Tom Moeller

<html>
<head>
<style>
.odd{
 background-color:#edf5ff;
}
.even{
 background-color:#dde5ef;
}
.grey1{
	background-color:#f0f0f0;
}
.grey2{
	background-color:#e2e2e2;
}
.grey3{
	background-color:#d4d4d4;
}
.grey4{
	background-color:#c6c6c6;
}
.grey5{
	background-color:#b8b8b8;
}
</style>
</head>

 



<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071205a.jpg" width="353">
Due mostly to an upward revision in output, nonfarm labor productivity growth last quarter was revised up to 6.3% from 4.9%. The revised gain matched Consensus estimates and it was the quickest quarterly rise in four years. 
The largest factor behind the revision came from output growth to 5.7% from the preliminary 4.3%. More output from fewer hours worked. Hours worked were revised little and now are estimated to have fallen 0.6%, the largest quarterly drop in over four years.
Revised in the opposite direction, compensation per hour last quarter was taken down to 4.2%. Despite that revision, as well as a deceleration in compensation growth from outsized gains during 1Q &amp; 4Q &#39;06, the annual gain in compensation of 5.8% was its quickest since 2000.<img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071205b.jpg" width="353">
The combination of more productivity and less compensation lowered unit labor cost growth to -2.0% from -0.2%, again the weakest since 2004.That was enough to drop the y/y gain to its lowest in a year.
Released for the first time with this report were figures for the nonfinancial corporate sector. Output per hour there rose 4.2%, its quickest since 2004. The gain was accompanied by a moderate 4.4% rise in compensation and that left unit labor costs about flat as they were in 2Q. Raising costs, however, were two large increases during 1Q and 4Q &#39;06. They raised the y/y gain in unit labor costs to 3.6%, its fastest in two years. <img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071205c.jpg" width="353">
Productivity in the factory sector also was revised up, but to a lesser extent, to 5.0% from a preliminary 4.6% gain. It was double the 2Q increase and it still owed to a slight decline in hours worked accompanied by a swift 4.5% gain in output. Compensation growth in the factory sector made up for a 2Q decline with a 1.5% rise. That left the y/y gain stable at 5.6%, its fastest since early 2005. Unit labor costs in the factory sector fell a revised 3.3%, about as they did in the initial report. The annual increase was lowered a bit 2.8%, still the quickest since late 2000.
How well do wages follow productivity growth? from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis can be found <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20070301/cover.pdf"> here</a>.

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<colgroup><col><col><col><col><col><col><col></colgroup>
<thead>
<tr>
<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@EC/@EC02/@EC02.HTM">Non-farm Business Sector</a> (SAAR)</th>
<th scope="col">Q3 &#39;07 Revised</th>
<th scope="col">Q3 &#39;07 Prelim.</th>
<th scope="col">Q2 &#39;07</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2006</th>
<th scope="col">2005</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Output per Hour</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Compensation per Hour</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Unit Labor Costs</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


</html>

Due mostly to an upward revision in output, nonfarm labor productivity growth last quarter was revised up to 6.3% from 4.9%. The revised gain matched Consensus estimates and it was the quickest quarterly rise in four years. The [...]

Q3 Productivity Revised Up, Unit Labor Costs Revised Down

Louise Curley

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html><head>
<style>
.odd{
background-color:#edf5ff;
}
.even{
background-color:#dde5ef;
}
.grey1{
background-color:#f0f0f0;
}
.grey2{
background-color:#e2e2e2;
}
.grey3{
background-color:#d4d4d4;
}
.grey4{
background-color:#c6c6c6;
}
.grey5{
background-color:#b8b8b8;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
 



<img src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204g.jpg" align="left" border="0" height="265" width="353">
The countries included in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC)--Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates--have, with the exception of Kuwait, pegged their currencies
to the U. S dollar for over the past ten years or so. Kuwait has
allowed its currency to float in a narrow band but, in May of this
year, formally abandoned the dollar peg and switched to a basket of
currencies. The UAE's dirhams per us dollar, as an example of the
stability in the exchanges of all the five non Kuwaiti currencies and
Kuwait's dinars per dollar are shown in the first chart. By the end of
September, the Kuwaiti dinar had appreciated by slightly more than 4%
since the peg was abandoned.
At the conclusion of the recent GCC annual meeting, the Qatari
Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani said the group,
excluding Kuwait, had decided to keep the dollar peg. However, doubts
regarding the resolve of the individual countries have begun to
surface. All six of the gulf countries have been experiencing rapid and
rising price increases. For the three countries that report monthly
data, year to year price increases are running between 5 and 7% as
shown in the second chart. Current data for inflation in Bahrain is
woefully lacking. The latest report is for the year 2005. While the
consumer price index rose only 2.6%, this represented a substantial
change from the deflation that had taken place earlier. Current
inflation data for Qatar and the U.A.E are also scarce, but the recent
annual data are of concern. In 2006, the consumer price index rose 9%
in the U.A.E. and 12% in Qatar. The inflation rates for the three
countries that have only annual data are shown in the third chart.
Inflation pressures were a factor in Kuwait's decision to abandon it
peg in May.
Data on the GCC countries can be found in the country sourced
data in the EMERGEMA database and in the IFS
database. 
<img src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204i.jpg" height="265" width="312"><img src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204h.jpg" height="265" width="312">

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<colgroup><col><col><col><col><col><col><col><col><col></colgroup>
<thead><tr>
<th scope="col" class="firstcol">GULF
COOPERATION COUNCIL</th>
<th scope="col">Sep 07</th>
<th scope="col">Aug 07</th>
<th scope="col">Jul 06&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">Jun 06&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">2006</th>
<th scope="col">2005</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
<th scope="col">2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">INFLATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Bahrain</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Kuwait&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Oman</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol"> Qatar</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</body></html>

The countries included in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates--have, with the exception of Kuwait, pegged their currencies to the U. S dollar for over the past [...]

Are the Gulf States About to Abandon Their Dollar Pegs?

Robert Brusca

<html>
<head>
<style>
.odd{
 background-color:#edf5ff;
}
.even{
 background-color:#dde5ef;
}
.grey1{
	background-color:#f0f0f0;
}
.grey2{
	background-color:#e2e2e2;
}
.grey3{
	background-color:#d4d4d4;
}
.grey4{
	background-color:#c6c6c6;
}
.grey5{
	background-color:#b8b8b8;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
 



<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204f.jpg" width="353">
The NTC sector indexes for the UK show that all three main sectors have been losing traction. The new services sector observation is not yet released so the table below reflects changes through October. But for MFG and Construction there are new observations available for November. Through November, these sectors show a trend of weakness that has been moderated in November by a run up in MFG that still leaves that sector short of its September level. Construction continued to fall and it fell hard in November. In October services took a large fall leaving it in the bottom 40 percent of its range. Construction is now weaker in the lower third of its range. MFG is still in the top 35% of its range. We are eagerly awaiting the new services observation to see if that weakness remains in place or not. 

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<colgroup></colgroup>
<thead>
<tr>
MFG, Construction and Services PMI CIPS/NTC
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="even">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;</td>
<td colspan="3">Monthly readings</td>
<td colspan="3">Change over:</td>
<td>percentile</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;</td>
<td>Nov-07</td>
<td>Oct-07</td>
<td>Sep-07</td>
<td>3MO</td>
<td>6MO</td>
<td>12MO</td>
<td>of range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">MFG</td>
<td>54.32</td>
<td>57.41</td>
<td>60.25</td>
<td>-10.50</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>36.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Construction</td>
<td>54.32</td>
<td>57.41</td>
<td>60.25</td>
<td>-10.50</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>36.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Services*</td>
<td>#N/A</td>
<td>53.08</td>
<td>56.69</td>
<td>-3.94</td>
<td>-4.17</td>
<td>-6.18</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="8">MFG range since January 1992; Construction Since April 1997 Services Since July 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="8">*Services changes and ranking and stem from Oct-07 which is the most current date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</body>
</html>

The NTC sector indexes for the UK show that all three main sectors have been losing traction. The new services sector observation is not yet released so the table below reflects changes through October. But for MFG and Construction [...]

UK Sector Downdraft Still Seems to be in Play Waiting for the New Services Numbers, However ...

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html><head>
<style>
.odd{
background-color:#edf5ff;
}
.even{
background-color:#dde5ef;
}
.grey1{
background-color:#f0f0f0;
}
.grey2{
background-color:#e2e2e2;
}
.grey3{
background-color:#d4d4d4;
}
.grey4{
background-color:#c6c6c6;
}
.grey5{
background-color:#b8b8b8;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
 



<img src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204e.jpg" align="left" border="0" height="265" width="353">
The EMU ex construction PPI chart shows a clear pattern of
acceleration. The PPI (excluding construction) has a 3-month rate in
excess of its six-month pace that is, in turn, above the Yr/Yr pace.
That is acceleration by definition. All measures are well above the
hypothetical ceiling rate of inflation of 2% (that ceiling applies to
the HICP alone, however). Still, having PPI inflation at this strong of
a pace must be disconcerting to the ECB. 

More disconcerting is for ex-energy inflation to show that
same sort of accelerating pattern: 3-month inflation, at 3.4%, exceeds
6-month inflation, at 3%, and that pace is only a tick below the
12-month pace at 3.1%. All of these speeds are above the 2% mark and
therefore excessive. 
 

These sorts of &#8216;cost pressures&#8217; in turn feed into the CPI in a
way that is unhealthy. It is hard for the CPI (HICP) to maintain a sub
2% pace if the things that go into it, or that underlie it, are
speeding ahead faster. Consumer goods inflation is a major culprit with
inflation on a steady sequential acceleration and a three-month pace of
6.4%. Of course energy and all its pressures are embodied in that
measure. Intermediate goods inflation has been quieting down with the
opposite tendency, revealing deceleration with inflation below 2% over
the recent three months at 1.7%. Capital goods inflation is at 1.1% and
also has been decelerating, but not uniformly. 
 

Among the larger EU countries, Germany shows overall and
Ee-energy PPI inflation that is excessive and accelerating. Italy shows
an excessive and accelerating PPI and an ex-energy inflation that is
over the 2% mark but not worsening. The UK shows a greatly accelerating
headline PPI while ex-energy producer price pressures are clear but a
bit less strident. 
 

On balance, the ECB has a PPI report that will give it little
sense of relief. The EMU PPI components make inflation appear a bit
more like it is a consumer sector problem in the main. That is curious
since that has been such a weak sector in EMU while the capital goods
sector has been vibrant and yet there inflation remains tame and is
ensconced well within its preferred range. All this leave the ECB in a
quandary that only worsens when you look at the foreign exchange market
and consider, too, the loss of momentum growth has been seeing in the
region. 



<table border="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<colgroup></colgroup>
<thead><tr><th colspan="7" scope="col">Euro area and UK PPI Trends </th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;</td>
<td colspan="2">M/M</td>
<td colspan="4">Saar</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Ezone-13</td>
<td>Oct-07</td>
<td>Sep-07</td>
<td>3-Mo</td>
<td>6-MO</td>
<td>Yr/Yr</td>
<td>Y/Y Yr Ago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Total excl Construction</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">4.5%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Excl Energy</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.0%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.1%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Capital Goods</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td style="color: red;">1.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Consumer Goods</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td style="color: red;">6.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">4.8%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Intermediate &amp; Capital
Goods</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Energy</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td style="color: red;">9.1%</td>
<td style="color: red;">6.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">MFG</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td style="color: red;">4.0%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Germany</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.7%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Germany ex Energy</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.0%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.9%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Itlay</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td style="color: red;">4.7%</td>
<td style="color: red;">4.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Italy ex Energy</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.1%</td>
<td style="color: red;">4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">UK</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">14.3%</td>
<td style="color: red;">9.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">UK ex Energy</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.4%</td>
<td style="color: red;">0.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">2.9%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.2%</td>
<td style="color: red;">3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="grey1">
<td colspan="7" class="firstcol">E-zone 13 Harmonized PPI excluding
Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr class="grey1">
<td colspan="7" class="firstcol">The EA 13 countries are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,</td>
</tr>
<tr class="grey1">
<td colspan="7" class="firstcol">Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</body></html>

The EMU ex construction PPI chart shows a clear pattern of acceleration. The PPI (excluding construction) has a 3-month rate in excess of its six-month pace that is, in turn, above the Yr/Yr pace. That is acceleration by definition. [...]

Uh, oh and Away …PPI Sails Well Above 2% Pace

<html>
<head>
<style>
.odd{
 background-color:#edf5ff;
}
.even{
 background-color:#dde5ef;
}
.grey1{
	background-color:#f0f0f0;
}
.grey2{
	background-color:#e2e2e2;
}
.grey3{
	background-color:#d4d4d4;
}
.grey4{
	background-color:#c6c6c6;
}
.grey5{
	background-color:#b8b8b8;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
 



<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204c.jpg" width="353">
U.S. sales of light vehicles nudged up 0.9% last month to a 16.20M unit annual selling rate, according to the Autodata Corporation. The uptick followed declines in four of the prior five months. Nevertheless, sales so far in 4Q are running slightly ahead of the 3Q average due to an abysmal start to that quarter.
Sales of domestically made light vehicles improved 1.0% m/m to 12.20M units (0.1% y/y). The gain came as sales of U.S. made cars jumped 9.9% to 5.47M units and that more than offset a 4.8% m/m drop in sales of domestic light trucks, still feeling the effects of higher gas prices. It was the third sharp m/m decline in U.S. made light truck sales. <img align="right" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204d.jpg" width="353">
Sales of imported light vehicles inched up 0.4% after firm gains during the prior two months. The rise to 4.00M units (1.4% y/y) was to the highest level since June. The increase was due to a 1.5% gain in sales of imported autos which was the third strong gain in as many months. Sales of imported light trucks fell a moderate 1.4% after a like increase in October.
Import&#39;s share of the U.S. light vehicle market remained stable m/m at 24.7% versus an average 23.1% for all of last year.
U.S. Economic Growth Will Be Somewhat Below Potential in 2008 according to participants of the Chicago Fed Economic Outlook Symposium and the news release is available <a href="http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/2007_eos_release.cfm"> here</a>.

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<colgroup><col><col><col><col><col><col></colgroup>
<thead>
<tr>
<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@ED/@ED09/@ED0901/@ED0901.HTM">Light Vehicle Sales (SAAR, Mil. Units)</a></th>
<th scope="col">November</th>
<th scope="col">&nbsp;October</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2006</th>
<th scope="col">2005</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Total</td>
<td>16.20</td>
<td>16.05</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>16.96</td>
<td>16.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Autos</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>7.49</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Domestic</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Imported</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Light Trucks</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>-5.3%</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>9.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Domestic</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>-6.8%</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Imported</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</body>
</html>

U.S. sales of light vehicles nudged up 0.9% last month to a 16.20M unit annual selling rate, according to the Autodata Corporation. The uptick followed declines in four of the prior five months. Nevertheless, sales so far in 4Q are [...]

U.S. Vehicle Sales Still Driven By Gasoline Prices

<html>
<head>
<style>
.odd{
 background-color:#edf5ff;
}
.even{
 background-color:#dde5ef;
}
.grey1{
	background-color:#f0f0f0;
}
.grey2{
	background-color:#e2e2e2;
}
.grey3{
	background-color:#d4d4d4;
}
.grey4{
	background-color:#c6c6c6;
}
.grey5{
	background-color:#b8b8b8;
}
</style>
</head>

 



<img align="left" border="0" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/071204b.jpg">
In the biggest weekly decline since 2006, chain store sales collapsed 2.0% w/w in the final period of this year, according to the International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC)-UBS.
The decline probably is not indicative, however, of the true extent of a weakening in consumer demand. The variable timing of the Thanksgiving holiday has created similar downdrafts in this seasonally adjusted measure during the last several years. Sales in the next week, each year, have bounced back sharply.
Sales during all of November fell 0.2% from the October average which fell 0.1% from September. The latest m/m decline was the sixth in the last seven months.
During the last ten years there has been a 45% correlation between the y/y change in chain store sales and the change in nonauto retail sales less gasoline.
The ICSC-UBS retail chain-store sales index is constructed using the same-store sales (stores open for one year) reported by 78 stores of seven retailers: Dayton Hudson, Federated, Kmart, May, J.C. Penney, Sears and Wal-Mart.
The leading indicator of chain store sales from ICSC-UBS fell 0.1% (-1.6% y/y) for the third consecutive weekly decline.
Market Bailouts and the &quot;Fed Put&quot; is last week&#39;s speech by William Poole, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and it is available <a href="http://www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2007/11_30_07.html"> here</a>.
What Do You Get for &quot;Sixteen Tons&quot;? is analysis from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis of average hourly earnings and labor income. It can be found <a href="http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20071201/cover.pdf"> here</a>.

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<colgroup><col><col><col><col><col><col></colgroup>
<thead>
<tr>
<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/surveyw/@S2/@S2.HTM">ICSC-UBS (SA, 1977=100)</a></th>
<th scope="col">12/011/07</th>
<th scope="col">11/24/07</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2006</th>
<th scope="col">2005</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Total Weekly Chain Store Sales</td>
<td>468.5</td>
<td>478.2</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


</html>

In the biggest weekly decline since 2006, chain store sales collapsed 2.0% w/w in the final period of this year, according to the International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC)-UBS. The decline probably is not indicative, however, [...]

U.S. Chain Store Sales Collapsed, But Did They?

USD/EUR exchange rate uncoupling from interest rate differential

Widespread downgrading of 2025 GDP outlook

Trade and fiscal policy uncertainty has exploded with the new administration

Much lower US electricity costs gives it a competitive advantage

Wage growth slowing in the US and Euro area; elevated and sticky in the UK

Stagflation-lite: Blue Chip forecasts below-trend growth and elevated inflation

US policy gyrations boosting policy uncertainty worldwide

Expected tariff hikes have boosted inflation expectations

US and Japan ended 2024 on solid ground in contrast to Europe

US economy expected to outperform other major economies in 2025

Only modest evidence of AI-related surge in US productivity growth

Previous Trump tariffs fading. A boost from new tariffs ahead?

Heavy US manufacturing states underperforming while Sun Belt states outperforming

Rising long-term yields a global phenomenon

US financial market concerns shifting from growth to inflation

Economic activity is picking up in the US but remains lackluster abroad

Policy uncertainty has surged since the US national elections.

Recent turnaround in US economic surprises leading to increases in rate-cut expectations

The outlook has brightened in the US, while it has dimmed for other major economies

Headline US PCE inflation elevated by sticky services prices

US and global equity prices have recently diverged

US leading global upturn in economic surprises

Blue Chip forecasters look for further significant monetary easing apart from Japan

Recent rise in global supply chain pressures could augur a pickup in global inflation pressures

Underperforming German economy generating increased policy uncertainty relative to Europe and the US

Our global data offering is unparalleled in terms of coverage, quality, and organization. We offer 290+ databases from 2500 government and private sources, a wealth of key survey and forecast data covering the world’s economies, and a robust offering of archive databases that drive machine learning for big data applications.

Optimized for precision analytics, our data is seamlessly integrated with Microsoft Office and all leading statistical packages through our DLX® software and platform independent HaverView™ website. We further offer direct database feeds, client server or cloud-based delivery, and RESTful API.


Privacy Policy

Disclaimer

Contact us

A premier time series data platform for the global strategy, research, and quant communities. 

New York

London

Singapore

Tokyo

Economy in Brief

Viewpoints

Contact Us

Our Data

Our Products

What We Do

Our Authors

About Us

Data News

Resources

Release Calendars

Training Center

Webinars

Newsletters

Download Software

For Clients

Live Updates

250502A5.jpg

250502B5.jpg

Nonfarm payrolls increased 177,000 (1.2% y/y) during April after rising 185,000 in March, revised from 228,000, and 102,000 in February, revised from 117,000. Expectations had been for a 130,000 rise in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. The latest figure left the three-month average change at 155,000 in April, down from 232,000 in January.

Average hourly earnings rose 0.2% during April after unrevised increases of 0.3% in March and 0.2% in February. Earnings growth of 3.8% y/y was below the 5.9% high in March 2022.

The unemployment rate, measured in the household survey, held m/m at an expected 4.2% in April, and compared to 4.1% in February and 4.0% in January. It reached a low of 3.4% in April 2023. The unemployment rate, including employees working part-time for economic reasons plus all marginally-attached workers, eased to 7.8% in April from 7.9% in March.

In the **establishment survey**, private-sector employment rose 167,000 (1.2% y/y) after a 170,000 March increase. Factory sector jobs edged 1,000 lower (-0.7% y/y) following a 3,000 gain. Construction sector employment increased 11,000 (1.7% y/y), after rising 7,000 in March.

Private service-producing sector employment increased 156,000 (1.4% y/y) in April after improving 161,000 in March. Increases varied greatly amongst service sector categories. Private education & health sector employment rose 70,000 (3.4% y/y) last month following a 74,000 March increase. Leisure & hospitality employment rose 24,000 (1.3% y/y) after a 38,000 gain. Trade, transportation & utilities rose 32,000 (0.9% y/y) in April following a 25,000 March increase. Professional & business services employment rose 17,000 (-0.1% y/y) following a 3,000 rise while temporary help employment rose 3,600 (-3.9% y/y) following a 2,700 decline. Financial activities employment improved 14,000 (1.2% y/y) after a 6,000 gain. The number of information sector jobs held steady (-0.4% y/y) last month after falling 2,000 in March.

Government sector payrolls rose 10,000 (1.3% y/y) last month after increasing 15,000 in March. The number of local government jobs increased 13,000 (1.4% y/y) following a 17,000 gain. State government employment rose 6,000 (1.8% y/y) following a 2,000 March increase but federal government payrolls fell 9,000 (-0.3% y/y), the third consecutive monthly decline.

Private-sector average hourly earnings rose 0.2% (3.8% y/y) in April after increasing 0.3% in March. Earnings in the goods-producing sector eased 0.1% (+4.0% y/y) following a 0.6% gain. Earnings in construction rose 0.3% (3.6% y/y), after a 0.2% rise but factory sector earnings declined 0.3% (+4.3% y/y) after surging 0.8% in March. In the private services-sector, earnings rose 0.2% (3.7% y/y) in April for the third straight month. Information sector pay increased 1.0% (5.2% y/y) last month after easing 0.1%, and financial activities earnings rose 0.5% (4.3% y/y) for the second straight month. Trade, transportation & utilities sector pay increased 0.4% (3.4% y/y) after 0.6%. Professional & business sector earnings increased 0.1% (4.4% y/y) after 0.2% in March. Leisure & hospitality earnings held steady (+3.8% y/y) following a 0.6% March increase.

250502C5.jpg

250502D5.jpg

The length of the average workweek held steady at 34.3 hours in April. The workweek in the goods-producing sector eased to 39.8 hours from 40.0 hours. The construction sector average workweek eased to 39.0 hours from 39.3 hours while the factory sector workweek moved lower to 40.0 hours from 40.2. The average workweek in the private service sector held at 33.2 hours. Professional & business service hours fell to 36.3 hours from 36.4 while trade, transportation & utilities hours improved to 34.3 from 34.0 hours. Private education hours rose slightly to 32.8, but leisure & hospitality held steady at 25.5 hours.

In the **household survey**, the unemployment rate held at 4.2% in April as employment rose 436,000 and the size of the labor force increased 518,000. The labor force participation rate edged up to 62.6% last month from 62.5% in March. It remained below the high of 63.3% early in 2020. The rate for teenagers declined to 36.9%. For workers aged 20-24, the rate held steady at 72.1%, up from 71.8% six months earlier. For workers aged 25-54 the rate rose to 83.6%, a five-month high. For individuals 55 and over, the rate improved to 38.4% in April.

The employment/population ratio for all workers in April rose to 60.0%. It remained below the peak reading of 61.1% in February, 2020 just prior to the pandemic.

The employment and earnings data are collected from surveys taken each month during the week containing the 12th day of the month. The labor market data are contained in Haver's **USECON** database. Detailed figures are in the **EMPL** and **LABOR** databases. The expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

250502X5.jpg

250502F5.jpg

- Job growth spreads across most sectors.
- Earnings growth trend decelerates.
- Jobless rate holds steady.

U.S. Job Growth Is Firm in April but March Gain Is Lessened

Winnie Tapasanun

250502F32.jpg

250502G32.jpg

Total factory orders rose a slightly less-than-expected 4.3% m/m in March after rises of 0.5% in February and 1.8% in January, data from the U.S. Census Bureau showed. A 4.5% m/m March increase had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. The March reading was the third successive monthly rise and the largest since July 2024. The year-on-year rate accelerated to 6.0% in March, the highest since November 2022, from 2.3% in February. Notably, orders for nondefense aircraft & parts soared 139.0% in March following a 7.4% drop in February and a 92.9% surge in January. Factory orders excluding defense rose 4.8% (5.9% y/y), the largest of three straight m/m/ rises, after a 0.4% February increase. Factory orders excluding the transportation sector fell 0.2% (+1.1% y/y), the first m/m fall since August, after rising 0.3% in February, January and December.

Durable goods orders jumped 9.2% (11.9% y/y) in March, the third consecutive m/m gain and the biggest since July 2024, on top of a 0.8% increase in February (matching +9.2% m/m in the advance report on April 24). The March jump reflected m/m orders increases of 27.1% (the largest m/m surge since July 2024; 31.2% y/y) in transportation equipment, 1.1% (4.9% y/y) in primary metals, 0.5% (-0.4% y/y) in furniture & related products, 0.1% (2.5% y/y) in fabricated metal products, and 0.1% (0.9% y/y) in machinery. To the downside, durable goods orders for computers & electronic products (-1.3%; +2.7% y/y) and electrical equipment, appliances & components (-1.0%; +4.2% y/y) declined m/m in March.

Nondurable goods orders, which equal nondurable goods shipments, fell 0.3% (+0.4% y/y) in March, the first m/m fall since September, after a 0.1% uptick in February. The March fall reflected m/m drops of 2.4% (-9.3% y/y) in petroleum & coal products and 0.9% (-1.2% y/y) in apparel. To the upside, the following nondurable goods shipments rose m/m in March: leather & allied products (1.5%; 8.6% y/y), beverage & tobacco products (0.7%; 5.8% y/y), paper products (0.6%; 2.3% y/y), printing (0.3%; 3.8% y/y), textile mills (0.3%; 0.8% y/y), chemical products (0.2%; 5.4% y/y), plastics & rubber products (0.2%; 0.4% y/y), food products (0.1%; 1.8% y/y), and textile products (0.1%; 2.1% y/y).

Total shipments slipped 0.1% (+2.0% y/y) in March, the first m/m easing since October, after a 0.7% increase in February. Excluding transportation, shipments were virtually unchanged m/m (+1.1% y/y) in March following six straight m/m gains. Shipments of durable goods industries inched up 0.1% (3.8% y/y) in March, the smallest of four consecutive m/m increases, after a 1.3% advance in February. This reflected m/m durable goods shipments rises of 1.2% (5.6% y/y) in primary metals, 0.9% (0.1% y/y) in furniture & related products, 0.8% (-0.2% y/y) in nonmetallic mineral products, 0.4% (0.0% y/y) in machinery, 0.3% (1.8% y/y) in fabricated metal products, 0.2% (4.5% y/y) in computers & electronic products, 0.2% (-2.1% y/y) in wood products, and 0.1% (3.0% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components. In contrast, durable goods shipments for transportation equipment (-0.5%; +7.3% y/y) and miscellaneous durable goods (-0.1%; +2.9% y/y) fell m/m in March following three successive m/m increases.

Unfilled orders rose 2.0% (2.3% y/y) in March, up for the eighth month in nine, after a 0.1% uptick in February. Excluding transportation, unfilled orders dipped 0.1% (+0.7% y/y) in March, the first m/m easing since May 2024, after holding steady in February. Backlogs of durable goods rose 2.0% (2.3% y/y) in March, reflecting m/m rises of 3.1% (3.1% y/y) in transportation equipment and 0.2% (2.4% y/y) in electrical equipment, appliances & components.

Inventories edged up 0.1% (0.9% y/y) in March, the fifth straight m/m increase, after rising at the same pace in the prior two months. Excluding transportation, inventories were up 0.1% (0.5% y/y) in March, the fifth consecutive m/m rise. Durable goods inventories ticked up 0.1% (1.0% y/y) in March after holding steady in February and January; nondurable goods inventories edged up 0.1% (0.8% y/y), the fifth successive m/m increase.

The factory sector data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics Forecast Survey is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

250502H32.jpg

250502I32.jpg

- March manufacturers’ new orders +4.3% m/m; +6.0% y/y, highest since Nov. ’22.
- Durable goods orders (+9.2%) jump m/m, while nondurable goods orders (-0.3%) and shipments (-0.1%) decline m/m.
- Transportation equipt. orders +27.1% m/m, w/ a 139.0% m/m surge in nondefense aircraft & parts orders.
- Unfilled orders +2.0%, the eighth m/m rise in nine months.
- Inventories +0.1%, the fifth consecutive m/m increase.

U.S. Factory Orders Increase for the Third Straight Month in March

250502E.jpg

The global manufacturing data showed broad weakening in April as conditions weakened across more than half of the contributing early reporters in the S&P survey of manufacturing. Of the 18 early reporting countries, more than half of them showed deceleration over six months and 12 months. Over three months, only 8 of 18 showed deterioration and that's about as good as it got in this report. In the current month, month-to-month changes showed more than half of the survey contributors showing weaker results than the month before. In the S&P framework, manufacturing improved month-to-month for the U.S.; however, looking at sequential averages for the U.S., U.K., European monetary union, Canada, and Japan, we see a steady weakening and results over 12 months, over six months versus 12 months, and for three months versus 6 months. The highly developed countries are not doing particularly well.

Asian economies are also showing slight deterioration but doing a little better than the developed countries in general.

Only five of the 18 reporting countries have queue percentile standings in their data back to January 2021 that are above their medians. Readings at or above the 50% mark are at or above the median standing. Canada is showing the weakest manufacturing result on record over this span, in terms of its queue percentile standing which is at 0 in the current month.

I showed the graphic for the Baltic dry goods index in this report rather than statistics on the manufacturing PMI data because the Baltic data, which reflect shipping volume for dry goods - that is excluding things like oil - is weak but it's only in the neighborhood where it's been for some time. There has been a great deal of talk about how tariffs may have impacted trade flows, expected trade flows, shipping, shipping rates, and the like. However, according to the Baltic dry goods index, there isn't much evidence that this is occurring right now and affecting the current data. That may still lie ahead but for now it's not baked in the cake.

250502.jpg

Globally Manufacturing Weakens

Andrew Cates

**China-US shipping activity** 
The economic fallout from escalating US-China trade tensions is becoming increasingly visible in the data. A clear example is the chart below, which highlights a sharp drop in vessel arrivals at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, along with a notable decline in ships waiting offshore. These trends point to a tangible weakening in bilateral trade flows, as the effects of tit-for-tat tariffs imposed by both countries begin to bite. Given the outsized role the US and China play in global commerce, this slowdown is likely to reverberate through global supply chains, weighing on trade volumes, dampening demand, and curbing economic growth worldwide.

250501Z1.jpg

**GDP growth in Q1**
Data this week showed that the US economy contracted, albeit modestly, in Q1 even as the euro area recorded a modest expansion—an unusual divergence. The contraction in US GDP can be largely attributed to a sharp increase in imports, as firms rushed to front-load purchases ahead of anticipated tariff hikes. In addition, domestic demand was subdued, with weaker contributions from both consumer spending and government consumption. This decoupling between the US and euro area economies is particularly striking given the current global focus on the US dollar. While the euro area has shown unexpected signs of resilience, the US downturn raises important questions about its underlying momentum, especially as trade dynamics and policy uncertainty continue to cloud the outlook.

250501Z2.jpg

**The US dollar versus yield differentials**
Chart 3 below illustrates a sharp breakdown in the correlation between the US-Germany 10-year yield differential and the EUR/USD exchange rate. Historically, the dollar has moved closely with interest rate spreads, as yield-seeking capital flowed into US assets. But since early 2025—and more acutely following the April tariff actions—the dollar has weakened markedly even as the yield spread has narrowed only modestly. This decoupling underscores a critical shift: capital markets are reacting not just to monetary policy, but to rising trade and geopolitical uncertainty. In other words, the exchange rate is now being driven as much by risk sentiment as by interest rate arbitrage.

250501Z3.jpg

**The US economy’s structural outperformance and the dollar**
A second dynamic, captured in the next chart, reveals a tight correlation between the US real effective exchange rate and the potential GDP growth differential between the US and euro area over the past 50-60 years. This raises the question: has dollar strength (until recently) merely been a reflection of US growth leadership—or are capital inflows themselves helping to sustain this growth outperformance? In effect, the tail may be wagging the dog. Global investors have long allocated capital to the US, attracted by its macroeconomic resilience, technological leadership, and deep, liquid financial markets. The danger now is that the US trade war may disrupt this equilibrium. A sharp or sustained reduction in capital inflows could undermine growth, weaken the dollar, and trigger broader financial instability. Moreover, reversing this dynamic is not straightforward—barring a credible structural resurgence in European (or Asian) growth, the global investment landscape remains tilted toward the US.

250501Z4.jpg

**US competitiveness versus Europe, China and Japan** 
The next chart below examines relative unit labour costs across major economies since 2011. The US and China have seen a broadly similar trajectory, with steady increases in relative cost structures, while the euro area has remained flat and Japan has seen dramatic improvement. This suggests that, from a cost competitiveness standpoint, the US is not uniquely disadvantaged vis-à-vis China. However, as we discuss further below, this parallel erosion of cost competitiveness is occurring at much higher nominal wage levels in the US, which blunts its ability to regain export share through tariff-related shifts alone. The trade war strategy—absent a corresponding improvement in productivity or structural reforms—risks imposing costs without delivering material competitiveness gains.

250501Z5.jpg

**Average wages in selected developed and developing economies**
This point is reinforced by the final chart, which shows estimates for average monthly wages across countries in 2024. US labour remains much more expensive than in peer or emerging economies. So even if China’s costs rise in tandem with the US, the global supply chain has ample alternatives. 'China plus one' strategies are accelerating, and the US remains structurally misaligned with low-cost production hubs. Tariffs aimed at reshoring supply chains are unlikely to deliver sustained gains unless accompanied by deep supply-side reforms, and risk further disincentivizing foreign direct investment if global firms perceive US trade policy as erratic or punitive.

250501Z6.jpg

Financial markets found a measure of calm this week, buoyed by some subtle shifts in tone from US policymakers. A softening in the administration’s rhetoric around trade tariffs coupled with a less confrontational stance toward Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, helped ease tensions that had roiled markets earlier in the month. Equities rebounded modestly, and volatility indicators edged lower, reflecting cautious optimism that the worst of the policy shocks may be behind us. But beneath the surface, significant downside risks persist. New shipping data point to a pronounced slowdown in US-China trade flows (chart 1), suggesting the damage from recent tariff escalations is already rippling through global supply chains. Meanwhile, incoming data for the US revealed an unexpected contraction in the economy in Q1 and further signs of weakness in the labour market (chart 2). The US dollar, in the meantime, while long supported by superior growth and yield differentials, has begun to decouple from traditional drivers (charts 3 and 4) suggesting growing pressure on capital flows. At the same time, structural imbalances are drawing renewed scrutiny: unit labour cost comparisons show the US steadily losing competitiveness (chart 5), while nominal wage disparities remain stark versus China and other Asian economies, further complicating any effort to restore trade balance without broader reforms (chart 6). In short, while markets may be drawing temporary comfort from a pause in tariff brinkmanship, the deeper economic and financial vulnerabilities exposed this month remain unresolved—and increasingly central to the global macro narrative.

<iframe style="border-radius:12px" src="https://open.spotify.com/embed/episode/3PzXXKrkHcwtOLipohEdnB?utm_source=generator" width="100%" height="152" frameBorder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; fullscreen; picture-in-picture" loading="lazy"></iframe>

Charts of the Week: Tariff Truce, Tenuous Trust

250501F20.jpg

250501G20.jpg

U.S. light vehicle sales dropped 2.9% (+6.5% y/y) to 17.31 million units (SAAR) in April after surging 10.8% to 17.82 million units in March. The retreat in April vehicle sales accompanied a 1.7% y/y rise in real disposable income through March, which compared to 2.0% growth last year.

Sales declines were broad-based last month. Light truck sales fell 1.3% (+9.9% y/y) during April to 14.34 million units (SAAR), after rising 12.4% in March. Purchases of domestically-made light trucks declined 1.2% (+11.9% y/y) to 11.02 million units, after jumping 12.5% in March. Sales of imported light trucks fell 1.8% (+4.4% y/y) to 3.32 million units, following an 11.6% March surge.

Trucks’ record 82.8% share of the light vehicle market last month compared to 81.5% in March and 80.3% in April of last year. The share averaged 80.3% during all of 2024 versus 53.3% ten years earlier.

Auto sales also declined last month, down 9.5% (-7.5%) to 2.97 million units (SAAR) following a 3.5% March rise. The decline reversed all of the increase over the prior two months. Purchases of domestically-produced cars fell 9.8% (-4.3% y/y) last month to 2.22 million units, after rising 3.8% in March. Sales of imported autos declined 9.6% (-15.7% y/y) to 0.75 million units, following a 2.5% March increase.

Imports' 23.5% share of the U.S. light vehicle market was little changed from 23.6% in March and compared to a May 2023 low of 22.9% and a high of 26.3% in November of 2023. Imports' share of the passenger car market held steady at 25.3% last month and compared to 27.7% in April of last year. It reached a high of 38.7% in September 2021. Imports' share of the light truck market eased to 23.2% last month after falling to 23.3% in March.

U.S. vehicle sales figures can be found in Haver's **USECON** database. Additional detail by manufacturer is in the I**NDUSTRY** database.

250501H20.jpg

250501I20.jpg

- Light truck sales pull back, while auto sales tumble.
- Both domestic and imported sales decline.
- Imports' market share slips further.

Economy in Brief: December 2007

Jump to:

Q3 Productivity Revised Up, Unit Labor Costs Revised Down

Q3 Productivity Revised Up, Unit Labor Costs Revised Down

Are the Gulf States About to Abandon Their Dollar Pegs?

UK Sector Downdraft Still Seems to be in Play Waiting for the New Services Numbers, However ...

Uh, oh and Away …PPI Sails Well Above 2% Pace

U.S. Vehicle Sales Still Driven By Gasoline Prices

U.S. Chain Store Sales Collapsed, But Did They?

U.S. Chain Store Sales Collapsed, But Did They?