Robert Brusca

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Construction spending shows weakness up and down the line for the private sector in August. Residential spending is lower by 0.7% and nonresidential spending is lower by 0.2%.

Nonresidential spending sees declines in commercial, power, and manufacturing. These three nonresidential sectors make up 54% of nonresidential spending.

However, this private sector weakness was offset in August by public sector strength that was itself strong across most categories of government spending and rose by a strong 2% on the month.

Quarter-to-date trends 
However, in the quarter-to-date, spending is not contributing to GDP growth at all. QTD the consumer sector output for both public and private sectors is at zero. The quarterly patterns echo the monthly pattern with a decline in residential spending (of -6.7% annualized) and a further decline in nonresidential spending (at an annualized rate of -1.6%). Five nonresidential sectors accounting for 68% of the spending contribute to declines on a QTD basis. This weakness is offset completely by the public sector where construction spending QTD rose at a 16% annualized pace on gains in all four public sectors.

Sequential growth (trends) 
Sequential growth rates (from 12-months to six-months to three-months) show a penchant for accelerating declines in the private residential sector and in the private nonresidential sector. This weakness is not offset by accelerating gains in the public sector, but the public sector is quashing the negative stimulus with steady state expansion. Public spending is expanding over each of these horizons and it is holding to double-digit rates of growth. Meanwhile, the private sector for residential and nonresidential activity each is experiencing a decelerating trend. Within nonresidential there are only two sector with formal decelerating trends; these are commercial and lodging. They account for about 26% of nonresidential spending (although the catch- all 'other' is very close to showing sequential deceleration and it adds about 16% to this total).

The BIG Picture 
The economy is showing some signs of slowing and these signs are most apparent in construction. Rising interest rates related to Fed policy are an issue and despite the flat yield curve, which keeps some of the Fed's short-term rate pressure off of long-term rates (that usually is used to finance construction projects), markets are feeling the pressure. While rates are still historically low by the experience of the post war period, so is inflation and people have become accustomed to rates being so low over the past decade. Small rises in rates, therefore, hit consumer psyches harder. In addition, the fact that consumers are carrying a lot of debt means that rising rates hurt them more and hit them sooner than in the past. In the housing market, you will hear real estate related organizations tell you that housing affordability is still good by historic experience. but house prices are very high and affordability is being undermined by rate hiking. Homeowners or potential buyers are not affected so much by the current level of rates but are haunted by concerns of where rates are going and what that is going to do to values in the housing market.


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Construction spending shows weakness up and down the line for the private sector in August. Residential spending is lower by 0.7% and nonresidential spending is lower by 0.2%. Nonresidential spending sees declines in commercial, [...]

U.S. Private Sector Construction Spending Contracts

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The quarterly Tankan Survey is Japan's most important economic assessment. The reading for large manufacturing firms is the bellwether for the report. The large firm index is off for the third quarter running and some are making a lot of that. But the index also is off from its 15-year high in Q4 2017. So while there is a steady slide, it is also from a 15-year peak reading.

The large manufacturing firm reading has been higher than its Q3 vale only about 26% of the time. The large enterprises in nonmanufacturing have seen their index higher less than 18% of the time. The all industry large enterprise gauge has been higher only about 16% of the time. These readings mark the Tankan as still quite strong - even in the face of three straight quarters of slippage.

The Tankan also is equipped with an outlook index. The large enterprise manufacturing index has been fluctuating in a range from 19 to 21 over the last five quarters. The peak reading in this period occurred last quarter at a level of 21; this quarter the reading has slipped to 19. But at a diffusion value of 19, the manufacturing sector still has an 82.5 percentiles queue standing, putting in the top 18% of its historic queue of values. Manufacturing has an outlook that ranks fifth over the last 15 years while the nonmanufacturing outlook ranks third.

Despite the focus on how Japan is slipping, the counterpoint is that Japan is holding to some every high levels of activity and its slippage has been slow and measured.

Japan's PMI reading for manufacturing in September is weaker in some ways than its Tankan reading. Manufacturing has a 65th queue percentile standing over the last five years of data and a raw diffusion score of 52.5 which is a moderately positive reading. The Tankan standing for manufacturers over a longer period is near the top one quarter of its historic queue of data in comparison.

International dimensions... 
Europe has shown more economic slippage than Japan and the Bank of Japan may be in less of a pickle than the European Central Bank in that regard. In the U.S., economic data are still strong and while inflation is not really excessive it is at target and the Fed still has a clear path to continue to hike rates. In the U.K., an unexpected rise of inflation has created a quandary for the BOE, or it will if the unexpected spurt does not reverse and particularly if there turns to be a 'Hard Brexit' which is the most disruptive economic scenario for both the U.K. and for Europe.

All in all, the global scene is in flux. And paths that central banks have been carefully planning out for themselves are no longer such smooth-going. Even in the U.S., the part for the Fed is only clear for now and the fact of still-contained inflation despite what appears to be a very tight labor market in the economy still has economists and policymakers scratching their heads, and as the dandruff is cascading all over the shoulders of their blue suits, they are nonetheless giving guidance on a future they do not come close to understanding. Needless to say, these are very interesting economic times. There is good reason to wake up every day and read the papers and scrutinize each and every economic report. The truth is out there somewhere. We just have to find it. But you won't find it reading anything written by central banks because they are too burdened with dogma.


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The quarterly Tankan Survey is Japan's most important economic assessment. The reading for large manufacturing firms is the bellwether for the report. The large firm index is off for the third quarter running and some are making a lot [...]

Japan's Tankan Slips for Third Quarter in a Row

Global freight costs are on the rise while supply chain pressures are contained

Accelerating positive economic surprises in the G10 are boosting the global economy

Considerably more monetary ease expected from US and UK as Japan tightens

Tighter US immigration enforcement adversely impacting labor force

Economic policy uncertainty, while still elevated, is declining

Gradual disinflation and easier monetary policies across advanced economies

Largest October layoffs since 2003, led by technology

Subdued global shipping costs not yet pointing to supply chain problems

PMIs show still-elevated but slowing US inflation

AI boosting US investment in data centers

US productivity growth has been significantly faster than in other major economies

Consumers' short-term US inflation expectations still elevated while longer-term expectations of financial markets are steady

US financial markets have gotten used to elevated policy uncertainty

FOMC now expects more rate cuts going forward than in June

China gaining ASEAN exports while US exports slump

Job openings less than the number unemployed in July for first time since 2021

Reaccelerating goods price inflation along with sticky services inflation clouds the outlook

Falling oil prices aren't pulling down inflation expectations, pointing to a boost from increased tariffs

Equity market exuberance outpacing macroeconomic data

Apart from Japan, Blue Chip forecasters expect further sizable monetary easing

US production rebounded in Q2, but demand continued to slow

US leader, Germany trailer for real GDP growth over past 3 years

Negative US inflation surprises leading G10 down

Deflation continues in China

Incoming data surprising on downside in US; positive surprises elsewhere

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Andrew Cates

**Faster-than-Expected Monetary Easing**
Our first potential upside risk for 2026 is that monetary policy across most major advanced economies is loosened further and by more than markets and forecasters currently anticipate. Monetary policy cycles have a history of being underestimated in both length and magnitude—in large part because of the powerful feedback loops between interest rates, inflation, and economic behaviour. On the way up, higher policy rates feed into mortgage costs, debt-service burdens, rents, and the general cost of doing business, reinforcing wage pressures and inflation persistence. But these same channels work in reverse on the way down. As rates fall, debt servicing eases, housing and rental inflation softens, and cost pressures across the economy unwind more rapidly than expected—allowing inflation to decelerate faster and creating scope for further easing. A risk, therefore, is that if disinflation becomes self-reinforcing, central banks find themselves cutting rates more aggressively than currently priced, not because of economic distress, but because restrictive policy proves increasingly unnecessary.

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**Energy Supply Dynamics Prove More Supportive**
The second chart reinforces the message from the first: easing monetary policy may be accompanied—and amplified—by a more benign energy backdrop. Recent projections from the EIA point to a renewed build-up in OECD crude oil and liquids inventories over the year ahead, a dynamic that has historically been associated with downward pressure on oil prices. If inventories continue to rise as supply growth outpaces demand, spot prices for crude could undershoot current forecasts, keeping energy inflation subdued. That, in turn, would reinforce disinflationary forces already in play—lowering headline CPI, easing cost pressures for firms and households, and giving central banks greater confidence to loosen policy further. In that sense, softer oil prices would not just be a standalone positive shock, but part of a reinforcing feedback loop alongside rate cuts, supporting real incomes, financial conditions, and global growth into 2026.


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**AI-Driven Productivity Gains Materialise More Quickly** 
The third chart shows a clear pickup in US nonfinancial productivity growth, reviving the debate around whether AI-driven efficiency gains may arrive sooner than many forecasters expect. While the longer-term productivity potential of AI remains uncertain and uneven across sectors, there are reasons to think that at least some near-term gains could prove more tangible than currently assumed. Rather than transformative breakthroughs, early benefits are likely to come from incremental improvements—automation of routine processes, better scheduling and logistics, more efficient use of capital and labour, and modest reductions in overhead costs—areas where US firms are already well positioned to implement new technologies quickly. If these gains accumulate and diffuse more broadly, the implications would still be meaningful. Even a modest, sustained uplift in productivity would help contain unit labour costs, support real income growth, and raise the economy’s speed limit without generating renewed inflation pressure. In that scenario, productivity would not need to “revolutionise” the economy to matter: incremental efficiency gains could nonetheless provide a supportive backdrop for growth, earnings, and policy easing into 2026—representing a genuine upside risk to the outlook.


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**The US Economy Proves Resilient Again**
The next chart highlights a further upside risk to the 2026 outlook: the possibility that the US economy once again outperforms its peers. Unlike the typical pre-recession backdrop, there is little evidence of meaningful financial stress in the US private sector. After a prolonged period of balance-sheet repair, private-sector debt ratios have been trending lower in recent years, while the sector as a whole is running a healthy financial surplus. This stands in stark contrast to previous late-cycle episodes, which were characterised by rising leverage, widening deficits, and growing dependence on credit expansion. The absence of private-sector excesses reduces the economy’s vulnerability to higher rates and external shocks, and helps explain why growth has remained more durable than expected. If households and firms continue to prioritise balance-sheet strength rather than forced deleveraging, the usual mechanisms that tip the economy into recession may fail to materialise. In that environment, even modest easing in financial conditions could translate into renewed spending and investment, allowing the US to sustain above-trend growth into 2026—representing another upside risk to the global outlook.


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**India’s Growth Engine Accelerates Further** 
Chart 5 points to another potential upside risk for 2026 emanating from India’s economy. After a period of relative pessimism earlier in the year, consensus growth forecasts for 2026 have been revised modestly higher, even as inflation projections have continued to drift lower. This combination—firmer growth expectations alongside easing inflation pressures—creates scope for a more supportive policy backdrop than markets currently assume. With real interest rates no longer rising and financial conditions stabilising, India’s investment cycle, already underpinned by public infrastructure spending and improving corporate balance sheets, could prove more durable than forecast. If these trends persist, India may deliver growth that is both stronger and more internally driven than expected, providing a meaningful demand impulse to the broader global economy. Given India’s increasing weight in global growth, even small upside surprises would have outsized effects on trade, commodity demand, and regional activity—reinforcing the case that the global outlook for 2026 may be skewed to the upside.


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**The Global South Becomes a More Independent Source of Demand** 
The final chart points to a broader upside risk for the global economy in 2026: that economies across the so-called Global South generate more durable momentum than currently assumed. With a few notable exceptions—such as China and Thailand—many emerging economies continue to benefit from stronger growth in their working-age populations and/or faster real GDP per capita growth than their advanced-economy counterparts. These demographic and income dynamics are helping to underpin domestic consumption, support labour-force expansion, and attract capital inflows, as reflected in the pattern of net FDI across countries. In contrast, much of the advanced world faces binding demographic constraints and lower steady-state growth rates, limiting the scope for demand to re-accelerate organically. If growth in the Global South proves more resilient and internally driven—rather than overly dependent on exports to advanced economies—it could provide a more stable and geographically diversified source of global demand. In that scenario, global growth in 2026 would be less reliant on a narrow set of advanced economies, reinforcing the case that risks to the outlook may be skewed to the upside.


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_This marks our final Charts of the Week publication for 2025 The next edition will be released on Thursday 8 January._

Last week’s Charts of the Week focused on the darker tail risks hanging over the 2026 outlook: the possibility of monetary policy mis-calibration, that geopolitics and trade fragmentation further disrupt supply chains, and that elevated debt levels—particularly in the public sector—reassert themselves as a drag on growth. This week’s charts take a deliberately different tack. Taken together, they highlight a set of upside risks that are possibly underappreciated in current forecasts. For example, policy easing across advanced economies may extend further than expected as disinflation feeds on itself (chart 1); oil prices could surprise on the downside as inventories rebuild (chart 2); US productivity may deliver incremental but meaningful gains sooner than assumed (chart 3); the US economy itself could continue to benefit from an absence of private-sector financial stress (chart 4); India’s growth momentum might firm again as inflation pressures recede (chart 5); and, more broadly, parts of the Global South appear increasingly capable of generating their own demand impulse, supported by favourable demographics and income growth (chart 6). None of these forces is guaranteed, and each carries its own caveats—but together they suggest that, having spent much of the past year fixated on downside risks, the risks to global growth in 2026 may be more evenly balanced than is widely assumed.

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Charts of the Week: The Upside Risks

Kathleen Stephansen, CBE

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Initial claims for unemployment insurance dropped 13,000 to 224,000 during the week of December 13, from 237,000 during the week of December 6, revised from 236,000. The four-week moving average of initial claims was 217,500, an increase of 500 from the previous week, which was revised to 217,000 from 216,750.

Federal government employees initially filed 1091 (NSA) jobless insurance claims in the week ended December 6, after filing 643 claims in the week ended November 29.

Continuing claims for unemployment insurance rose 67,000 to 1,897,000 in the week ending December 6, following a sharp decline of 107,000 to 1,830,000 in the prior week, revised from 1,838,000. The four-week moving average was 1,902,000 in the week ending December 6, a decrease of 14,000 from 1,916,00 in the week ended November 29, revised from 1,918,000. The insured unemployment rate stood at 1.2% in the week of December 6, unchanged from the prior week.

Federal government employees’ continuing benefits rose to 14,077 (NSA) in the week of November 29 from 12,732 (NSA) in the week ended November 22.

The insured unemployment rate varied greatly across individual states and territories. In the week ending November 29, the highest unemployment rates were in Washington (2.48%), New Jersey (2.42%), California (2.26%), Minnesota (2.16%), and Massachusetts (2.10%). The lowest rates were in Florida (0.34%), South Dakota (0.40%), North Carolina (0.41%), Louisiana (0.44%), Alabama (0.46%), Virginia (0.47%), and Tennessee (0.49%). Rates in other notable states include New York (1.81%), Illinois and Pennsylvania (both 1.67%), and Texas (1.22%). These state data are not seasonally adjusted.

Data on weekly unemployment claims are from the Department of Labor itself, not the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They begin in 1967 and are contained in Haver’s **WEEKLY** database and summarized monthly in **USECON**. Data for individual states are in **REGIONW** back to December 1986.



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- Initial claims dropped from the prior week.
- Continuing claims rebounded from the prior week sharp decline.
- The insured unemployment rate was unchanged.


U.S. Initial Claims for Unemployment Insurance Eased in Latest Week

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Mortgage applications dropped 3.8% w/w (+40.9% y/y) in the week of December 12 after a rise of 4.8% w/w (45.4% y/y) in the week of December 5, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s (MBA) Weekly Mortgage Applications Survey. Applications for loans to purchase a house fell 2.8% w/w (+12.3% y/y) in the latest week after declining 2.4% w/w (+17.2% y/y) in the week of December 5. Applications for loan refinancing dropped 3.6% w/w (+86.0% y/y) in the week of December 12, following the 14.3% (87.8% y/y) jump in the week ended December 5.

The effective interest rate on a 30-year fixed-rate loan rose 6bps to 6.56% in the week ending December 12, from 6.50% in the week ending December 5. The rate on 15-year fixed-rate mortgages rose 4bps to 5.91% in the latest week from 5.87% in the December 5 week. The rate on 30-year jumbo edged down 2bps to 6.55% in the December 12 week from 6.57% in the prior week. The rate on a 5-year ARM eased 4bps to 5.76% in the latest week from 5.80% in the December 5 week.

The share of applications for refinancing an existing loan rose to 59.0% of total applications in the December12 week from 58.2% in the week ending December 5. The adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) share of activity rose to 7.2% in the latest week from 7.0% in the December 5 week.

The average size of a mortgage loan rose 1.5% (6.4% y/y) to $400,000 in the December 12 week, following a decline of 0.7% (+7.1% y/y) to $394,200 in the December 5 week. The average size of a purchase loan edged up 0.6% (-0.3% y/y) to $424,200 in the latest week, after dropping 0.4% (+1.3% y/y) to $421,700 in the December 5 week. The average size of a loan to refinance a mortgage rose 2.4% (19.8% y/y) to $383,300 in the week ending December 12 after rising 0.2% (19.4% y/y) to $374,500 in the December 5 week.

The Mortgage Bankers Association Survey covers 75% of all U.S. retail residential mortgage applications and has been conducted weekly since 1990. Respondents include mortgage bankers, commercial banks and thrifts. The base period and value for all indexes is March 16, 1990=100. The figures for weekly mortgage applications and interest rates are available in Haver’s **SURVEYS** database.

- Purchase applications fell 2.8% w/w; refinancing loan applications fell 3.6% w/w.
- Effective interest rate on 30-year fixed loans rose to 6.56%.
- Average loan size rose moderately.

U.S. Mortgage Applications Retreated in the Week of December 12

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U.K. inflation has moderated in November, posting a 0.1% drop on the HICP, a 0.1% gain in the CPI-H headline measure as well as a 0.1% gain in the CPI-H core (excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco). The sequential trend in core inflation points lower and is eroding but continues to run over the 2% mark set as a target by the Bank of England for overall inflation (over 12 months). The headline is excessive as well but also eroding.

Sequentially the CPI-H gains 3.5% over 12 months, slows to a 2.8% annual rate over six months and then dips to 1.4% annual rate over three months. The CPI-H core rises by 3.6% over 12 months, ticks down to a 3.0% pace over six months, and then runs at a 2.4% annualized pace over three months.

The trend for the CPI core, and for the headline, both are quite good and would be completely consistent with the Bank of England cutting rates, a move that is widely expected – although the 12-month pace for each is excessive.

Not only is inflation showing signs of falling into the Bank of England's target zone, but the economy has been weak although the unemployment rate currently is only hovering around the 4% mark. Still, recent economic data have been weak, and the recent monthly GDP report posted a negative reading, further unsettling the outlook. The October monthly GDP change was estimated at -0.1% while the year-over-year increase in GDP in October produced a gain of just 1.1%. These metrics have put the U.K. economy on recession watch at a time when there has been a sharp revision in the budget process that will be much more constrictive. A sharp pullback in the manufacturing of motor vehicles is blamed for the sudden weakness in GDP in October. The three-month drop in GDP is the first such drop since December 2023.

Meanwhile, the headline and the core inflation statistics are progressing. The table calculates breadth statistics on how widespread inflation acceleration has been and we see that it has not been prevalent (over 50%) in September or November, although breadth did touch the 58% mark in October. Sequentially, inflation acceleration has been tamed: over 12 months (when it is neutral), six months, and three months. Over 12 months, inflation accelerated in only 50% of the categories. And inflation according to the CPI headline and in the core over six months continues to show deceleration to accompany narrowing breadth - only 8.3%. That reading indicates that there was more inflation deceleration than acceleration by a wide margin over six months. At 50%, inflation acceleration and deceleration forces are balanced. Readings below 50% indicate relatively more deceleration, and that is now the more common condition. Inflation acceleration is extremely rare across categories over six months and three months.

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On balance, inflation by the headline and by the core measures is well disciplined and falling into line although still excessive over 12 months. The breadth statistics reinforce the view that inflation is broadly coming to heel at the same time the real economy data are showing a cooling in the economy- and perhaps an excessive slowing at that. The new budget should put the economy under additional downward pressure, further restraining inflation and causing growth to moderate. In this situation, a rate cut from the Bank of England is the odds-on bet. Perhaps the only question now is how large a cut? How much will the Bank think that circumstance have changed and that key trends have been altered in a significant way? Will policy react mostly to lower trend tempered by an excessive 12-month pace, or will it be willing to look farther forward and weight heavily the deteriorating economic trend as well?

United Kingdom

U.K. Inflation Moderates Open Door for BOE Rate Cut

Sandy Batten

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The Bureau of Labor Statistics released establishment survey data for both October and November today. With the government shutdown during the month of October, there was no household survey for that month. Today’s release contained only November data for households. Nonfarm payrolls (from the establishment survey) increased 64,000 in November but fell 105,000 in October. The 119,000 increase previously reported for September was revised down to a 108,000 rise. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected an 80,000 decrease in October and a 35,000 increase in November. The three-month average change in payrolls rebounded to 22,000 in November from -8,000 in October. However, this figure has trended down since early this year, pointing to a modest softening of labor-market conditions. 

This softening was reinforced by a 0.2%-point jump in the unemployment rate, measured in the household survey, to 4.6% in November from 4.4% in September. (As already noted, there was no household survey in October.) The unemployment rate, including employees working part-time for economic reasons plus all marginally attached workers, surged to 8.7% in November from 8.0% in September. For both series, these were the highest readings since September 2021.

Average hourly earnings (AHE), a key variable for the Federal Reserve, showed a further slowing in wage growth. AHE edged up 0.1% m/m in November after a 0.4% monthly jump in October. Importantly, the y/y rate slowed to 3.5%, the slowest since May 2021, from 3.7% in both September and October. The annual pace of the rise in service-producing wages slowed to 3.4% in November from 3.7% in both September and October while the annual growth of goods-producing wages was unchanged at 4.0%. Depending on your estimate of productivity growth, the current pace of total AHE growth is likely still a little too fast to be consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target. But clearly, it is moving in the desired direction.

In the **establishment survey**, much of the recent softening reflects declines in federal government employment. Federal government employment fell again in November (-6,000). This follows a sharp decline of 162,000 in October, as some federal employees who accepted a deferred resignation offer came off federal payrolls. Federal government employment is down by 271,000 since reaching a peak in January. (Note however that federal employees on furlough during the government shutdown were counted as employed in the establishment survey because they received pay, even if later than usual, for the pay period that included the 12th of the month. Employees on paid leave or receiving ongoing severance pay are counted as employed in the establishment survey.)

Private-sector employment rose 69,000 in November and 52,000 in October following an upwardly revised 104,000 increase in September (previously 97,000). Goods sector employment rebounded in November, rising 19,000 after a 9,000 fall in October. Construction jobs increased 28,000 in November, their largest monthly gain in more than a year, but slipped 1,000 in October. Manufacturing jobs continued to decline, falling 5,000 in November and 9,000 in October. They have now declined for seven consecutive months, not the result that the Trump Administration new tariff policy had intended.

Private-sector service-producing jobs gained 50,000 in November on top of a 61,000 increase in October and an 87,000 rise in September. A 46,000 increase in healthcare jobs on top of a 44,000 increase in October and an 18,000 gain in social assistance jobs in November after a 21,000 increase in October led the overall increases in the past two months. Other major sectors mostly experienced either job declines or minimal gains in October and November.

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The length of the workweek increased to 34.3 hours in November from 34.2 hours in August, September and October. The goods-producing workweek edged up to 39.8 hours in November from 39.6 hours in October while the private service-producing workweek was unchanged at 33.2 hours in November.

In the **household survey**, the unemployment rate jumped to 4.6% in November, the highest since September 2021 and up from a recent low of 3.4% in April 2023, from 4.4% in September (again, no data for October). The labor force increased 323,000 in November from September after a 470,000 monthly gain in September. The gain in employment slowed in November with the number of employed rising only 96,000 from September following a 251,000 monthly increase in September. The number of unemployed increased 228,000 in November from September following a 219,000 monthly increase in September. The labor force participation rate rose to 62.5% in November, its highest since April, from 62.4% in September. On a slightly brighter note, the average duration of unemployment slipped to 23.0 weeks in November from 24.1 weeks in September while the median duration of unemployment fell to 9.5 weeks, the lowest since May, from 10.0 weeks in September.

The employment/population ratio for all workers slipped to 59.6% in November from 59.7% in September. It remained below the recent peak reading of 61.1% in February 2020 just prior to the pandemic. For men, the rate slipped to 64.6% in November from 64.8% in September and 65.0% in August, and for women, the rate was unchanged at 54.8% in November.

The employment and earnings data are collected from surveys taken each month during the week containing the 12th day of the month. The labor market data are contained in Haver's **USECON** database. Detailed figures are in the **EMPL** and **LABOR** databases. The expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Total payrolls rose 64k in November but fell 105k in October
- The October decline was more than accounted for by a 157k decline in government employment
- The unemployment rate jumped to 4.6% in November from 4.4% in September.
- There were no household survey data collected for October.

U.S. Employment and the Unemployment Rate Rose in November

Economy in Brief: October 2018

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U.S. Private Sector Construction Spending Contracts

Japan's Tankan Slips for Third Quarter in a Row