Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Economy in Brief

    • Headline: -0.4% m/m, the third straight m/m fall; -0.5% y/y, the first negative y/y pace since Apr. ’19.
    • Residential private construction -0.9% m/m, led by a 1.1% drop in single-family building.
    • Nonresidential private construction -0.5% m/m, down for the third month in four.
    • Public sector construction +0.4% m/m, reflecting a 0.5% rise in nonresidential public building.
  • The months readings are decidedly mixed. Four service sectors report stronger month-to-month and four weaker; manufacturing sectors report three weaker and five stronger. The composite headlines are split four-and-four.

    Still, it’s not as if nothing is happening. On data back to January 2021, the average of the composite ranked in May has a 35-percentile standing – still below its median on the period. Services have slipped with a 28-percentile ranking well into the bottom one-third ranking position. Manufacturing has been rehabilitating despite the Russia-Ukraine war and the Trump tariffs, as the sector has an above median 60.4 ranking on its average reading.

    On an individual country basis, the EMU, Germany, France, the United States, Australia, and India – all reporting countries except the United Kingdom and Japan show manufacturing PMI rank standings above their respective medians (above a ranking of 50%). But only Japan and India show service sectors with rankings above their respective medians and only India has a composite standing above its median on this timeline. And India is an exception with extremely high rankings across sectors.

    The monthly average shows very little change from March to April to May. The composite and services readings get slightly weaker while manufacturing gets marginally stronger moving up from 49.9 in March to 50.5 in May- hardly a rocket shot. Similarly, there is little change from the 12- month to six-month to 3-month averages. Looking at 3-months to 12-months, the composite weakens from 51.6 to 51.2, manufacturing improves from 48.8 to 49.6 and services weaken from 52.4 to 51.3.

    There is a great deal of grumbling about policy and U.S. tariff threats, but so far there is little evidence of impact. I’m sure there will be impact, but I am not as persuaded that ‘uncertainty’ ‘per se’ is the bogeyman everyone else wants to make it out to be. It can be an issue. But I expect Trump to resolve these issues so that the main impact I expect is the impact from the deals he makes.

  • This week, we examine the deepening divisions between the US and China, which are affecting not just trade but also investment flows, monetary policy, and technological development.

    On the trade front, China has shifted from modest trade shares with its partners (chart 1) to capturing significantly larger shares across Asia, Africa, and Latin America (chart 2), while US progress in these regions has been more subdued. This signals a clear bifurcation, with China forging its own trading blocs, often at the expense of US market share. However, economies like Vietnam have managed to deepen trade ties with both countries (chart 3).

    China’s efforts to strengthen relationships extend beyond trade to direct investment abroad (chart 4) and loan financing, particularly in Africa, where it has become a major investor in new projects. This has allowed China to cement a foothold in regions where US influence is limited. The bifurcation also extends to the monetary and currency space, with China gradually reducing its US Treasury holdings while increasing its gold reserves, possibly as part of a diversification push (chart 5). Concurrently, China’s push for de-dollarisation continues, despite significant hurdles.

    Finally, US–China bifurcation is also playing out in the technological sector, where China has made significant advancements in critical areas, driven in part by substantial R&D investment over the years (chart 6). In response, US efforts to limit China’s access to key technologies may have inadvertently accelerated China’s development of its own systems and infrastructure, deepening the bifurcation further.

    Shifts in China and US trade shares While economists may differ on when the broader US–China bifurcation began, many agree that the more significant phase of decoupling was triggered in 2018, when President Trump initiated the first wave of trade restrictions and tariffs against China during his first term. Prior to these sharp policy shifts—and before Trump took office—China’s share of total trade with several major global economies remained relatively modest, generally below 20%, as shown in chart 1. Similarly, the US also maintained a relatively balanced trade share with most partners, though its trade was more concentrated with neighbouring countries such as Canada and Mexico.

    • Second straight month of slow core inflation pulls y/y increase down sharply.
    • Real spending moves up minimally after earlier surge.
    • Disposable income strength bolsters savings rate.
    • Deficit: $87.6 bil. in April, down $74.6 bil. from a record $162.3 bil. in March.
    • Exports up 3.4%, the largest of four straight m/m gains, led by a 15.5% jump in exports of industrial supplies & materials.
    • Imports, down in all end-use categories, slump 19.8%, the deepest m/m fall since Feb. 1975, led by a 32.3% plunge in nonauto consumer goods imports.
  • Global| May 30 2025

    Global Monetary REFLATION

    Global monetary reflation is once again underway. The United States, the European Monetary Union, and the United Kingdom are all our participants; Japan is the country going its own way continuing to tighten and to restrict policy through disciplined and tightening monetary growth.

    Reflation afoot Among the other three countries that are showing monetary stimulus, the U.K. is leading the way with the sterling M4 growth rate up to 7.6% at an annual rate over three months. The U.K. data lag other data in the table; they're not up to date through April; still, the acceleration is quite apparent over three months. Over 12 months, U.K. money growth is 3.5%, U.S. money growth is 4.4%, and the European Monetary Union money growth rate is 3.6%. The annual numbers still represent reflation increases in the annual growth rates compared to where they have been in the last three years, although none of the year-over-year growth rates really look like they are yet excessive compared to inflation targeting plans and likely GDP growth rates. However, this is definitely a transition to reflation. The question is whether it will be tempered at the right point.

    EMU trends In the European Monetary Union, the two-year growth rate and the three-year growth rates for money are under 2% while the 12-month growth rate is up to 3.6%. Monetary Union growth rate of real money balances is up over three months at 2.3% at an annual rate and at 1.5% over 12 months. European credit growth is picking up, as well, with private credit growth running at a 2.5% annual rate over three months and at a 2.3% pace over 12 months; in real terms, private credit growth year-over-year, however, is only 0.2%.

    U.S. trends In the United States, money growth is up to 6.5% at an annual rate over three months, money growth has progressed from averaging 0.2% over three years, to 2.7% over 2 years, and now to 4.4% over 12 months. U.S. nominal money growth clearly is accelerating. Looking at the growth of real balances in the U.S., the real money stock is growing at a 4.9% annual rate over three months and at 2.1% at an annual rate over 12 months.

    U.K. trends In the United Kingdom, there is that 7.6% three-month growth rate that compares to 3.5% over 12 months and to slower growth over 2 and 3 years. Real balance money growth is at a 3.3% annual rate over three months; over 12 months, the U.K. growth rate for real money balances is flat! While the U.K. seems to be in a period of relatively sharp acceleration for money growth, it's not yet a long-lived period of expansion, and so that has not yet had much impact on actual inflation developments. But the jack-rabbit start to monetary acceleration is something to be wary of.

    Japan trends In Japan, M2 plus CD's is falling at a 2% annual rate over three months, and rising at only a 0.4% in an annual rate over 12 months. That represents a lower growth rate than its two-year or three-year growth rate for the money stock. In terms of real money balances, over three months Japan's real balances are shrinking at a 3% annual rate, the same as the 12-month growth rate. Japan clearly is using monetary policy to squeeze inflation lower.

    Oil Disinflation efforts have been helped everywhere by oil prices that are falling in dollar terms at a 48.3% annual rate over three months and falling at a 24.6% annual rate over 12 months.

  • Financial markets have entered a more unsettled phase, with long-term yields, until very recently, rising notably across the US, Europe, and Japan. While inflation persistence and increased government borrowing have played a role, the moves also reflect broader concerns about global policy credibility and capital market dynamics. In the US, the unusual combination of higher yields and a weaker dollar points to growing risk premia linked to trade uncertainty and questions around institutional leadership (chart 1). At the same time, the withdrawal of central bank balance sheet support has continued to lift real yields across major economies (chart 2). Investors are also paying closer attention to savings and investment imbalances, where fewer surplus economies and persistent US deficits suggest a potentially tighter global savings environment (chart 3). Interestingly, the US stands out for a different reason: early signs of a productivity revival are emerging, possibly tied to AI investment and the broader digital infrastructure boom (chart 4). That contrasts with continued productivity stagnation in most other advanced economies (chart 5), where structural frictions and energy costs remain a drag. Indeed, the US may also be benefiting from a more fundamental edge—significantly cheaper electricity—giving it a further competitive advantage in this new capital- and data-intensive era (chart 6).

    • First GDP decline in three years is minimally changed.
    • Substantial foreign trade subtraction ahead of tariffs is increased; inventory addition is raised.
    • Domestic final demand growth is reduced.
    • Price index strength is unchanged, but corporate profits decline.