Bank of Lithuania and start in Q1 2004.

Chart: Despite a gross external debt of €88.6 billion, Lithuanian-owned assets abroad outpace foreign liabilities. Net external debt is negative, standing at -€9.3 billion or -10.9% of GDP as of Q1 2026. It peaked at 40% of GDP in Q2 2010 before steadily improving into negative territory thanks to sustained current account surpluses and capital inflows. A record low of -13.2% of GDP was achieved in Q1 2025. Ratings agencies like Fitch highlight this elimination of net external debt as a core pillar of Lithuania’s economic strength and recently upgraded its sovereigns to an A+ rating with a stable outlook.

260805DA2.jpg

<br></br>

**ENERGY** → OECD Net Effective Energy Rates

Effective energy rate (EER) statistics were added to **ENERGY**. The EER is the sum of fuel excise taxes, carbon taxes, electricity excise taxes and tradeable permits that effectively put a price on energy use. The net EER equals the EER minus fossil fuel and electricity subsidies that decrease pre-tax energy prices. This data set includes the EER and its components and is available for 79 individual countries. Annual data (not reported consecutively) are sourced from the OECD and start in 2018.

Chart: Of the 79 countries covered, 32 do not apply taxes on electricity use. Among those that levy an electricity excise tax, its role in revenues is still small relative to other tax instruments. However, in a few countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, revenues from electricity taxes make a more substantial contribution to government revenues. This is caused by a high electricity tax rate, a broad tax base due to a high degree of electrification, or a combination of both.

Discover Haver!

Data

Software

Connectivity

Research

University

Archive

World Economy Tracked for You

Diverse Data Sources

Driven By Quality

Global Data

Speed Matters

Economic Commentary

Productivity: Moderate Growth in Q2

Recent Commentaries

U.S. Initial Unemployment Claims Edged Up in the Week of August 1

Charts of the Week: A Resilient World Economy, and Its Price

U.S. ISM Services PMI Edges Up in July, Indicating Expansion for the 25th Straight Month

Never Have Investors Paid So Much for So Little Corporate Output

U.S. ADP Employment Disappoints in July

U.S. Mortgage Applications Declined in the July 31 Week

Latest Releases

Graph of the Week

Decades high real price of copper posing physical challenge to investment boom

Economy in Brief

Viewpoints