Tom Moeller

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914a.jpg" width="353">
US retail sales fell 2.1% in August due to a 12.0% drop in motor vehicle dealers&#39; sales. Consensus expectations had been for a 1.3% decline. Less autos, however, retail sales doubled expectations and rose 1.0%.
Some of this m/m strength was due to a 4.4% surge in gasoline service station sales, although it was just half the 8.6% m/m increase in the retail price of gasoline to an average $2.49 per gallon.
Less gasoline, nonauto retail sales rebounded 0.5% (7.0 y/y) following no change in July.
Sales at furniture &amp; electronics stores rose 0.6% (5.9% y/y) following an upwardly revised 0.2% July increase. Sales of nonstore retailers (internet &amp; catalogue) jumped 1.8% (11.0% y/y) and sales of building materials rose 0.5% (8.4% y/y).
On the disappointing side, general merchandise store sales rose a modest 0.3% (6.7% y/y) after downwardly revised gains in both July and June while apparel store sales were unchanged after a deepened 0.9% drop in July.
Oil Prices and Consumer Spending from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond is available <a href="http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/economic_quarterly/pdfs/summer2005/mehrapetersen.pdf"> here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol">&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/usecon/@ED/@ED04/@ED0401/@ED0401.HTM">Retail Sales &amp; Food Services</a></td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Excluding Autos</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
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US retail sales fell 2.1% in August due to a 12.0% drop in motor vehicle dealers' sales. Consensus expectations had been for a 1.3% decline. Less autos, however, retail sales doubled expectations and rose 1.0%. Some of this m/m [...]

U.S. Retail Sales Down With Autos, Elsewhere OK

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914a.jpg" width="353">
US retail sales fell 2.1% in August due to a 12.0% drop in motor vehicle dealers&#39; sales. Consensus expectations had been for a 1.3% decline. Less autos, however, retail sales doubled expectations and rose 1.0%.
Some of this m/m strength was due to a 4.4% surge in gasoline service station sales, although it was just half the 8.6% m/m increase in the retail price of gasoline to an average $2.49 per gallon.
Less gasoline, nonauto retail sales rebounded 0.5% (7.0 y/y) following no change in July.
Sales at furniture &amp; electronics stores rose 0.6% (5.9% y/y) following an upwardly revised 0.2% July increase. Sales of nonstore retailers (internet &amp; catalogue) jumped 1.8% (11.0% y/y) and sales of building materials rose 0.5% (8.4% y/y).
On the disappointing side, general merchandise store sales rose a modest 0.3% (6.7% y/y) after downwardly revised gains in both July and June while apparel store sales were unchanged after a deepened 0.9% drop in July.
Oil Prices and Consumer Spending from the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond is available <a href="http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/economic_quarterly/pdfs/summer2005/mehrapetersen.pdf"> here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol">&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
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<td class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/usecon/@ED/@ED04/@ED0401/@ED0401.HTM">Retail Sales &amp; Food Services</a></td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Excluding Autos</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
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</table>
Industrial Production Increase Again Light 
by <a href="/comment/Moeller.html">Tom Moeller</a> September 14, 2005


<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914b.jpg" width="353">
Industrial output in August rose 0.1% for the second consecutive month and fell short of Consensus expectations for a 0.3% increase. The disappointment centered on declines in utility output (-0.5%) and mining output (-0.7%). Factory sector production rose 0.3% (2.9% y/y) but the July increase was revised down to just 0.1%. 
Hurricane Katrina lowered the gain in output by 0.3 percentage points. 
A 3.8% (5.5% y/y) rise in motor vehicle &amp; parts production accounted for all of last month&#39;s output gain. Less motor vehicles, factory output was unchanged (2.6% y/y) following an unrevised 0.3% July increase. <img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914c.jpg" width="353">
Output of computers &amp; peripheral equipment jumped another 1.5% (19.4% y/y) after the huge 2.3% spike in July. Excluding the high tech sector as well as autos, factory output fell 0.1% (+1.6% y/y). 
Output of appliances, furniture &amp; carpeting rose 0.7% (1.0% y/y) and recovered a 0.8% drop in July although output of nondurable goods doubled the prior month&#39;s decline and fell 0.6% (+2.4% y/y). U.S. clothing output has fallen nearly two thirds from what is was ten years ago (-6.7% y/y) and, during the last three months, paper products&#39; output is down as well (+3.4% y/y). 
Total capacity utilization was stable at 79.8% and capacity grew 1.1% y/y. Factory sector utilization rose to 78.4%, up from 77.2% last August while capacity rose 1.4% y/y.
Pricing, Production and Persistence from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia can be found <a href="http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/wps/2005/wp05-4.pdf"> here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@EA/@EA.HTM">Production &amp; Capacity</a></th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
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<td class="firstcol">Industrial Production</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>-0.0%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Consumer Goods</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Business Equipment</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Capacity Utilization</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>78.3% (8/04)</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S. Budget Deficit Deepened Due To Widespread Spending 
by <a href="/comment/Moeller.html">Tom Moeller</a> September 14, 2005


<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914f.jpg" width="353">
In August, the U.S. federal government ran a budget deficit of $50.0B. That was slightly deeper than Consensus estimates but it was quite a bit deeper than a $41.1BB deficit last August. Nevertheless, the deficit of $352.6B during the first eleven months of FY 2005 was 19% lower than the prior fiscal year&#39;s first eleven months. 
Overall, U.S. net outlays grew 6.8% during the first eleven months of FY05. A 20.3% y/y gain in federal outlays on defense (19% of total outlays) counted for much of the deterioration in the deficit picture versus last August. That rise lifted defense spending by 7.3% in fiscal year 2005 versus 2004. Medicare spending (12% of total outlays) also popped 29.6% versus August of 2004 and FYTD growth accelerated to 9.4%. Growth in spending on social security (21% of total outlays) was about stable at 5.6% though spending on health programs (10% of the total) picked up a bit to 4.4%. Spending on education &amp; training (4% of the total) surged 51% versus last August and grew 15.3% FYTD while interest expense (8% of the total) grew 11.7% with higher interest rates versus declines last year. 
Net receipt growth at 13.7% during the first eleven months of FY05 continued to reflect the improved economy. Individual income taxes (44% of total receipts) rose 15.3% and corporate income taxes (10% of total receipts) rose 41.3%. The improved job market raised employment taxes (36% of total receipts) by 8.1%. 
Do Productivity Growth, Budget Deficits, and Monetary Policy Actions Affect Real Interest Rates? Evidence From Macroeconomic Announcement Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is available <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2004/2004-019.pdf"> here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@E1/@E106/@E10602/@E10602.HTM">US Government Finance</a></th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">FY &#39;05 - YTD</th>
<th scope="col">FY2004</th>
<th scope="col">FY2003</th>
<th scope="col">FY2002</th>
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<td class="firstcol">Budget Balance</td>
<td>$-50.0B</td>
<td>$52.8B</td>
<td>$-352.6B</td>
<td>$-412.1B</td>
<td>$-377.6B</td>
<td>$-157.8B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Net Revenues</td>
<td>$155.4B</td>
<td>$142.1B</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>-6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Net Outlays</td>
<td>$205.4B</td>
<td>$194.9B</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Good Growth in Irish Employment; Unemployment Rate Low in Q2 
by <a href="/comment/Stone.html">Carol Stone</a> September 14, 2005


<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914d.jpg" width="353">
As we monitor large economies around the world, it&#39;s easy to lose track of their smaller neighbors. Ireland&#39;s Central Statistics Office reported employment and unemployment data this morning for Q2. The labor market there is strong and undergoing an interesting structural shift.
Employment shot up in Q2 by 20,900 from Q1, producing a 93,000 increase from Q2 a year ago, a substantial 5.1% growth rate. In comparison, employment in the UK, which was reported today for the three months centered on June, grew by 1.11% year-on-year, and that was the fastest rate since last November (the three months centered on November), when it was just marginally higher, 1.14%. Further for Ireland, whose data are not seasonally adjusted, the increase was also the biggest for Q2 over Q1 in five years, since 2000. <img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050914e.jpg" width="353">
The Irish unemployment rate rose very modestly from 4.1% in Q1 to 4.2% in Q2. Even so, these two quarters have the lowest six-month average rate since 2001. The rate peaked at 5.1% in Q3 2003. Impressively, the low unemployment is being maintained at high levels of labor force participation. The participation rate reached 61.5% in Q2, a record for Q2, and 1.5 percentage points above Q2 2004.
One might think of Ireland as a manufacturing-centered country, but it, as others, has seen that sector diminish. Factory jobs fell to 294,200 in Q2, the first Q2 figure below 300,000 in the eight-year history of the series and down from a peak of 330,700 in Q3 2001. Notably, though, &quot;industry&quot; as a whole has held steady as construction jobs have taken up the slack. Services are responsible for the firm overall growth in jobs, with several individual sectors advancing steadily -- finance, education and health care, most notably.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/IRELAND/IRELAND.HTM">Ireland</a> Not Seasonally Adjusted</th>
<th scope="col">Q2 2005</th>
<th scope="col">Q1 2005</th>
<th scope="col">Q2 2004</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
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<td class="firstcol">Employment (thousands)</td>
<td>1929.2</td>
<td>1908.3</td>
<td>1836.2</td>
<td>1865.0</td>
<td>1810.6</td>
<td>1777.0</td>
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<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Yr/Yr %Chg</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Unemployment Rate (%)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Participation Rate (%)</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>60.0</td>
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Louise Curley

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913j.jpg" width="353">
Inflation in Europe has remained surprisingly subdued in the face of sharply rising oil prices. However the data released today for three Euro Zone countries--France, Germany and Spain--and the United Kingdom suggest that this situation may be about to change. Although the August year-over-year percentage increases in consumer price indexes (the generally accepted definition of inflation) for Germany and Spain were lower than the July increases, those for the U. K. and France were significantly higher. Data for Germany and Spain are shown in the first chart and those for the U.K. and France in the second chart.
Of the four countries, the sharpest change has occurred in the U.K. Over that past five years, inflation in the UK showed little trend as it varied between 0.65% and 1.98% -- for the most part, well below the Bank of England&#39;s 2% inflation target rate. In late 2004, however, inflation began to rise sharply, and, for the last two months has been above the target rate, 2.3% in July and 2.4% in August. In spite of the July rise in inflation above its target rate, the Bank of England voted 5 to 4 to lower the base rate from 4.75% to 4.50% on August 4 to counteract slow growth. Should inflation continue above the target rate, further reductions in the base rate, even if growth remains sluggish, may now be less likely.<img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913i.jpg" width="353">
Among the countries in the Euro Zone, France is the other country, reporting today, to show some recent increase in the rate of inflation. Inflation in France had seemed to trending downward in the last part of 2004 but now shows some signs of reversing that trend. In contrast to France, inflation in Spain and Germany rose sharply in early 2004 and has since remained trend less at the higher level. In the face of sluggish growth in the Euro Zone, the European Central Bank has maintained its base rate at 2% since June, 2003. With the increased risk of higher inflation, slow growth would be unlikely to trigger a further decline in the base rate, while any indication of improved growth is very like to trigger an increase in the base rate.
Both France and Germany have had relatively low rates of inflation, while Spain has been among the high inflation group within the Euro Zone. As an indication of the relative position of the Euro Zone countries on the inflation scale, one can compare the level of the Harmonized Consumer Price Indexes which are comparable across countries and have the same base year,1996. For example, in 2004, the Harmonized Consumer Price Index for France averaged 113.3, that for Germany, 110.7, and for Spain, 124.1. 

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<colgroup><col><col><col><col><col><col><col><col></colgroup>
<thead>
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<th scope="col" class="firstcol">Year-over-Year Percent Change in CPI Index</th>
<th scope="col">Aug 05&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">Jul&nbsp; 05</th>
<th scope="col">Aug 04</th>
<th scope="col">M/M dif</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y dif</th>
<th scope="col">2004&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td class="firstcol">U. K.&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">France&nbsp;</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Germany&nbsp;</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Spain&nbsp;</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.53</td>
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</tbody>
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Inflation in Europe has remained surprisingly subdued in the face of sharply rising oil prices. However the data released today for three Euro Zone countries--France, Germany and Spain--and the United Kingdom suggest that this [...]

European Inflation Becoming a Rising Concern to Central Banks

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913f.jpg" width="353">
The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) reported that their index of optimism amongst small businesses fell 0.2% in August and reversed a small up tick the month prior.
During the last ten years there has been a 64% correlation between the level of the NFIB index and the two quarter change in real GDP.
A greater percentage of firms expected higher real sales in six months but a lower percentage expected the economy to improve.<img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913g.jpg" width="353">
The percentage of firms with one or more job openings jumped back to the five year high of 24%. During the last ten years there has been a 67% correlation between hiring plans and the three month growth in nonfarm payrolls.
The percentage of firms planning to raise capital spending fell as did the percentage of firms raising average selling prices rose.
About 24 million businesses exist in the United States. Small business creates 80% of all new jobs in America.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/SURVEYS/@S7/@S7.HTM">Nat&#39;l Federation of Independent Business</a></th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
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<td class="firstcol">Small Business Optimism Index (1986=100)</td>
<td>100.9</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>104.6</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>101.2</td>
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The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) reported that their index of optimism amongst small businesses fell 0.2% in August and reversed a small up tick the month prior. During the last ten years there has been a 64% [...]

Small Business Optimism Slipped

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The Manpower Employment Outlook Survey for next quarter slipped to 20, down slightly from the average of 21 during the prior three quarters. The index indicates that a net 20% of 16,000 employers expect to increase hiring activity.
Since 1980 there has been a 74% correlation between the Manpower index and the y/y change in non-farm payrolls.
Not seasonally adjusted, 20% of employers planned to raise employment in 4Q04 while 8% planned to decrease employment.
The latest press release from Manpower Inc. covering global employment prospects can be viewed <a href="http://www.manpower.com/mpcom/viewMeos?name=4Q05_MEOS_Int_Release_FINAL.doc">here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/SURVEYS/@SC/@SC.HTM">Manpower Employment Survey</a></th>
<th scope="col">4Q &#39;05</th>
<th scope="col">3Q &#39;05</th>
<th scope="col">4Q &#39;04</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">All Industries - Net Higher (SA)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
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The Manpower Employment Outlook Survey for next quarter slipped to 20, down slightly from the average of 21 during the prior three quarters. The index indicates that a net 20% of 16,000 employers expect to increase hiring activity. [...]

Manpower Index Slipped

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The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC)-UBS survey indicated that chain store sales fell 0.2% last week after no change the prior week. So far this month sales are 0.5% below the August average which fell 0.1% from July. 
The ICSC indicated that at least 13 shopping malls were closed indefinitely be Hurricane Katrina. 
During the last ten years there has been a 56% correlation between the y/y change in chain store sales and the change in non-auto retail sales less gasoline, as published by the US Census Department. Chain store sales correspond directly with roughly 14% of non-auto retail sales less gasoline.
The leading indicator of chain store sales from ICSC rose 0.4% in the latest week (-0.3% y/y) following 0.2% declines during the prior two weeks. 
The ICSC-UBS retail chain-store sales index is constructed using the same-store sales (stores open for one year) reported by 78 stores of seven retailers: Dayton Hudson, Federated, Kmart, May, J.C. Penney, Sears and Wal-Mart.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/surveyw/@S2/@S2.HTM">ICSC-UBS (SA, 1977=100)</a></th>
<th scope="col">09/10/05</th>
<th scope="col">09/03/05</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Total Weekly Chain Store Sales</td>
<td>454.6</td>
<td>455.4</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
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</tbody>
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The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC)-UBS survey indicated that chain store sales fell 0.2% last week after no change the prior week. So far this month sales are 0.5% below the August average which fell 0.1% from July. [...]

Weekly Chain Store Sales Down A Bit

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The U.S. foreign trade deficit narrowed to $57.9B in July versus the June deficit of $59.4 which was deeper than initially reported. Consensus expectations had been for a deficit of $59.7B. Despite the narrowing, the U.S. trade deficit remained in record territory with the average during the last three months a record $57.8B.
Adjusted for price inflation, the customs value of the U.S. trade deficit narrowed to $54.6B, the narrowest since March.
Total exports rose a paltry 0.4% following two months of having been roughly unchanged. The 0.5% (10.6% y/y) rise in goods exports last month was again held back by a decline in food, feeds &amp; beverages which fell 2.8% (+9.0% y/y). Capital goods exports rose 0.6% (8.3% y/y) though exports of advanced technology products fell 10.2% (NSA, +8.6% y/y). Nonauto consumer goods exports rose 0.5% (13.0% y/y)
Services exports rose 0.1% (10.1% y/y) for the second month.<img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913b.jpg" width="353">
The 0.7% decline in imports of goods &amp; services was due mostly to a 2.2% decline in capital goods (+9.5% y/y) and a 2.2% (+7.8% y/y) decline in nonauto consumer goods. Imports of petroleum products rose 5.2% (45.5% y/y) as the average price of crude oil rose to $49.03 per bbl. (46.9% y/y). Imports of non-petroleum goods fell 1.4% (+7.6% y/y).
The US trade deficit with China remained about stable at $17.7B ($161.9B in 2004) but the US trade deficit with Japan improved slightly to $6.6B ($75.6B in 2004). The monthly trade deficit with the Asian NICs also narrowed slightly to $1.2B ($21.9B in 2004) but the deficit with the European Union deepened to $11.2B ($109.3B in 2004). 
A Look at China&#39;s New Exchange Rate Regime from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco is available <a href="http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2005-23.pdf"> here</a>.
Also from the San Francisco Fed, Understanding the Twin Deficits: New Approaches, New Results can be found <a href="http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2005-16.pdf"> here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@EE/@EE03/@EE03.HTM">Foreign Trade</a></th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">June</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Trade Deficit</td>
<td>$57.9B</td>
<td>$59.5B</td>
<td>$51.3B (7/04)</td>
<td>$617.6B</td>
<td>$494.8B</td>
<td>$421.2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Exports - Goods &amp; Services</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Imports - Goods &amp; Services</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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The U.S. foreign trade deficit narrowed to $57.9B in July versus the June deficit of $59.4 which was deeper than initially reported. Consensus expectations had been for a deficit of $59.7B. Despite the narrowing, the U.S. trade [...]

U.S. Trade Deficit Unexpectedly Narrowed

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913e.jpg" width="353">
The producer price index for finished goods less food &amp; energy, the so called &quot;core&quot; PPI, was unchanged last month versus Consensus expectations for a 0.1% increase and versus a 0.4% gain in July. The overall PPI rose 0.6% in August and that was below Consensus expectations for a 0.8% increase.
The core PPI is focused on since it provides an indication of the degree to which pressures on energy or food prices may be &quot;spilling over.&quot;
Consumer durable goods prices fell 0.1% (+1.3% y/y) led by declines in passenger cars (+0.1% y/y) and appliances (+2.1% y/y). Core consumer nondurable goods prices rose 0.1% (3.7% y/y) while capital goods prices fell 0.1% (2.2% y/y).
Already, the pressure which lifted energy prices 3.7% (19.1% y/y) in August has begun to dissipate. The domestic spot market price of WTI crude oil yesterday fell to $63.35/bbl. from a daily high of $69.82 two weeks ago and an average $64.97 in August. Natural gas prices also have backed off 15% from the daily high but as of yesterday remained up 14% versus the August average.<img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/050913c.jpg" width="353">
Intermediate goods prices again were strong and rose 0.7% due to a 3.3% rise in energy prices. Core intermediate goods prices, however, declined for the fourth consecutive month.
Crude prices also reflected the strength in energy prices, up 3.8% (28.8% y/y). Core crude prices also were strong for the second straight month reflecting a 22.8% (-26.9% y/y) jump in iron &amp; steel scrap prices and higher prices for aluminum (8.8% y/y) and copper (49.5% y/y) scrap. During the last thirty years &quot;core&quot; crude prices have been a fair indicator of industrial sector activity with a 48% correlation between the six month change in core crude prices and the change in factory sector industrial production.
Hard &quot;Core&quot; Inflation from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is available <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/20050201/cover.pdf"> here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@E8/@E802/@E80201/@E80201.HTM">Producer Price Index</a></th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">July</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
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<td class="firstcol">Finished Goods</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Core</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Intermediate Goods</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Core</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Crude Goods</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>-10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Core</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The producer price index for finished goods less food & energy, the so called "core" PPI, was unchanged last month versus Consensus expectations for a 0.1% increase and versus a 0.4% gain in July. The overall PPI rose 0.6% in August [...]

"Core" PPI Unchanged in August

Crude oil price has returned to pre-conflict level but traffic through Hormuz still subpar

Surging orders for computers and electronics propelling durable goods orders

Next year's inflation forecasts are on the rise and above target

Disrupted global supply chains placing upward pressure on US goods prices

Construction of data centers has overtaken transportation construction in US

Elevated energy prices putting intense upward pressure on input prices around the globe

US is big leader in global surge in private AI investment

Larger-than-usual income tax refunds this year are supporting consumer spending

Sharply rising share of AI-related jobs

Inflationary impact of surge in oil prices larger in Europe than in the US

Futures market thinks the price of oil will recede significantly over the next six months

Recent pickup in US defense orders could help support overall growth ahead

Cost of transporting crude oil has soared to series high

Market-based inflation expectations have not yet reflected recent surge in oil prices

Global equity markets are fearing a major economic disruption from soaring oil prices

Is recent drop in sentiment signaling softer growth ahead?

With the Iran conflict, geopolitical risk has soared to alarming levels

Soaring AI-related investment in US underpinning strong contribution of business spending to overall growth

AI-related outperformance of IP in Advanced Asia ex Japan

Resilient US economy pushing up Blue Chip 2026 outlook

US and China big leaders in adoption of AI models

Robust US demand for advanced technology products

China's export growth rotating away from the US

More pronounced upward revisions in countries more exposed to AI investment

Stable job openings and hiring rates point to cautious hiring

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Andrew Cates

**Tightening Bias Intact, but Unevenly Distributed**
The July Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey's expectations for policy rate changes over the next twelve months reveal a striking divergence across the major advanced economies, as chart 1 below makes clear. Across the board, the rate outlook is higher than it was in late February, before the US-Iran conflict escalated: the energy price shock and its inflationary consequences have left an imprint on the panel's thinking, even as oil prices have since retreated. Japan tops the list with an expected increase of around 40 basis points, reflecting the building pressure on the Bank of Japan to respond to yen weakness and still-elevated domestic inflation. Canada and the euro area also sit firmly in positive territory, with expected increases of around 30 and 20 basis points respectively. The US and the UK, by contrast, are in negative territory — the US barely so, the UK more distinctly, with the panel pencilling in modest rate reductions over the coming year. This pattern is not simply a reflection of where each economy sits in the inflation cycle. It also encodes a judgement about the current stance of monetary policy: in Japan, the euro area and Canada, policy is likely seen as insufficiently tight relative to the inflation challenge, and the conflict has reinforced that view. In the US and UK, by contrast, policy is judged to be closer to or already beyond neutral, meaning the next move is more likely to be an easing than a further tightening — even if, in the US case, that easing has been pushed well into 2027.

260702Z1.jpg

**When Will the Next Move Come?**
Chart 2 below adds a timing dimension to the rate outlook, showing where the BCFF panel currently places the next policy move for the Fed, ECB, Bank of England and Bank of Japan. For the BoJ, the distribution is concentrated around the near term, with a significant share of respondents expecting action in September or October — consistent with the building pressure illustrated in chart 1 and with the BoJ’s next scheduled decision on 31 July. For the ECB, September or later than November emerge as the most likely timing for the next step. The Bank of England panel is more spread, with a meaningful share expecting action to come later. For the Fed, the dominant view places the next move firmly in the ‘later’ category, consistent with the BCFF consensus that the Fed funds rate will hold through the rest of 2026, with a first cut not expected until Q2 2027. Under chair Kevin Warsh, the June FOMC meeting delivered a hawkish dot plot that shifted some participants toward a hike before year-end, but the panel as a whole has not moved that far.

260702Z2.jpg

**Headline Up, Core Contained: The Inflation Picture Across Advanced Economies**
One of the more reassuring features of the current inflation episode has been the limited pass-through from energy prices to underlying price dynamics. Across the advanced economies, headline CPI inflation has risen materially since the conflict escalated in March, driven overwhelmingly by consumer energy costs. Core inflation — stripping out food and energy — has edged higher, but only modestly, suggesting that second-round effects remain contained for now. In the United States, the pressures are arguably more alarming, with core PCE rising sharply between February and May to its highest level since October 2023. In the euro area, the focus this week has been firmly on Eurostat's June flash CPI estimate, published yesterday. Headline inflation fell back to 2.8% from a peak of 3.2% in May, as energy costs — the main driver of the surge since the conflict began — eased meaningfully. Crucially, core inflation also ticked down, and services inflation retreated as well. The June data therefore tell a broadly reassuring story: the energy shock is unwinding without leaving a lasting imprint on underlying price dynamics — precisely what the ECB will have been hoping for.

260702Z3.jpg

**Consumer Price Expectations: Are Households Convinced?**
The aggregate inflation picture looks relatively contained at the macro level, but whether households are similarly reassured is a separate question. Chart 4 below draws on the European Commission's consumer survey data on price expectations — one of the more timely and widely watched indicators of inflation psychology in the euro area. The survey captures whether consumers expect prices to rise, stay the same or fall over the coming twelve months, and its relationship with actual inflation outturns has historically been close. A sustained elevation in consumer price expectations risks becoming self-fulfilling, feeding into wage demands and pricing behaviour in ways that complicate the ECB's task considerably. The June survey, however, brought an encouraging development: expectations fell steeply, suggesting that households have begun to register the reversal in energy prices and the broader easing of the inflationary impulse. That said, the absolute level of expectations remains elevated relative to the pre-conflict period, and one month's decline does not constitute a trend. Whether the June reading marks the beginning of a sustained normalisation — or proves a temporary dip before expectations re-anchor at a higher level — will be one of the key variables shaping the ECB's decision calculus in the months ahead.

260702Z4.jpg

**Japan: A Weak Yen at the Worst Possible Time**
Japan occupies a particularly uncomfortable position in the current global conjuncture. The yen has depreciated to levels not seen since December 1986, with USD/JPY touching 162 this week. The move reflects the persistence of a large interest rate differential: even as the Bank of Japan has continued its gradual tightening, the Fed’s hawkish pivot under chair Kevin Warsh — with the mid-June FOMC dot plot signalling a possible hike before year-end — has reinforced the carry trade dynamics weighing on the currency. For Japan, which imports virtually all of its energy, yen weakness at a time of still-elevated global oil prices is a double burden, amplifying domestic inflation and squeezing real incomes. Verbal warnings from Japan’s Finance Ministry have had only a modest and short-lived effect on the exchange rate. The Bank of Japan’s next policy decision is on 31 July, and the pressure to act more decisively is building. The BCFF panel’s July survey revised upward its expectation for a stronger US dollar against the yen over the coming year — consistent with the fundamental picture that chart 5 below describes.

260702Z5.jpg

**AI: Optimism on the Technology, Scepticism on the Price**
Returning to the BCFF survey, its special questions reveal a panel that continues to look beyond the current cyclical turbulence toward a longer-horizon structural narrative. On artificial intelligence, respondents are broadly optimistic: 45% expect a noticeable impact on US productivity and growth within one to three years, with a further 45% believing those effects are already becoming evident. That is a striking degree of conviction about a technology whose macro-level productivity impact remains, by most empirical measures, still to fully materialise. Yet the same panellists are considerably more cautious about financial markets than about the technology itself. Nearly all respondents believe that expected AI gains are already fully reflected — or even over-reflected — in current asset prices. Chart 6 below captures this tension. It is a combination — high conviction on transformative potential, high scepticism on current valuations — that has historically been associated with stretched risk premia and vulnerability to disappointment, even where the underlying technology story ultimately proves correct.

260702Z6.jpg

Global financial markets have had a more settled feel this week, reflecting the continued unwinding of the geopolitical risk premium that had built up during the worst of the US-Iran conflict. Oil prices have fallen further, equity markets have been broadly supported, and incoming inflation data — notably the euro area’s June flash CPI estimate — have come in below expectations. The US holiday-shortened week ahead, with Independence Day on Friday, is likely to keep volumes thin and activity subdued. The bigger picture, however, remains one of tension between a more benign near-term inflation trajectory and central banks that may not yet be ready to stand down. In the charts below we look first at what the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) survey reveals about the expected change in and timing of policy rates across the major economies (charts 1 and 2), then at the divergence between headline and core inflation across the advanced economies (chart 3), and at what euro area consumers are more specifically expecting about inflation in the period ahead (chart 4). We turn next to Japan and the yen’s slide this week to 40-year lows (chart 5), and finally to the BCFF survey’s special questions on artificial intelligence and asset valuations (chart 6).

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Charts of the Week: Forecasters Hold Firm

Tian Yong Woon

In this week's Letter, we trace how an energy shock and a resilient AI upcycle shaped Asia through the first half of 2026 and weigh the risks that may define the second. The year opened hopeful on AI, though some feared stretched valuations, before the US-Iran conflict and a closed Strait of Hormuz shook the mood (chart 1). A later MoU eased energy prices and inflation fears, yet valuations largely held on AI optimism, despite bouts of reassessment. The oil surge hit import-reliant emerging Asia hardest, leaving India, Thailand and the Philippines doubly exposed through their Middle East sourcing (chart 2). Pass-through inflation, subsidies that some governments later pared back, and currency pressure followed, though resuming Strait traffic should ease these strains. Rising inflation then boxed in policymakers, straining already-stretched fiscal positions and limiting more pro-growth monetary policy stances in some economies (chart 3). Our latest Blue Chip survey found a slim majority reassessed the risk balance after oil fell, though the shifts stayed mild versus the June survey (chart 4). Most still rank upside inflation risk above downside employment risk, even as a slightly larger share now see the balance as more even. AI remains the region's key offset, with Taiwan and South Korea riding a sharp rise in memory and chip exports (chart 5). Malaysia and Thailand instead draw data centre FDI, so Asia gains from the buildout phase rather than the West's hoped-for productivity gains. We close on an uncertain second half, where a possible Super El Niño could revive food-driven inflation even as energy pressures fade (chart 6). Beyond that, an AI reassessment, fresh geopolitical flashpoints, trade tensions and the US midterms could each reshape the outlook.

**The year thus far**
We began the year on a relatively hopeful note, buoyed by AI optimism and market valuations that reflected it, although some investors worried that valuations had become overstretched. The geopolitical mood shifted quickly in early January, however, when US military forces captured former Venezuelan leader Maduro, though the event did little to move markets (chart 1). A far greater shock came when the US-Iran conflict erupted in late February, closing the Strait of Hormuz and dealing a negative blow to global energy supplies. More recently, the US and Iran have reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aimed at ceasing hostilities and resuming trade flows through the Strait. This has allowed energy prices to ease, softening policymakers' concerns about energy-driven inflation. Even so, equity valuations have largely remained underpinned by AI optimism, albeit with interim bouts of reassessment and price retracement. This drew on repeated reports of strong growth along the AI supply chain, and on signs that supply could not keep pace with demand. This continued even as AI models with leapfrogging capabilities reached the public. At several points, the US government stepped in to rein in public access to some models, given security concerns about such immense capabilities falling into the wrong hands.

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**Oil impact on Asia**
Within emerging Asia, among the hardest hit by the oil surge are India, Thailand and the Philippines. These are relatively heavy net importers of crude oil, and they source most of that crude from the Middle East. That combination left them doubly exposed when the Strait of Hormuz closed (chart 2). The surge in oil prices also carries multiple, wider impacts. First, the higher cost of imported crude passes through to consumer inflation, leaving households with a heavier energy bill. Several governments have stepped in with energy subsidies to ease the consumer burden. That support has not proved indefinitely sustainable, as some governments eventually pared it back given the immense costs. In effect, subsidies shift some of the burden from consumers to the state, straining public finances. There is also a currency effect, since higher crude prices require more domestic currency to buy the same volume, weighing on the exchange rate. That said, other drivers of currency depreciation may also have been at play over the period. Trade flows through the Strait have recently picked up, with traffic gradually resuming. If the current truce and its conditions hold, these effects may ease before long. On the growth front, higher oil prices would not appear in volume-based measures. Their second-order effects on output would still come through, such as demand dampened by higher energy costs.

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**Inflation and monetary policy**
Higher crude oil prices drove inflation sharply higher across Asia and much of the world. That greatly complicated policymakers' task on both the fiscal and monetary fronts. On the fiscal side, several Asian governments were already facing pressures before the oil shock. These ranged from grand, fiscally costly policy pushes in Indonesia to calls for greater fiscal sustainability in Japan. Higher oil prices added a need for more support, further complicating their position. On the monetary side, previously pro-growth moves, such as rate cuts in India, looked riskier, as they threatened to stoke already-surging inflation (chart 3). That made further easing, or even holding current pro-growth settings, hard to sustain. The danger is sharper still if inflation expectations become unanchored, raising the risk of runaway inflation. The recent US-Iran de-escalation, and the crude price slump that followed, certainly help to ease the situation. One would expect so material a shift in the geopolitical backdrop to prompt a reassessment among policymakers and investors alike. Yet that was not entirely the case, based on our latest Blue Chip Financial Forecast survey, whose results we discuss in the next section.

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**The latest Blue Chip survey results**
The recent US-Iran MoU has largely held, despite occasional flare-ups. Against that backdrop, and the sharp fall in oil prices that followed, we asked panellists to assess the balance of risks between employment and inflation. A slim majority (59%) said their assessment had shifted, while a non-trivial minority said it had not. Looking specifically at how US risk expectations moved, we find the shifts have been quite mild. That is relative to the June survey, which was conducted before the MoU. Even so, most panellists (65%) still see upside risks to inflation as the key risk, rather than downside risks to employment. Meanwhile, a slightly larger share than in June (23%) now see the risks as more balanced.

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**The AI upcycle and Asia**
We turn next to a key offset to the growth dampeners facing much of Asia. It stems from parts of the region being well positioned to capture the current AI upcycle. Advanced economies such as Taiwan and South Korea have benefited from strong demand for AI and related memory chips. This has driven a sharp rise in exports of such goods (chart 5). Those exports have propelled growth in these economies this year, at a pace faster than in previous years. Other economies, such as Malaysia and Thailand, are going through a data centre boom. They benefit through an additional channel beyond AI-related goods exports: robust FDI inflows. Foreign firms are driving these inflows as they expand their data centre footprint in the region. Other economies, including those in the West, hope to reap large productivity gains from the current jump in AI capabilities. By contrast, much of Asia's benefit comes from the ongoing buildout of the parts and infrastructure that the upcycle requires.

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**Watching H2 2026**
Bringing it all together, the first half of the year has been shaped by two main drivers: the US-Iran conflict and the ongoing AI upcycle. What the overarching themes for Asia will be in the second half remains anyone's guess. For one, the threat of an imminent "Super El Niño" event (chart 6) could trigger a crop supply shock. That may reintroduce inflationary pressure, albeit through the food channel. On another front, market optimism around AI-related companies' revenues and spending still persists. Yet disruptions or new discoveries could emerge down the line, including some that sharply reduce the compute needed for a given output. Such developments may in time prompt investors to reassess their views. In addition, pockets of geopolitical pressure are still brimming in parts of the world, including the Middle East. These threaten to upend supply flows of oil, and of other crucial goods too. The trade front, though faded from focus in recent months, could become another flashpoint. It bears on growth and on bilateral relationships, especially those with the US. Finally, other events, such as the US midterm elections later this year, may also skew the global backdrop.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: Woah, We’re Halfway There

Sandy Batten

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The luster fell a bit off the employment rose in June with nonfarm payrolls rising 57,000 against expectations of a 115,000 increase, according to today’s report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Moreover, the increases previously reported for April and May were revised down by a total of 74,000. Upon revision, payrolls increased 148,000 in April versus 179,000 previously reported and rose 129,000 in May versus 172,000 previously reported. The average increase over the past three months fell to 111,000 from 164,000 in May while the average increase over the past six months rose to 92,000 in June, its highest reading since February 2025, from 80,000 in May. Both remain on a modest uptrend and much stronger than payroll gains last year. In 2025, monthly payroll gains averaged only 10,000.

The weaker-than-expected payroll report was reinforced by a weak report from the **household survey**. While the number of unemployed fell 213,000 and the unemployment rate edged down to 4.2% from 4.3% in May, the number of employed slumped 507,000 in June, the largest monthly decline since May 2025 (with population adjustment to January 2026). The labor force plunged 720,000 with the labor force participation rate falling to 61.5%, its lowest level since March 2021.

Growth of average hourly earnings (AHE), a key variable for the Federal Reserve, was relatively well behaved in June. AHE increased 0.3% m/m, the same monthly gain as in May, in line with expectations. The y/y rate of advance edged up to 3.5% in June from 3.4% in May. Wage growth in private services-producing firms picked up in June, rising 0.4% m/m (3.4% y/y) versus 0.2% m/m (3.2% y/y) in May. Goods-producing wages increased 0.2% m/m in June after 0.3% monthly gains in both April and May with the y/y rate holding at 4.1%.

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In the **establishment survey**, private-sector employment was also weaker than expected in June, increasing only 49,000 against an expected 115,000 increase. Moreover, April and May figures were also revised down by a total of 50,000. Government employment rose 8,000 following a 32,000 increase in May. Private goods-producing employment increased 10,000, its largest monthly gain in three months with an 11,000 gain in construction and a 3,000 rise in manufacturing jobs, the first increase in three months. In contrast, services-producing employment increased only 39,000 in June, its weakest monthly performance in four months. Private education and health services jobs posted another solid gain of 69,000, up from 45,000 in May. However, retail jobs fell 7,500, their first monthly decline in four months, and leisure and hospitality jobs slumped 61,000, their largest monthly decline since December 2020, after increasing 40,000 in May. There had been speculation in the market that the World Cup would generate additional leisure and hospitality jobs, but this obviously failed to pan out. On a brighter note, although the one-month payroll diffusion index, a measure of the breadth of job gains, slipped to 54.4 in June from 56.0 in May, it remained well above the key 50 level that indicates that more industries were adding jobs than losing them.

The length of the workweek was unchanged at 34.3 hours in June with the aggregate weekly hours index edging up 0.1% m/m, the same monthly gain as in May. The aggregate hours index rose 1.3% q/q saar in Q2, the fastest quarterly gain in four quarters, providing a solid base for Q2 real GDP growth. The goods-producing workweek was unchanged at 40.1 hours, the highest since January 2023, while the private service-producing workweek edged down to 33.2 hours from 33.3 hours in May.

The employment and earnings data are collected from surveys taken each month during the week containing the 12th day of the month. The labor market data are contained in Haver's **USECON** database. Detailed figures are in the **EMPL** and **LABOR** databases. The expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- U.S. nonfarm payrolls increased 57,000 in June with meaningful downward revisions to both April and May.
- The market consensus looked for a 115,000 increase.
- The unemployment rate edged down to 4.2% from 4.3%, due mostly to a large decrease in the labor force.
- Average hourly earnings rose 0.3% m/m (3.5% y/y), in line with expectations.

U.S. Payroll Employment Gains Smaller than Expected in June

Robert Brusca

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Unemployment rates in the European Monetary Union (EMU) were steady in May at 6.2%, the same level as in April, after April had fallen to 6.2% from 6.3%. The 6.2% reading is the lowest for the community since it was formed. Meanwhile, for the larger community, the EU, the unemployment rate has stabilized at 5.9%, the same as in April, again, a tick lower than it was in March. This 5.9% reading is a tick above the historic low for the European Union (EU). In both cases, the performance of these two economic conglomerations is quite excellent.

**Monthly**
The table looks at 12 of the most senior members of the monetary union, including an observation for the United Kingdom based on its claimant-count unemployment rate, presented at the bottom of the table. In May, the monetary union saw 4 of 12 members in the table with lower unemployment rates than they had in April. In April, five members had lower unemployment rates than in March. In March, seven members had lower unemployment rates than they posted in February. The progression to lower unemployment rates has slowed based on monthly data.

**Sequentially**
Looking at changes in the unemployment rates over broader sequential periods—three months, six months, and 12 months—6 out of 12 reporters have lower unemployment rates over three months; 7 have lower unemployment rates over six months; only 4 report unemployment rates that are lower over 12 months. The broader periods for comparison show changes in the unemployment rates that report more declines over the shorter and more recent periods compared to the longer/older periods. This is not the same trend leaning that we get from the last three months of data. It'll be good to watch these developments in the coming months to see if the tendency to lower unemployment rates is slowing or whether dropping unemployment is continuing in force.

**Rankings**
The ranking of unemployment rates since 1990 finds only three of these 12 monetary union members with unemployment rates above their medians. Those are Luxembourg, with a 98.2 percentile standing, Finland with an 81.9 percentile standing, and Austria with a 76.6 percentile standing. Italy, on the other hand, is reporting the lowest unemployment rate that it has seen during this period. The Greek unemployment rate has been this low or lower only about 3% of the time, while in Spain the unemployment rate has been this low or lower 11% of the time. For Portugal, the unemployment ranking figure has been weaker 13% of the time. The monetary union continues to report excellent labor market results even though economic growth has been relatively disappointing.

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**Summing up and central bankers**
In the wake of the monetary conference in the Sintra this past week, central banks featuring contributions from the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank of Canada, saw central bank heads talking about getting back to basics and stopping the use of some of the newer tools that had been pressed into service after the great financial crisis and during COVID. Bankers are getting back to basics to focus on short-term interest rates and say they will stop fiddling with the size of the balance sheet and to largely set aside the use of forward guidance. It will take time to determine what these changes are going to mean in terms of how policy performs and how markets will react. While there was a lot of discussion, and in some places concerns about the loss of forward guidance, what is clear is that, with forward guidance gone, there will be more volatility; however, the markets will be freer to price economic events themselves and will not be so stuck to the outlook of the central bank.  That could turn out to be a gigantic win for both markets and central bankers.

Europe

Unemployment Remains Quite Low in Europe

Winnie Tapasanun

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The ISM U.S. manufacturing PMI fell to a lower-than-expected 53.3 in June, the first m/m fall since February, following a 1.3-point increase to 54.0 in May, according to data from the Institute for Supply Management. The June reading, above the 50 expansion-contraction threshold, indicated the U.S. manufacturing sector expanded for the sixth straight month, albeit at a slightly slower pace. A reading of 53.8 for June had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. The June manufacturing PMI, while above a contraction-level 49.0 in June 2025 and a low of 47.0 in October 2024, remained below a peak of 63.8 in March 2021.

The production index declined to 52.2 in June from 54.3 in May, indicating production expanded for the eighth consecutive month but at the slowest pace since December. The index was above a low of 44.8 in April 2025 but below a peak of 66.5 in March 2021. In June, 19.0% (NSA) of respondents reported higher production while 13.0% reported lower production. The new orders index slipped to 56.0 in June from 56.8 in May, signaling new orders grew for the sixth straight month following four successive months of contraction. The index remained well above a low of 41.8 in January 2023 but below a high of 67.0 in May 2021. In June, 22.3% (NSA) of respondents reported higher new orders while 13.4% reported declines. The inventories index climbed to 51.4 in June from 49.9 in May, marking the first expansion since April 2025. The index was slightly below a high of 52.7 in March 2025 but above a low of 43.8 in October 2024. Meanwhile, the supplier deliveries index fell to 57.4 in June from 60.6 in May and April, indicating slowing delivery performance for the seventh consecutive month after faster deliveries in November. In June, 18.1% (NSA) of respondents reported slower delivery speeds while 3.4% reported faster speeds.

On the labor front, the employment index improved to 49.7 in June from 48.6 in May, showing employment contracted for the 33rd straight month but at the slowest contraction pace since January 2025. The index was above a low of 44.1 in November 2025 but below a high of 56.5 in March 2022. In June, 16.2% (NSA) of respondents reported higher employment while 13.8% reported lower hiring.

On the pricing front, the prices paid index fell to a still-high 73.0 (NSA) in June, a 9.1-point drop—the largest decline since July 2022—from 82.1 in May, indicating raw materials prices rose for the 21st straight month but at the slowest rising pace since February. The index remained well above a low of 39.4 in December 2022 but below a high of 87.1 in March 2022 and a peak of 92.1 in June 2021. In June, 55.1% (NSA) of respondents reported higher prices while 9.2% reported price declines.

In other ISM series not included in the composite index, the new export orders index fell to 48.5 in June from 50.6 in May, indicating new export orders contracted for the third time in four months. The index was up from a low of 40.1 in May 2025 but down from a high of 52.4 in January 2025 and a peak of 57.1 in February 2022. The imports index edged down to 52.9 in June from 53.0 in May, suggesting imports expanded for the fifth successive month. The index was below its recent high of 54.9 in February but above a low of 39.9 in May 2025. The order backlog index decreased to 50.5 (NSA) in June from 52.2 in May, showing backlog levels grew at the slowest pace in six months. The index was below a high of 56.6 in February and a peak of 70.6 in May 2021 but well above a low of 37.5 in May 2023.

The ISM figures are based on responses from over 400 purchasing and supply executives from 18 industries, which are weighted according to each industry’s contribution to GDP. These data are diffusion indexes where a reading above 50 indicates expansion; below 50 indicates contraction. The ISM Manufacturing PMI is a composite index based on the diffusion indexes of five of the indexes (seasonally adjusted) with equal weights: New Orders, Production, Employment, Supplier Deliveries, and Inventories. The figures from the Institute for Supply Management can be found in Haver’s **USECON** database; further detail is found in the **SURVEYS** database. The expectations number is available in Haver’s **AS1REPNA** database.

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- ISM Mfg. PMI down slightly to 53.3 in June; sixth straight month above 50.
- Production (52.2) expands for the eighth consecutive mth.; new orders (56.0) for the sixth successive mth.
- Employment (49.7) contracts for the 33rd straight mth.; at the slowest contraction pace since Jan. ’25.
- Prices Index (73.0) at a four-month low, still indicating prices rising for the 21st consecutive mth.
- Exports (48.5) contract for the third time in four mths.; imports (52.9) continue to grow.

Economy in Brief

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