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[SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) is a seamless interface between Haver and SAS data processing that enables SAS users to read economic and financial time series data that reside in a Haver Analytics DLX (Data Link Express) database. [SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) requires both SAS/ETS and Base SAS Software.

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[RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) Econometric Software](https://estima.com) by Estima is a leading econometrics and time-series analysis software package. It provides ability to do linear and non-linear least squares, forecasting, SUR and ARIMA models and in addition, supports advanced techniques such as GMM, ARCH and GARCH models, state space models, and more.

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Gain proficiency in building modern time-series models in Python through real-world applications. Designed for professionals in both the public and private sector, the course does not require prior experience, assuming only that participants have a basic understanding of regression and statistical concepts.

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Remote Training: Applied Time Series in Python

Surging orders for computers and electronics propelling durable goods orders

Robert Brusca

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In June, there's a slight divergence in the performance of industry climate and service sector climate, although broadly the two sectors have seen their composite indexes moving in more or less the same direction. Since 2024, the industry survey has moved up slightly after falling faster than the services gauge. The services survey has been locked in a slow trend of deterioration, largely since it reached a peak in 2021 in the wake of COVID.

The industry climate gauge has a 30.8 percentile standing, but the recent production trend, while declining, logs a more substantial 42.8 percentile standing. Contributing survey members find their own industry ‘likely trend’ much weaker, at a 21.2 percentile standing. Demand overall, however, has standings above the 50th percentile, putting overall and foreign orders & demand each above their respective medians for this period of ranking back to 2001. Inventories have a strong 81-percentile ranking. Prices are extremely strong, with 87-percentile and 86-percentile standings for respondents for their personal industry trend for prices as well as for the overarching manufacturing sector estimate of prices. Higher prices seem to be the one thing that everyone can agree on by a large margin.

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As for services, the service climate index improved slightly to 93.4 in June from 92.6 in May. The three-month moving average was weaker in June than in May as well; the 12-month moving average has been stuck at its current level for a number of months. The outlook in June improved slightly to a reading of -12 from -15 in May, but the outlook ranking is still a weak 26.8 percentile standing. The three-month expectations and observations of past sales trends haven't changed much in the last two months, but there has been a slight improvement for sales expectations. However, both sales metrics have low 20th percentile standings. Sales prices have deteriorated slightly in June compared to May for both the observed and the expected trends, but prices have standings above their 50th percentiles, logging above-median performance. Employment over the last three months has weakened noticeably, and expected employment is weaker by a small amount.

In terms of rankings, all of the sector rankings are below the 50th percentile on all of these observations, including the climate headline except for sales prices where both the past three-month observed trend and the expected trend have readings above their respective 50th percentiles, indicating past and expected price pressures in excess of normal.

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**Assessment**
On balance, the readings for the French industry, manufacturing sector and services are not encouraging. In addition, concerns about prices linger. The services sector, those concerns seem moderate compared to the concerns in manufacturing.

The hot war continues between Ukraine and Russia, while in the Middle East there was talk of some improvement and a potential peace deal between the United States and Iran, but every time there is some talk of a breakthrough, there appears to be a breakdown. In the most recent development, Iran has asserted its right to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and it's not clear how that demand would ever be consistent with the U.S. allowing a ceasefire. It appears that Iran may have traded its irreconcilable demand for nuclear weapons for a more pragmatic and real-world argument—that it will control the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz simply because it can—and it still is doing exactly that, even after all the destruction it suffered.

Stopping Iran from controlling the Strait would take a commitment to restart the war. All this makes me personally more pessimistic. I think Iran sees the need for Trump to cut a deal and stop the war before the U.S. mid-term elections, and it is pressing that need to its advantage. Trading its nuclear ambitions for real world control of the Strait would elevate Iran’s power from being dangerous but ethereal to a real world event with constant consequences.

France

French Industry and Services Confidence Diverge in June

Andrew Cates

**Equity Momentum and Global Surprises — Still Moving Together**
One of the more telling features of global equity markets in 2026 has been the persistence of the correlation between non-US equity momentum and global growth and inflation surprise indices. Equity markets outside the United States have generally prospered when economic data have beaten consensus expectations and when inflation surprises have been negative  — a combination that has historically been associated with stronger corporate earnings and a more benign policy backdrop in economies other than the US. That correlation has held reasonably well through the turbulence of the past few months, even as the Middle East conflict introduced significant noise into both the economic data and the financial market signal. What the chart reveals this week is a picture of moderate but not alarming deterioration: global growth surprises have softened at the margin, consistent with the energy cost headwinds that have weighed on European and Asian activity, but the relationship between equity momentum and the broader data pulse remains intact. It is a signal that market participants continue to track economic fundamentals rather than purely geopolitical newsflow — a modestly reassuring sign that the underlying framework for assessing the global cycle has not broken down.

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**The Fed Decouples: Why Oil and US Two-Year Yields Have Parted Ways**
For much of 2026, oil prices and US two-year Treasury yields moved in close alignment. The logic was straightforward: higher oil prices raised inflation expectations, which in turn pushed market participants to anticipate a more hawkish Federal Reserve, lifting short-dated yields in the process. That relationship held with notable consistency through the March escalation and the months that followed, as energy market shocks and monetary policy expectations fed off each other. What this week’s chart captures is a striking breakdown in that correlation. As oil prices have fallen on the back of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding and the associated unwinding of the geopolitical risk premium, US two-year yields have not followed them lower. The reason is last week’s Federal Reserve meeting. Under new chair Kevin Warsh, the Fed delivered a hawkish dot plot that shifted the median year-end projection to a hike, making clear that the easing cycle previously priced by some market participants is no longer the central scenario. The message is important: the deflationary impulse from lower oil prices is being offset — at least in the Fed’s framing — by persistent underlying inflation pressures and a commitment to keeping policy tight.

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**Flash PMIs Signal Easing Supply Chain Stress and Softer Price Pressures**
June’s flash PMI surveys, released this week across the major advanced economies, provide a timely read on how the global manufacturing and services sectors are absorbing the shifting macro backdrop. Two findings stand out. First, supplier delivery times have improved (or not lengthened as much as they had in the prior two months). This finding coheres naturally with the broader narrative: lower oil prices reduce transport and energy input costs, while the resumption of Strait of Hormuz shipping flows — examined in more detail in chart 4 — is beginning to reduce the freight disruption and re-routing costs that had been building since the conflict escalated. Second, output price inflation in manufacturing has softened, suggesting that some of the pipeline pressure from earlier energy cost spikes is beginning to fade.

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**Hormuz Traffic and Oil: A Coherent Story of Tentative Normalisation**
The recent US-Iran memorandum of understanding to work towards a final deal, though not without subsequent flare-ups, has already brought relief to markets, most visibly in crude oil prices. This should go a long way towards unwinding the inflation-related concerns that previously elevated oil prices had stoked. While the pullback has owed much to anticipation of the glut of pent-up supply expected to follow, certain trackers of shipping volume through the Strait of Hormuz, such as the IMF’s, already point to a marked pickup in traffic, even if it remains well below pre-conflict levels. Should this normalisation of shipping flows persist, it would lend continued justification to a corresponding easing in oil prices, energy-related inflation and, by extension, headline inflation — a welcome development for central banks grappling with the delicate balancing act of reining in price pressures without dampening growth too sharply.

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**South Korea’s Trade Data Flag a Modest Softening in Global Demand**
South Korea’s trade data serve as one of the global economy’s most useful early warning systems. As one of the world’s most open economies, with exports spanning semiconductors, petrochemicals, steel, automobiles and consumer electronics, South Korea’s monthly trade figures provide a timely and broad-based read on the state of global demand. This week’s data show a slightly softer picture than the strong prints that characterised much of the first quarter. Headline export growth has moderated at the margin, and crucially, semiconductor exports — which had been the most dynamic component of the trade data, propelled by AI-related chip demand — have also come in a touch below the exceptional run rates seen earlier in the year. This is not, in itself, alarming: some moderation from peak rates was always to be expected, and the semiconductor cycle remains structurally supported by the scale of AI infrastructure investment globally.

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**A Super El Niño on the Horizon — The Next Inflation Risk**
With that said, while one driver of price pressures seems to be ebbing for now — albeit not without the risk of future flare-ups — another potential inflationary risk looms on the horizon. The chart illustrates the transmission mechanism. It plots Thailand’s milled rice production (left axis) against Australia’s Southern Oscillation Index (right axis), a well-established barometer of El Niño and La Niña conditions. The convention is straightforward: SOI readings persistently above +8 indicate La Niña, associated with above-average rainfall across Southeast Asia and broadly supportive crop conditions; readings persistently below -8 signal El Niño, which brings drought stress and reduced water availability across the region. The historical relationship is striking. The sharp negative SOI troughs around 2002–03, 2009–10 and most dramatically around 2015 all coincide with visible falls in Thai milled rice output. The severe El Niño of 2014–16 produced both the deepest SOI trough in the series and the sharpest single drop in rice production, to below 24,000 thousand tonnes. As meteorological authorities have been warning for some time, the world appears to be facing an imminent Super El Niño event, with the SOI already drifting back towards negative territory in recent months. Were a significant El Niño to materialise in the second half of this year, the implications for Thai rice output — and by extension for Asian food price inflation — could be substantial. Central bankers, in other words, may find themselves having to wrestle with a new inflationary impulse just as they had begun to hope the worst was behind them.

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The mood in global financial markets this week is more settled, though “settled” should not be confused with resolved. The US-Iran memorandum of understanding, signed last week, has continued to do its work: oil prices have fallen further, Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic has picked up measurably, and the risk premium that had been embedded in energy markets since the conflict escalated in March is now visibly unwinding. That is a material development for the inflation outlook, and central bankers will be watching carefully. Yet the picture is not without its complications. Technology stocks — the most conspicuous beneficiary of the prevailing low-rate, high-growth narrative — have been subject to renewed jitters this week, as investors grow more attentive to stretched valuations and the implications of a Federal Reserve that, under new chair Kevin Warsh, is no longer signalling the easing cycle previously priced into markets. Against this backdrop, this week’s charts draw on the latest data to assess where the global economic cycle stands. Equity momentum outside the United States has tracked closely with global growth and inflation surprises, a correlation that tells us something important about how activity is being perceived (chart 1). Meanwhile, the breakdown of the previously tight relationship between oil prices and US two-year yields is arguably one of the more telling market signals of recent weeks (chart 2). June’s flash PMI surveys point to easing supply chain stress and softer output price inflation in manufacturing — a finding that chimes naturally with lower crude prices and the resumption of Hormuz flows (chart 3). The Strait of Hormuz itself deserves a closer look: traffic data and the mechanics of the oil price pullback are telling a coherent story that supports the PMI picture (chart 4). South Korea’s trade data, including semiconductors, offer a slightly softer read on global demand momentum at the margin (chart 5). And looming on the horizon, one new risk is drawing the attention of meteorological authorities: a Super El Niño event whose probability has been rising, with potentially significant implications for food commodity prices and Asian agriculture (chart 6).

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Charts of the Week: Calmer Waters, New Currents

Michael J. Moran

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The price index for personal consumption expenditures rose 0.4% in May, although the measure almost rounded up to 0.5% (0.4498%). May marked the sixth consecutive month with headline prices increasing 0.3% or more. This series of changes has pulled the year-over-year inflation rate to 4.1%, up from 2.3% just over one year ago (April 2025). Energy prices, of course, have been the most important factor behind the acceleration in inflation, and they remained an issue in May, increasing 4.0% after advances of 3.9% and 11.6% in the prior two months. Food prices have moved erratically in the past year, with jumps and lulls leaving an average monthly increase of 0.2%. The noise was evident in recent months, with food prices increasing only 0.1% in May after a jump of 0.5% in April.

Core prices also have contributed to the pickup in inflation. After averaging monthly increases of 0.24% during 2025, core prices have increased at an average rate of 0.34% so far this year. The year-over-year increase in core inflation totaled 3.4% in May, up from a recent low of 2.6% in April of last year. Both the headline and core inflation rates are uncomfortably above the Federal Reserve’s target of 2.0%.

Total personal income rose briskly in May (0.7%). A surge in farm income played an important role (up 125% month-to-month, most likely reflecting government support payments), but nominal results also were firm elsewhere (up 0.5% ex farm income). Inflation reduced the purchasing power of this income gain, but aggregate income still advanced slightly in real terms (0.2%).

Given the recent surge in energy-driven inflation, May marked only the second monthly increase in real income so far this year. Tight budgets have dampened consumer spending, but individuals have not pulled to the sidelines. Real consumption expenditures rose 0.5% (annual rate) in the first quarter, and results for April and May suggest that real PCE is on track to increase 1.5% to 2.0% in the second quarter.

Households have managed to remain moderately active in their spending by limiting their saving. The saving rate has drifted lower since early 2024 moving to 3.0% in May (chart, below right). The erosion in saving perhaps seems reckless, but some of the reduction could be a response to the strength in the equity market, where wealth gains have possibly limited the incentive to save. Also, larger-than-normal tax refunds this year because of tax cuts in the One Big Beautiful Budget Act have allowed many households to spend actively despite modest increases in real income.

The personal income and consumption figures are available in Haver’s **USECON** database with detail in the **USNA** database. The Action Economics forecasts are in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Energy prices rose sharply for the third consecutive month; core prices were unsettling as well.
- A jump in nominal income translated to a modest advance in real terms, allowing consumers to remain reasonably active.

Personal Income, Consumption, and Prices in May

Winnie Tapasanun

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New orders for durable goods fell 4.5% m/m in May, the first monthly fall in three months, following an upwardly revised 8.5% gain in April (+7.9% initially reported on May 28) and a 1.3% increase in March (unrevised), according to today’s advance report by the U.S. Census Bureau. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected a 4.4% m/m May decrease. The year-on-year rate decelerated to -3.5% in May from +17.7% in April (+20.0% in May 2025), marking the first negative reading since December 2024 (-4.5%). Excluding transportation, durable goods orders rose 1.3% (10.2% y/y) in May, the 13th consecutive m/m rise, after a 1.4% increase in April. Meanwhile, durable goods orders excluding defense dropped 4.6% (-5.0% y/y), down for the third time in four months, following an 8.4% April rebound.

The m/m fall in May durable goods orders was driven by a 51.8% m/m plunge in orders for nondefense aircraft & parts, following a 167.4% surge in April and a 23.0% slump in March. Orders for defense aircraft & parts rose 7.9% (63.5% y/y), the fourth successive m/m increase, after gains of 2.5% in April and 23.7% in March. Orders excluding aircraft climbed 1.0% (9.8% y/y), the six straight m/m rise and the 10th in 11 months, after a 1.3% April increase.

Durable goods orders for transportation dropped 14.0% (-22.1% y/y) in May, the first m/m decline since February, following a 22.4% gain in April. In addition to May’s m/m plunge in nondefense aircraft orders and increase in defense aircraft orders, motor vehicles & parts orders rose 1.1% (12.4% y/y), the sixth straight m/m rise, after a 0.7% April increase. Orders for primary metals advanced 3.0% (15.9% y/y), the largest of six successive m/m gains, after a 2.6% April rise. Machinery orders climbed 1.9% (14.0% y/y), up for the 13th straight month, on top of a 1.3% April rise. Orders for fabricated metal products grew 1.5% (11.2% y/y), the third m/m increase in four months, following a 4.1% April gain. Orders for all other durable goods rose 0.8% (3.2% y/y), the strongest of nine consecutive m/m increases, after a 0.1% April uptick. Orders for computers & electronic products rebounded 0.3% (13.3% y/y), the eighth m/m gain in nine months, following a 0.4% April decrease. Orders for electrical equipment, appliances & components recovered 0.3% (5.8% y/y), the second increase in three months, after a 0.2% April decline.

Capital goods orders fell 13.6% (-21.1% y/y) in May, the first m/m fall in three months and the deepest since June 2025, following a 22.2% jump in April. Nondefense capital goods orders dropped 15.7% (-26.4% y/y), the fifth m/m decrease in six months, after a 24.9% April rebound. Core capital goods orders (i.e., nondefense capital goods orders excluding aircraft) rose 1.6% (10.5% y/y), the third m/m gain in four months, reversing a 0.7% April decline. Defense capital goods orders slid 3.4% (+14.4% y/y), the first m/m slide since January, after a 10.4% April gain. Notably, core capital goods shipments (core capex shipments)—a reliable coincident indicator of business spending on equipment in the national accounts—rose 0.3% (7.6% y/y), the eighth m/m rise in nine months, after a 0.5% April increase.

Shipments of all manufactured goods climbed 1.6% (8.9% y/y) in May following a 1.3% gain in April. Durable goods shipments rose 1.0% (8.9% y/y) after a 0.7% April increase. Nondurable goods shipments advanced 2.2% (9.0% y/y), building on a 1.9% April gain. All three series posted the sixth consecutive m/m increase.

Unfilled orders of durable goods rose 0.6% (8.5% y/y) in May, the 10th straight m/m rise, after a 1.8% gain in April. Excluding transportation, unfilled orders increased 0.9% (4.3% y/y), also up for the 10th consecutive month, following a 0.7% April rise.

Manufacturing inventories edged up 0.2% (1.9% y/y) in May, the seventh successive m/m gain, after a 0.3% rise in April. Durable goods inventories grew 0.2% (2.1% y/y), the eighth straight m/m increase, after rising 0.3% in April and March. Nondurable goods inventories, up for the fourth consecutive month, rose 0.3% (1.6% y/y), matching April's pace.

Manufacturers’ orders and shipments of durable and nondurable goods, along with unfilled orders and inventories, are compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. They are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics forecast data are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- May headline orders -4.5% m/m, first fall in three mths.; -3.5% y/y, first negative reading since Dec. ’24.
- Nondefense aircraft & parts -51.8% m/m vs. April’s +167.4%.
- Transportation orders -14.0%, first m/m drop since Feb.; orders ex transp. +1.3%, 13th straight m/m rise.
- Core capital goods shipments +0.3%, eighth gain in nine mths., pointing to a moderate contribution to Q2’26 GDP from business equipt. spending.
- Durable goods shipments +1.0%; unfilled orders +0.6%; inventories +0.2%.

U.S. Durable Goods Orders Drop in May on Nondefense Aircraft Weakness

Sandy Batten

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Q1 2026 real GDP growth was revised up to 2.1% q/q saar in the third estimate from 1.6% in the second estimate, slightly eclipsing the 2.0% advance estimate, according to figures released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis today. The Action Economics Forecast Survey looked for a slight upward revision to 1.7%. The major factor behind the upward revision was a large downward revision to import growth to 11.8% from 21.1% in the second estimate. The downward revision in imports was accompanied by a much smaller downward revision in export growth (10.9% versus 13.1%), leading to a meaningful downward revision to the trade deficit. Accordingly, net exports subtracted 0.4%-point from overall GDP growth in Q1, down markedly from -1.3%-point in both the second and advance estimates. The BEA stated that the downward revision to imports was widely spread—in goods (led by imports of consumer goods ex food and autos) and services (led by international travel).

The other revision of note was to personal consumption expenditures where the Q1 growth was revised down to 0.4% q/q saar from 1.4% in the second estimate and 1.6% in the advance report. The downward revision was entirely in consumption of services with small upward revisions to consumption of goods. The growth of services consumption was lowered markedly to 0.5% from 1.8% in the second estimate and 2.1% in the advance report. The BEA stated that the revision primarily reflected downward revisions to financial services and insurance (led by portfolio management and investment advice), based on newly available and updated data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Services Survey.

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Growth of total fixed investment was little revised to 6.5% q/q saar from 6.4%. This reflected an upward revision to nonresidential fixed investment growth to 10.6% from 10.1% in the second estimate and a downward revision in residential investment growth to -7.8% from -6.3%. Growth of government spending was unrevised at 4.4%. The decline in inventories was revised slightly smaller with inventories adding 0.2%-point to overall growth versus 0.1%-point in the second estimate.

With growth in both imports and personal consumption expenditures being revised down, private domestic demand growth (final sales to private domestic purchasers, a favored gauge of demand by the Federal Reserve) was revised down meaningfully to a still-solid 1.7% q/q saar from 2.4% in the second estimate and 2.5% in the advance report.

The GDP data can be found in Haver’s **USECON** and **USNA** databases. **USNA** contains virtually all of the Bureau of Economic Analysis detail in the national accounts. The Action Economics consensus estimates can be found in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Q1 GDP growth was unexpectedly revised up to 2.1% q/q saar in the third estimate, up from 1.6% in the second estimate and inching past the 2.0% advance estimate.
- A meaningful downward revision to imports was the primary factor behind the upward revision, leading to a much smaller subtraction from net exports.
- Personal consumption expenditures growth was revised down to 0.5% q/q saar, the slowest pace since Q1 2022, due mostly to a downward revision to household spending on financial services and insurance.
- With the downward revision to import demand and PCE, domestic demand growth was revised down meaningfully to 1.7% q/q from 2.4%.

Unusually Large Upward Revision in Third Estimate of U.S. Q1 2026 Real GDP Growth

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German consumer climate, as measured by the GfK survey for the month ahead of July, posted a reading of -29.2, a slight improvement from -29.7 in June. This is the second consecutive monthly improvement, slight though it may be, in the reading for climate. The ranking of this reading on data back to 2002 finds that it has been weaker only about 4% of the time on this timeline. The reading for climate remains extremely weak in Germany, despite the slight up-creep over the past couple of months.

The components for the climate index are up to date only through June. On that basis, there was a small increase in economic expectations, a small increase in income expectations, and a smaller decline in the rating for the propensity to buy, a consumer spending metric. The reading for economic expectations in June has a 22.4 percentile standing, the reading for income has a 14.6 percentile standing, and the reading for the propensity to buy has a 23.8 percentile standing. All three of these metrics have readings that are in the lower quartile of their range of readings back to 2002. The headline reading is substantially weaker in its ranking than the three components; however, these are for different timelines—the headline is for July, while the components are for June. The weaker climate standing may simply reflect the confluence of the weak readings for these three components, marking that as a more unusual event than the stand-alone rankings of each one by itself.  In any event, there is little in the German survey to give much confidence that conditions in Germany are significantly improving, let alone getting better.

The table also includes consumer confidence readings for other EU members, specifically Italy and France, as well as for the nonaligned United Kingdom. Italy's reading is up to date as of May, while the French and U.K. readings are up to date as of June. The recent Italian reading ticked up slightly, from 90.8 in April to 93.4 in May. The May reading for Italy has a 60.3 percentile standing, much better than the readings for the German headline, France, or the U.K. The French reading, at 84, is improved from 82.4 in June but still has only a 6.8 percentile standing, an extremely weak standing comparable to the headline standing for German climate. The U.K. reading is stuck at -23 for two months in a row, which produces a 26.9 percentile standing, another weak reading and a near 25-percentile low reading for the U.K.

These various readings span months ending in May, June, or July; the signals they emit are consistent that consumer confidence is quite weak in Europe—extremely weak in Germany and France, quite weak in the U.K., and only Italy produces a number where the ranking is above its 50th percentile, putting it above its historic mean of readings over data back to the year 2002. Italian consumer confidence readings have tended to be more resilient than those of other countries recently.

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**Summing up**
The bottom line is that consumer confidence in these selected European countries is extremely weak. There's no evidence of a rebound and little evidence that conditions are improving in a significant way. The conditions in Ukraine haven't changed much in recent months, although there are some indications that Ukraine has been gaining somewhat of an upper hand, while in the Middle East, circumstances regarding the war with Iran and the state of the Strait of Hormuz continues to be touch-and-go. In this environment, it's not surprising that consumers remain on their back foot. However, the extreme degree of consumer unrest remains surprising.

Germany

German Confidence Edges Up but Remains in Deep Doldrums

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New single-family home sales unexpectedly fell 7.3% m/m (-6.8% y/y) to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 580,000 units in May following an upwardly revised 5.7% decline to 626,000 in April (initially -6.2%, 622,000) and an upwardly revised 5.4% increase to 664,000 in March (previously +3.4%, 663,000), according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected May sales of 640,000. May marked the lowest level since January, down 23.4% from a high of 757,000 in November 2025 but up 8.4% from a low of 535,000 in July 2022. The May decline coincided with a rise in the average 30-year fixed mortgage rate to 6.44%, the highest since August 2025, from 6.33% in April, according to Freddie Mac.

Regionally, May new home sales showed a mixed performance. Sales in the West plummeted 26.9% (-17.0% y/y) to 117,000 in May, a seven-month low, reversing a 19.4% rebound to 160,000 in April. Sales in the South fell 4.1% (-5.4% y/y) to 350,000, the lowest level since January, on top of an 11.4% April drop to 365,000. In contrast, sales in the Midwest recovered 16.2% (-3.7% y/y) to 79,000, the third m/m gain in four months, after a 20.0% April plunge to 68,000. Sales in the Northeast increased 3.0% (17.2% y/y) to 34,000, the highest level since December, following a flat reading in April and a 73.7% surge in March. Notably, the South remained the dominant region, accounting for 60.3% of total U.S. new home sales.

The median sales price of a new home rose 2.0% (0.0% y/y) to $424,900 in May, the highest since December, following a 6.0% rise to $416,500 in April and three consecutive m/m decreases. The median sales price was 6.9% above a low of $397,600 in November 2024 but 7.7% below its record high of $460,300 in October 2022. The average sales price of a new home climbed 7.8% (5.0% y/y) to $540,600, the first m/m increase in three months and the highest level since July 2022, following a 1.3% April decline to $501,400. The average price was 13.7% above a low of $475,600 in August 2024 and just 0.1% below a peak of $541,200 in July 2022. These sales price data are not seasonally adjusted.

The number of unsold new homes on the market grew 2.3% (-1.4% y/y) to 496,000 in May, the third m/m rise in four months and the highest level since July 2025, after a 0.8% rebound to 485,000 in April. The latest figure was 17.0% above a low of 424,000 in May 2023. The seasonally adjusted months' supply of new homes for sale rose to 10.3 months in May from 9.3 months in April, remaining above a low of 6.9 months in May 2023 and matching a high last seen in July 2022.

The median number of months a new home stayed on the market increased to 3.7 months in May, the highest since July 2021, from 3.6 months in April. The latest reading was above its record low of 1.5 months in September and October 2022 but well below a peak of 5.1 months in March 2021. These figures date back to January 1975.

New home sales are recorded when the sales contract is signed. New home sales activity and prices are available in Haver's **USECON** database. The consensus expectation figure from Action Economics is available in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Sales -7.3% m/m (-6.8% y/y) to 580,000 in May; down 23.4% from a November high.
- Sales m/m down in the West (-26.9%) and South (-4.1%); up in the Midwest (+16.2%) and Northeast (+3.0%).
- Sales y/y down in all regions except the Northeast (+17.2%).
- Median sales price +2.0% m/m to $424,900, a 5-month high; avg. price +7.8% m/m to $540,600, highest since July ’22.
- Months' supply up to 10.3 mths., highest since July ’22.

U.S. New Home Sales Unexpectedly Hit a Four-Month Low in May

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The US current account balance, which consists of international trade and income flows, deteriorated slightly in the first quarter, moving to a deficit of $226.8 billion versus a shortfall of $221.1 billion in the fourth quarter of last year (chart, upper left). Trade flows moved slightly in favor of the US, as the deficit narrowed by $11.6 billion to $165.8 billion, with trade in both goods and services contributing to the improvement. The latest reading on the trade deficit was among the best of the post-pandemic period (chart, upper right).

The improvement in trade was more than offset by softening in both primary income and secondary income. Primary income consists of net receipts of both investment income and employee compensation, with net flows defined as receipts of US residents from abroad less US payments to residents in foreign countries. Net investment income is by far the larger of the two components of primary income, and it accounted for nearly all the slippage in primary income, dropping $17.0 billion to -$7.8 billion. The shift pushed net investment income back into negative territory after a quarter in the plus column (chart, lower left). Employee compensation moved in favor of the US by 4.0%, but given the small size of employee compensation, the improvement represented an insignificant offset to the slippage in investment income.

Secondary income consists of transfer payments (payments made without receiving something of economic value in return); examples include personal remittances (foreign workers sending funds to families in their home countries), charitable donations, taxes, fines, and penalties. Payments made by US residents have always exceeded payments received, leaving a regular deficit in secondary income. This component of the current account slipped 1.3% in Q1, but it remained within the range of observations over the past year.

Annual revisions to the current account were notable, as both the trade balance and the balance on primary income were revised to show deeper deficits. The quarterly average trade deficit for 2025 now totals $233.0 billion versus a previous estimate of $227.9 billion. Primary income now shows a quarterly average deficit of $11.9 billion for 2025 versus a surplus of $3.2 billion.

The shift to a deficit position in primary income in 2025 is not shocking, as previously estimated positive readings on average in 2025 (and prior years) were surprising in light of the international investment position of the US. Foreign investors hold far larger amounts of US assets than US investors hold of foreign assets (chart, lower right). That is, the US has a deficit in investment holdings. However, despite the differential in asset holdings, US investors typically earned higher rates of return on their foreign investments than foreigners earned on their US investments. Although the gap in asset holdings has been large, the higher returns earned by US investors left net investment income positive. Revised data now suggest that the net international investment position of the US has slipped to such a degree that higher rates of return will no longer offset the differential in asset holdings. Positive quarterly readings on net investment income might be apparent at times (such as 2025-Q4), but net investment income (and primary income in total) will probably be negative in most coming quarters.

Balance of Payments data are in Haver’s **USINT** database, with summaries available in **USECON**. The expectations figure is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Improvement in the trade balance offset by weaker net investment income.
- Annual revision showed wider deficit in 2025.


Q1 Current Account: Modest Slippage in Early 2026

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The Conference Board U.S. Consumer Confidence Index rose 0.7% m/m (-4.2% y/y) to a lower-than-expected 91.2 in June, the fourth monthly rise in five months, after a downwardly revised 3.4% decline to a four-month-low 90.6 in May (-0.7%; 93.1 initially). A reading of 94.3 had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. The June reading was 6.4% above a low of 85.7 in April 2025 but down from 95.2 in June 2025 and 19.1% below a high of 112.8 in November 2024.

Consumers' views of present economic conditions weakened for the second consecutive month in June, while the views of future economic conditions improved m/m. The Present Situation Index—which assesses current business and labor market conditions—fell 2.5% m/m (-12.5% y/y) to 116.4 in June, the lowest level since February 2021, following a 4.0% drop to 119.4 in May and two successive m/m increases. The index was lower than 133.0 in June 2025 and 25.0% below a high of 155.3 in June 2023. The Expectations Index—which measures the short-term outlook for income, business, and labor market conditions—rose 4.2% m/m (6.4% y/y) to 74.4 this month, the highest level since December and the second increase in three months, after a 2.7% decline to 71.4 in May. The index was higher than 69.9 in June 2025, while 20.6% below a high of 93.7 in November 2024.

Labor market readings showed less optimism this month. The jobs gap—representing the difference between respondents indicating that jobs are plentiful and those saying jobs are hard to get—dropped to 2.4% in June, the lowest reading since February 2021, from 5.0% in May. Calculated by Haver Analytics, this series had an 85% correlation with the unemployment rate over the last 20 years. The jobs plentiful measure inched up to 24.9% of respondents in June from 24.8% in May (the lowest since February 2021). Perceptions of the current labor market weakened, with the jobs hard-to-get measure rising to 22.5% this month, the highest level since January 2021, from 19.8% in May.

Consumers generally viewed business conditions as slightly more favorable compared to last month. Current business conditions were perceived as good by 20.0% of respondents in June, up from 19.2% in May but below a high of 23.4% in June 2023. Expectations that business conditions would improve in six months were 19.0% of respondents, up from 18.8% in May but below a high of 24.7% in November 2024. More jobs were expected in six months by 15.2% of respondents, slightly down from 16.6% in May and below a high of 22.8% in November 2024. The percentage expecting rising income rose to 20.8% in June from 19.2% in May, the highest since February 2020 and above a low of 14.4% in February 2023.

Inflation expectations eased this month but remained elevated. The expected inflation rate in twelve months slipped to 6.0% in June, the lowest since February, after holding at 6.2% for three straight months. The latest reading was below a high of 7.0% in April 2025 but above a low of 5.0% in November 2024. In June, 61.5% of respondents expected that interest rates would rise over the next twelve months, down from 62.4% in May but up from 42.1% in January 2024.

The share of respondents planning to buy a home within six months rebounded to 6.6% in June from 6.5% in May. It was below its most recent high of 7.0% in April but above a low of 4.6% in February 2024. Those planning to buy automobiles rose to 13.3% of respondents this month from 12.6% in May; it was up from a low of 10.6% in April 2025. Meanwhile, the share of respondents planning a vacation within six months declined to 39.1%, the lowest since April 2021, from 41.4% in May.

The Consumer Confidence data are available in Haver’s **CBDB** database. The total indexes, which are indexed to 1985=100, appear in **USECON**, and market expectations are in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Headline up 0.6 pts. to 91.2 in June, below expectations; fourth m/m increase in five mths.
- Present Situation Index down 3.0 pts. to 116.4, lowest since Feb. ’21.
- Expectations Index up 3.0 pts. to 74.4, a six-month high.
- Consumers less optimistic about current business & labor market conditions; more upbeat about future business & financial conditions.
- Inflation expectations down to 6.0%, lowest since Feb., as lower oil prices in recent weeks eased consumer inflation fears.

U.S. Consumer Confidence Rebounds in June from a Four-Month Low

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