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Resilient US economy pushing up Blue Chip 2026 outlook

Sandy Batten

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The Bureau of Labor Statistics did not publish a report on export and import prices for October because of the government shutdown, and BLS was unable to construct statistics for October. Therefore, the charts here have a gap for October between the September and the November and December values.

Import prices rose 0.1% m/m (unchanged y/y) in December from November, in line with the expectations of the Action Economics Forecast Survey. Since there was no value for October value, a monthly change for November could not be calculated. Import prices fell 0.1% y/y in November. Export prices rose 0.3% m/m in December. Again, a monthly change for November could not be calculated. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected a 0.1% monthly increase in December. The y/y reading fell to 3.1% in December from 3.2% in November.

Note that these indexes are not directly affected by tariffs because they measure the price of goods before taxes. Tariffs are considered taxes and thus are excluded from these calculations.

For imports, a 3.3% monthly decline in prices of imported petroleum and petroleum products restrained the rise in overall prices. Prices of nonpetroleum imports rose 0.4% m/m (1.0% y/y). Prices of imported food increased 0.5% m/m while prices of imported industrial supplies rose 0.4% m/m even with a 0.8% monthly decline in prices of fuels and lubricants. Prices of the remaining end-use categories were little changed in December. Given the recent weakness of the foreign exchange value of the dollar, there could be further upward pressure on nonpetroleum import prices in coming months.

For exports, prices of agricultural products 0.2% m/m (2.1% y/y) in December following a 0.9% m/m jump in November. Prices of nonagricultural exports increased 0.3% m/m in December. A monthly change could not be calculated for November. The y/y rate slowed to 3.1% in December from 3.3%. Exported food prices rose 0.4% m/m, down from a 1.1% monthly jump in November. Prices of exported industrial supplies also increased 0.4% m/m in December. Prices of exported consumer goods excluding autos jumped 0.8% m/m in December, their largest monthly increase since January 2023.

These import and export price series are not seasonally adjusted; they can be found in Haver’s **USECON** database. Detailed figures are available in the **USINT** database. The expectations figure from the Action Economics Forecast Survey is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Import prices rose 0.1% m/m in December, in line with expectations.
- The December increase reflected a 0.2% monthly gain in non-fuel import prices and a 0.8% m/m decline in fuel prices.
- Export prices rose 0.3% m/m against expectations of a 0.1% m/m increase. Both agricultural and nonagricultural prices rose in December.


U.S. Import and Export Prices Rise in December

Michael J. Moran

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The Employment Cost Index rose at an annual rate of 3.0% in the final three months of 2025 (0.7% not annualized). The latest observation reinforced the deceleration that began in the latter part of 2022 and returned the change to the range in place before the pandemic - albeit the upper portion of that range.

Most of the deceleration occurred in the goods-producing sector, where the latest increase of 2.5% (annual rate) trailed the average of 3.9% in the prior three quarters. The service sector saw compensation growth of 3.1%, down from an average of 3.5% in the prior three quarters. The difference between the performances of goods and service is not surprising, as compensation growth in the goods-producing sector tends to be more volatile, and it has typically been softer in the past few years.

Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued recently that labor costs are not a driving force behind above-target inflation, and recent results on the employment cost index support this view. While the increase in compensation of 3.0% in Q4 is a percentage point above the Fed’s target, businesses can maintain profits without passing along the full extent of the increase. Productivity growth, which has been strong recently (average growth of 2.3% in the past eight quarters), can effectively offset compensation growth and dampen the inflation impulse.

The chart on the upper right shows quarterly growth in total compensation less the 8-quarter increase in productivity (the 8-quarter average smooths the high degree of volatility in productivity growth). This metric, which gives insight into the likely path of inflation, has been below 2.0% for the past 6 quarters, with the latest increase totaling less than 1.0%. (the chart ends in 2025-Q3 because productivity statistics for Q4 are not available).

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Total compensation in the ECI includes both wages and benefits. In the third quarter, both components rose by the same amount (0.7% quarter-to-quarter, or 3.0% at an annual rate). This balance is a shift from the pattern of recent years, when wages typically posted firmer growth. The advantage to wages in the past few years, in turn, represents a break from the more common tendency for benefits to grow at a faster pace.

The employment cost index measures the change in the cost of labor, free from the influence of employment shifts across occupations and industries. It is provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and is available in Haver’s **USECON** database. Consensus estimates from the Action Economics Forecast Survey are in Haver’s **AS1REPNA** database.

- Vigorous growth during the pandemic-related recovery gives way to moderate advances recently.
- Labor costs seem in line with the Fed’s inflation target.

Employment Cost Index: Continued Deceleration

Robert Brusca

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In December, among ten reporting monetary union members, output increased for six of them and declined in four of them. In addition, two reporting European economies, Sweden and Norway, each showed increases in output in December. In November, five monetary union members showed decreases, while only two showed declines in October. The recent trends and data on industrial production are not exactly friendly, but neither are they scathing results. In December, the median change in the monetary union was a 0.1% increase in manufacturing output following a 0.9% median drop in November and a 0.3% median increase in October.

For the full set of reporting countries, 60% showed acceleration in December, about the same as in October. However, in November only 23% showed output accelerating on a month-to-month basis. Coupled with weak median results, the recent reports on industrial production are not particularly impressive.

Sequential results, looking at 12-month, to 6-month to 3-month growth rates, are disappointing as well. The 12-month growth rate puts the annualized median rise of manufacturing output at 2.2%, the 6-month annualized growth rate at -2%, and the 3-month growth rate at -2% for EMU member countries. For the full sample of countries, there is acceleration in 50% over 12 months, 61.5% of them over six months, and that drops down to 38.5% over three months.

In addition, these sequential data show that five reporting countries have persistent decelerations in output growth rates from 12-months to 6-months to 4-months. Those countries include France, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. However, there are contrary accelerating trends in three reporting countries Malta, Sweden, and Norway; the latter two, of course, are not monetary union members but have various affiliations with the European trading bloc.

Quarter-to-date data (covering the completed fourth quarter) for the full sample show that five countries have output declining on balance in Q4. However, among monetary union members, the median change in the quarter is an annual rate of 1.1% increase in manufacturing industrial production.

Assessing the growth rates based on year-over-year growth in industrial output, only four countries in the sample have output growth rates below their historic medians on data back to 2006. Those are Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and Malta. Other reporters have growth rates that rank above the 50% mark which puts them above their historic median. Sweden has a year-over-year growth rate in its 93.7 percentile; Norway has a growth rate in its 85.3 percentile; Greece, Portugal, and France have growth rates in their 70th percentiles, respectively.

The December news is not upbeat, but it is not dismal either. It suggests the same old industrial slog is still underway in Europe.

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Europe

IP in Europe Shows Lethargy

Tian Yong Woon

In our Letter this week, we explore Asia in two parts. The first reviews key developments from the past week, focusing on snap election outcomes in Japan (chart 1) and Thailand (chart 2), both of which delivered victories for incumbent parties and helped reduce near-term political uncertainty.

The second, and larger, section builds on last week’s discussion of Asia and AI, shifting the focus to AI’s potential impact on the region from an end-user perspective. On the upside, Asia stands to benefit meaningfully from the eventual large-scale adoption of AI-powered robotics, reflecting the region’s relatively high share of manufacturing value added (chart 3). That said, important considerations remain, including the cost viability of transitioning towards humanoid robotics given the sizeable upfront capital expenditure involved. Beyond manufacturing, AI adoption could also deliver gains in healthcare, particularly as many Asian economies grapple with ageing populations—implying a growing care burden alongside a shrinking domestic caregiver base (chart 4). However, regulatory, ethical, and implementation challenges persist. 

At the same time, the AI transition will likely displace certain jobs, making this a race not only of adoption but of adaptability, where education—while an imperfect proxy—offers some insight into which economies may be better positioned to adjust (chart 5). Finally, bureaucratic frictions also matter (chart 6), although even traditionally more bureaucratic economies have begun introducing fast-track frameworks to avoid falling behind in what could prove to be a pivotal transition reshaping the regional, and potentially global, economic landscape.

**Japan’s snap election**
Following a snap election held on Sunday, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured a historic landslide victory, winning a more than two-thirds majority in Japan’s 456-seat Lower House. The LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, also expanded its presence to 36 seats. The outcome suggests that Takaichi’s political gamble to capitalise on strong opinion polling has paid off. While the election result has removed a key source of near-term political uncertainty for Japan, attention now turns to the policy agenda enabled by the government’s newly strengthened mandate. Among the first expected moves, Takaichi appears set to proceed with a temporary food tax pause, reducing the 8% consumption tax on food to 0% for two years. This proposal reinforces the perception that her policy stance is fiscally accommodative, even as critics raise concerns around fiscal discipline and long-term sustainability. As for the market reaction, Japanese equities rallied on stimulus expectations, bond yields rose on prospects of increased issuance to fund higher spending, while the yen recorded only muted net moves (chart 1)—prompting some speculation that some intervention may have taken place.

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**Thailand’s snap election**
Thailand also held snap elections last Sunday, which saw the incumbent deliver a strong showing at the polls. Unlike Japan’s election outcome, however, the scale of the increase in the incumbent Bhumjaithai (BJT) Party’s parliamentary footprint came as a surprise to many observers. That said, despite these sizable gains, the BJT Party fell short of an outright majority, securing 193 of the 500 seats in parliament, implying that a coalition government will likely still be required to pass legislation smoothly. Thai equities and the baht nevertheless rallied on the election results (chart 2). Attention now turns to whether—and how—Prime Minister Anutin will follow through on key campaign promises, including the revival of a popular shopping subsidy programme. While such measures would provide a near-term boost to consumption, they would also raise concerns around fiscal sustainability. Beyond the parliamentary vote, Thai voters also approved a proposal to replace the constitution. If pursued, this could pave the way for deeper structural reforms to Thailand’s economy.

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**AI’s (potential) impact on Asia**
We now turn to the longer, second part of this week’s letter, where we examine AI’s potential impact on Asia. In contrast to last week’s discussion, the focus here is on Asia’s role as an end-user of AI, rather than its position within the global AI supply chain. While AI broadly promises substantial productivity gains if deeply embedded across economies, one sector where Asia may benefit disproportionately is manufacturing. This reflects the relatively high share of manufacturing value added in GDP across many Asian economies compared with the global average (chart 3). In particular, Asia stands to reap significant productivity gains through the widespread adoption of AI-powered robotics. Cost, however, remains a key consideration: relative to the overall cost of human labour, AI-enabled robots have yet to become unequivocally competitive once high upfront capital outlays are taken into account. That said, recent advances in humanoid, AI-enabled robots have demonstrated increasingly broad and sophisticated capabilities in replicating human tasks, including delicate and precision operations. Over time, this could meaningfully alleviate a persistent structural challenge facing many advanced Asian economies—ageing populations and the associated labour constraints.

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Digging deeper into the ageing population challenge faced by many Asian economies, another area where AI and robotics could play a meaningful role is healthcare. Ageing societies face a twin burden: a rising number of elderly individuals requiring care alongside a shrinking pool of working-age caregivers, absent offsetting labour inflows. One proxy for this imbalance is the old-age dependency, which, as shown in chart 4, is already relatively high in several Asian economies, including China, Japan, and South Korea. That said, adoption remains at a very early stage. Significant barriers to widespread deployment persist, including regulatory and ethical considerations, high implementation costs, and questions around the consistency, reliability, and safety of AI-enabled systems in delivering healthcare-related tasks.

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**Asia’s challenges in AI adoption**
That said, the outlook is not entirely positive for Asia in the context of widespread AI adoption. As with previous waves of transformative technology, AI will inevitably render some jobs—at least in their current form—obsolete, even as it creates new roles and reshapes others. This implies that many Asian economies will need to navigate a significant structural adjustment in their labour markets, as certain types of work are displaced while demand for new skill sets emerges. How effectively Asia manages this transition will be critical in determining whether its economies move ahead of—or fall behind—the global shift towards AI. At present, and using education quality as a rough proxy, some Asian economies appear better positioned to manage this adjustment than others. As illustrated in chart 5, economies such as China, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea seem relatively well placed to absorb and adapt to the coming changes. That said, education quality is only an imperfect indicator. Other factors will also matter, including the capacity to rapidly retool and reskill the workforce, as well as the inclusiveness of the transition. Ensuring that lower-skilled and more vulnerable segments of society are not left behind will be an important determinant of the long-term economic and social outcomes of AI adoption across the region.

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Another potential hurdle relates to bureaucratic costs, which—when elevated—can act as a meaningful source of friction in the adoption of new AI-driven technologies. On this front, some Asian economies stand out for having comparatively low bureaucratic burdens, notably Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, while others, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and China, tend to lag (chart 6). That said, as with many broad-based indicators, this picture masks important nuances. Several of these economies have introduced industry-specific—particularly AI-focused—fast-tracking initiatives aimed at accelerating development within targeted domestic sectors. Even so, in an increasingly competitive and intensifying global race to adopt AI and capture its economic upside, we may see a growing tendency toward an “adopt first, regulate later” approach in the years ahead. This is likely to persist unless and until major incidents or heightened concerns emerge that materially slow the pace of AI adoption.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: Of Ballots and Bots

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Japan's economy watchers index has flattened out and backed off slightly for the current and future outlooks depending on the time horizon that you seek. However, what's clear is that the index reached the low point around the middle of last year, has been rebounding and now the rebound has either run out of gas or slowed after the index has rebuilt itself considerably.  

It is certainly too early to get pessimistic on Japan's economy, with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi having just won a significant - essentially a landslide - snap election that she called after recently having been elected. The LDP would appear to be back in the driver's seat, and she has her sights set on more fiscal stimulus and expanded military spending. She is apparently much more on the same wavelength as Donald Trump in the United States. Mr. Trump was an Abe supporter, and Ms. Takaichi is a disciple of Mr. Abe.

At the moment, Japan would seem to have a groundswell of support behind the government and that government is set to try to rekindle some growth which could potentially put the Bank of Japan in a more decisively defensive track as far as setting rates and potentially raising rates.

**Economy watchers index is trending**
In January, the economy watchers index backed off for the second month in a row. However, it still has a percentile standing in its 51-percentile, slightly above its median standing since early-2005. The headline and all the components have standings above their respective 50th percentiles on this timeline, with the exception of housing, services, and employment; three readings that are extremely important to consumers. Housing has a 26.1 percentile standing, services (the employment sector) have a 45.8 percentile standing, while employment has a 22.9 percentile standing. Despite the otherwise solid and strong set of readings, there are these three significant flies in the ointment. Corporate Japan is doing extremely well with corporations having a 66.8 percentile standing; manufacturers and nonmanufacturers, separately, each come in with readings in their mid-to-upper 60th percentiles.

**The future index**
The future readings from the economy watchers index show continued but slight increases over the last few months. Only two future readings weaken month-to-month: housing and employment—once again two key readings as far as consumers are concerned. However, in terms of current monthly diffusion readings, the assessment of households, retailing, housing, and employment all have current diffusion values below 50, indicating net declines rather than increases. The percentile standing is for the future index are, like those for the current index, generally upbeat - and generally stronger than for the current indexes - with the future headline posting a 66.4 percentile standing in January. However, like the current index, the standing for housing is at its 21.3 percentile and the standing for employment is at its 30th percentile, both well below the neutral level that would place the ranking at the 50th percentile. Corporations show high readings, higher for the future indexes than for the current index standings. There also are high readings and standings for eating and drinking places as well as services. It's good to see services come up with a strong rating since it creates hope for the future for employment because services are the core employment sector. It will be interesting to see how this value changes in the coming months as Takaichi’s new policies are implemented and take hold.

**Summing up**
On balance, the economy watchers index has been firm to strong. There is some slight give-back in the current index in terms of trend. But beyond the index, there's more immediate reason to be more positive because Japan has just executed a very decisive and pro-growth snap election that is going to put the new Prime Minister Takaichi and strong control of the economy at a time where she seeks to cement economic strength. These elections were just completed over the weekend, and we will see the results reflected in data in the weeks and months to come.

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Japan

Economy Watchers Indexes Show Firmness; Impact of Takaichi Election to Come in Months Ahead

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With the December report, Germany’s production and some of the early European industrial production data reveal a good deal of chaos in terms of the embedded trends. On the month, German industrial production fell by 1.9%, with consumer goods output up by 0.5%, capital goods output falling by 5.3%, and intermediate goods output falling by 1.2%. Among the early reporters in the monetary union—France, Spain, and Portugal—only Spain showed an increase in manufacturing IP in December; however, Spanish industrial production is notoriously volatile.

**Broader IP trends in Germany and elsewhere in Europe**
As for other early industrial production reporters, both Sweden and Norway showed strong-to-solid gains in December and each of them showed two-months of gains in a row. Beyond that, sequential growth rates from 12-months to six-months to three-months show accelerating growth in German consumer goods output against decelerating growth for intermediate goods. Real manufacturing output and real sales show mixed results- no clear trends; however, real manufacturing orders in Germany are off the map strong. 

**German manufacturing/industrial Surveys**
German industrial surveys from the IFO for manufacturing shows persistent weakening as well as for IFO manufacturing expectations, and in the EU Commission industrial index in the last three months. More broadly, Germany shows some modest but ongoing step up all of these based on average levels from 12-months to six-months to three-months for IFO expectations and the EU Commission industrial readings with mixed results for other survey readings.

**IP trends in Europe**
For the early reporting EMU members France, Spain, and Portugal, who report industrial production trends, each show mixed monthly trends against ongoing decelerations for manufacturing output over the broader sequential periods (12-month, to 6-month, to 3-month). However, for other Europe, Sweden and Norway, manufacturing trends are steadily accelerating on this broader timeline.

**A feeling of ‘Deja- What?’**
These combinations of opposed trends mixed with a lack of trends leave us with this sense of confusion about what's going on in manufacturing. For Germany, the extreme strength in orders is reassuring since orders should be forward-looking rather than backward-looking or even contemporaneous. But orders can also be a fickle series and so we'll have to watch it to see if the trends for German orders hold up.

**Current quarter-What’s been happening now**
In addition, current quarter growth for Germany actually looks quite good with industrial production up 3.7% at an annual rate in the current quarter, led by output increases in manufacturing against a decline in the intermediate goods output. Real orders in the quarter are surging at a 44% growth rate, while real sales in manufacturing only had a 0.1% uptick at an annual rate. The industrial indicators for Germany in the quarter show weakness or flatness with the only exception being IFO manufacturing expectations that advanced by a small amount. The three EMU members who report industrial production data show positive growth in the just-completed quarter except for Portugal where industrial production is falling at a 2.9% rate in the fourth quarter. Sweden and Norway, European countries but not monetary union members, show a strong 22% annual rate gain in Sweden against the 3% annual rate decline in Norway.

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**Rankings**
**How growth rates stack up…**
Moving away from short-term trends, the rankings of growth rates of these various metrics using 12-month growth rates on data back to 2006, show below-median growth rates for German industrial production and all three of its major sectors. All of them have rankings below the 50% mark where the median resides. Germany’s manufacturing output growth rate is below its median as is the growth of real sales; and once again real manufacturing orders break out and show a stunning 90th percentile standing, extremely strong compared to other growth rates on this period.

**Indicator rankings are poor**
However, the survey based industrial indicators for Germany, ranked based on their index levels, are all extremely weak and much weaker than German sector or other German metrics. The strongest indicator reading is the 29th percentile standing for IFO manufacturing expectations while the current ZEW index, IFO manufacturing index, and the EU Commission industrial readings, all reside below their 15th percentile. The survey rankings suggest that industrial sentiment is in much worse shape than activity and growth.

**IP elsewhere in Europe**
However, the growth ranking of manufacturing industrial production for the reporting EMU members and other European members are all quite solid, with percentile standings ranging from the 66th up to the 93rd percentile.

**Summing up**
From these data, Germany emerges as the weak economy compared with historic norms based on industrial production growth and indicator readings. However, there's a glimpse of positivity from the growth of real orders, and at the same time, some concern about ongoing sentiment for manufacturing in Germany as distinct from actual performance.

Germany

German IP Reveals Chaotic Trends

Andrew Cates

**The Global Monetary Policy Consensus**
The latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey points to a notably more balanced global monetary policy outlook over the coming year. In contrast to the pronounced easing bias that dominated much of the past two years, expectations are now more symmetric, with a similar number of central banks projected to raise rates as to ease policy. Japan is seen delivering further tightening, while Canada is expected to initiate an interest rate hike in coming months. In Australia’s case, this tightening guidance was reinforced this week, with the Reserve Bank lifting its policy rate by 25 basis points. Elsewhere, and in contrast, the euro area, UK and US are expected to move in the opposite direction.

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**US manufacturing activity**
The second chart underscores the recent improvement in US economic momentum, highlighted by an unexpected surge in the January ISM manufacturing PMI. After spending much of the past year hovering below the 50 threshold consistent with stagnation, the index jumped sharply back into expansionary territory, signalling a renewed pickup in industrial activity. This rebound has coincided with a broader run of stronger-than-anticipated US economic data, as reflected in the upswing in the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index. Together, these developments point to a US economy that continues to display notable resilience, complicating expectations of monetary easing in the near term.

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**US Bank Lending Standards and Financial Stress** 
The next chart turns to US financial conditions, highlighting the latest readings from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey. The net proportion of banks tightening lending standards on corporate loans and mortgages is now more modest by historical standards, and well below the extremes seen during past episodes of financial stress. Some easing in credit headwinds has occurred alongside relatively subdued readings on the OFR Financial Stress Index, which continues to hover below its long-run average. Together, these indicators suggest that the US financial system has continued to avoid the kind of acute stress typically associated with sharp slowdowns in credit availability—helping to underpin the recent resilience in economic activity.

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**Semiconductor Sales**
The fourth chart highlights the renewed surge in global semiconductor sales, with momentum strengthening sharply over recent months across the Americas, China and the broader Asia-Pacific region. After the cyclical downturn in 2022–23, sales have rebounded to fresh highs, reflecting a powerful revival in demand for advanced chips and related technologies. This upswing has taken place amid intense investor preoccupation with artificial intelligence, with expectations that AI adoption will drive a sustained wave of capital spending on data centres, cloud infrastructure and high-performance computing. In contrast, semiconductor sales in Europe remain comparatively subdued, reflecting the region’s smaller footprint in high-end chip manufacturing, weaker industrial demand, and the ongoing impact of slower economic growth. While semiconductors are inherently cyclical, markets have increasingly interpreted the current rebound elsewhere as structural rather than purely cyclical—underpinned by the belief that AI represents a transformative and durable source of demand growth.

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**Large-Scale AI Models**
The next chart illustrates the rapid proliferation of large-scale AI models globally, with newly updated data for 2025 pointing to a further sharp acceleration in development activity. The United States continues to lead by a wide margin, while China has also seen a steep rise in model deployment in recent years, underscoring the intensifying technological competition between the two economies. Growth in the UK and other regions has been more modest by comparison, highlighting the increasingly concentrated nature of AI innovation. Taken together with the surge in semiconductor sales, these trends help explain the market’s strong preoccupation with AI as a potential driver of future productivity and investment cycles—although the geographic concentration of activity also raises questions about the uneven distribution of any resulting economic gains.

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**An AI Bubble?** 
The final chart draws on the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts special questions, highlighting market participants’ perceptions of the economic gains likely to be delivered by artificial intelligence. While a sizeable share of respondents still believe that financial markets may be overestimating AI’s potential benefits, an increasing proportion now judge current expectations to be broadly accurate, with only a small minority viewing the gains as underestimated. Notably, this represents a softening in scepticism compared with the survey results from last month, when concerns about excessive market optimism were more pronounced. The shift suggests a growing acceptance that AI-related investment and innovation could translate into meaningful economic impacts—though uncertainty remains high around the scale, timing and distribution of these gains.

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Financial markets have experienced renewed gyrations in recent weeks, as shifting geopolitical risks, questions around Federal Reserve independence, renewed talk of US dollar “debasement,” and ongoing enthusiasm surrounding artificial intelligence have combined to drive volatility across asset classes. These cross-currents have also contributed to a degree of rotation away from high-flying technology stocks, as investors reassess valuations and the timing of anticipated AI-driven gains. Against this backdrop, the charts in this week’s COTW highlight several important themes. Policy rate expectations now appear more balanced globally, marking a clear shift away from the one-sided easing bias of the past two years (chart 1), even as resilient US data—underscored by the unexpected jump in the January ISM index and a run of positive economic surprises—continues to complicate the outlook for monetary easing (chart 2). At the same time, US financial conditions remain relatively benign, with limited evidence of widespread credit stress or aggressive tightening in lending standards (chart 3). Meanwhile, the sharp rebound in semiconductor sales and the accelerating rollout of large-scale AI models underscore why investors remain so focused on the AI narrative, even as Europe lags behind due to weaker industrial momentum and a smaller footprint in advanced chip production (charts 4 and 5). Finally, while some scepticism about AI’s ultimate economic impact persists, the latest survey results suggest a moderation in concerns that markets are materially overestimating its gains (chart 6). Taken together, these developments paint a picture of a US economy that remains more resilient than many had anticipated, set against a financial landscape increasingly shaped by powerful—if sometimes competing—narratives around geopolitics, policy, and technological transformation.

Charts of the Week: Balanced Policy, Resilient Data and AI Narratives

Winnie Tapasanun

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**Total job openings** fell 5.6% m/m (-12.9% y/y) to 6.542 million in December after a downwardly revised 7.0% decline to 6.928 million in November (previously -4.1% m/m; 7.146 million), according to the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. December marked the third consecutive m/m fall and the lowest level since September 2020. The job openings rate declined to 3.9% in December, the lowest since April 2020, from 4.2% in November, remaining below a record-high 7.4% in March 2022. This rate is calculated as the ratio of job openings to total nonfarm employment plus openings. Significantly, the drop in job openings also lowered the **ratio of job openings to unemployed individuals** to 0.872 in December—the lowest since March 2021—from 0.890 in November, down from 1.085 in December 2024 and a pre-pandemic 1.211 in February 2020. A reading of 0.872 implies there were about 0.87 open jobs per unemployed person—indicating fewer openings than unemployed workers. December was the fifth time in six months that this ratio remained below 1.0.

**Private sector job openings** fell 6.8% (-12.5% y/y) to 5.804 million in December after a 6.6% fall to 6.227 million in November, registering the third successive m/m decline and the lowest level since September 2020. The private sector job openings rate fell to 4.1% in December, the lowest since April 2020, from 4.4% in November. The December m/m decline in private sector openings reflected drops of 27.7% (-36.9% y/y) in financial activities, 20.2% (-25.5% y/y) in professional & business services, 14.4% (-5.1% y/y) in trade, transportation & utilities, and 5.2% (-12.4% y/y) in private educational & health services. To the upside, private sector openings in the following categories rose m/m in December: other services (21.1%; 11.0% y/y), mining & lodging (17.6%; 0.0% y/y), information (13.5%; -4.7% y/y), manufacturing (8.5%; 0.5% y/y), leisure & hospitality (7.5%; -17.2% y/y), and construction (2.8%; 42.4% y/y). Meanwhile, government job openings rose 5.3% (-15.6% y/y) in December, the first m/m rise in three months, after a 10.6% drop in November.

**Total hiring** rebounded 3.4% (-1.5% y/y) to 5.293 million in December, the first m/m increase since September, following a 4.6% decrease to 5.121 million in November. The hiring rate edged up to 3.3% in December from 3.2% in November, though it remained below pre-pandemic levels. **Private sector hiring** rose 3.1% (-0.4% y/y) to 4.978 million in December, the third m/m rise in four months, after a 4.0% decline to 4.826 million in November. The private sector hiring rate rose to 3.7% in December from 3.5% in November, the same as in October and September. The December m/m increase in private sector hiring was led by a 32.1% jump (42.3% y/y) in information, followed by gains of 24.0% (-4.6% y/y) in financial activities, 23.5% (0.0% y/y) in mining & lodging, 6.5% (-4.8% y/y) in private educational & health services, 4.2% (-4.9% y/y) in trade, transportation & utilities, 3.6% (6.1% y/y) in construction, 3.4% (7.9% y/y) in leisure & hospitality, and 1.8% (-4.3% y/y) in manufacturing. To the downside, private sector hiring in professional & business services (-5.2%; +0.5% y/y) and other services (-4.3%; -16.5% y/y) declined m/m in December. Meanwhile, government hiring rebounded 6.4% (-16.3% y/y) in December, the first m/m rise since September, following a 13.5% drop in November.

**Total separations** rose 2.1% (3.3% y/y) to 5.251 million in December after a 1.5% rise to 5.144 million in November, marking the third m/m increase in four months and the highest level since September. The total separations rate edged up to 3.3% after holding at 3.2% in November and October. Private sector separations rose 1.6% (4.2% y/y) to 4.932 million in December, the highest level since June, while government sector separations jumped 10.4% (-9.1% y/y) to 319,000 following two consecutive m/m declines. **Total quits** (voluntary separations initiated by the employee) increased 0.3% (3.5% y/y) to 3.204 million in December, the third m/m rise in four months and the highest level since June, after a 7.4% rebound in November. The quits rate (a measure of workers’ willingness or ability to leave jobs) held at 2.0% in December and November, slightly below 2.3% in February 2020. Private sector quits eased 0.2% (+4.5% y/y) following an 8.4% November rebound. **Layoffs and discharges** (involuntary separations initiated by the employer) increased 3.6% (5.6% y/y) to 1.762 million in December, up for the third time in four months, after an 8.1% drop in November. The layoffs & discharges rate remained at 1.1% in December and November, marginally below 1.3% in February 2020. Private sector layoffs grew 4.3% (7.8% y/y) following a 7.3% November decrease.

The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database.

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- Job openings down 5.6% (-12.9% y/y) to 6.542 mil., third straight m/m decline.
- Hiring up 3.4% (-1.5% y/y) to 5.293 mil., first m/m increase since September.
- Separations rise to a three-month high; quits reach a six-month high; layoffs rebound.

U.S. JOLTS: Openings Drop to Lowest Level Since Sept. ’20; Hiring Rebounds in December

**The Blue Chip Growth Consensus**
The first chart this week highlights a striking feature of recent forecast revisions: the outperformance of Asia, and Taiwan in particular. Over the past six months, Blue Chip panelists have upgraded their 2026 GDP growth forecasts most aggressively for Taiwan, far outpacing revisions elsewhere. This reflects the central role Taiwan plays in the global AI supply chain, especially in advanced semiconductors, where demand linked to data centres, AI accelerators and high-performance computing continues to strengthen. More broadly, positive revisions across parts of Asia suggest that the current AI-driven investment cycle is not just a US story, but one that is increasingly feeding through global tech supply chains, boosting exports, industrial production and capital spending across the region. In contrast, forecast changes elsewhere remain far more muted, underscoring how tightly the near-term growth impulse from AI is concentrated in economies most directly exposed to the semiconductor and hardware build-out.

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**The Blue Chip Inflation Consensus**
The second chart highlights a growing theme of cross-country divergence, this time through the lens of inflation and monetary policy. Recent changes to Blue Chip CPI forecasts for 2026 show upward revisions in economies such as Japan, Australia and Canada, where inflation pressures are proving more persistent and policy tightening is either already under way or increasingly expected. In contrast, inflation forecasts in the US have been revised lower, consistent with softer recent data and reinforcing expectations of further monetary easing. The result is an increasingly asymmetric global policy backdrop: some central banks are still leaning against residual inflation risks, while others are preparing to shift toward rate cuts. This divergence, moreover, could matter more for global capital flows, exchange rates and financial conditions in the period ahead.

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**South Korea’s Semiconductor Trade**
The third chart provides a concrete, high-frequency illustration of the forces underpinning the forecast upgrades seen earlier for Asia. South Korea’s semiconductor exports have surged sharply on a year-on-year basis, marking one of the strongest upswings of the past decade and underscoring the revival of the global tech cycle. This acceleration is closely linked to AI-related demand, particularly for advanced memory chips used in data centres and high-performance computing. Alongside Taiwan, South Korea sits at the core of the AI hardware supply chain, and the strength of semiconductor exports helps explain why growth expectations in parts of Asia have been revised higher so decisively. In this sense, the chart offers a real-economy counterpart to the consensus forecast revisions: the AI boom is not just a financial or expectations story, but one that is already showing up clearly in trade and industrial data across the region.

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**Global Supply Chain Pressures**
The fourth chart places recent inflation dynamics in a broader supply-chain context and offers little evidence that current US tariff policies are materially exacerbating global bottlenecks. The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has remained close to historical norms in recent months, a sharp contrast with the extreme dislocations seen during the pandemic period. Consistent with this, producer price inflation across advanced economies has remained muted, reinforcing the tight relationship between supply-chain stress and upstream price pressures. While tariffs may still influence relative prices at the margin and contribute to sector-specific adjustments, the data do not point to a broad-based resurgence in supply-chain pressures of the kind that would generate renewed, systemic inflationary pressure.

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**Uncertainty in the US versus Europe** 
The fifth chart highlights a striking shift in the global policy uncertainty landscape. The US news-based economic policy uncertainty index has risen sharply and is now approaching levels more typically associated with Europe — a vivid contrast with the post-GFC and post-pandemic period, when US policy uncertainty was consistently well below European norms. This convergence likely reflects a combination of factors: renewed uncertainty around US trade policy and tariffs, questions over fiscal sustainability and debt dynamics, and growing debate around institutional independence, including the role of the Federal Reserve. At the same time, political polarisation and an increasingly unpredictable policy environment have become more prominent features of the US backdrop. The implications are potentially important for markets. A sustained rise in policy uncertainty would argue for a higher risk premium on US assets, particularly if it begins to influence corporate investment decisions, capital flows or the perceived safe-haven status of US markets.

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**The Global Business Cycle** 
The final chart brings the story together by highlighting a further strengthening in global economic sentiment in February. The Sentix global expectations index moved higher alongside a renewed run of positive economic surprises across a number of major economies, as captured by the Citi Global Economic Surprise Index. This combination points to an environment in which incoming data have consistently exceeded expectations, helping to reinforce investor confidence and support risk appetite. Taken together, the improvement in sentiment and the upside surprise in activity data underscore the constructive macroeconomic backdrop that markets have been responding to in recent months — one characterised by resilient growth, easing inflation pressures and still-supportive financial conditions, even as policy paths and regional dynamics continue to diverge.

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While markets have been unsettled at times by shifting policy expectations, geopolitical noise and questions around valuation, underlying global macroeconomic signals remain broadly supportive. Upgrades to Blue Chip consensus growth forecasts for parts of Asia — led by Taiwan — point to the tangible impact of the AI-driven tech cycle, a theme reinforced by the sharp rebound in semiconductor exports from South Korea (charts 1 and 3). At the same time, revisions to inflation forecasts underline a growing divergence in monetary policy paths, with easing still expected in the US and UK, while tighter stances persist elsewhere (chart 2). Importantly, there is little evidence so far that global supply-chain pressures are re-emerging in a way that would reignite inflation, notwithstanding lingering trade policy tensions (chart 4). Against this backdrop, rising policy uncertainty — particularly in the US — stands out as a potential source of risk, with implications for asset pricing and risk premia (chart 5). Yet the improvement in global sentiment surveys and a continued run of positive economic surprises suggest that markets are responding not just to policy noise, but to a genuinely resilient and improving macroeconomic environment (chart 6).

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Charts of the Week: AI-Led Growth Meets Monetary Divergence

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