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**The global business cycle**
Our first chart this week looks at the March flash composite PMIs—one of the earliest sentiment reads on how the Middle East crisis, which escalated at the end of February, is feeding through into global activity. The message on momentum is soft. Three-month changes are generally weak—and in several cases negative—pointing to a modest cooling in growth as we moved into March. But the level still matters. Most major economies remain in expansion territory (above 50), including India, the US, UK, euro area and Japan. So while growth has lost a little pace, it has not collapsed. The main exceptions are France and Australia, where PMIs are now below 50, signalling contraction. Elsewhere, this looks less like a sharp shock and more like an early loss of momentum—potentially just the first pass of the geopolitical impact rather than the full effect.

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**The age of uncertainty**
Our second chart underscores just how elevated—and persistent—global policy uncertainty has become. While spikes in uncertainty are nothing new, what stands out here is the shift in regime: rather than brief, event-driven surges, uncertainty now appears to be running at structurally higher levels, punctuated by sharper geopolitical shocks—most recently the escalation in the Middle East. This matters because uncertainty is no longer just cyclical noise around the business cycle; it is increasingly a feature of the economic backdrop itself. A more fragmented geopolitical order, the weaponisation of trade and finance, the energy transition, and more activist—and at times less predictable—fiscal and industrial policy are all contributing to a world where firms and households face a more complex and less stable decision-making environment.

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**Global supply chains under strain**
A key channel through which this elevated uncertainty is manifesting is in global supply chains. After easing back from the pandemic-era extremes, supply chain stress is once again trending higher—and, more importantly, appears to be settling at a structurally elevated level. The drivers are increasingly familiar. Geopolitical fragmentation and trade tensions are reshaping production networks; conflict-related disruptions (including in the Middle East) are affecting key shipping routes; and firms are deliberately trading efficiency for resilience via reshoring, friend-shoring and inventory rebuilding. Layer on top the energy transition—which is reconfiguring commodity flows—and the result is a system that is inherently more complex and arguably more prone to disruption. Methodologically, the index captures these pressures by tracking the movement of large, globally significant container vessels (Panamax and above, >4,000 TEU) using shipping data. In other words, it focuses on the core arteries of global trade rather than regional flows—making the recent rise all the more telling.

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**Monetary policy in an uncertain world**
It almost goes without saying that, in a world of greater supply-side complexity, uncertainty around the path of monetary policy has also moved higher. The challenge for central banks is clear: they are attempting to steer demand in an environment where inflation is increasingly being driven by supply shocks—energy, geopolitics, supply chains—rather than traditional cyclical forces. That makes the reaction function harder to read, both for policymakers and markets. This is reflected in the Kansas City Fed’s measure of policy rate uncertainty, which has risen markedly since the pandemic and remains elevated. The index is derived from market pricing and captures the dispersion of expectations around where short-term U.S. interest rates will be one year ahead—effectively a real-time gauge of how confident (or not) markets are about the policy outlook. In that sense, monetary policy uncertainty is no longer just about timing or calibration. It reflects a deeper question about effectiveness: how central banks respond in a world where the sources of inflation—and the structure of the economy itself—have fundamentally shifted.

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**The limits of monetary policy**
This brings us to a more subtle—but arguably more important—challenge for policymakers: credibility. The Bank of England/Ipsos inflation attitudes survey shows that a consistently large share of respondents do not believe that higher interest rates will slow inflation over the medium term. In other words, the core transmission mechanism of monetary policy—working through expectations—is being called into question. That matters because if households don’t see rate hikes as disinflationary, then managing inflation expectations becomes significantly harder. Instead of anchoring expectations, tighter policy may even be perceived as part of the inflation problem itself—raising mortgage costs and reinforcing the sense that prices are still rising. In the context of a supply-constrained world, this is a serious complication. Monetary policy is being asked to do more, in an environment where its effectiveness may be diminished—and where expectations are increasingly shaped by lived experience (energy, food, housing) rather than central bank signalling.

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**Anchored inflation expectations**
Finally, and on a slightly more reassuring note, markets are not (yet) extrapolating the recent energy shock into a sustained inflation problem. Oil prices have spiked sharply in response to the latest Middle East escalation, but US medium-term inflation expectations—proxied here by the 5-year forward—have remained relatively contained. That divergence matters. It suggests that, for now at least, markets still see energy-driven inflation as temporary rather than systemic. In other words, while the supply side remains volatile, the broader inflation regime has not become unanchored. In the context of everything discussed above—higher uncertainty, strained supply chains and more complex policy trade-offs—that resilience in expectations offers a degree of comfort. It implies that credibility, while challenged, has not been lost—and that the system still has some anchors, even in a more fragmented and supply-constrained world.

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Recent de-escalation signals in the Middle East have offered some relief to markets, but the economic aftershocks from the earlier escalation are still feeding through—particularly via energy prices and heightened geopolitical risk. Crucially, these shocks are not hitting a clean cyclical backdrop. Instead, they are amplifying a set of pre-existing supply-side pressures—fragmented trade, strained supply chains, and a more complex policy environment—that have been building for some time. The charts this week pick up that theme. Forward-looking sentiment indicators suggest global growth has lost some momentum, even if activity remains in expansion territory (chart 1). At the same time, broader measures of uncertainty remain elevated (chart 2), while supply chain stress is once again moving higher, reinforcing the idea that disruption is becoming more structural (chart 3). Financial markets are reflecting this shift, with increased uncertainty around the future path of policy rates (chart 4), and survey evidence pointing to a more fundamental challenge around the credibility and transmission of monetary policy itself (chart 5). And yet, there are some offsets. Despite the recent spike in oil prices, medium-term inflation expectations—at least in the US—remain relatively well anchored (chart 6). Even so, the overall message is one of a more fragile, supply-driven cycle—where shocks like the Middle East do not just disrupt the outlook, but intensify the underlying constraints shaping the global economy.

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Charts of the Week: A Supply-Constrained World Comes into Sharper Focus

Kathleen Stephansen, CBE

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Initial claims for unemployment insurance rose by 5,000 to 210,000 in the week ending March 21, from an unrevised level of 205,000 in the week ending March 14. The four-week average declined 250 to 210,500 in the March 21 week from the unrevised average of 210,750 in the prior week. The Forecast Survey looked for 210,000 claims to have been filed.

The total number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries—also known as “continuing claims”—declined by 32,000 to 1.819 million in the week ending March 14, from 1.851 million in the week ending March 7 revised from 1.857 million. This is the lowest level for insured unemployment since May 25, 2024, when it was 1,804 million. The four-week moving average stood at 1.847 million, a decline of 2,000 from 1.849 million in the week ended March 7. This is the lowest level for this average since October 5, 2024, when it was 1,846 million. The insured unemployment rate remained at 1.2% in the week of March 14. It has remained at that level since the week of November 29, 2025.

The insured unemployment rate varied greatly across individual states and territories. In the week ending March 7, the highest unemployment rates were in Rhode Island (3.00%), New Jersey (2.80%), Massachusetts (2.70%), Washington (2.40%), Minnesota (2.30%), California (2.20%), New York and Illinois (both 2.10%), Montana (2.07%) and Michigan and Montana (both 2.00%). The lowest rates were in Florida and Louisiana (both 0.30%), and Arkansas, Alabama and North Carolina (all 0.40%). Rates in other notable states include Connecticut (1.90%), Pennsylvania (1.80%), and Texas (1.10%). These state data are not seasonally adjusted.

Data on weekly unemployment claims are from the Department of Labor itself, not the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They begin in 1967 and are contained in Haver’s **WEEKLY** database and summarized monthly in **USECON**. Data for individual states are in **REGIONW** back to December 1986.

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- New claims rose by 5,000 to 210,000.
- Continuing claims declined by 32,000 to 1.819 million, the lowest level for insured unemployment since May 25, 2024.
- The insured unemployment rate remained at 1.2%.

U.S. Initial Unemployment Claims Edged Up in the Week of March 21

Robert Brusca

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**Current global money and credit trends**
Money supply growth accelerated in February over three months compared to six months in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the EMU, money growth backed down from a 6.3% growth rate over six months to a still hot 5.6% over three months. Japan, as always, was the exception, with money growth sinking to a weak 1.5% over three months from 2.1% over six months. And the Bank of Japan still has its sights on raising rates further and bringing the level of interest rates eventually to a normalized level. In the EMU, credit growth accelerated as private credit grew at a 5.4% pace over three months, up from 5.1% over six months.

**Excessive money growth**: Money and credit growth are excessive compared to what would seem to be equilibrium conditions. Those conditions right now have economic growth weak, in the region of 1% to 2%, and monetary targets are 2% all around. All of them are being exceeded—at least in terms of core inflation rates.

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**And yet the policy tilt had been toward more ease**: Central banks had been making ready to cut rates again in their perceived long march back to normalcy for their key benchmark rates. But inflation has been over target since the wake of COVID either for headline inflation, core inflation, or both, depending on the country. Yet, central bankers have been looking to reduce interest rates to perceived long-run equilibrium norms even in the face of excessive inflation. This has been a remarkable and frustrating period for anyone who thought that 2% meant 2%. Central bankers have been engaged in a strange new calculus we could call Wimpy-nomics (in honor of Popeye’s friend) because they would gladly promise you 2% in the future for something excessive today—accompanied by rate cuts.

**Bit-in-the-teeth-onomics**: Even the Trump tariffs did not untrack this train of thought. It spawned more excuses about how it was temporary and could be ignored. The Iran war brought more of that until oil prices hit triple digits; that seems have sobered up some central bankers. Still, in recent central bank meetings the Fed gave us no clues on policy, while both the ECB and the BOE talked of likely hikes if the war was still engaged at the time of their next meetings. And some central bankers try to disabuse us of the notion that policy is not on a preconceived course and is data dependent.

**Growth rules**: Money growth is and has been excessive, and money growth rates have progressed to excessive norms over three months, six months, and even 12 months (in the U.S.). Full employment growth plus 2% should max out money growth; those metrics would put max money growth at 3% or 4%, depending on the country. Maybe U.S. productivity is in gear, and the U.S. can step that up. But so far, the demonstrable excess is inflation, soaking up the extra nominal GDP growth.

**Back from the brink**: The Iran war has brought policymakers back from the brink even if some won’t tell us what they think. ‘Data dependent’ does not begin to cut it because the question is about oil prices—how long they will stay elevated and how high they will go. The rear-view mirror will not answer that question, nor will it set out a reliable trend. So, the concept of data-dependency does not work here. Meanwhile, oil prices are surging, and Iran is refusing to roll over and play dead, even though its leaders have very few options—and none of them are good. The country has no cohesive military left, just a few pockets of some military capability and a population that, if it could, would overrun the leadership over the way it has been abused and steamrolled. Leadership has refused to give in, but if the regime falls, none of its leaders would survive a rebellion by the locals after the way they were treated.

**The operative ‘model’**: The ‘model’ for Iran is catastrophe theory. It will look like the regime is in power until its repressive dam breaks, and then it will be all over. Will the regime hold? That is hard to predict—it’s hard to know—because the regime might even survive. What markets need to know especially about is control of the Strait of Hormuz. Securing that strait is now the policy and military focus. Can the strait be secured if the regime holds on? That may be the critical question we need answered about Iran. The economics are not about money or inflation anymore. The future is about oil more than money, and that is why the future is so uncertain. War is simply not predictable. Money supply is. But even then, central banks may choose to not control it as they should, and as they have promised, as we have seen. Whenever a policymaker has a choice to make, one option is always the wrong one. Let’s hope that is not the one they pick.

Globally Money Supplies Retain Hot Growth

Michael J. Moran

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The current account measures the economic interactions of the US with foreign economies. It could be viewed as a cash flow statement, showing receipts into the US economy and payments to foreign entities. Two broad categories are involved: trade in goods and services and income flows.

The US typically runs a deficit in the current account, registering a shortfall in every quarter since 1991-Q3; it last recorded an annual surplus in 1981. Current account deficits moved to striking levels the past two years, although the results were less alarming when measured as a share of GDP (4.0% in 2024 and 3.6% in 2025 versus the record of 5.9% in 2006). Moreover, hints of improvement have emerged recently.

Last year involved considerable volatility in the trade portion of the current account, as President Trump’s tariff threats led to a burst in imports in Q1. The import surge was largely offset in the second quarter, leading to a narrower deficit, but the trade shortfall continued to improve in the third and fourth quarters. Dips in imports of goods in the third and fourth quarters suggest some residual offset to the Q1 increase, but solid growth in exports throughout 2025 after slow results in 2024 suggested that fundamentals might be turning in favor of the US. By the fourth quarter, the deficit in goods and service trade was not far out of line with readings before the pandemic.

The income portion of the current account also showed signs of improvement in the fourth quarter. This section of the current account has two subcomponents: primary income and secondary income. Secondary income covers transfer payments, which are advances for which no goods or services are received in return for the outlay. Examples include personal remittances, pension payments (including Social Security), casualty insurance settlements, and charitable donations. Secondary income flows changed little in Q4.

However, primary income flows jumped in the final months of last year. Historically, the US registered a healthy inflow of primary income, which includes investment income, labor compensation, and miscellaneous items. Primary income, led by the investment component, began to soften around the time of the pandemic, and it moved into negative territory during much of 2024 and 2025. The fourth quarter, though, brought a notable rebound, pulling it into the plus column. The improvement was the result of returns on direct investment rather than on portfolio income, and the new total was far above other recent readings. One wonders about random volatility or a one-time gain, but for now it represents a welcome development.

Balance of Payments data are in Haver’s **USINT** database, with summaries available in **USECON**. The expectations figure is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Firm exports boosted the trade component.
- Primary income flows rebounded from soft showings in prior quarters.

Current Account: Notable Improvement in Q4

Winnie Tapasanun

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Import prices rose a more-than-expected 1.3% m/m in February, the largest monthly increase since March 2022, after upwardly revised rises of 0.6% in January (+0.2% initially) and 0.1% in December (+0.2% previously), according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The year-on-year rate accelerated to 1.3% in February, the highest since February 2025, from 0.3% in January. Export prices advanced a higher-than-expected 1.5% m/m in February, the fastest monthly pace since May 2022, after unrevised increases of 0.6% in both January and December. The y/y rate quickened to 3.5% in February, the highest since September, from 2.6% in January (2.7% in February 2025). The Action Economics Forecast survey had expected m/m rises of 0.4% in import prices and 0.5% in export prices for February. _(**Note**: Import and export price indexes are not directly affected by tariffs because they measure the prices of goods before taxes. Tariffs are classified as taxes and therefore are excluded from these calculations. October 2025 data were unavailable due to the U.S. federal government shutdown.)_

The m/m rise in February import prices reflected a 3.8% rebound (-10.6% y/y) in imported fuel prices after a 1.2% decline in January (-2.2% initially). The fuel price rebound was led by a 24.7% jump (+57.9% y/y) in natural gas, followed by rises of 6.3% (-6.2% y/y) in other petroleum products, 4.6% (-10.5% y/y) in fuel oil, 3.1% (-21.3% y/y) in liquefied petroleum gases, 2.5% (-14.8% y/y) in petroleum & petroleum products, and 1.1% (-17.4% y/y) in crude oil. Nonfuel import prices rose 1.1% (2.5% y/y) in February after a 0.8% increase in January (+0.5% initially). Import prices for the following categories all rose m/m in February: nonfuel industrial supplies & materials (+2.6%; +9.6% y/y), capital goods (+1.3%; +3.9% y/y), foods, feeds & beverages (+0.8%; -3.4% y/y), consumer goods excluding autos (+0.5%; +0.6% y/y), and automotive vehicles & parts (+0.2%; -0.9% y/y).

The February advance in export prices reflected m/m gains in both agricultural and nonagricultural export prices. Agricultural export prices rose 0.7% (2.2% y/y) in February, the fourth m/m rise in five months, on top of a 0.2% increase in January (unrevised). Nongricultural export prices climbed 1.7% (3.8% y/y) after rising 0.7% in January and December. Export prices for industrial supplies & materials (+3.5%; +4.4% y/y), foods, feeds & beverages (+0.9%; +2.8% y/y), consumer goods excluding autos (+0.7%; +4.0% y/y), capital goods (+0.2%; +3.0% y/y), and automotive vehicles & parts (+0.1%; +2.6% y/y) all increased m/m in February.

These import and export price series are not seasonally adjusted; they can be found in Haver’s **USECON** database. Detailed figures are available in the **USINT** database. The expectations figure from the Action Economics Forecast Survey is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Import prices +1.3% m/m (+1.3% y/y) in Feb., led by a 3.8% rebound in fuel import prices.
- Excluding fuels, import prices +1.1% m/m (+2.5% y/y) after a 0.8% Jan. increase.
- Export prices +1.5% m/m (+3.5% y/y), driven by a 1.7% gain in nonagricultural exp. prices.

U.S. Import and Export Prices Jump in February, Exceeding Expectations

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External Debt, BOP (Q4), Labor Force Survey (Feb)

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