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[SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) is a seamless interface between Haver and SAS data processing that enables SAS users to read economic and financial time series data that reside in a Haver Analytics DLX (Data Link Express) database. [SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) requires both SAS/ETS and Base SAS Software.

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Bootcamp and Econometric Tools 1 & 2

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Remote Training: Applied Time Series in Python

Futures market thinks the price of oil will recede significantly over the next six months

Winnie Tapasanun

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Existing home sales fell 3.6% m/m (-1.0% y/y) to 3.98 million units (SAAR) in March, the lowest level since June 2025, following a 2.7% rebound to 4.13 million in February (previously +1.7%; 4.09 mil.), according to the National Association of Realtors (NAR). The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected March sales of 4.08 million units. Sales remained 38.1% below a high of 6.43 million in January 2022 and 39.7% below a peak of 6.60 million in January 2021. The March fall coincided with an increase in the average 30-year fixed mortgage rate to a three-month-high 6.18% in March after declining to 6.05% in February, according to Freddie Mac. The sales figures are based on closings of sales contracts signed over the past couple of months.

Existing single-family home sales fell 3.5% (-0.3% y/y) to 3.63 million units in March, the second m/m fall in three months and the weakest reading since June 2025, after a 3.3% increase to 3.76 million in February. Sales of condos and co-ops slid 5.4% (-7.9% y/y) to 350,000, the fourth m/m slide in five months and the lowest level since May 2020, on top of a 2.6% February fall to 370,000.

By region, March existing home sales declined m/m across all major regions. Sales in the Northeast dropped 8.5% (-12.2% y/y) to 430,000 in March after a 6.0% decrease in February, marking the third consecutive m/m fall and a record low. Sales in the Midwest fell 4.2% (-3.2% y/y) to 920,000, the lowest reading since September 2024, reversing a 3.2% February increase. Sales in the South slid 3.1% (+2.2% y/y) to 1.86 million after a 3.2% February rise. Sales in the West fell 1.3% (+1.3% y/y) to 770,000 following a 6.8% February rebound. The Midwest, South, and West each posted the second m/m decline in three months. Notably, the South remained the dominant region, accounting for 46.7% of total U.S. existing home sales.

The median price of all existing homes (NSA) rose 2.7% (1.4% y/y) to $408,800 in March, the highest since November, following a 0.8% increase to $398,000 in February (unrevised) and three successive m/m declines. Prices were 5.5% below a high of $432,700 in June 2025 but 13.3% above a low of $360,800 in January 2023. The median price of an existing single-family home grew 2.5% (1.3% y/y) to $412,400 in March, the highest since November, after a 1.0% rebound to $402,300 in February. The median price of condos and co-ops, up for the third time in four months, climbed 4.8% (2.3% y/y) to $371,500, the highest since June 2025, following a 2.9% February drop to $354,400. Regionally, overall prices rose m/m in March in the Midwest (+3.8%; +4.9% y/y), Northeast (+3.5%; +5.7% y/y), West (+2.7%; -1.3% y/y), and South (+1.7%; +0.8% y/y).

Inventories of homes for sale increased for the third consecutive in March. The number of existing homes for sale (NSA) rose 3.0% (2.3% y/y) to 1.36 million units, the highest level since November, following a 4.8% February rise to 1.32 million. The supply of homes on the market at the current selling rate (NSA) rose to 4.1 months, the highest in four months, after holding at 3.8 months in February and January. The recent high of 4.6 months was in August 2025, while a record low in supply of 1.6 months was in January 2022.

The data on existing home sales, prices and affordability are compiled by the National Association of Realtors. The data on single-family home sales extend back to February 1968. Total sales and price data and regional sales can be found in Haver's **USECON** database. Regional price and affordability data and national inventory data are available in the **REALTOR** database. Mortgage interest rates can be found in the **WEEKLY** database. The expectations figure is from the Action Economics Forecast Survey, reported in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- March sales -3.6% m/m to lower-than-expected 3.98 mil.; -1.0% y/y, fifth straight y/y decrease.
- Broad-based regional m/m declines: Northeast (-8.5%), Midwest (-4.2%), South (-3.1%), West (-1.3%); y/y sales up in the South and West but down in the Northeast and Midwest.
- Median sales price +2.7% (+1.4% y/y) to $408,800, highest since November.
- Unsold inventory +3.0% (+2.3% y/y) to four-month-high 1.36 mil. units; 4.1 months' supply.

U.S. Existing Home Sales Drop in March to a Nine-Month Low

Robert Brusca

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As the chart makes clear, Dutch exports and imports are driven by very complementary forces and tend to track one another closely. Both flows boomed when COVID ended, slowed to a contraction in 2023, and then recovered to maintain steady levels (growth rates that hugged a zero-percent growth rate) from mid-2024 to late-2025. Recently, exports and imports have begun to weaken, with both flows showing contraction over 12 months. Goods imports are falling at a 5.5% pace as exports are falling at a 4% pace. 

As for intra-year trends, the sequential growth rates show exports have transitioned into a progressively more contractive mode, while imports have declined over 12 months, six months, and three months, but without a clear signal on whether the trend is getting better or worse.

Of course, the trade flow depends on price trends and economic trends; both are under strain and uncertainty.

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The S&P Global PMIs had been tracing improvement through February, but their March values showed a broad weakening globally. We have yet to see the March number for Dutch trade in that window, but it’s coming, and we should brace for things to get worse. Oil prices, of course, will be rising sharply, and there are concerns about the knock-on effects of higher oil prices on activity. Already there are supply chain disruptions for goods other than oil, with fertilizers and helium frequently cited. It is the planting season for farms, and fertilizer is in strong demand. Helium is an input into the chip-making process, and a shortage is not good for the tech sector. The largest hub producing helium is in Qatar, and it has been shuttered since the war in Iran began.

If the closure of the Strait of Hormuz drags on—and the newest development is that the U.S. has put an embargo on that passage—we will have to see what other shortages develop and how bad the oil shortage becomes. It is a difficult time; it comes during a period in which central banks have largely been missing their inflation targets, leaving them less flexibility to deal with shortages and fallout.  The Bank of England and the European Central Bank have put markets on notice that, if the Iran conflict drags on, at their next meeting rate hikes are quite possible. In the U.S., the Fed has given markets no guidance.

So far, the Baltic dry index has held up and does not show any clear evidence of global trade slowing. But that is something else to watch for. In economics, there is an expression about how things happen. And it says: first things take longer than you expect to occur, and then they progress at pace much faster than expected. There may not be a good warning period if these conditions worsen.

Netherlands

Dutch Trade Trends Improve Goods Balance—for Now

Tian Yong Woon

In this week’s Letter, we continue to track developments in the Middle East and their implications for Asia. While the recent US–Iran ceasefire initially provided some relief to markets, subsequent complications have kept uncertainty elevated, with no conclusive resumption of trade flows yet through the Strait of Hormuz (chart 1)—flows that are critical to restoring the global energy system to more normal conditions.

Overall, our Blue Chip Economic Indicators panellists have broadly downgraded growth expectations for Asia this year, with the exceptions of China and Taiwan, while inflation forecasts have been revised higher across the board (chart 2). That said, the growth and inflation impact from the conflict are largely viewed as transitory, with most panellists expecting them to last between six and twelve months (chart 3). Nonetheless, central banks in the region appear increasingly reluctant to ease policy further. This is evident in the latest round of decisions, where India, South Korea, and New Zealand all held policy rates steady (chart 4), citing heightened uncertainty stemming from the ongoing conflict.

While inflationary pressures are beginning to build more broadly across the region, China had already been experiencing a pickup in recent months (chart 5). This has been supported by easing producer price deflation and improving industrial profits, alongside policy efforts to curb excessive price competition among producers. Attention now turns to China’s upcoming Q1 GDP release and the full slate of monthly data due later this week (chart 6).

**Middle east conflict developments**
Crude oil prices fell sharply earlier last week following news of a temporary US–Iran ceasefire. That said, the geopolitical backdrop remains highly fragile, as reflected in continued rhetoric from both sides, alongside the US announcement of a naval blockade over the strait after talks failed to yield an agreement. Compounding this, Iran has indicated that it cannot fully reopen the strait, citing uncertainty over the location of sea mines it had previously laid—further complicating any swift normalization of oil flows. Even prior to these latest developments, IMF-tracked shipping volumes had only begun to show tentative signs of recovery and remain well below pre-escalation levels. As such, while the ceasefire provides a welcome reprieve, meaningful economic relief will hinge on a sustained restoration of oil flows—crucially without additional frictions or costs that could impair global trade. Until then, crude prices are likely to remain elevated, albeit possibly off recent highs, weighing on growth while sustaining inflationary pressures. In Asia, where many economies are heavily reliant on oil imports, the region is likely to bear a disproportionate share of these effects.

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**The latest Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey**
In light of recent developments, our latest Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI) survey provides a timely update. It is a monthly poll of forecasters covering key economic indicators across a wide range of economies. As shown in chart 2, panellists have generally trimmed their 2026 growth forecasts across most Asian economies. Taiwan is a notable exception, with growth expectations revised higher, likely continuing to be supported by the ongoing AI-driven expansion. Meanwhile, forecasts for China’s 2026 growth were left unchanged. On the inflation front, expectations for 2026 have been revised higher across all Asian economies, consistent with the pass-through from the recent surge in oil prices. The largest upward revision was seen in Australia (+0.7 ppts), while increases were more modest in economies such as Japan and China (+0.3 ppts each).

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Digging deeper into this month’s BCEI survey, the special questions provide additional insight into panellists’ views. In particular, one question asked about the time horizon over which current energy supply chain disruptions are expected to materially affect global inflation and growth. Panellists largely view the impact as short term (chart 3), with most clustering around a six- to twelve-month window. Smaller shares see effects lasting either less than six months or extending between one and three years, while only a very small minority expect disruptions to persist beyond three years. Overall, while the recent oil price surge represents a clear shock to the global economy, it is widely seen as transitory—temporarily lifting inflation and weighing modestly on growth, but unlikely to drive a fundamental shift in the broader macroeconomic outlook.

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**The week’s central bank decisions**
Turning to last week’s key monetary policy decisions in the region, the central banks of India (RBI), South Korea (BoK), and New Zealand (RBNZ) all kept policy rates unchanged, with several common threads across their communications. Notably, each highlighted the considerable uncertainty stemming from the Middle East conflict, which has already begun to feed into global inflation via higher oil prices. This aligns with broader investor sentiment: the bar for further policy easing has risen given renewed inflationary pressures, while the threshold for a shift toward tightening remains high, as most economies are still far from overheating. On central bank–specific nuances, the RBI emphasized the delicate trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations and minimizing growth sacrifices. The BoK noted that its policy rate is around the neutral level, while flagging potential additional pressure on the won from elevated oil prices. Meanwhile, the RBNZ signalled that near-term inflation is likely to rise even as the economic recovery softens, citing significant supply chain disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict.

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**China and the week ahead**
Lastly, we turn to China and the week ahead. As shown in chart 5, even prior to the Middle East conflict, China had already begun to see a pickup in inflation—an early indication that it may be moving out of its prolonged period of chronically low, or even negative, price pressures. This recent firming in CPI inflation has been accompanied by more sustained growth in industrial profits and a steady improvement in producer price pressures, with PPI inflation recently turning positive after a multi-year stretch of deflation. Together, these trends point to gradually strengthening price dynamics. The shift in inflation also reflects underlying policy efforts to curb excessive price competition among producers, which had weighed on prices for an extended period. Looking ahead, the recent oil price shock could provide an additional boost to inflation, as higher energy costs begin to feed through into future readings.

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Looking ahead to the coming week, Asia faces a packed data calendar, with the spotlight firmly on China as its Q1 GDP release and the usual slate of monthly indicators are due (chart 6). A key focus will be how March data shapes overall Q1 growth, particularly given that activity in the first two months of the year largely surprised to the upside. Investors will also be watching for any early signs of spillovers from the Middle East conflict in the March prints. Retail sales will be closely monitored as a gauge of the effectiveness of policy support for consumption, while developments in house prices will remain in focus as the property downturn continues to unfold gradually.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: A Shifting Consensus

Michael J. Moran

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The Consumer Price Index rose 0.9% in March, easily the sharpest monthly rise since the inflation burst in 2022. Although pronounced in magnitude, the increase was not surprising, as essentially all analysts had built in pressure from the energy sector. Energy prices jumped 10.9%, led by a surge of 21.2% in gasoline prices. Other energy components wiggled: charges for electricity services rose 0.8%, offsetting declines in the prior two months; a drop 0.9% in the price of natural gas services followed sharp increases in the prior three months.

The press report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed food prices as unchanged, but calculating the shift to more than one decimal point showed a marginal decline (-0.005%) The dip was almost imperceptible, but it nevertheless was a welcome rarity. The decline occurred in the food-at-home component (i.e. grocery store prices, -0.2%); prices of food away from home (i.e. at restaurants and bars) rose 0.2%.

Core prices rose 0.2 percent, softer than the expected increase of 0.3%. Only two areas posted high-side readings. Apparel prices increased 1.0% after a jump of 1.3% in February, perhaps reflecting hope for an active spring selling season. Airfares jumped 2.7%, hardly surprising in light of recent energy developments. Sharper increases are likely in coming months because of higher fuel prices. Most other core items were contained, including declines of 1.0% in medical-care commodities and 0.4% in the prices of used motor vehicles. Prices of medical-care commodities have been quiet since the middle of 2024; the latest year-over-year change totaled only 0.3%. Prices of used cars and trucks have declined for four consecutive months, leaving a year-over-year decline of 3.2%.

Although core prices were well contained in March, the outlook is uncertain because of potential passthrough from higher energy prices. At the same time, recent trends in the inflation rates for core goods and core services offer a reason to be optimistic, as both are decelerating. As shown in the left chart below, core goods prices in the past six months have been subdued, which has pulled the year-over-year change from 1.5% last fall (August to October) to 1.2% in March. Core service prices, shown in the right chart below, have registered changes of 0.3% or 0.4% in the three months before the 0.2% reading in March. However, results for October and November were restrained, and changes in the past six months in total show deceleration. The year-over-year change of 3.0% in core service prices in March reflects an advance of 3.3% in the first six months of this span (annual rate) and 2.7% in the past six months. The pattern is choppy, but it traces a decelerating trend.

The Consumer Price figures can be found in Haver's **USECON** database. The expectations figure is contained in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Gasoline prices drove the energy component higher; electricity prices also contributed.
- Food prices provided a surprise by posting a fractional decline.
- Core prices rose less than expected; both goods and services components were contained.

March CPI: Pressure in the Energy Sector (as Expected); Tame Elsewhere (Surprisingly)

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Total factory orders were virtually unchanged m/m in February following a flat reading in January and a 0.4% decline in December, data from the U.S. Census Bureau showed. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected a 0.2% m/m February increase. The year-on-year growth rate eased to 3.7% in February, the lowest since October, from 4.2% in January (+3.0% in February 2025), remaining far below the April 2021 peak of 39.6%. Notably, orders for nondefense aircraft & parts plunged 28.6% m/m in February following decreases of 1.7% in January and 22.7% in December, while orders for defense aircraft & parts fell 2.1% after a 26.9% January slump and an 11.8% December jump. Factory orders excluding defense edged up 0.1% (3.6% y/y), the third m/m increase in four months, following a 0.4% January rebound. Factory orders excluding the transportation sector rose 1.2% (2.5% y/y), the strongest of four consecutive m/m gains, after a 0.5% January increase.

Durable goods orders fell 1.3% (+7.4% y/y) in February after a 0.4% decline in January (in line with a 1.4% m/m decrease in the advance report on April 7), marking the fourth m/m decline in five months. The February m/m fall reflected a 5.3% orders drop (+10.2% y/y) in transportation equipment following a 1.9% January decrease, alongside m/m declines of 0.5% (+2.4% y/y) in furniture & related products and 0.3% (+4.9% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components. Other major durable goods orders categories rose m/m in February, led by a 2.4% gain (10.5% y/y) in primary metals, followed by increases of 1.7% (9.5% y/y) in machinery, 0.5% (5.4% y/y) in fabricated metal products, and 0.2% (7.7% y/y) in computers & electronic products.

Nondurable goods orders, which equal nondurable goods shipments, advanced 1.5% (0.1% y/y) in February, the biggest of three successive m/m gains, after a 0.5% increase in January. The February m/m rise was led by a 6.2% jump (-6.4% y/y) in petroleum & coal products, followed by gains of 5.9% (-5.8% y/y) leather & allied products, 1.2% (-2.8% y/y) in textile mills, 1.0% (1.6% y/y) in paper products, 0.9% (1.2% y/y) in plastics & rubber products, 0.6% (3.7% y/y) in beverage & tobacco products, 0.5% (3.2% y/y) in chemical products, 0.4% (3.2% y/y) in apparel, and 0.2% (0.5% y/y) in food products. To the downside, nondurable goods shipments for textile products (-1.4%; -1.5% y/y) and printing (-0.4%; -0.9% y/y) fell m/m in February following their January increases.

Total shipments rose 1.4% (3.5% y/y) in February after gains of 0.7% in January and December, registering the fourth m/m rise in five months. Excluding transportation, shipments advanced 1.4% (2.3% y/y), the fifth m/m gain in six months, after a 0.5% January increase. Shipments of durable goods industries also rose 1.4% (6.9% y/y), up for the fifth time in six months, after a 0.9% January gain. This reflected m/m increases across nearly all durable goods shipments categories, led by a 2.5% rise (10.1% y/y) in primary metals, followed by gains of 1.7% (5.5% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components, 1.7% (4.0% y/y) in furniture & related products, 1.6% (9.7% y/y) in transportation equipment, 1.4% (7.6% y/y) in machinery, 1.3% (3.8% y/y) in nonmetallic mineral products, 1.0% (6.1% y/y) in computers & electronic products, 1.0% (2.5% y/y) in miscellaneous durable goods, and 0.9% (5.4% y/y) in fabricated metal products. In contrast, durable goods shipments for wood products were the only category with a monthly decline in February, easing 0.1% (-2.9% y/y) following a flat January reading.

Unfilled orders edged up 0.1% (11.1% y/y) in February, the smallest of seven consecutive m/m increases, following a 0.6% rise in January. Excluding transportation, unfilled orders grew 0.2% (1.9% y/y), up for the seventh straight month, after a 0.3% January increase. Backlogs of durable goods ticked up 0.1% (11.1% y/y) in February, led by gains of 0.5% (2.0% y/y) in machinery and 0.2% (4.9% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components, partially offset by declines of 0.7% (+1.5% y/y) in furniture & related products and 0.1% (+2.3% y/y) in primary metals.

Inventories inched up 0.1% (0.8% y/y) in February, the fourth successive m/m increase, following matching 0.1% gains in January and December. Excluding transportation, inventories edged up 0.1% (1.0% y/y) after no change in January. Durable goods inventories increased 0.1% (1.8% y/y) in February after rising 0.2% for four straight months, while nondurable goods inventories were virtually unchanged (-0.8% y/y) after declining 0.3% in January and December.

The factory sector data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics Forecast Survey is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Factory orders virtually unchanged (+3.7% y/y) in Feb. for second straight month; still 7.6% above the Jan. ’24 low.
- Durable goods orders (-1.3%), fourth m/m fall in five mths.; nondurable goods orders (+1.5%), largest of three successive m/m gains; shipments (+1.4%), fourth m/m rise in five mths.
- Transportation orders -5.3% m/m, led by a 28.6% plunge in nondefense aircraft orders.
- Unfilled orders +0.1%, smallest of seven straight m/m increases.
- Inventories +0.1%, holding within a narrow 0.1%-0.2% range for four consecutive mths.

U.S. Factory Orders Flat in February on Weak Nondefense Aircraft Orders

Andrew Cates

**Positive Growth Surprises, Negative Inflation Surprises—For Now**
The global macro backdrop heading into the latest Middle East shock was, by recent standards, relatively constructive. As the chart shows, growth data had been consistently surprising to the upside, while inflation surprises have been in negative territory—an unusually benign combination suggesting resilient activity alongside easing price pressures. What is striking, however, is that—at least through March and into early April—this pattern has not yet been meaningfully dislodged. For now, the data flow still reflects a world that was stabilising rather than deteriorating. That said, this is almost certainly a lagging signal. Supply-side shocks of this nature—particularly those centred on energy—tend to work with a delay but can be highly disruptive once they feed through. The risk, therefore, is that the current “goldilocks” surprise dynamic proves short-lived as higher energy costs, supply chain frictions and rising uncertainty begin to reshape the incoming data in the weeks ahead.

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**Monetary Policy Expectations Shift as Easing Bets Are Repriced**
How policymakers respond to the evolving situation in the Middle East will be critical in shaping both market dynamics and the broader global outlook. This chart, based on the latest April Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey, suggests that expectations are already beginning to shift. Forecasters are now less inclined to anticipate policy easing in the period ahead—particularly in the euro area, where expectations for rate cuts have been scaled back. Similarly, some of the easing previously priced for the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England has been pared back over the next 12 months. While this is not yet a full pivot toward tightening, it does point to a more cautious policy backdrop, reflecting the risk that renewed energy-driven inflation pressures could constrain central banks’ ability to support growth.

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**Delay, Don’t Tighten: Central Banks’ Likely Playbook**
If the previous chart highlights a shift in policy expectations, this one gives a clearer sense of the reaction function underpinning it. When asked how central banks would respond if energy-driven inflation proves more persistent, most panellists point not to renewed tightening, but to a more cautious delay in easing. In other words, the hurdle for rate cuts has risen, even if the bar for  hikes remains relatively high. This distinction matters. It suggests that policymakers are likely to treat the shock as a supply-driven inflation impulse—one that complicates the outlook but does not automatically warrant aggressive tightening. At the same time, the responses underscore a second important theme: divergence. A sizeable share of forecasters expect policy paths to vary significantly across regions, reflecting differences in energy exposure, inflation dynamics and domestic growth conditions. Taken together, the message is one of constrained flexibility. Central banks may want to support growth, but persistent energy pressures could keep them on hold for longer than previously anticipated—reinforcing the more cautious policy outlook already evident in market pricing.

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**Markets Signal Fiscal Concern, Not Inflation Panic**
If central banks are likely to proceed cautiously, financial markets are already beginning to draw their own conclusions. This chart shows that the recent adjustment in US Treasury markets has been driven primarily by a rise in real yields rather than a meaningful increase in inflation expectations. In other words, markets are not yet pricing a loss of monetary policy credibility or a sharp unanchoring of inflation expectations. Instead, the move points more toward concerns around the broader policy mix—particularly the fiscal backdrop and the potential for increased borrowing needs in an environment of heightened geopolitical risk. This distinction is important. A rise in inflation expectations would suggest fears of central banks falling behind the curve. What we are seeing instead is a repricing of real rates, consistent with tighter financial conditions and a higher risk premium. For now, at least, markets appear to view the shock less as a classic inflation spiral and more as a development that complicates the growth outlook and places greater strain on policy frameworks—especially on the fiscal side.

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**Electricity Prices Reflect Energy Dependence**
The initial response in electricity markets since the Middle East disruption has followed a familiar pattern. Economies with greater domestic energy capacity—such as Scandinavia and, to a lesser extent, the US—have seen relatively contained electricity prices. By contrast, those more reliant on imported energy—most notably the UK and parts of Europe—continue to face significantly higher costs

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**Generation Capacity Determines Energy Resilience**
These price dynamics are closely linked to underlying differences in electricity generation capacity. As the sixth chart shows, countries with higher per capita electricity production—again including Scandinavia and the US—are structurally better positioned to absorb external shocks. In contrast, economies with more limited domestic generation capacity, such as the UK and Germany, are inherently more exposed to fluctuations in global energy markets. This structural divide is likely to prove increasingly important in the period ahead, influencing not just near-term inflation outcomes but also the relative resilience of growth across economies as energy costs remain volatile.

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Amid further tentative signs of de-escalation—most notably President Trump’s decision on April 7th to step back from further escalation—financial markets have stabilised somewhat, but the macroeconomic implications of the Middle East crisis remain highly uncertain. As our charts show, the global economy entered this shock from a position of relative strength, with positive growth surprises and easing inflation pressures still evident in the data (chart 1). However, that benign backdrop now looks vulnerable. Central banks are already reassessing the outlook, with expectations for policy easing being pared back (chart 2) and a growing consensus that any response to persistent energy-driven inflation will likely involve delaying cuts rather than tightening aggressively—albeit with significant regional divergence (chart 3). Financial markets, for their part, are not yet signalling a loss of inflation control, but the rise in real yields suggests increasing concern around the broader policy mix, particularly fiscal pressures (chart 4). Finally, the adjustment to the shock is unlikely to be uniform. Structural differences in domestic energy capacity are already driving wide divergences in electricity prices, leaving more import-dependent economies exposed to higher costs and sharper trade-offs between growth and inflation (charts 5 and 6). Taken together, the message is clear: even if geopolitical tensions ease, the economic aftershocks are likely to be uneven, persistent and increasingly shaped by structural constraints.

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Charts of the Week: From Oil Shock to Policy Dilemma

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This monthly report is always packed with information relating to the household sector. At this time, most observers will probably be most interested in price developments, and the results for February were a bit unsettling. The headline price index rose 0.4%, influenced by a jump of 0.8% in energy prices. This increase was largely anticipated and not especially troubling when viewed in isolation. Energy prices have shown little net change in the past two years, and the latest reading of the index was comfortably within the recent range of observations. However, given developments in the Middle East, energy prices undoubtedly will surge out of that recent range in the months ahead.

Core PCE prices also rose 0.4%, a touch firmer than the expected increase of 0.3%. An increase of 0.4% in core inflation is a quick pace even when viewed in Isolation, but this advance followed a similar increase in January, and the December reading almost rounded to 0.4%. These recent changes pulled the year-over-year increase in core prices to 3.0%, a full percentage point above the Federal Reserve’s target.

Nominal personal income dipped 0.1% in February, which translated to a decline of 0.4% after adjusting for inflation (almost rounding to -0.5%). The softness is striking, but a review of the detail suggests that special factors played a role. Much of the weakness reflected a decline of 1.7% in dividend income, which followed a jump of 1.9% in January. Dividend payments in the prior two years followed the same pattern, leaving one to suspect that seasonal adjustment has gone awry. Government transfer payments also declined, with the miscellaneous category accounting for most of the drop. Medicaid payments also fell, marking the fifth consecutive decline, most likely driven by the tightening of provisions included in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

Nominal consumer expenditures rose 0.5%, a seemingly strong result, but the change amounted to only 0.1% in real terms. The small increase followed a flat reading in January and increases of only 0.1% in November and December. Consumers spent actively in the second and third quarters of last year, but they have become cautious recently. The data in hand suggest real outlay growth of approximately 1.0% in the first quarter, slower than the average pace of 3.0% in the middle of last year and 1.9% in 2025-Q4.

The personal income and consumption figures are available in Haver’s **USECON** database with detail in the **USNA** database. The Action Economics forecasts are in **AS1REPNA**.

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- The energy component contributed to a high-side reading on the price index for personal consumption expenditures; the core component was firm as well.
- Consumer spending showed signs of slowing.

Personal Income, Consumption, and Prices: Higher Prices Dampen Real Gains

Sandy Batten

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The third estimate of Q4 2025 GDP showed that real GDP growth slowed to 0.5% q/q saar versus 0.7% in the second estimate and 1.4% in the advance estimate. GDP had grown 4.4% in Q3. The more than one-month long shutdown of the federal government continued to have been a notable restraint on GDP growth in Q4, subtracting 1.0%-point from overall growth, the same as in the second estimate.

Revisions were very small across major expenditure categories. Growth of personal consumption expenditures was revised down slightly to 1.9% q/q saar from 2.0% previously. Nonresidential fixed investment increased 2.4%, up slightly from the 2.2% reported in the second estimate. The 0.5% q/q decline previously reported for residential investment was revised to a larger decline of 1.7%, subtracting 0.1%-point from overall growth versus 0.0%-point in the previous estimate. Inventories declined more than previously estimated, reducing their contribution to growth from 0.3%-point in the second estimate to 0.1%-point in today’s estimate.

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There were slight downward revisions to the declines previously reported for both exports and imports, leaving net exports essentially unrevised. As already noted, a 16.6% q/q saar plunge in federal government spending (revised down slightly from -16.7%) accounted for most of the weakness in Q4. This included a 24.3% q/q collapse in nondefense spending, the second largest quarterly decline in nearly forty years. By contrast, state and local government spending increased 1.5%, revised up from 1.2% in the previous estimate.

Private domestic demand growth (final sales to private domestic purchasers, a favored gauge of demand by the Federal Reserve) was revised slower to 1.8% q/q saar in Q4 from 1.9% in the second estimate and 2.4% in the advance report. However, even the revised pace of growth is respectable and close to the economy’s potential growth rate.

The GDP data can be found in Haver’s **USECON** and **USNA** databases. **USNA** contains virtually all of the Bureau of Economic Analysis detail in the national accounts. The Action Economics consensus estimates can be found in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Q4 GDP growth revised to 0.5% q/q saar from 0.7% in the first revision and 1.4% in the advance report.
- The shutdown of the federal government still played a critical role in the slowdown, subtracting 1.0%-point from Q4 growth.
- Domestic demand slowed further with final sales to private domestic purchasers revised down to 1.8% from 1.9% in the first revision and 2.4% in the advance report.

U.S. Q4 2025 Real GDP Growth Revised Slower

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The industrial production index fell 0.5% in March, noticeably weaker than the expected increase of 0.1%. In addition, the March results were joined by slight net downward revisions in prior months (sharp upward revision in February offset by a larger downward adjustment in January and tweaks in earlier months). A good portion of the March softness was the result of a drop of 2.3% in utility output, which is not deeply concerning because changes in this sector typically are driven by weather conditions. However, mining activity also was soft (-1.2%), and manufacturing production dipped 0.1%.

Within manufacturing, auto production played a large role in the dip, registering a decline of 3.7%. However, the auto sector had plenty of company on the soft side, as furniture, textiles, apparel, and printing all posted declines of more than 1.0%. Given these drags, manufacturing output excluding autos rose only 0.1%. There was a nearly even split between expanding and contracting industries within manufacturing: 11 boosting production and 9 reducing activity.

The dip in manufacturing activity in March might seem inconsequential in light of solid advances in January and February (up 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively). However, the gains early in the year followed a weak fourth quarter, leaving an unimpressive trend.

Trends in industrial activity are often more apparent by focusing on the level of production indexes rather than month-to-month (or quarter-to-quarter) changes. As shown the chart below, the level of the manufacturing index stirred for a time in 2025, but it lost momentum in the closing months of the year. Changes so far in 2026 have not pushed the index above the September 2025 peak. The 6-month moving average of the manufacturing index is now running sideways.

The capacity utilization rate in manufacturing has naturally reflected movement in production. Utilization rose in 2025 as production strengthened, but it retraced most of the upward movement once momentum in production faded. The utilization rate in manufacturing stood at 75.2% in March, down slightly from the average of 75.4% in 2025.

Industrial production and capacity data are in Haver’s **USECON** database. Additional detail on production and capacity utilization can be found in the **IP** database. The expectations figures come from the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Downward noise in utility output; slow activity in manufacturing and mining.
- Flat underlying trend in recent months.

Industrial Production: Soft in March

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