Tom Moeller

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New single-family home sales rose 12.4% in November (-14.0% y/y) to 744,000 (SAAR) from 662,000 in October, revised from 745,000. Sales remained below the January peak of 993,000. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected 775,000 sales in November.

By region, November sales in the West rose 53.2% (14.2% y/y) to 242,000. Rising by 15.6% (8.8% y/y) to 37,000 were sales in the Northeast. Sales in the South gained 2.7% (-21.2% y/y) to 412,000. Offsetting these increases, sales in the Midwest fell 25.4% (-44.8% y/y) to 53,000.

The median price of a new home rose 2.0% (18.8% y/y) in November to a record $416,900. The average sales price of a new home edged 0.7% higher (21.6% y/y) to a record $481,700. These sales price data are not seasonally adjusted.

The supply of new homes for sale fell to 6.5 months in November from 7.1 months in October. This compares with a low of 3.5 months averaged from August through October of last year. The median number of months a new home stayed on the market rose slightly to 2.7 from the record low of 2.5 months in October. These figures date back to January 1975.

New home sales activity and prices are available in Haver's **USECON** database. The consensus expectation figure from Action Economics is available in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Sales are highest since April.
- Strengthening is pronounced in West.
- Median sales price increases to record.

U.S. New Home Sales Surge in November

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The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) fell to 0.37 during November from 0.75 in October, revised from 0.76. The index is constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

The index's three-month moving average of 0.37 was the highest since July. During the last 10 years, there has been a 75% correlation between the change in the Chicago Fed Index and quarterly growth in real GDP.

The Production & Income component led last month's decline with a weakening to 0.21 from 0.42 in October. The Personal Consumption & Housing reading weakened to -0.05 last month from 0.04 in October. The Employment, Unemployment & Hours component moved down to 0.18 from 0.23. The Sales, Orders & Inventories index slipped to 0.03 from 0.06.

The CFNAI diffusion index, which measures the breadth of movement in the component series, improved to 0.35 in November from 0.18 in October. Fifty-three of the 85 component series contributed positively to the overall index and 32 made negative contributions.

The CFNAI is a weighted average of 85 monthly indicators of national economic activity. It is constructed to have an average value of zero and a standard deviation of one. Since economic activity tends toward trend growth rate over time, a positive index reading corresponds to growth above trend and a negative index reading corresponds to growth below trend. The CFNAI was constructed using data available as of October 25, 2021. Fifty of the 85 indicators had been published at that time. For all missing data, estimates were used in constructing the index.

These figures are available in Haver's **SURVEYS** database.

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- Index reverses half of prior month's gain.
- Production & personal consumption lead downturn.
- Trend continues to improve.

Chicago Fed National Activity Index Declines in November

Sandy Batten

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Real GDP growth in Q3 2021 was revised up slightly to 2.3% q/q SAAR in the third estimate from 2.1% in the second estimate and 2.0% in the advance estimate, still down markedly from the 6.7% increase in Q2. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had looked for no revision in this estimate for Q3. Compared to a year ago, GDP grew 4.9% in Q3, the same as in the second estimate and also in the advance report.

The lofty 4.3% q/q (not annualized) increase in corporate profits was revised down to a still-solid 3.4% gain and were up 19.7% y/y, revised down slightly from 20.7% in the first estimate. Profits from domestic nonfinancial industries were revised down while profits from abroad were revised up, extending their first quarterly gain in three quarters.

Personal consumption expenditures were revised up to a 2.0% q/q SAAR increase in the third estimate from 1.7% in the second and 1.6% in the advance report. Still, this was a significant slowdown from the 12.0% gain in Q2 and so remained the major factor behind the Q2 slowdown in overall GDP growth.

Business nonresidential fixed investment was revised up to 1.7% q/q SAAR from 1.5% in the second estimate. This reflected upward revisions to structures and spending on equipment (both smaller declines than previously reported) and another downward revision to spending on intellectual property products (+9.1 from +9.3%). The initially reported decline in inventories was revised slightly smaller such that their contribution to overall GDP growth was revised up marginally to 2.20%-points from 2.13%-points in the second estimate. The 8.3% q/q SAAR decline in residential investment reported in the second estimate was revised up to a 7.7% decline, the same pace of decline as in the advance report.

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The drop in exports in Q3 was revised even larger to -5.3% q/q SAAR from -3.0% q/q in the second estimate. The rise in imports was revised down to 4.7% from 5.8%. As a result the trade deficit was revised slightly wider, and it subtracted a little more from overall GDP growth than previously estimated (-1.26%-points versus -1.16%-points).

Government outlays growth was unrevised at 0.9% q/q SAAR but the drop in Federal government expenditures was revised deeper to -5.1% from -4.9% while the rise in spending by state and local governments was revised up to 4.9% from 4.7%.

Inflation as measured by the indexes in this report remained elevated and was revised up slightly in the third estimate. The GDP price index increased 6.0% q/q SAAR in the third estimate, up from 5.9% in the second estimate and 5.7% in the advance report. The revised Q3 reading was the second highest since Q4 1981, surpassed only by the 6.1% rise in Q2. The 5.3% q/q gain in the PCE price index was not revised in this estimate. However, the 4.5% q/q increase in the core PCE price index was revised up slightly to 4.6%. The increase in prices of nonresidential fixed investment was not revised at a 4.3% q/q increase while the rise in prices of residential investment was revised up to a 14.8% q/q gain from 14.4%. This was the third consecutive quarter in which prices of residential investment posted double-digit increases. The rise in export prices was revised down slightly while the gain in import prices were revised up slightly. Prices paid by governments rose an upwardly revised 6.1% from 6.0% in the second estimate and 5.4% in the advance report.

The GDP figures can be found in Haver's **USECON** and **USNA** databases. **USNA** contains virtually all of the Bureau of Economic Analysis' detail in the national accounts. Both databases include tables of the newly published not seasonally adjusted data. The Action Economics consensus estimates can be found in **AS1REPNA**.

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- GDP growth revised up to 2.3% q/q SAAR from 2.1%.
- Upward revision to consumption with offsetting small revisions elsewhere.
- Price inflation revised up to second fastest quarterly rate in 40 years.
- Rise in Q3 corporate profits revised down to a still-solid 3.4% q/q from 4.3%.

U.S. Q3 GDP Growth Revised Up in Third Estimate

Winnie Tapasanun

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Existing home sales rose 1.9% m/m (-2.0% y/y) to 6.460 million units (SAAR) in November after unrevised rises of 0.8% to 6.340 million in October and 7.0% to 6.290 million in September, according to the National Association of Realtors (NAR). November existing home sales were at the highest level since January, up 11.8% from a May low. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected a rise in sales to 6.53 million units in November. These data are compiled when existing home sales close.

Existing single-family home sales rose 1.6% (-2.2% y/y) to 5.750 million units in November after a 1.3% increase to 5.660 million in October. That was the third successive m/m rise to the highest level since January. Sales of condos and co-ops rebounded 4.4% (0.0% y/y) to 710,000, the highest level since July, after a 2.9% decline to 680,000.

Sales patterns mostly improved last month. Sales in the South advanced 2.9% (1.1% y/y) to 2.850 million in November after holding steady at 2.770 million in October. Sales in the West rose 2.3% (-3.6% y/y) to 1.330 million, the highest level since February, following a 0.8% decline to 1.300 million. Sales in the Midwest grew 0.7% (-0.7% y/y) to 1.520 million, a 10-month high, on top of a 4.9% gain to 1.510 million. However, sales in the Northeast were unchanged (-11.6% y/y) at 760,000 in November after a 1.3% October drop.

The median price of an existing home increased 0.3% (13.9% y/y) to $353,900 in November, a three-month high, after a 0.4% rebound to $352,700 in October. Prices in the South rose 1.7% (18.4% y/y) to $318,900, a record high, after having recovered 2.7% to $313,600. In the Midwest, prices were up 0.2% (9.0% y/y) to $260,100 following four consecutive m/m drops. In contrast, prices in the Northeast fell 1.7% (+4.7% y/y) to $372,500 after a 2.1% drop to $379,100, registering the fifth straight m/m fall to the lowest level since March. In the West, prices held steady (+8.4% y/y) at $507,200 after a 0.2% October rise. The price data are not seasonally adjusted.

The number of existing homes on the market dropped 9.8% (NSA) in November to 1.110 million units (-13.3% y/y), the lowest level since March, after a 2.4% decline to 1.230 million in October. The supply of homes on the market fell to 2.1 months in November, an eight-month low, from 2.3 months in October. That was well below the high of 4.6 months in May 2020 but above the all-time low of 1.9 months reached last December. These figures date back to January 1999.

The data on existing home sales, prices and affordability are compiled by the National Association of Realtors. The data on single-family home sales extend back to February 1968. Total sales and price data and regional sales can be found in Haver's **USECON** database. Regional price and affordability data and national inventory data are available in the **REALTOR** database. The expectations figure is from the Action Economics Forecast Survey, reported in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Sales increase for the fifth time in six months.
- November regional sales patterns are mostly positive.
- Median price at a three-month high; price in the South at a record high.

U.S. Existing Home Sales Rise in November to a 10-Month High

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The Mortgage Bankers Association's Loan Applications Index slipped 0.6% (-33.9% y/y) in the week ended December 17 following a 4.0% decline in the prior week. Applications for loans to purchase a house fell 3.3% (-8.6% y/y) after a 0.7% rise. Applications for loans to refinance gained 2.2% (-42.4% y/y) following a 6.4% decline in the prior week.

The share of applications for refinancing rose to 65.2% last week, the most in three months. The adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) share of activity held w/w at 4.3%.

The effective interest rate on a 30-year mortgage eased to 3.39% last week from 3.41% in the prior week. The effective rate on a 15-year rate mortgage edged up to 2.67%. The effective rate for a 30-year Jumbo mortgage loan eased to 3.39% last week, while the rate on a 5-year adjustable-rate loan increased to 2.90%. The last two series date back only to January 2011, while the others begin in January 1990.

Applications for fixed-rate loans slipped 0.6% (-34.9% y/y) last week, after a 4.4% decline in the prior week. Applications for adjustable-rate mortgages eased 0.2% (+18.2% y/y) following a 7.6% rise in the previous week.

The average size of a mortgage loans was $348,200 in the week ending December 17 compared to $342,100 in the week prior. The average size of loans for purchase was $416,200 in the latest week versus $406,800 one week earlier. The average size of refinanced loans rose to $311,900, up from $3000 in the prior week.

This survey covers over 75% of all U.S. retail residential mortgage applications and has been conducted weekly since 1990. Respondents include mortgage bankers, commercial banks, and thrifts. The base period and value for all indexes is March 16, 1990=100. The figures for weekly mortgage applications and interest rates are available in Haver's **SURVEYW** database.

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- Purchase applications decline as refinancings increase.
- 30-year mortgage rate slips.
- Purchase loan size increases.

U.S. Mortgage Applications Edge Lower As Rates Ease

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The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index increased 3.5% (33.0% y/y) to 115.8 during December from 111.9 in November, revised from 109.5. It was the highest level since July. A December reading of 110.6 had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. During all of 2021, the confidence index improved to 112.8, its highest level since 2019.

The Consumer Expectations reading rose 7.4% (11.4% y/y) to 96.9 this month from 90.2 in November, revised from 87.6. The Present Situation index eased 0.2% (+65.3% y/y) to 144.1 from 144.4 in November, revised from 142.5.

The jobs gap, representing the difference between respondents indicating that jobs are plentiful and those saying jobs are hard to get, fell to 42.6% of respondents this month from 44.7% in November, revised from 46.9%. This series has had a 75% correlation with the unemployment rate over the last ten years. The jobs plentiful measure fell to 55.1% of respondents this month. The series dates back to February 1967. The jobs hard-to-get measure rose to 12.5% of redpondents, the highest level since September. The jobs-not-so-plentiful reading fell to 32.4% of respondents. The figure is down from 51.1% averaged in 2020.

Current business conditions were perceived as good by 19.9% of respondents in December, the highest level in four months. Expectations that business conditions would improve in six months rose modestly to 26.7% of respondents but remained well below the 2020 highs. More jobs were expected in six months by a greatly improved 25.1% of respondents, the most since July. The percentage expecting rising income fell slightly in December to 18.0% of respondents and remained well below the 2019 highs.

The expected inflation rate in twelve months fell sharply to 6.9% in December from an elevated 7.3% in November, but remained up from a 4.4% low in January of last year. The share of respondents planning to buy a new home within six months rose to 0.9%, the highest level in nine months but remained below a June 2020 high of 2.0%. Those planning to buy a major appliance also rose sharply to 50.8% of respondents, an eight-month high.

Confidence of individuals under 35 years rose moderately this month to a five-month high. Confidence amongst those between 35 & 54 also surged (32.0% y/y) to an eight-month high. Confidence amongst individuals 55 and over has been relatively stable for five months, but is up 35.5% y/y.

The Consumer Confidence data are available in Haver's **CBDB** database. The total indexes, which are indexed to 1985=100, appear in **USECON**, and market expectations are in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Expectations improve.
- Jobs are seen as harder to find.
- Price inflation expectations ease.

U.S. Consumer Confidence Strengthens in December

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The U.S. current account deficit widened to $214.8 billion in Q3'21 from $198.3 billion in Q2'21, revised from $190.3 billion. It was the deepest deficit since Q3 2006. The Action Economics Forecast Survey anticipated a $203.7 billion deficit. As a percent of GDP, the deficit rose to 3.71%, the deepest since Q4 2005 when it was 6.29% of GDP.

The deficit in goods trade rose to a record $274.8 billion as exports grew 1.1% (23.8% y/y) in Q3. Industrial supplies & materials exports increased 3.9% (46.1% y/y) and nonauto consumer goods rose 9.0% (28.5% y/y). Food, feeds and beverages exports declined 8.5% (+6.5% y/y), autos, parts and engines exports fell 1.4% (-5.7% y/y) and capital goods exports eased 0.7% (+16.8% y/y). Imports of goods rose 1.4% (19.0% y/y) in Q3. Imports of industrial supplies and materials increased 8.0% (63.3% y/y) as oil prices rose. Foods, feeds and beverage imports rose 2.7% (19.6% y/y) while capital goods imports strengthened 1.2% (16.7% y/y). Auto and parts imports fell 4.1% (-1.8% y/y) while nonauto consumer goods declined 1.8% (+11.5% y/y).

The surplus on services trade deteriorated sharply to $49.9 billion in Q3, the smallest surplus since Q4'11 and down from the peak $78.9 billion surplus in Q1'18. Services exports eased slightly (+14.7% y/y). Travel exports increased 1.6% (54.8% y/y) but export charges for the use of intellectual property declined 5.8% (+2.7% y/y). Imports of services improved 9.8% (30.3% y/y), reflecting a 47.3% rise (379.3% y/y) in travel imports. Import charges for the use of intellectual property increased 8.2% (6.6% y/y).

The surplus on primary income rose to $48.2 billion in Q3. Investment income receipts rose 6.8% (17.4% y/y) while investment income payments increased 3.7% (21.8% y/y). The deficit on secondary income deepened to $38.0 billion.

Balance of Payments data are in Haver's **USINT** database, with summaries available in **USECON**. The expectations figure is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

**A Hopeless and Imperative Endeavor: Lessons from the Pandemic for Economic Forecasters** by Fed Governor Christopher J. Waller is available [here](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20211217a.htm).

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- Deficit is largest in 15 years.
- Goods & services balances both deteriorate.

U.S. Current Account Deficit Deepens Further in Q3

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**Retail gasoline prices** fell to $3.30 per gallon (+48.2% y/y) in the week ended December 20 after declining to $3.32 per gallon in the previous week. Prices were at the lowest level since the second week of October. Haver Analytics adjusts the gasoline price series for normal seasonal variation. The seasonally adjusted price rose to $3.56 per gallon. Typically, gasoline prices decline this time of year.

The price of **West Texas Intermediate crude oil** edged 0.2% lower w/w (+48.4% y/y) to $71.17 per barrel in the week ended December 17 from $71.31 per barrel in the previous week. Yesterday, the price declined to $68.23 per barrel. The average price of **Brent crude oil** eased 1.1% w/w (+44.6% y/y) to $73.94 per barrel last week from $74.80 per barrel in the prior week. The price was $71.76 per barrel yesterday.

**Natural gas** prices rose 3.3% w/w to $3.79/mmbtu (+40.4% y/y) in the week ended December 17 after declining to $3.67/mmbtu in the prior week. Prices remained down from the $5.87/mmbtu high in the second week of October. Yesterday, the price improved to $3.91/mmbtu.

In the four weeks ended December 10, **gasoline demand** increased 15.4% y/y, up from 6.4% y/y growth early in October. Demand for **all petroleum products** rose an improved 12.6% y/y in the latest week. **Crude oil input to refineries** rose 10.2% y/y. **Gasoline inventories** fell 8.5% y/y, while **crude oil inventories** declined 9.8% y/y.

The **supply of gasoline** inventories in the week ending December 10 of 23.9 days remained down sharply from the recent high of 32.9 days in the third week of February. The supply of crude oil fell to 27.3 days, the lowest level in seven weeks. It stood well below the recent high of 41.8 days in the second week of March.

These data are reported by the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy. The price data can be found in Haver's **WEEKLY** and **DAILY** databases. Greater detail on prices, as well as the demand, production and inventory data are in **USENERGY**.

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- Gasoline prices slip.
- Crude oil prices ease.
- Natural gas prices improve.

U.S. Energy Product Prices Are Little-Changed

Crude oil price has returned to pre-conflict level but traffic through Hormuz still subpar

Surging orders for computers and electronics propelling durable goods orders

Next year's inflation forecasts are on the rise and above target

Disrupted global supply chains placing upward pressure on US goods prices

Construction of data centers has overtaken transportation construction in US

Elevated energy prices putting intense upward pressure on input prices around the globe

US is big leader in global surge in private AI investment

Larger-than-usual income tax refunds this year are supporting consumer spending

Sharply rising share of AI-related jobs

Inflationary impact of surge in oil prices larger in Europe than in the US

Futures market thinks the price of oil will recede significantly over the next six months

Recent pickup in US defense orders could help support overall growth ahead

Cost of transporting crude oil has soared to series high

Market-based inflation expectations have not yet reflected recent surge in oil prices

Global equity markets are fearing a major economic disruption from soaring oil prices

Is recent drop in sentiment signaling softer growth ahead?

With the Iran conflict, geopolitical risk has soared to alarming levels

Soaring AI-related investment in US underpinning strong contribution of business spending to overall growth

AI-related outperformance of IP in Advanced Asia ex Japan

Resilient US economy pushing up Blue Chip 2026 outlook

US and China big leaders in adoption of AI models

Robust US demand for advanced technology products

China's export growth rotating away from the US

More pronounced upward revisions in countries more exposed to AI investment

Stable job openings and hiring rates point to cautious hiring

Our global data offering is unparalleled in terms of coverage, quality, and organization. We offer 290+ databases from 2500 government and private sources, a wealth of key survey and forecast data covering the world’s economies, and a robust offering of archive databases that drive machine learning for big data applications.

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The U.S. ISM Services PMI edged down to 54.0 in June, the third m/m decline in four months, following a 0.9-point increase to 54.5 in May, according to data from the Institute for Supply Management, indicating expansion in the services sector for the 24th straight month, albeit at a slightly slower pace. The June index, while above 50.8 in June 2025 and a low of 49.4 in June 2024, remained below its recent high of 56.1 in February and a record-high 67.5 in November 2021. The 12-month average was 53.1, pointing to continued growth in the U.S. services sector. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had also expected 54.0 for June.

Haver Analytics constructs a composite index combining the services index and the manufacturing reading. This index slipped to 53.9 in June after a 0.9-point increase to 54.4 in May, signaling expansion for the 13th consecutive month but at a slightly slower rate. The latest reading was above 50.6 in June 2025 and a low of 49.3 in June 2024, while remaining below a record-high 66.7 in November 2021. These series date back to July 1997.

In the latest services survey, the business activity index fell to 55.4 in June following a 1.8-point rise to 57.7 in May, indicating continued expansion in business activity for 24 months in a row, though at the slowest pace since March. The index was above a low of 50.0 in June 2024 but below a peak of 70.9 in November 2021. In June, 24.3% of respondents (NSA) reported higher activity while 14.5% reported an activity decline. The new orders index decreased to 55.1 in June after a 3.8-point gain to 57.3 in May, reflecting expansion in new orders for the 13th successive month but at a slower pace. The index was above a low of 47.2 in May 2025 but below a high of 61.0 in February 2023 and a record-high 69.2 in October 2021. In June, 25.9% of respondents (NSA) reported higher new orders while 17.1% reported declines. Meanwhile, the supplier deliveries index (NSA) fell to 54.4 in June from 55.2 in May, indicating slower supplier delivery performance for the 19th straight month after one month in faster territory in November 2024.

On the labor front, the employment index recovered to 51.2 in June from 47.9 in May, showing employment activity in the services sector expanded for the first time since February. The latest reading was above a low of 43.5 in December 2023 but below a high of 54.1 in June 2023 and a peak of 58.9 in April 2021. An increased 16.0% of respondents (NSA) indicated higher employment in June while 10.9% reported declines.

On the inflation front, the prices index fell to a still-elevated 67.7 in June from 71.3 in May, indicating prices paid by services organizations for materials and services had risen (i.e., above 50) since June 2017 but at the slowest rising pace in four months. The index was above a low of 53.9 in March 2024 but significantly below a peak of 83.7 in March 2022. In June, 40.7% of respondents (NSA) reported higher prices while only 3.8% reported price declines.

Additionally, the new export orders index edged up to 50.4 in June from a neutral 50.0 in May, showing new export orders expanded for the fourth time in five months, while the imports index fell to 49.4 from 51.1, marking the first contraction since January. The inventories index dropped to 51.2 in June from 62.5 in May (the highest level since May 2010), indicating inventories expanded for the fifth successive month. The inventory sentiment index fell to 52.6 in June from 55.2 in May, showing continued expansion since May 2023. The backlog of orders index rebounded to 54.9 in June from 51.3 in May, registering the fifth consecutive month of expansion following 11 straight months of contraction. These series are not seasonally adjusted and not included in the ISM Services PMI total.

The ISM Services PMI is a composite index consisting of four equally weighted diffusion indexes: Business Activity, New Orders, Employment, and Supplier Deliveries. A reading above 50 indicates expansion in the services sector; below 50 suggests contraction. Supplier Deliveries is the only ISM index that is inversed; a reading above 50 indicates slower deliveries. The ISM figures are available in Haver's **USECON** database, with additional detail in the **SURVEYS** database. The expectations figure from Action Economics is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- ISM Services PMI down to 54.0 in June, remaining above the 12-month avg. of 53.1.
- Business Activity (55.4) expands for the 24th consecutive mth.; New Orders (55.1) for the 13th straight mth.; Employment (51.2, first expansion since Feb.); Supplier Deliveries (54.4 vs. 55.2).
- Prices Index (67.7) at a four-month low, still indicating prices rising since June ’17.

U.S. ISM Services PMI Eases in June, Still Indicating Expansion for the 24th Straight Month

Robert Brusca

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The global PMI data for a select group of 24 countries and their composites, provided on the graph, indicate a slight overall improvement for the total PMIs in June, with the service sector getting slightly stronger as the manufacturing sector is slightly weaker.

Conditions, however, remain uneven. The overall average for the PMI composite in June moved up to 51.4 from 50.7 in May, but the May reading had fallen from 51 in April. The median rose to 50.8 in June from 50.2 in May, but it had been at 51.2 in April. There continues to be a great deal of weakness and irregularity in the progression of the global economy—not surprisingly with the recent data coming during the period when oil prices had surged in the Strait of Hormuz had been closed. We now are seeing different conditions in force, and we'll see how much improvement occurs in July if the current global situation remains improved.

In June, nine of twenty-four reporters had PMI readings below 50, indicating contraction in economic activity. In May, there had been ten such reporters, while in April there had been nine. These readings, of course, are less than half of the reporters; however, it's still a very large proportion of the reporters where the total PMI gauges are indicating economic contraction. Over three months, there are nine reporters with average readings below 50; over six months, there are only seven; and over 12 months, there are six. This progression tells us that the situation has been getting worse rather than better.

Based on monthly data, the European Monetary Union, Germany, France, Russia, Egypt, and Qatar each recorded three consecutive months of readings below 50, indicating contraction in each of those months. Sequentially, over 12 months, six months, and three months, only France, Russia, Ghana, Egypt, and Qatar show consistent readings that average below 50 (based on raw data).

The queue standings of the levels reported by countries in June show only seven with standings above the 50th percentile; this means there are only seven countries whose PMIs in June are higher than their average back to January 2022. Not surprisingly with the recent events really focused on oil prices and the situation in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, some of the weakest ranking readings are coming from oil producers in the Middle East such as Qatar (6.1%), the UAE (1.5%), Saudi Arabia (6.1%), and Egypt (18.2%). Clearly, the interruption of the oil flow and war damage has had an outsized impact on these data.

However, quite apart from the current situation and the closure of the Strait, if we calculate the average PMI standing rather than the ranking just the average of the PMI total sector ranking, there are four countries that have averaged readings below 50 based on monthly data back to January 2022. Those countries are France, Zambia, Egypt, and Kenya. The average readings across all countries back to January 2022 is a reading of 52.3. The highest ranking during this previous period is from India; its ranking is at 58.1. Ironically, some of the strongest readings in the earlier period come from oil producers whose current rankings are so low such as Saudi Arabia at 56.6, the UAE at 54.6, and Qatar at 53.4.

There has been upward momentum this month, particularly in services, while manufacturing backtracked. However, the trend to improve conditions is no longer so clear. What is clear is that the outlook is going to depend upon whatever peace agreement proves durable involving Iran and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. This conclusion is not rocket-science; it is obvious. And it's going to take close-watching because there have been so many missteps around alleged ceasefires and treaty discussions that we can't be very sure about what's going to play out in the future and what will last.

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Globally S&P PMIs Gain a Modicum of Traction

Tian Yong Woon

In this week's Letter, we trace how an energy shock and a resilient AI upcycle shaped Asia through the first half of 2026 and weigh the risks that may define the second. The year opened hopeful on AI, though some feared stretched valuations, before the US-Iran conflict and a closed Strait of Hormuz shook the mood (chart 1). A later MoU eased energy prices and inflation fears, yet valuations largely held on AI optimism, despite bouts of reassessment. The oil surge hit import-reliant emerging Asia hardest, leaving India, Thailand and the Philippines doubly exposed through their Middle East sourcing (chart 2). Pass-through inflation, subsidies that some governments later pared back, and currency pressure followed, though resuming Strait traffic should ease these strains. Rising inflation then boxed in policymakers, straining already-stretched fiscal positions and limiting more pro-growth monetary policy stances in some economies (chart 3). Our latest Blue Chip survey found a slim majority reassessed the risk balance after oil fell, though the shifts stayed mild versus the June survey (chart 4). Most still rank upside inflation risk above downside employment risk, even as a slightly larger share now see the balance as more even. AI remains the region's key offset, with Taiwan and South Korea riding a sharp rise in memory and chip exports (chart 5). Malaysia and Thailand instead draw data centre FDI, so Asia gains from the buildout phase rather than the West's hoped-for productivity gains. We close on an uncertain second half, where a possible Super El Niño could revive food-driven inflation even as energy pressures fade (chart 6). Beyond that, an AI reassessment, fresh geopolitical flashpoints, trade tensions and the US midterms could each reshape the outlook.

**The year thus far**
We began the year on a relatively hopeful note, buoyed by AI optimism and market valuations that reflected it, although some investors worried that valuations had become overstretched. The geopolitical mood shifted quickly in early January, however, when US military forces captured former Venezuelan leader Maduro, though the event did little to move markets (chart 1). A far greater shock came when the US-Iran conflict erupted in late February, closing the Strait of Hormuz and dealing a negative blow to global energy supplies. More recently, the US and Iran have reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aimed at ceasing hostilities and resuming trade flows through the Strait. This has allowed energy prices to ease, softening policymakers' concerns about energy-driven inflation. Even so, equity valuations have largely remained underpinned by AI optimism, albeit with interim bouts of reassessment and price retracement. This drew on repeated reports of strong growth along the AI supply chain, and on signs that supply could not keep pace with demand. This continued even as AI models with leapfrogging capabilities reached the public. At several points, the US government stepped in to rein in public access to some models, given security concerns about such immense capabilities falling into the wrong hands.

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**Oil impact on Asia**
Within emerging Asia, among the hardest hit by the oil surge are India, Thailand and the Philippines. These are relatively heavy net importers of crude oil, and they source most of that crude from the Middle East. That combination left them doubly exposed when the Strait of Hormuz closed (chart 2). The surge in oil prices also carries multiple, wider impacts. First, the higher cost of imported crude passes through to consumer inflation, leaving households with a heavier energy bill. Several governments have stepped in with energy subsidies to ease the consumer burden. That support has not proved indefinitely sustainable, as some governments eventually pared it back given the immense costs. In effect, subsidies shift some of the burden from consumers to the state, straining public finances. There is also a currency effect, since higher crude prices require more domestic currency to buy the same volume, weighing on the exchange rate. That said, other drivers of currency depreciation may also have been at play over the period. Trade flows through the Strait have recently picked up, with traffic gradually resuming. If the current truce and its conditions hold, these effects may ease before long. On the growth front, higher oil prices would not appear in volume-based measures. Their second-order effects on output would still come through, such as demand dampened by higher energy costs.

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**Inflation and monetary policy**
Higher crude oil prices drove inflation sharply higher across Asia and much of the world. That greatly complicated policymakers' task on both the fiscal and monetary fronts. On the fiscal side, several Asian governments were already facing pressures before the oil shock. These ranged from grand, fiscally costly policy pushes in Indonesia to calls for greater fiscal sustainability in Japan. Higher oil prices added a need for more support, further complicating their position. On the monetary side, previously pro-growth moves, such as rate cuts in India, looked riskier, as they threatened to stoke already-surging inflation (chart 3). That made further easing, or even holding current pro-growth settings, hard to sustain. The danger is sharper still if inflation expectations become unanchored, raising the risk of runaway inflation. The recent US-Iran de-escalation, and the crude price slump that followed, certainly help to ease the situation. One would expect so material a shift in the geopolitical backdrop to prompt a reassessment among policymakers and investors alike. Yet that was not entirely the case, based on our latest Blue Chip Financial Forecast survey, whose results we discuss in the next section.

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**The latest Blue Chip survey results**
The recent US-Iran MoU has largely held, despite occasional flare-ups. Against that backdrop, and the sharp fall in oil prices that followed, we asked panellists to assess the balance of risks between employment and inflation. A slim majority (59%) said their assessment had shifted, while a non-trivial minority said it had not. Looking specifically at how US risk expectations moved, we find the shifts have been quite mild. That is relative to the June survey, which was conducted before the MoU. Even so, most panellists (65%) still see upside risks to inflation as the key risk, rather than downside risks to employment. Meanwhile, a slightly larger share than in June (23%) now see the risks as more balanced.

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**The AI upcycle and Asia**
We turn next to a key offset to the growth dampeners facing much of Asia. It stems from parts of the region being well positioned to capture the current AI upcycle. Advanced economies such as Taiwan and South Korea have benefited from strong demand for AI and related memory chips. This has driven a sharp rise in exports of such goods (chart 5). Those exports have propelled growth in these economies this year, at a pace faster than in previous years. Other economies, such as Malaysia and Thailand, are going through a data centre boom. They benefit through an additional channel beyond AI-related goods exports: robust FDI inflows. Foreign firms are driving these inflows as they expand their data centre footprint in the region. Other economies, including those in the West, hope to reap large productivity gains from the current jump in AI capabilities. By contrast, much of Asia's benefit comes from the ongoing buildout of the parts and infrastructure that the upcycle requires.

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**Watching H2 2026**
Bringing it all together, the first half of the year has been shaped by two main drivers: the US-Iran conflict and the ongoing AI upcycle. What the overarching themes for Asia will be in the second half remains anyone's guess. For one, the threat of an imminent "Super El Niño" event (chart 6) could trigger a crop supply shock. That may reintroduce inflationary pressure, albeit through the food channel. On another front, market optimism around AI-related companies' revenues and spending still persists. Yet disruptions or new discoveries could emerge down the line, including some that sharply reduce the compute needed for a given output. Such developments may in time prompt investors to reassess their views. In addition, pockets of geopolitical pressure are still brimming in parts of the world, including the Middle East. These threaten to upend supply flows of oil, and of other crucial goods too. The trade front, though faded from focus in recent months, could become another flashpoint. It bears on growth and on bilateral relationships, especially those with the US. Finally, other events, such as the US midterm elections later this year, may also skew the global backdrop.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: Woah, We’re Halfway There

Andrew Cates

**Tightening Bias Intact, but Unevenly Distributed**
The July Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey's expectations for policy rate changes over the next twelve months reveal a striking divergence across the major advanced economies, as chart 1 below makes clear. Across the board, the rate outlook is higher than it was in late February, before the US-Iran conflict escalated: the energy price shock and its inflationary consequences have left an imprint on the panel's thinking, even as oil prices have since retreated. Japan tops the list with an expected increase of around 40 basis points, reflecting the building pressure on the Bank of Japan to respond to yen weakness and still-elevated domestic inflation. Canada and the euro area also sit firmly in positive territory, with expected increases of around 30 and 20 basis points respectively. The US and the UK, by contrast, are in negative territory — the US barely so, the UK more distinctly, with the panel pencilling in modest rate reductions over the coming year. This pattern is not simply a reflection of where each economy sits in the inflation cycle. It also encodes a judgement about the current stance of monetary policy: in Japan, the euro area and Canada, policy is likely seen as insufficiently tight relative to the inflation challenge, and the conflict has reinforced that view. In the US and UK, by contrast, policy is judged to be closer to or already beyond neutral, meaning the next move is more likely to be an easing than a further tightening — even if, in the US case, that easing has been pushed well into 2027.

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**When Will the Next Move Come?**
Chart 2 below adds a timing dimension to the rate outlook, showing where the BCFF panel currently places the next policy move for the Fed, ECB, Bank of England and Bank of Japan. For the BoJ, the distribution is concentrated around the near term, with a significant share of respondents expecting action in September or October — consistent with the building pressure illustrated in chart 1 and with the BoJ’s next scheduled decision on 31 July. For the ECB, September or later than November emerge as the most likely timing for the next step. The Bank of England panel is more spread, with a meaningful share expecting action to come later. For the Fed, the dominant view places the next move firmly in the ‘later’ category, consistent with the BCFF consensus that the Fed funds rate will hold through the rest of 2026, with a first cut not expected until Q2 2027. Under chair Kevin Warsh, the June FOMC meeting delivered a hawkish dot plot that shifted some participants toward a hike before year-end, but the panel as a whole has not moved that far.

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**Headline Up, Core Contained: The Inflation Picture Across Advanced Economies**
One of the more reassuring features of the current inflation episode has been the limited pass-through from energy prices to underlying price dynamics. Across the advanced economies, headline CPI inflation has risen materially since the conflict escalated in March, driven overwhelmingly by consumer energy costs. Core inflation — stripping out food and energy — has edged higher, but only modestly, suggesting that second-round effects remain contained for now. In the United States, the pressures are arguably more alarming, with core PCE rising sharply between February and May to its highest level since October 2023. In the euro area, the focus this week has been firmly on Eurostat's June flash CPI estimate, published yesterday. Headline inflation fell back to 2.8% from a peak of 3.2% in May, as energy costs — the main driver of the surge since the conflict began — eased meaningfully. Crucially, core inflation also ticked down, and services inflation retreated as well. The June data therefore tell a broadly reassuring story: the energy shock is unwinding without leaving a lasting imprint on underlying price dynamics — precisely what the ECB will have been hoping for.

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**Consumer Price Expectations: Are Households Convinced?**
The aggregate inflation picture looks relatively contained at the macro level, but whether households are similarly reassured is a separate question. Chart 4 below draws on the European Commission's consumer survey data on price expectations — one of the more timely and widely watched indicators of inflation psychology in the euro area. The survey captures whether consumers expect prices to rise, stay the same or fall over the coming twelve months, and its relationship with actual inflation outturns has historically been close. A sustained elevation in consumer price expectations risks becoming self-fulfilling, feeding into wage demands and pricing behaviour in ways that complicate the ECB's task considerably. The June survey, however, brought an encouraging development: expectations fell steeply, suggesting that households have begun to register the reversal in energy prices and the broader easing of the inflationary impulse. That said, the absolute level of expectations remains elevated relative to the pre-conflict period, and one month's decline does not constitute a trend. Whether the June reading marks the beginning of a sustained normalisation — or proves a temporary dip before expectations re-anchor at a higher level — will be one of the key variables shaping the ECB's decision calculus in the months ahead.

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**Japan: A Weak Yen at the Worst Possible Time**
Japan occupies a particularly uncomfortable position in the current global conjuncture. The yen has depreciated to levels not seen since December 1986, with USD/JPY touching 162 this week. The move reflects the persistence of a large interest rate differential: even as the Bank of Japan has continued its gradual tightening, the Fed’s hawkish pivot under chair Kevin Warsh — with the mid-June FOMC dot plot signalling a possible hike before year-end — has reinforced the carry trade dynamics weighing on the currency. For Japan, which imports virtually all of its energy, yen weakness at a time of still-elevated global oil prices is a double burden, amplifying domestic inflation and squeezing real incomes. Verbal warnings from Japan’s Finance Ministry have had only a modest and short-lived effect on the exchange rate. The Bank of Japan’s next policy decision is on 31 July, and the pressure to act more decisively is building. The BCFF panel’s July survey revised upward its expectation for a stronger US dollar against the yen over the coming year — consistent with the fundamental picture that chart 5 below describes.

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**AI: Optimism on the Technology, Scepticism on the Price**
Returning to the BCFF survey, its special questions reveal a panel that continues to look beyond the current cyclical turbulence toward a longer-horizon structural narrative. On artificial intelligence, respondents are broadly optimistic: 45% expect a noticeable impact on US productivity and growth within one to three years, with a further 45% believing those effects are already becoming evident. That is a striking degree of conviction about a technology whose macro-level productivity impact remains, by most empirical measures, still to fully materialise. Yet the same panellists are considerably more cautious about financial markets than about the technology itself. Nearly all respondents believe that expected AI gains are already fully reflected — or even over-reflected — in current asset prices. Chart 6 below captures this tension. It is a combination — high conviction on transformative potential, high scepticism on current valuations — that has historically been associated with stretched risk premia and vulnerability to disappointment, even where the underlying technology story ultimately proves correct.

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Global financial markets have had a more settled feel this week, reflecting the continued unwinding of the geopolitical risk premium that had built up during the worst of the US-Iran conflict. Oil prices have fallen further, equity markets have been broadly supported, and incoming inflation data — notably the euro area’s June flash CPI estimate — have come in below expectations. The US holiday-shortened week ahead, with Independence Day on Friday, is likely to keep volumes thin and activity subdued. The bigger picture, however, remains one of tension between a more benign near-term inflation trajectory and central banks that may not yet be ready to stand down. In the charts below we look first at what the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) survey reveals about the expected change in and timing of policy rates across the major economies (charts 1 and 2), then at the divergence between headline and core inflation across the advanced economies (chart 3), and at what euro area consumers are more specifically expecting about inflation in the period ahead (chart 4). We turn next to Japan and the yen’s slide this week to 40-year lows (chart 5), and finally to the BCFF survey’s special questions on artificial intelligence and asset valuations (chart 6).

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Charts of the Week: Forecasters Hold Firm

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The luster fell a bit off the employment rose in June with nonfarm payrolls rising 57,000 against expectations of a 115,000 increase, according to today’s report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Moreover, the increases previously reported for April and May were revised down by a total of 74,000. Upon revision, payrolls increased 148,000 in April versus 179,000 previously reported and rose 129,000 in May versus 172,000 previously reported. The average increase over the past three months fell to 111,000 from 164,000 in May while the average increase over the past six months rose to 92,000 in June, its highest reading since February 2025, from 80,000 in May. Both remain on a modest uptrend and much stronger than payroll gains last year. In 2025, monthly payroll gains averaged only 10,000.

The weaker-than-expected payroll report was reinforced by a weak report from the **household survey**. While the number of unemployed fell 213,000 and the unemployment rate edged down to 4.2% from 4.3% in May, the number of employed slumped 507,000 in June, the largest monthly decline since May 2025 (with population adjustment to January 2026). The labor force plunged 720,000 with the labor force participation rate falling to 61.5%, its lowest level since March 2021.

Growth of average hourly earnings (AHE), a key variable for the Federal Reserve, was relatively well behaved in June. AHE increased 0.3% m/m, the same monthly gain as in May, in line with expectations. The y/y rate of advance edged up to 3.5% in June from 3.4% in May. Wage growth in private services-producing firms picked up in June, rising 0.4% m/m (3.4% y/y) versus 0.2% m/m (3.2% y/y) in May. Goods-producing wages increased 0.2% m/m in June after 0.3% monthly gains in both April and May with the y/y rate holding at 4.1%.

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In the **establishment survey**, private-sector employment was also weaker than expected in June, increasing only 49,000 against an expected 115,000 increase. Moreover, April and May figures were also revised down by a total of 50,000. Government employment rose 8,000 following a 32,000 increase in May. Private goods-producing employment increased 10,000, its largest monthly gain in three months with an 11,000 gain in construction and a 3,000 rise in manufacturing jobs, the first increase in three months. In contrast, services-producing employment increased only 39,000 in June, its weakest monthly performance in four months. Private education and health services jobs posted another solid gain of 69,000, up from 45,000 in May. However, retail jobs fell 7,500, their first monthly decline in four months, and leisure and hospitality jobs slumped 61,000, their largest monthly decline since December 2020, after increasing 40,000 in May. There had been speculation in the market that the World Cup would generate additional leisure and hospitality jobs, but this obviously failed to pan out. On a brighter note, although the one-month payroll diffusion index, a measure of the breadth of job gains, slipped to 54.4 in June from 56.0 in May, it remained well above the key 50 level that indicates that more industries were adding jobs than losing them.

The length of the workweek was unchanged at 34.3 hours in June with the aggregate weekly hours index edging up 0.1% m/m, the same monthly gain as in May. The aggregate hours index rose 1.3% q/q saar in Q2, the fastest quarterly gain in four quarters, providing a solid base for Q2 real GDP growth. The goods-producing workweek was unchanged at 40.1 hours, the highest since January 2023, while the private service-producing workweek edged down to 33.2 hours from 33.3 hours in May.

The employment and earnings data are collected from surveys taken each month during the week containing the 12th day of the month. The labor market data are contained in Haver's **USECON** database. Detailed figures are in the **EMPL** and **LABOR** databases. The expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- U.S. nonfarm payrolls increased 57,000 in June with meaningful downward revisions to both April and May.
- The market consensus looked for a 115,000 increase.
- The unemployment rate edged down to 4.2% from 4.3%, due mostly to a large decrease in the labor force.
- Average hourly earnings rose 0.3% m/m (3.5% y/y), in line with expectations.