Haver’s data services are provided through the DLX platform; delivering tools for data management, visualization, modeling and publishing. DLX is designed to increase productivity and integrates with Excel, PowerPoint, and major statistical software packages; MatLab, R, Python, SAS, E-views and Stata. DLX component application DLXVG3 offers precision graphics, publishing, analytic tools, and easy navigation for all Haver databases.

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Chart and compare multiple data series with accompanying data table of values

Advanced functions (growth rates, moving averages, aggregation, seasonal adjustment)

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Excel and PowerPoint direct export and complete integration (dynamic spreadsheets and presentations update on a click)

DLXVG3

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DLX Add-ins for all versions of Excel provide instant data updates of entire workbooks

Use DLXVG3 to locate data series codes from within any file, easily creating new spreadsheets for analysis

Edit date ranges, archive data, apply functions

Excel Spreadsheet Add-ins

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Haver offers timely, accurate, and professionally supported data via an update service, meeting the strictest demands of the institutional research community

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Haver supports a DLX API permitting clients to leverage and build processes with DLX data

Database Compatibility

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Data Link Express

Platform Independent site delivering DLX Databases across any workstation or device.

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HaverView

[Matlab](http://matlab.com) by The MathWorks lets you access, visualize, and analyze historic time-series data to identify patterns or uncover complex relationships. From within a single environment you can:

- Access data from multiple sources including files, spreadsheets, databases, data providers, and the Web
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- Customize your analysis environment with advanced functionality from signal processing, statistics, or econometrics

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MATLAB

[Stata Data Analysis and Statistical Software](https://www.stata.com) by StataCorp LP is an integrated statistical package designed for researchers of all disciplines. It provides the ability to do data analysis, data management and graphics and has features such as multiple imputation, factor variables, GMM, competing-risks regression, state-space modeling, predictive margins, and more.

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Stata

[SAS](https://www.sas.com) provides an integrated environment for predictive and descriptive modeling, data mining, text analytics, forecasting, optimization, simulation, experimental design and more. From predictive analytics to model deployment and process optimization, SAS provides a range of techniques and processes for the collection, classification, analysis and interpretation of data to reveal patterns, anomalies, key variables and relationships, leading ultimately to new insights and better answers faster.

[SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) is a seamless interface between Haver and SAS data processing that enables SAS users to read economic and financial time series data that reside in a Haver Analytics DLX (Data Link Express) database. [SASEHAVR](http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/etsug/67525/HTML/default/viewer.htm#etsug_sasehavr_gettingstarted01.htm) requires both SAS/ETS and Base SAS Software.

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[RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) Econometric Software](https://estima.com) by Estima is a leading econometrics and time-series analysis software package. It provides ability to do linear and non-linear least squares, forecasting, SUR and ARIMA models and in addition, supports advanced techniques such as GMM, ARCH and GARCH models, state space models, and more.

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RATS

Session 1: Bootcamp Part 1

Visualization with GGPlot2 and data analysis

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A popular open source option for statistical computing and graphics that is available on many UNIX platforms, Windows and MacOS

Estimating, evaluating, and forecasting ARIMA models

Understanding the concept of non-stationarity and testing for unit roots

Estimating autoregressions, granger causality tests, and impulse response functions

Understanding the concept of cointegration and testing using the Enger-Granger test

Estimating and forecasting with vector error correction models

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Teaches econometrics and forecasting at the University of Colorado Denver. He has over 15 years of econometric experience in both the private and public sector.

Daniel L. Jerrett, Ph.D.

Abdel M. Zellou, Ph.D.

Bootcamp and Econometric Tools 1 & 2

Econometrics Training: Applied Time Series in R

Session 5: Multivariate Models Part 1

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Haver partners with SmartMacro Labs to offer a two week immersive online course introducing participants to the power of the Python programming language. This applied hands-on training develops statistical economics skills with a concentration on economics and finance.

Gain proficiency in building modern time-series models in Python through real-world applications. Designed for professionals in both the public and private sector, the course does not require prior experience, assuming only that participants have a basic understanding of regression and statistical concepts.

Proficiency working in Jupyter notebooks and the Python environment

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Remote Training: Applied Time Series in Python

US retail sales accelerate even as consumers remain gloomy

Robert Brusca

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**Money works with a lag but sometimes it’s reported with a lag too**: U.S. and U.K. money supply data lag the results for the monetary union and for Japan by one month. Monetary trends currently based on the most up-to-date data, which are either May or June depending on the country we're looking at, show that three-month money supply growth, and credit growth in the case of the monetary union, have slowed compared to six months, except in the case of Japan. In Japan, for the six-month and three-month growth rates are identical at 1.9% overall; growth rates are lower over three months and six months compared to 12 months.

**Real money balances**: The growth rate of real money balances shows the step-down in growth in the monetary union from 1.6% over 12 months to a 1% annual rate over six months to a 0.6% annual rate over three months. Over the same sequence of dates, private credit in the monetary union has gone from 1.2% over 12 months to a pace of 1.4% over six months, and then down to 1.1% over three months. In the U.S., money growth over this period has decelerated from 2.5% over 12 months to 2% at an annual rate over six months to -0.4% over three months annualized. The U.K. shows a slightly different pattern for real money balances that grow 2.4% over 12 months, accelerate to 3.4% annually over six months, but then back down to a 1.6% annual rate over three months, showing a net deceleration from 12 months to three months but with an intervening bulge. In Japan, the money growth slowdown is monotonic, from 0.5% over 12 months to a 0.3% pace over six months to a -1.2% pace over three months.

**Pattern reversal**: Nominal money growth, which had shown some acceleration early in the year, is now beginning to show deceleration, and this is before central banks have generally begun to raise rates, although there have been ongoing rate increases of a slight amount in Japan and also the start of a tightening cycle in the European Monetary Union. In the U.S., there's a new head of the central bank and policies there are expected to shift, but the jury is out on what to expect, as is often the case with a new chairman. There are a variety of views on what he plans to do; he will most likely make his reputation by what he in fact does rather than by what he says about what he intends to do. On balance, growths in the U.S., the monetary union, and Japan are all showing deceleration with a slight exception from the U.K. But generally speaking, money supply no longer is showing a moderate disturbing acceleration pattern; in real terms, money growth has lost a great deal of steam, particularly in the U.S. and Japan, where three-month growth rates of real money balances are declining and show negative rates of growth.

**Summing up**
These are new trends, and they are not much talked about in markets because markets don't speak the language of money supply growth much anymore. However, it's a good idea to continue to look at money supply and what it does. Just because central banks aren't targeting money doesn't mean that it isn't relevant anymore; it just means that central banks have put their attention someplace else. At present, central bankers seem to be arguing about where their attention should be. It could be a good time for us to keep close tabs on what money supply is doing.

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An Update on Withering Money Growth Metrics

Tian Yong Woon

In this week's Letter, we trace three threats converging on Asia's inflation outlook. The first is renewed US tariffs, with the latest salvo of duties imposed over alleged forced labour issues. That move is widely seen as a replacement for the now-expired Section 122 tariffs, with only mild incremental effects from the new Section 301 duties. Set against that, the US effective tariff rate has pulled back from its 2025 highs in recent months (chart 1). The second is the Strait of Hormuz, where the re-escalation of US-Iran tensions has once again reduced shipping volumes to a trickle. Crude oil prices have been driven up as a result (chart 2). It could have been worse, were it not for China's sharply reduced crude imports over the period (chart 3). Arguably, though, at least part of that reduced intake simply reflected the absence of supply from the Strait. The third is the ongoing El Niño event, which several authorities have warned will likely be the largest on record (chart 4). It risks disrupting food crop yields, among other effects, channelling a price shock through food supply. Together these pressures threaten to upend the pullback in commodity inflation seen in recent months (chart 5), once again complicating policymaking. As an aside, we also explore economy-specific political developments that are brewing or could become an issue further down the road. One is the recent resignation of Indonesia's central bank governor, which came amid protracted rupiah weakness (chart 6) and concerns about fiscal health.

**Tariff trouble**
Recent US forced labour tariffs have revived concerns, pushing the tariff theme back to the fore. The US imposed additional Section 301 duties of 10% or 12.5% on imports from 60 investigated economies, effective 24 July 2026. These followed USTR investigations into those economies' failure to impose and enforce prohibitions on goods produced with forced labour. They took effect the same day the temporary 10% Section 122 global surcharge expired by statute, and are seen as its replacement. Yet overall US effective tariff rates, calculated as duty as a percentage of the respective dutiable value, have pulled back significantly from their 2025 highs (chart 1). That retreat began with the numerous bilateral trade deals the US eventually struck with many of its trading partners. It went further in February, when the Supreme Court struck down President Trump's tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). That ruling dented the overall impact of US tariffs on its trading partners, with possible tariff refunds still in the works. Cutting the other way, the Section 122 surcharge had partially raised overall rates while it ran. Even so, some estimates suggest the new duties will only marginally increase US effective tariff rates on its trading partners.



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**Strait trouble**
Tariff concerns have not resurged in isolation. Worries about the US-Iran conflict have returned alongside them, along with their consequences for shipping flows and crude oil prices. Those flows are the starting point, and shipping volumes through the Strait of Hormuz have tumbled once more, reduced again to a trickle (chart 2). Crude prices have followed, surging towards their post-conflict highs, with Brent flirting with $100/bbl. Against that, some interim reprieve may have come from the pause in strikes between the US and Iran, which followed 13 straight nights of US attacks. A pause is not a reopening, however, and the key metric remains the flow of goods, and especially energy, through the Strait. Those flows have not yet recovered to anywhere near pre-crisis levels. Resolving them is what the talks now under way between Oman and Iran are meant to address.

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A less appreciated point amid the US-Iran flare-up and the subsequent surge in oil prices is that it could have been considerably worse. One reason concerns China, whose crude oil imports fell sharply after the conflict broke out (chart 3). That absence of demand was partly involuntary, since little crude was flowing through the Strait in any case. Even so, it likely alleviated much of the price surge that would otherwise have occurred. Over the same period, China's exports of refined petroleum products also tumbled. That decline was driven by the authorities' fuel export restrictions, imposed in March soon after the conflict began. Those restrictions were largely lifted only recently, after the US and Iran reached a ceasefire and the Strait reopened. Now that the situation has escalated again, how long the lifting holds remains to be seen. The broader question is how long China can sustain such sharply reduced crude imports. That turns on the size of the reserves it can draw upon, and those figures are undisclosed, with external estimates carrying wide uncertainty.

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**Climate trouble**
Adding to investor and policymaker concerns is the ongoing El Niño event, which has already formed. Recent Southern Oscillation Index readings offer one line of evidence (chart 4). Agencies such as the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have confirmed the event separately. Many authorities warn that this year's event is set to be the largest on record. That points to more severe effects than previously seen, from sharply higher global temperatures to flooding and landslides. Crop yields would be among the casualties, and the resulting disruption ultimately amounts to economic losses. Those losses look unlikely to be confined to 2026, since the current Super El Niño is expected to stretch well into next year.

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**Converging on inflation**
Bringing it all together, three pressures now converge on the inflation outlook. First is a resurgent oil price shock from renewed US-Iran tensions. Layered on top are the potential knock-on effects from the Super El Niño pattern, which run through food crop yields and subsequently food prices. Renewed US tariffs add a third, milder push. Together they threaten to upend the pullback in commodity inflation seen in recent months (chart 5), once again complicating policymaking. That threat has further to run, since the worst of the El Niño price surge may not yet have materialised in full. Should the oil shock persist or worsen alongside it, price pressures would likely be pushed sharply upward. All of this lands on Asian economies already clinging to what few drivers of growth remain, such as the ongoing AI upcycle, while a slew of domestic issues weighs from within.

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**Political troubles?**
Finally and as an aside, we also explore other economy-specific developments that have been brewing or threaten to evolve into an issue further down the road. These troubles sit on the political front and have, so far, remained contained within their respective economies. Indonesia offers the first case, where central bank governor Perry Warjiyo resigned citing personal reasons, adding a layer of uncertainty. The timing sharpens it, with the rupiah already under protracted weakness (chart 6). Compounding that, Indonesia's President continues to pursue loose fiscal policy in an attempt to boost growth. Japan presents a different kind of pressure, with Prime Minister Takaichi's cabinet approval rating diving 10pp in the latest Nikkei and TV Tokyo poll. That took it below 60% for the first time since she took office last October, with perceived reasons for the decline varying. The resulting 58% rating is still comparatively high by historical standards. Even so, an extended slide from here could spell deeper underlying perception issues.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: Triple Threat

Michael J. Moran

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Sales of new homes rose 1.6% in June, and results in the prior three months were revised upward by a combined 2.8%. The results were favorable when viewed in isolation, but they still left the performance so far this year lagging that in the prior three years. Annual sales from 2023 to 2025 averaged 676,000 units; the average annual rate so far this year has totaled 626,000 (chart, upper left).

Not only are results this year lagging those of the prior three years, but they are light relative to the experience in the 1990s (a period not affected by the inflating and bursting of a housing bubble, and one not influenced by a pandemic). New home sales in the latter portion of that decade topped 800,000. With the number of households now much larger than at that time (133 million versus approximately 100 million), one might expect current sales to be at least as firm as in that earlier period.

Developments in the existing home market also would lead one to expect strong results in the new home market. Many homeowners with low-rate mortgages have postponed or cancelled plans to move in order to retain their attractive financing. This has led to a dearth of existing homes for sale and pushed activity to a dreadfully low level – the lowest since the trough that followed the bursting of the housing bubble (chart, upper right). Aspiring homeowners could turn to the new home market to satisfy their demand, but uninspiring sales of new homes suggest that such shifts have not been pronounced.

The supply of new homes on the market does not seem to be a factor in restraining activity, as the number of homes for sale is in the upper reaches of the historical experience. The number of listings at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006 was notably larger, but otherwise, observations in the past year exceed previous results by a sizeable margin (chart, lower left). The months’ supply of homes (the length of time to clear inventory at the current sales pace) also is in the upper portion of its historical range.

Soft demand seems to explain recent results, with affordability being the key consideration. The housing affordability index published by the National Association of Realtors has moved to the low portion of its historical range. Indeed, the only time with lower readings was in the late 1970s and 1980s, when double-digit mortgage rates pushed the measure to its record low (chart, lower right). With housing costs joining other financial challenges (health care, child care, education), housing activity is lacking vigor.

New home sales are recorded when the sales contract is signed. New home sales activity and prices are available in Haver's **USECON** database. The consensus expectation figure from Action Economics is available in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Respectable advance in the latest month…
- …and net upward revisions in the prior three months
- …but still trailing results in the prior three months

New Home Sales: Improvement in June, but a Still-Soft Performance

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The Bank of Japan is in a bit of a policy pickle. Inflation has picked up. After a long period of super-low inflation and interest rates, the policy rate itself has only been lifted to 1%. The BOJ faces a world with key geopolitical strains, higher inflation, supply chain disruptions, and rising oil prices with gains in other commodity prices as well. The war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, after a brief respite in June, is back in force. The future is again clouded and has led to negativism.

The yen has been weakening; that has put the BOJ in another difficult spot. So far, it has been unwilling to use interest rates to defend it. And we know that intervention is only a fleeting tool and not any sort of lasting solution.

But with all this on its plate, the BOJ has to deal now with some unexpected fiscal stimulus. The Takaichi government, like every Japanese government, has a special relationship with the central bank having two representatives at BOJ meetings, one from the MOF and another from the Cabinet Office. These representatives do not vote but can request that policy moves be delayed. Still, the BOJ has become more independent since 1998 when governing laws were changed. BOJ is directed to cooperate with government and to act independently. Earlier this year, when inflation flared on rising oil prices, the Takaichi government took steps to mute the impact on Japan’s inflation. So its inflation data have been dressed up a bit by inflation-suppressing government programs, which also make it seem less pressing that the BOJ act.

Still, inflation is heating up. The core inflation rate, which excludes fresh foods & energy, is now at 1.7% year-on-year, while the suppressing impact of some of the government programs is still in force. For its part, the BOJ has seen firms reporting more pass-throughs of prices and cost increases, making it more wary of building inflation pressures.

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Takaichi’s government has just finished a new policy blueprint that it is promoting, with a pool of $2.3 trillion (yes, dollar equivalent) being committed in public and private funds to finance new technologies in a government-industry joint effort. This comes after Takaichi had been elected knowing she has plans for a stimulus but being aware that Japan has a fragile excessive fiscal spending situation and a massive debt-to-GDP ratio. It was thought that she could promote some deregulation impediments and take some steps to promote research, but this sort of commitment of funds was not on the radar. Her new plan sets the old goal of fiscal austerity aside and promotes a new era of dedicated spending to improve industry. Her first blueprint draft contained language that offended markets because it seemed to bully the BOJ. The final version of the blueprint is a revised statement with a note urging the BOJ to do what it can to achieve its inflation target and make it clear that the BOJ is not being bullied. But was it?

For its part, the BOJ has recently said that it could hike rates faster and it connects that to the weakness of the yen. The BOJ has specifically said it is not tied to rising rates only every six months.

The government is also trying to get investment firms, especially pension funds, to buy more JGBs and to invest less aggressively outside the yen area. If firms do this, some pressure will be off the yen, and the government will find its rising deficit easier to fund. While this might seem manipulative, and it is, the U.S. is doing the same sort of thing. A proposal for U.S. treasuries held by banks to incur no capital change is the same sort of fudge. That will encourage banks to buy and hold more U.S. treasuries. The bottom line is that countries with large fiscal deficits will go to great lengths not to deal with the problem and to instead finance kicking the can down the road some more.

The BOJ is still in a tough spot in Japan. It is trying to deliver price stabilizing policy. The government has hidden building inflation pressures by providing subsidies and programs that blunted the impact of inflation on the economy. That kept inflation down and gave the BOJ a less urgent inflation situation to deal with. The government then uncorked a blueprint that was far more expansive than what had been expected, shelving the previous tilt toward fiscal austerity. On one hand, the expansion of the fiscal deficit from such a pre-existing large position is surprising. But spending is not classical demand stimulus; it is targeted to improve the supply side and that may explain why markets have not reacted as adversely to this spending. Still, there continue to be hints and scattered evidence of the government using its influence to try to slow down BOJ rate hikes. So far, this is all talking and worrying around the fringes. The BOJ has managed to make the policy it wants. But this will be something to continue to watch as the BOJ tries to get its policy rate back up to neutral while the government is trying to stimulate growth.

Japan

Japan’s CPI Is Misbehaving as BOJ Faces a Stern Test

Andrew Cates

**A World on Edge, Markets at Ease**
The gap between how uncertain the world feels and how calm markets are behaving has rarely looked as wide as it does today. A widely followed gauge of US economic policy uncertainty remains elevated by any historical standard, standing well above its long-run average and sustained by the confrontation with Iran, an unsettled trade environment and persistent doubts over the policy outlook. The Cboe volatility index, the VIX, presents a striking contrast, having drifted to the lower end of its range — a level more usually associated with calm and untroubled markets. During the pandemic shock of 2020 the two moved higher in lockstep; today they have decoupled almost entirely, with investors seemingly content to look through a backdrop that the uncertainty measure suggests is anything but benign.

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**A New Lens on Global Risk Appetite**
New to the Haver platform this week is the Risk-On/Risk-Off, or RORO, index produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City — a measure designed to capture the realised variation in global investor risk appetite. Drawing on daily data from asset markets in the United States and the euro area, it relies on no single indicator but instead distils signals from four broad areas — advanced-economy credit risk, equity market volatility, funding conditions, and the behaviour of currencies and gold — into a single series that summarises the common thread running through them, and with it the overall risk-bearing capacity of international investors. Set against that backdrop, the index tells a consistent story. It has leaned (albeit very modestly) towards the risk-on end of its range in recent weeks, corroborating the impression that investors remain willing to carry risk despite the noisier geopolitical backdrop.

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**Reading the Supply Side: Freight and Delivery Times**
Two of the more reliable bellwethers of the physical economy are the Baltic Dry index, which tracks the cost of moving dry bulk commodities by sea, and the suppliers' delivery times component of the global manufacturing PMI. Freight rates and delivery times tend to move together, tightening when demand is running ahead of the system's capacity to supply it and easing when it is not. Watching how the two have evolved of late offers an early read on whether supply-side pressures are building again or continuing to unwind. This is terrain we explore in more depth in this week's podcast, recorded with the Baltic Exchange, whose members sit at the very heart of the world's shipping markets and whose data underpin the Baltic Dry index itself. We will also be returning to the theme in a forthcoming webinar, in which we will look more closely at what freight and shipping indicators can tell us about the turning points in global activity.

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**Grain Prices Stir — Is a Super El Niño to Blame?**
After a long stretch of relative calm, global grain prices have begun to firm. A number of forces are arguably at work, but one stands out as a candidate. Forecasters have grown increasingly confident that a strong, potentially a so-called super, El Niño is developing in the Pacific, and events of that intensity have a long history of disrupting agricultural output, from drought across parts of Asia and Australia to erratic rainfall in the Americas. A broad gauge of grain prices has turned higher in a manner consistent with markets beginning to price in that risk. The stakes are not trivial. Food carries a far heavier weight in household budgets across the emerging world than in advanced economies, so a weather-driven rise in grain prices would land unevenly, complicating the task of central banks that had been hoping the worst of the energy and food-price shocks of recent years were behind them.

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**China's Credit Impulse and the Demand Puzzle**
The soft patch in Chinese domestic demand that last week's Q2 GDP figures laid bare has an instructive counterpart in Haver's own calculation of China's credit impulse — broadly, the change in the flow of new credit relative to the size of the economy. The chart below certainly hints that one reason for why the latest growth data disappointed on the domestic side is because the credit impulse has been weak. For all the announcements of support, the credit engine that has historically powered Chinese demand has yet to be convincingly re-engaged.

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**Britain's Growth Problem Lands on a New Prime Minister's Desk**
Our final chart brings a structural question home. As Andy Burnham takes office as the new UK prime minister, the challenge that will define his tenure is an old and stubborn one: how to lift a rate of economic growth that has been disappointing for the better part of two decades. The chart below is an attempt to put that challenge in context. It measures how a range of factors have changed since the late 1990s, when the trend rate of British growth per head last stood at its historical highs, with each expressed in comparable terms so that the movements can be read side by side. The picture is instructive for anyone thinking about where to concentrate effort. Several of the things one might reach for first have, in fact, moved the right way — the business environment has improved, investment has held up, and measured income inequality has if anything eased. What has weighed on growth, persistently and unmistakably, has been the rising real cost of energy and an ageing, shrinking share of the population of working age. The demographic pressure is difficult to reverse quickly. The energy constraint, by contrast, is one that policy could address. As we have argued at length in these pages before, the real price of energy has been a quiet and underappreciated drag on growth across the advanced economies since the turn of the century, and Britain has been among the more exposed.

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Global financial markets have retained a notably composed tone this week, even as the geopolitical backdrop turned more unsettled once again. News of renewed skirmishes between the United States and Iran reintroduced a risk premium that investors had only lately begun to set aside, yet equities held firm and volatility stayed low. Last week's US inflation and Chinese GDP releases did little to disturb that calm, though the Chinese figures laid bare how soft domestic demand there has become. That composure is an enduring - and notable - feature. Measures of policy uncertainty remain elevated by historical standards, yet market volatility has sunk to the low end of its range — a divergence that says a good deal about the prevailing mood (chart 1). A new risk-appetite gauge from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, now carried on the Haver platform, points the same way, with investors still firmly disposed to take on risk (chart 2). Beneath the surface, though, evidence of supply-side stress is mounting, with freight rates and suppliers' delivery times pointing to renewed strain (chart 3) — a theme of this week's podcast with the Baltic Exchange. Nor is the pressure confined to manufacturing: firmer grain prices raise the question of whether a developing super El Niño is at work (chart 4). On the demand side, Haver's calculation of China's credit impulse helps to account for the softness in last week's growth figures (chart 5). And beyond the cycle lies the structural, as Britain welcomes a new prime minister in Andy Burnham to a persistent growth problem in which the cost of energy looms large (chart 6).

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Charts of the Week: The Uneasy Calm

Winnie Tapasanun

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The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) was at -0.02 in June, up from -0.19 in May (-0.10 initially) and down from +0.05 in April (+0.19 previously), today’s report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago showed, indicating that economic activity remained slightly below its historical trend in June but improved from May. The latest CFNAI marked the third negative reading in four months. It was above a low of -0.50 in October 2025 and a reading of -0.09 in June 2025 but below a high of +0.39 in February 2025.

The index's three-month moving average (CFNAI-MA3), which smooths out the m/m volatility in the index, inched up to -0.05 in June from -0.10 in May (-0.03 initially), registering the third negative reading in four months. It was above a low of -0.39 in October 2025 and -0.25 in June 2025 but below a high of +0.07 in February 2025. The CFNAI-MA3 is expressed in standard deviation units from zero (with a value of zero defined as trend real GDP growth). Research at the Chicago Fed indicates that an average reading of -0.70 or below is consistent with the economy being in a recession. Thus, the June reading suggested that the U.S. economy is not currently in a recession.

The June reading reflected a m/m decline in one of the four CFNAI key components and two negative contributions. The contribution of the Production & Income index to the CFNAI dipped to -0.05 in June, a three-month low, from -0.03 in May; it was below +0.04 in June 2025 and a high of +0.36 in February 2025 but above a low of -0.61 in January 2024. The contribution of the Sales, Orders & Inventories index increased to +0.01 in June, the first positive reading since February, from -0.09 in May; it was above a low of -0.20 in April 2025 and -0.06 in June 2025 but below a high of +0.16 in March 2025. The Employment, Unemployment & Hours index contributed -0.04 in June, unchanged from May; it was above its recent low of -0.13 in February and -0.07 in June 2025 but below its recent high of +0.05 in January. The contribution of the Personal Consumption & Housing index rose to +0.05 in June, the highest level since March 2025, from -0.03 in May; it was above a neutral value (0.00) in June 2025.

The CFNAI Diffusion Index—which measures the breadth of change in the component series and is also a three-month moving average—slipped to -0.03 in June, a four-month low, from -0.01 in May (unrevised). A string of negative readings was posted during the March 2023 to February 2026 period. A reading of zero indicates that all of the indicators are growing at their long-term average. The June reading was above a low of -0.56 in October 2025 and -0.39 in June 2025 but below a high of +0.14 in September 2022.

The CFNAI is a weighted average of 85 indicators of national economic activity. It is constructed to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one. Since economic activity tends toward trend growth rate over time, a positive index reading corresponds to growth above trend and a negative index reading corresponds to growth below trend.

These figures are available in Haver's **SURVEYS** database.

- CFNAI up to -0.02 in June, remaining negative for the third time in four months.
- One of four CFNAI components down m/m; two make negative contributions.
- CFNAI-MA3 slightly up to -0.05, third negative reading in four mths.; above -0.70 (recession signal).
- CFNAI Diffusion Index down to -0.03, lowest since February.

Chicago Fed National Activity Index Up in June but Still Negative

Kathleen Stephansen, CBE

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Initial claims for unemployment insurance dropped 22,000 to 187,000 in the week ending July 18, from 209,000 in the week ending July 11, revised from 208,000. This was the lowest level since September 1969. The four-week average was 207,500 in the July 18 week, down from 214,750 in the week ending July 11. The Action Economics/Haver Analytics Survey looked for 212,000 claims to have been filed.

The total number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries—also known as “continuing claims”—declined by 2,000 to 1.796 million in the week ending July 11, from 1.798 million in the week ending July 4, revised from 1.805 million. The four-week moving average edged down to 1.805 million in the July 11 week from 1.809 million in the July 4 week. The insured unemployment rate remained unchanged at 1.2% in the week of July 11. Except for a one-week dip to 1.1% in the week of April 25, the insured unemployment rate has been at 1.2% since the week of November 29, 2025.

The insured unemployment rate varies greatly across individual states and territories. In the week ending July 4, the highest unemployment rates were in Oregon (2.06%), Massachusetts (2.15%), Minnesota (2.19%), Rhode Island (2.33%), Puerto Rico (2.56%) and New Jersey (2.59%). The lowest rates were in South Dakota (0.30%), Florida (0.39%), Louisiana and North Carolina (both 0.41%), Alabama (0.45%), and Arkansas (0.48%). Rates in other notable states include California (1.88%), New York (1.76%), Pennsylvania (1.69%), Illinois (1.56%), and Texas (1.09%). These state data are not seasonally adjusted.

Data on weekly unemployment claims are from the Department of Labor itself, not the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They begin in 1967 and are contained in Haver’s **WEEKLY** database and summarized monthly in **USECON**. Data for individual states are in **REGIONW** back to December 1986.

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- New claims dropped by 22,000 to 187,000 in the week ending July 18, the lowest level since 1969.
- Continuing claims declined by 2,000 to 1.796 million in the week ending July 11.
- The insured unemployment rate was unchanged at 1.2% in the week of July 11.


U.S. Initial Unemployment Claims Plummeted in the Week of July 18

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French manufacturing saw its climate index rise to 101.3 in July from 100.2 in June, still below its May level and exceeded by readings from December 2025 to February 2026. Apart from those four readings, the French index was last stronger in March 2024. On data back to April 2023, some 40 observations, the industry climate index has been higher only six times. Still, on data back to 2001 the current climate reading has a 53-percentile standing. While the current reading is slightly above par on a long historic timeline and just above its median reading, which occurs at a ranking of 50, its 53-percentile ranking marks it as slightly above its historic median; however, it is quite strong compared to the past 40 months (3 1/3 years).

Manufacturing production expectations have improved slightly over the past year from -11.9 to -10.1, with a 38.6 percentile standing, below its historic median.

The recent trend for production has improved even more sharply over the past year from -2.5 to +7.3, with a 59.8 percentile standing, well above its historic median. Interestingly, when asked about their own industry, survey respondents were less upbeat as the current reading at -0.6 was better than its year-ago -5.0, but only at a 16.3 percentile standing, a rather dismal showing.

Orders & demand and foreign orders & demand both moved up from their year-ago readings, improving by some six to eight points from their respective year-ago levels. Orders & demand overall have a 69.9 percentile standing, quite a solid reading, compared to foreign orders & demand, with only a slightly above-median 50.7 percentile standing.

Pricing finds both the own likely price level and the overall manufacturing level higher than they were a year ago. Own prices are higher by 3.1 points while manufacturing prices in general are deemed higher by 18.8 points, a massive difference. But the price levels by each response, placed in a percentile standing mode, produce standings at about the 75th percentile for each of them.

The graph shows French manufacturing prices on another up-down cycle. The down phases triggered rapidly this time; however, it is probably going to give way to another spurt with the Middle East progress unraveling that progress; it has already happened in the real world but is not yet reflected in published economic reports. That means we will have to monitor the industry recovery path closely again.

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There has been too much war, and it remains too unpredictable to know its impact on the global economy. In the wake of what was a quite disruptive Covid that itself came as the world economy was still licking its wounds from the chaos and damage of the Great Recession, policymakers are still reeling and trying to decide where to draw lines and what standards to set. They all say the right things, but they have been unsure even what their own words should mean for action. All central bankers want to promote growth and give us stable prices; however, over the last 15 years, they have had a really hard time delivering the policy to achieve those simple goals. As of 2026, these decisions are not getting any easier.

France

French Manufacturing Survey Improves

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Mortgage applications dropped 6.4% w/w (+0.6% y/y) in the week ending July 24, after rising 1.9% w/w (3.3% y/y) in the week ending July 17, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s (MBA) Weekly Mortgage Applications Survey. Applications for loans to purchase a house declined 3.6% w/w (+2.7% y/y) in the latest week, after rising 5.5% w/w (0.4% y/y) in the July 17 week.  Applications for loan refinancing plummeted another 9.9% w/w (-2.2% y/y) in the July 24 week, following a decline of 2.4% w/w (+7.3% y/y) in the week ending July 17.

The effective interest rate on a 30-year fixed-rate loan rose 9bps to 6.96% in the week ending July 24 from 6.87% in the week ending July 17. The rate on 15-year fixed-rate mortgages rose 10bps to 6.36% in the July 24 week from 6.26% in the July 17 week. The 30-year Jumbo rate jumped 28bps to 6.85% in the latest week after dropping 20bps to 6.57% in the July 17 week. The rate on a 5-year ARM rose 6bps to 6.44% in the July 24 week from 6.38% in the July 17 week.

The share of applications for refinancing an existing loan declined to 39.5% of total applications in the week of July 24 from 41.2% in the July 17 week. The adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) share of activity rose to 8.1% in the July 24 week from 7.7% in the July 17 week.

The average size of a mortgage edged up 0.3% w/w (2.8% y/y) to $384,700 in the week of July 24, after rising 1.1% w/w to $383,700 in the week ending July 17. The average size of a purchase loan edged up 0.4% w/w (3.8% y/y) to $445,400 in the July 24 week, after rising 0.4% w/w to $443,800 in the July 17 week. The average size of a loan to refinance a mortgage declined 2.0% w/w (-0.9% y/y) to $291,800 in the week ended July 24, following a small rise of 0.2% w/w to $297,900 in the week ending July 17. 

The Mortgage Bankers Association Survey covers 75% of all U.S. retail residential mortgage applications and has been conducted weekly since 1990. Respondents include mortgage bankers, commercial banks and thrifts. The base period and value for all indexes is March 16, 1990=100. The figures for weekly mortgage applications and interest rates are available in Haver’s **SURVEYS** database.

- Both applications for loans to purchase and applications for loan refinancing declined in the latest week.
- Interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate loans rose 9bps to 6.96%. 
- Average loan size edged up.

U.S. Mortgage Applications Declined in the July 24 Week

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