Economy in Brief: June 2025

The months readings are decidedly mixed. Four service sectors report stronger month-to-month and four weaker; manufacturing sectors report three weaker and five stronger. The composite headlines are split four-and-four.

Still, it’s not as if nothing is happening. On data back to January 2021, the average of the composite ranked in May has a 35-percentile standing – still below its median on the period. Services have slipped with a 28-percentile ranking well into the bottom one-third ranking position. Manufacturing has been rehabilitating despite the Russia-Ukraine war and the Trump tariffs, as the sector has an above median 60.4 ranking on its average reading.

On an individual country basis, the EMU, Germany, France, the United States, Australia, and India – all reporting countries except the United Kingdom and Japan show manufacturing PMI rank standings above their respective medians (above a ranking of 50%). But only Japan and India show service sectors with rankings above their respective medians and only India has a composite standing above its median on this timeline. And India is an exception with extremely high rankings across sectors.

The monthly average shows very little change from March to April to May. The composite and services readings get slightly weaker while manufacturing gets marginally stronger moving up from 49.9 in March to 50.5 in May- hardly a rocket shot. Similarly, there is little change from the 12- month to six-month to 3-month averages. Looking at 3-months to 12-months, the composite weakens from 51.6 to 51.2, manufacturing improves from 48.8 to 49.6 and services weaken from 52.4 to 51.3.

There is a great deal of grumbling about policy and U.S. tariff threats, but so far there is little evidence of impact. I’m sure there will be impact, but I am not as persuaded that ‘uncertainty’ ‘per se’ is the bogeyman everyone else wants to make it out to be. It can be an issue. But I expect Trump to resolve these issues so that the main impact I expect is the impact from the deals he makes.

This week, we examine the deepening divisions between the US and China, which are affecting not just trade but also investment flows, monetary policy, and technological development.

On the trade front, China has shifted from modest trade shares with its partners (chart 1) to capturing significantly larger shares across Asia, Africa, and Latin America (chart 2), while US progress in these regions has been more subdued. This signals a clear bifurcation, with China forging its own trading blocs, often at the expense of US market share. However, economies like Vietnam have managed to deepen trade ties with both countries (chart 3).

China’s efforts to strengthen relationships extend beyond trade to direct investment abroad (chart 4) and loan financing, particularly in Africa, where it has become a major investor in new projects. This has allowed China to cement a foothold in regions where US influence is limited. The bifurcation also extends to the monetary and currency space, with China gradually reducing its US Treasury holdings while increasing its gold reserves, possibly as part of a diversification push (chart 5). Concurrently, China’s push for de-dollarisation continues, despite significant hurdles.

Finally, US–China bifurcation is also playing out in the technological sector, where China has made significant advancements in critical areas, driven in part by substantial R&D investment over the years (chart 6). In response, US efforts to limit China’s access to key technologies may have inadvertently accelerated China’s development of its own systems and infrastructure, deepening the bifurcation further.

Shifts in China and US trade shares While economists may differ on when the broader US–China bifurcation began, many agree that the more significant phase of decoupling was triggered in 2018, when President Trump initiated the first wave of trade restrictions and tariffs against China during his first term. Prior to these sharp policy shifts—and before Trump took office—China’s share of total trade with several major global economies remained relatively modest, generally below 20%, as shown in chart 1. Similarly, the US also maintained a relatively balanced trade share with most partners, though its trade was more concentrated with neighbouring countries such as Canada and Mexico.