Economy in Brief

Business optimism in the U.K. improved in the third quarter to a reading of -21 from a very low reading of -34 in the second quarter. Yet, the U.K. economy continues to be under a great deal of pressure and all the risk factors that had been in play remain in play from the Ukraine-Russia War to the ongoing COVID issues, to the central bank raising interest rates. But optimism is not as negative in the third quarter as it was in Q2. Its standing has improved to a lower 23 percentile level from a lower 9 percentile level previously. While there is considerable improvement month-to-month, it's still a very weak report.

Export optimism improved in the third quarter compared to the second quarter although expectations for capital expenditures for buildings remained at the same reading as in Q3; assessments of capital expenditures for equipment moved higher. Capital expenditure expectations for both categories are quite high with 85-percentile standings for buildings and with a 91-percentile standing for equipment.

The number employed over the last three months backtracked slightly in Q3 but still has a 94.5 percentile standing with the trend still and a 96-percentile standing although it also backed off in the third quarter. New orders from three months ago fell back to a +11 reading from +22 in the second quarter marking a 73-percentile standing, but the volume of orders expected three months ahead improved; that response has only a 57-percentile standing. Domestic orders versus expectations show a stronger standing for current orders compared to expectations; the same is true for foreign orders over the last three months versus expectations for three months ahead. Expectations for domestic and foreign orders each show sub-median readings for three months ahead.

The output metric fell back in the third quarter to a +6 reading from +19 to a standing at its 55th percentile; expectations for output for the period ahead also fell to a reading of +6 from +17 in the second quarter but that yields a low standing in its 39th percentile below its historic median.

Finished stocks record a little assessment change between quarters with the standing in the 90th percentile while the three-month-ahead assessment for stocks drops to a -10 reading from +1 to a below-median 42.5 percentile standing.

Next is series of readings on the cost of output: domestic orders and foreign orders show extremely high readings for both the current and the expected values over the past three months as well as for the next three months. All these metrics have high 90th percentile standings. Clearly inflation is expected to be engaged.

On balance, the quarterly CBI series shows an improvement in expectations although still a great deal of weakness and clear expectations that inflation is going to continue to be a factor in the period ahead.

You don't have to put too fine a point on it this month to see the trend. The flash PMI readings show weakening across all the countries and all the categories for which we have flash readings in the table for July. There's growing weakness in the EMU, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. There is growing weakness in manufacturing and services everywhere in July – except for manufacturing in the U.K. No judgement is required here.

In June, the readings were similarly weak but not as unequivocally weak. In June, the U.K. had a stronger services sector and a stronger headline (composite) while Japan also had a stronger services sector and a stronger headline with all other countries and sectors finding weakening month-to-month. May found only one composite index getting stronger that was Japan on the strength of a better services sector while there was also strengthening for manufacturing in Germany that was not enough to support the composite.

We also look at trends with three-, six-, and 12-month averages. These averages in the table are lagged by one month; they're only constructed over final data not over the preliminary or flash data. On this basis, a little bit more strength appears in the numbers and particularly a surprising result over three months compared to the three months that appear individually in the table; but then for the moving averages of three-, six-, and 12-months we are not including the month of July. However, at the far right of the table the change calculations are done on up-to-date data, including the flash readings, and there you see more widespread deterioration particularly over three months.

Even so, it's clear from the sequential averages that there is weakening in progress. And it's clear from the change data on the far right that over three months the weakening is in fact quite broad based and rather severe.

We can also try to get more of a sense of what things are like in absolute terms by looking at the queue standing or ranking data. As of July, only three readings in the table stand above their medians calculated back to January 2018. Those exceptions are the services sector in the U.K., the services sector in Japan, and Japan's composite; the latter barely beats the 50% mark at 50.9%. The United States this month comes in with the weakest data in the table with a composite reading in its lower 5.5 percentile based on a services sector that is in its lower 5.5 percentile as well. The EMU index challenges U.S. weakness with the ranking at its lower 14.5 percentile that comes about not because of extreme weakness in one sector but because of paired weakness in manufacturing and services with standings in roughly the 30th to 23rd percentiles of their respective rankings. This weakness occurs because of the weight of Germany in the EMU. Germany has an overall ranking in the 7.3 percentile, close to the U.S. and gets there the same way the EMU does, with paired weakness in manufacturing and services with rankings in the 20th the 30th percentiles, in rough terms.

The United States, the European Monetary Union, Germany, and France all have composite readings that are below the readings from January 2020 before COVID struck. This is not a good development.

Japan's trade trends continue to weaken as its deficit rose again in June and as the trend for the deficit continues to worsen from 12-months to six-months to three-months. Twelve-months ago, the trade position was in surplus. That's now a thing of the past.

The trends clearly showed that imports are stuck at a very high growth level well above that for exports; exports are trendless and fluctuating in much lower range of growth. Imports fluctuate in a higher range of growth and show some signs of accelerating.

Not surprisingly, during this period the yen has been weakening and weakening sharply; the yen is off by 21.7% over 12 months, it's falling at a 38.5% annual rate over six months and at a 62.9% annual rate over three months. A weaker yen makes imports more expensive at home and exports cheaper abroad. More expensive imports should cause consumers to buy fewer of them while cheaper exports should increase Japan's export penetration. On balance, the weaker yen should work to correct Japan's widening trade deficit. That, of course, is in theory.

In practice, the weak yen creates some problems for Japan. One is that the weaker yen makes oil imports even more expensive. In the short run, it's hard for consumers to substitute away from an energy source. To the extent that the weak yen causes the yen price of oil to rise sharply, the Japanese trade balance expressed in yen terms will widen for some time. Eventually consumers may find a way to cope with higher energy prices… to use more insulation, to buy more fuel-efficient cars, and so on. In time there is a price elasticity for energy products and energy consumption can be reduced. In Japan, however, there is a move afoot to recommission shuttered nuclear power plants. In the wake of Japan's nuclear disaster, they were all being decommissioned. But now in the face of global warming and high global energy prices, Japan is extending the commission on some plants that had been scheduled to be closed and making plans to open others. This could help to reduce its energy bill.

We can see the impact of the currency shifts on Japan prices as import prices are up by 46.2% over 12 months, up at a 58.8% pace over six months, and up at a 110.7% annual rate over three months. The weaker yen is pushing import prices up strongly. However, export prices also show substantial life, rising 18.8% over 12 months, at a 28.1% pace over six months and at a 40.1% pace over three months. The weakening yen allows Japanese exporters to raise their yen price and still to cut their export price in foreign currency terms. This is another way that a weakening currency helps to right the trade balance. Exports get a double boost because prices in the export market fall in foreign currency terms and through the effect of price elasticities that should cause the volumes purchased to rise more sharply. At the same time the yen prices are rising and so this can have a very positive effect on export prices and on export values.

Because prices move in advance of volumes, there is something called A ‘J-curve’ that reflects the fact that after a currency falls the trade balance often gets worse before it gets better sketching out a pattern of the letter ‘J’ lying face down. This mostly because of imports have prices rising before consumer react to buy fewer imports so total import value rises after a currency depreciates – note the rapid increase in Japan import values.

So far, the impact on real flows isn't discernible; exports are still weak across all horizons, down by 0.4% over 12 months, down by 3.5% at an annual rate over six months and down at a 2.1% annualized pace over three months. Real imports fall by 2.3% over 12 months, rise at a 5.7% annualized rate over six months but then fall at a 5.4% annual rate over three months. The impact of the currency rate change has yet to set in on trade flows.

CFOs in the U.K. responding to the Deloitte survey paint a dour picture of current circumstances and a picture of difficult circumstances for the coming 12 months. Among the ten elements in the current survey, the highest standing goes to the cost of credit being high, followed by a very high ranking for financial and economic uncertainty, a moderately high reading for demand for credit for the next year, and a moderately firm reading on corporate leverage. These responses show us that CFOs are wary about credit costs, needs for credit and about financial uncertainty.

The lowest rating among these current conditions is for the attractiveness of corporate debt. Clearly in this environment with high inflation and rising interest rates, corporate debt isn't attractive. This is the lowest rating in the survey on this timeline for this component. As an overall view, there's also an extremely weak reading for the financial prospects compared to three months ago. That assessment has been lower less than 5% of the time. And in a related low ranking, CFOs rate credit availability as quite poor and equity issuance as unattractive. Bank borrowing is also viewed as unattractive. There is a low, 31 percentile standing, in response to the question it's a good time to take risk. Only one third of the surveyed CFOs think that it's a good time to take risk.

Turning to some of the key metrics for 12 months ahead, the two lowest responses are for operating cash flow and for cash (or equivalent) levels. Operating margins also get very low assessment standing in the lower 5% of their historic queue of values. Dividends and share buybacks show a standing in the lower 10% of their historic queues. CFOs give their expected revenues a lower one-third standing for the next 12 months. Capital expenditures have a lower 25 percentile standing. Ranking very high, of course, are costs: operating costs have a 97.8 percentile standing as do financing costs.

Looking at the survey responses by quarter, much of this weakening has occurred within the last two quarters. Almost any category that you would consider a good response has deteriorated sharply over two quarters; all those considered bad responses have increased sharply. The outlook portion of the survey mostly began to deteriorate sharply as of Q1 2022. Deterioration has continued or worsened into Q2 2022.

Looking at changes since Q4 2019, which takes us back before the COVID virus struck, we see that for the most part bad metrics have gotten worse and good metrics have deteriorated. Despite there have been a significant recovery after COVID struck, the rise in inflation seems to have reintroduced an extremely negative sentiment across CFOs in the United Kingdom. The survey gives us a road map of how CFOs are starting to pull back and batten down the hatches and prepare for bad things to happen as inflation continues to linger high, as the Bank of England gets prepared to raise rates further and as war continues between Ukraine and Russia causing risks of more supply disruption and higher inflation to linger. There's almost nothing in this survey from which to take heart.