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[RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) Econometric Software](https://estima.com) by Estima is a leading econometrics and time-series analysis software package. It provides ability to do linear and non-linear least squares, forecasting, SUR and ARIMA models and in addition, supports advanced techniques such as GMM, ARCH and GARCH models, state space models, and more.

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**A lower bar, still cleared**
Job creation in the United States has slowed markedly over the past two years, to a pace that would once have been read as the approach of recession. The number of jobs required to hold unemployment steady has fallen alongside it. Tighter immigration and an ageing population have cut the growth of the labour force to a fraction of its pre-pandemic rate, so the economy now needs far fewer new jobs each month to absorb the people entering it. Hiring remains above that threshold, which is why unemployment has risen by less than the deceleration in payrolls alone would suggest. The awkwardness for policy is that weak employment numbers no longer carry the information about spare capacity that they used to, and the Federal Reserve must judge how much of the slowdown reflects faltering demand rather than a shrinking supply of workers.

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**France at the front of the queue**
French government bonds have borne the brunt of Europe's political strain, with the premium over Germany climbing above the Italian equivalent as a minority government struggled to secure agreement on a budget intended to narrow the deficit. The difficulty is not confined to Paris. A parliamentary defeat over housing measures in Spain has prompted a snap election, and regional gains for the far right have left the German coalition under pressure. Different economic circumstances have produced a common problem: assembling durable support for expensive choices. Voters want relief from rising living costs and better services, defence and energy security require more spending, and governments must refinance debt issued when interest rates were far lower. Rising interest bills leave less room to reconcile those demands just as the cost of failing to do so increases.

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**Consent follows living standards**
The roots of that difficulty extend well beyond the latest parliamentary arithmetic. Across the advanced economies, countries that have delivered stronger gains in output per person since 2019 have tended to preserve more of their political stability, with Germany and Greece marking the two extremes. The association does not establish causation, and the United States stands conspicuously outside it, combining rapid growth per head with a sharp deterioration in stability. Yet it is a reminder that governments find it easier to ask for restraint when households believe their prospects are improving. One reason the past five years have been so unforgiving is that the inflation surge flattered the arithmetic of public debt while many voters experienced it as a loss of purchasing power. Better ratios have not brought a stronger mandate to govern, and the familiar division between a dependable core and a vulnerable periphery has become harder to sustain.

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**Real, not imagined**
Government bond yields have risen almost everywhere this year, but the composition of the move differs in ways that matter. In the United States almost all of the increase has come from real yields, which is what one would expect of an economy drawing in capital to finance investment at a pace the rest of the world cannot match. In Germany and the UK a larger share reflects compensation for expected inflation, with less of the rise attributable to the real return required to fund productive capacity. The distinction matters for the cost of adjustment. A real yield that rises because investment demand is strong is easier to live with than an inflation premium that rises because energy and wages are expected to keep pushing prices up, particularly for governments already struggling to reconcile their budgets with their politics.

261008AC4.jpg

**Pressure without surprise**
Supply chains are tightening again. The New York Fed's gauge of global supply chain pressure, which measures freight costs and delivery delays against their historical norms, has climbed back to levels last seen in 2022. Rerouted shipping, sanctions and the strategic reordering of trade are doing to logistics what they have done to the oil market, raising the cost of moving goods for reasons that have little to do with the strength of demand. What has not followed, so far, is the proclivity of inflation to surprise. Global price data have surprised forecasters barely at all in recent months, a marked contrast with 2021, when the two moved closely together. The benign reading is that firms hold better inventories and wield less pricing power than they did then, and that spare capacity in the goods-producing economies is absorbing the shock. The less comfortable one is that the pass-through is merely slow. Delivery costs took the best part of a year to reach consumer prices last time, which is a long enough lag to catch a central bank out.

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**Alone in the top corner**
The September PMI surveys reinforced the impression of an uneven global expansion. The data suggest that activity in the United States is both the strongest and still accelerating, while the euro area and the United Kingdom have improved, but from a considerably lower base. Japan, China, India and Brazil have moved in the other direction. The global composite remains comfortably in expansion, but it is being held there in large part by a single economy, and that potentially has consequences for everyone else. A country growing faster than its own saving can finance will tend to draw in capital from the rest of the world, and it will usually do so by offering a higher real return. The rise in American real yields may therefore not be a purely domestic matter. It could help to set the terms on which governments and companies elsewhere must borrow, whatever the state of their own economies, and arguably at an awkward moment, with several of them already struggling to reconcile weak growth with heavy debts. The difficulty for much of the world may not be a shortage of demand so much as the cost of the capital needed to raise productive capacity. That cost is probably being shaped, at least in part, in a market where one borrower is currently bidding hardest.

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Charts of the Week: The Political Premium 

Kathleen Stephansen, CBE

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Mortgage applications fell 4.2% w/w (-36.6% y/y) in the week ending October 2, the fifth consecutive weekly decline, after declining 6.0% w/w (-37.0% y/y) in the week ending September 25, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s (MBA) Weekly Mortgage Applications Survey. Applications for loans to purchase a house fell 2.1% w/w (-14.9% y/y) in the latest week, after declining 4.3% w/w (-14.2% y/y) in the September 25 week. Applications for loan refinancing dropped 7.5% w/w (-56.3% y/y) in the October 2 week, the seventh consecutive weekly decline, following a decline of 8.7% w/w (-56.4% y/y) in the September 25 week.

The effective interest rate on a 30-year fixed-rate loan jumped 21bps to 7.73% in the week ending October 2 from 7.52% in the week ending September 25, reaching its highest level since November 2023. The rate on 15-year fixed-rate mortgages rose 16bps to 6.97% in the October 2 week from 6.81% in the September 25 week. The 30-year Jumbo rate increased 12bps to 7.54% in the latest week from 7.42% in the September 25 week. The rate on a 5-year ARM rose 13bps to 7.05% in the October 2 week from 6.92% in the September 25 week.

The share of applications for refinancing an existing loan fell to 37.0% of total applications in the week of October 2 from 38.3% in the week ending September 25. The adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) share of activity was unchanged at 10.3% in the latest week.

The average size of a mortgage fell 1.7% w/w (-5.1% y/y) to $377,700 in the week ending October 2, after rising 0.9% w/w (-5.8% y/y) to $384,200 in the week ending September 25. The average size of a purchase loan declined 0.6% w/w to $448,400 in the October 2 week after rising 0.9% w/w to $450,900 in the September 25 week. The average size of a loan to refinance a mortgage fell 7.0% w/w to $257,200 in the week ending October 2 after declining 0.6% w/w to $276,700 in the September 25 week.

The Mortgage Bankers Association Survey covers 75% of all U.S. retail residential mortgage applications and has been conducted weekly since 1990. Respondents include mortgage bankers, commercial banks and thrifts. The base period and value for all indexes is March 16, 1990=100. The figures for weekly mortgage applications and interest rates are available in Haver’s **SURVEYS** database.


- Applications for loans to purchase and applications for loan refinancing both declined in the latest week.
- Interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate loans jumped 21bps to 7.73%.
- Average loan size fell moderately in the October 2 week.


U.S. Mortgage Applications Fell in the October 2 Week

Michael J. Moran

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The US deficit in international trade in August widened by $12.7 billion (13.7%) to $105.6 billion, adding to notable slippage in July, when the deficit widened by $21.6 billion (30.4%). The recent deficits are well shy of the shortfalls seen in early 2025, when the rush to front-run likely tariffs led to surges in imports. Still, they are among the widest seen in the past few years, and they are well beyond readings seen before the pandemic (chart, left).

The trade results in the past few months have been driven by both strong imports and soft exports. Imports have increased noticeably in three of the past four months (and six of the past seven), with the increases in July and August being especially sharp at approximately 4% each. Exports, in contrast, eased from May through July before registering a small advance in August (chart, below). The shifts in exports and imports have largely been on the goods side; trade in services has shown modest changes recently, with the net result being a slight improvement in the services surplus.



261006B1.jpg

It might seem as though the surge in goods imports in recent months can be explained by another rush to beat the imposition of tariffs. President Trump in July signed proclamations imposing 50% tariffs on a broad range of Canadian goods, and the duties became effective on August 22. However, this presidential action did not seem to have a meaningful impact on trade. Imports from Canada in July were in the middle of the range from the past year; they moved into the upper portion of that range in August, but the magnitude of the change did not suggest a marked shift in behavior by Canadian exporters. A review of trade with other countries shows noticeable increases in US imports from several in July and August, while US exports to numerous countries have softened in recent months.

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The trade figures for July and August suggest that net exports will be a notable drag on GDP growth in the third quarter. The figures on goods trade in the past two months point to a negative contribution from net exports to GDP growth of approximately three percentage points, which would be one of the largest drags in modern history (chart, left). This estimate, of course, could shift. The data in hand could be revised, and September results could provide an offset. Also, the improvement in services trade will partly offset the slippage in goods trade, although the existing figures suggest only a modest influence.

- The past few months have shown strong imports and soft exports
- Net exports are likely to be a substantial drag on GDP growth in Q3


US International Trade: Deficit Surges in July and August

Robert Brusca

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**Expanding over all horizons based on median and average data**
Over the last 12-months and six months the composite PMI data show mostly setbacks – weaker performance- across the various 25 countries and regions that report in this table. However, over no horizon is there more than 8 of the 25 reporters showing an outright decline in terms of PMI values (readings below 50). Over the recent three-months more significant advances have been recorded. Only 21.7% of the reporters show weaking in their average performance over 3-months compared to 6-months. This is a sharp contrast with 82.6% weakening over six months compared to 12-months and even the 52.2% that shows weaking over 12-months compared to 12 months ago. The six-month comparison is a geopolitically difficult comparison.

**Progress, yes – but will it endure?**
Progress is in gear. The last three months of month-to-month PMIs readings yield median PMI values of 52.2 to 52.5 to 52.3 moving from July to September. September shows a slight back tracking, but all readings are above a diffusion value of 52. Averages show better growth transition from 52.1 to 52.4 to 52.8 on the same time sequence. Using averages we see a strengthening trend. 

The US, UK, and EMU as an unweighed group also show progressive improvement. This group shows irregular improvement from 12-months to six-months to three-months, but the three-month diffusion average is higher than the 12-month average. 

Among the 25 reporters surveyed. Eleven have percentile standings over the last 4 ½ years of data that are below their respective medians – that’s a lot. So, there is still a considerable proportion of reporters with weak queue percentile standings on the standards of about the last five-years- years that have not been terribly strong. 

**Summing up**
The good news in this report is the breadth of improvement in September. With only five reporters below a diffusion reading of 50, indicating contraction and with 60% of the reporters showing month-to-month improvement. 


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Composite Global PMIs trend higher 

Tian Yong Woon

In this week's Letter, we examine how a strengthening El Niño is adding a food and weather shock to an Asia already absorbing an oil shock. El Niño is now in full swing, with the Southern Oscillation Index at its lowest in over two decades, and its fullest effects may only arrive next year (chart 1). Food prices are already turning up, and food price levels have risen most in India, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia (chart 2). That adds a second source of inflation on top of the oil price surge that followed the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. On the supply side, drought is hurting rice producers just as fuel and fertiliser costs climb, raising the risk of a significant negative supply shock. The most exposed are net rice consumers with thin stocks, such as the Philippines (chart 3). India shows how quickly conditions can deteriorate: its monsoon ended with its largest deficit since 2015, and reservoir storage has slipped below normal (chart 4). The effects reach beyond food. Drier conditions have fed peat and forest fires in Indonesia, pushing Singapore's air quality into the unhealthy range for the first time since 2023 (chart 5). For policymakers, El Niño adds food security, water security and inflation management to a list already crowded by the energy shock and geopolitics. The most agriculture-reliant economies, India, Indonesia and Vietnam, face a double hit to growth and prices (chart 6). Should food inflation force central banks to tighten further, the growth cost would rise again.

**El Niño and food prices**
El Niño is now in full swing. The Southern Oscillation Index has plunged to around -2.7 on a three-month average basis, its lowest reading in over two decades and below even the 2015 trough (chart 1). Ocean temperatures tell the same story. The Niño 3.4 index, the main gauge of El Niño, tracks sea surface temperature anomalies in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific. A sustained reading of +0.5°C or more signals El Niño conditions, while readings above +1.5°C mark a strong event. The index reached +1.8°C in August, and the event is expected to persist into 2027. Its fullest effects may therefore only emerge next year, as weather damage to harvests feeds through to food supply with a lag. Food prices are already moving. Growth in the FAO Food Price Index has turned up to around 6% y/y, partly reflecting El Niño weather effects on crops. With food carrying a heavy weight in consumer baskets across emerging Asia, a sustained rise in global food prices would quickly find its way into regional inflation.

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That pass-through is already visible. Food price indices across the region have risen above their 2025 averages, led by India at around 8% higher by August (chart 2). The Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia follow at roughly 4% to 5%, with Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand near 2%. China is the exception, with food prices still about 2% below their 2025 average. Food-related pressure, owing to El Niño weather and crop effects, has nudged up headline CPI inflation in several of these economies. This adds a second source of inflationary pressure on top of the oil price surge that followed the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz since March. In the Philippines, inflation is running at around twice the central bank's target. For governments and central banks, the two shocks together complicate both fiscal and monetary policy.

261005T2.jpg

**El Niño and food supply**
One key driver of the food price surges in parts of Asia is El Niño, specifically the extended droughts now affecting rice producers. Those impacts compound higher input costs for fuel and fertiliser, which stem from the near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Iran conflict. Around a third of global seaborne fertiliser trade normally passes through the strait. Reduced rice planting due to higher input costs, coupled with weaker yields from poor weather, is setting up a negative supply shock. Among the most vulnerable are net consumers, which need more rice than they produce, and economies with low stocks relative to consumption (chart 3). The Philippines stands out on both counts, sitting well inside net consumer territory with thin stocks. By contrast, India, Thailand and Vietnam remain net producers.

261005T3.gif

India serves as an example of how quickly conditions can deteriorate. Average rainfall, on a 12-month moving average basis, has fallen back to the lows of the 2023 to 2024 dry spell (chart 4). The decline has been abrupt, coming after rainfall held near its highs of recent years through 2025. As a result, India's water storage has swung from over 20% above normal around the turn of the year to roughly 12% below normal, the deepest shortfall since mid-2024. The two series have tracked each other closely, with a correlation of 0.73 over the period shown. The speed of that reversal underscores the severity of India's current water situation. It also matters beyond India's borders. As one of Asia's largest rice producers, India's harvest has a direct bearing on regional supply (chart 4).

261005T4.jpg

**El Niño and health**
El Niño’s effects go beyond food prices; they also carry environmental and health costs for Asia. Parts of the region, such as Singapore, are now experiencing seasonal haze, as smoke from peat and forest fires is carried across borders by prevailing winds (chart 5). The fires this year have burned mainly in Sumatra and Kalimantan in Indonesia, with smaller clusters in Peninsular Malaysia. Singapore's PSI, on a 90-day average basis, has climbed to around 62, its highest since the 2019 episode, as the Southern Oscillation Index has plunged. On 4 September, the PSI entered the unhealthy range for the first time since October 2023. This year's extreme El Niño is expected to prolong drier conditions, worsening air quality and its health effects. The episode highlights the indirect link between El Niño and pollution, through weather that leaves peatland easier to ignite and harder to extinguish.

261005T5.jpg

**El Niño and policy**
Policymakers now have another issue to grapple with, on top of the energy supply shock from the Middle East, global geopolitics and domestic pressures. El Niño raises concerns ranging from food security, given the adverse supply shock, to water security, given drought-induced rainfall shortfalls. It also complicates inflation management as food prices rise, and adds demands for mitigation against hotter and drier conditions. For the more agriculture-reliant economies, the impact could be a double hit. Agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted for around 16% of nominal GDP in India in 2025, 13% in Indonesia and 12% in Vietnam (chart 6). These economies face a hit to growth as well as higher prices. To compound matters, food-driven inflation could force central banks to tighten policy further, adding to the growth cost. 

261005T6.jpg

Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: Food for Thought

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