Charles Steindel

State labor markets were, yet again, generally little-changed in March. Three (Texas, Florida, and Tennessee) had statistically significant increases in payrolls. The sum of the changes across the states was 201,700; not very different than the (currently reported) national change of 178,000.

No state reported a statistically significant change in its unemployment rate. 26 states (including DC) had rates significantly different than the national 4.3%, although three of the four largest states (Florida, Texas, and New York) had rates not significantly different (indeed, the rate in Texas was 4.3%). Rates at or above 5.0% were in DC, Delaware, Nevada, California, Oregon, Illinois, Washington, and Michigan, with DC’s 6.3% the highest. Alabama, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont had unemployment rates under 3.0%, while South Dakota’s 2.3% was the lowest in the nation.

Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate was unchanged at 5.6% and the island’s job count rose 1,800.

State Labor Markets in March 2026

Our global data offering is unparalleled in terms of coverage, quality, and organization. We offer 290+ databases from 2500 government and private sources, a wealth of key survey and forecast data covering the world’s economies, and a robust offering of archive databases that drive machine learning for big data applications.

Optimized for precision analytics, our data is seamlessly integrated with Microsoft Office and all leading statistical packages through our DLX® software and platform independent HaverView™ website. We further offer direct database feeds, client server or cloud-based delivery, and RESTful API.


Privacy Policy

Disclaimer

Contact us

Service Health

A premier time series data platform for the global strategy, research, and quant communities. 

London

Singapore

New York

Tokyo

Economy in Brief

Viewpoints

Contact Us

Our Data

Our Products

What We Do

Our Authors

About Us

Data News

Featured Data Additions

Resources

Release Calendars

Training Center

Webinars

Newsletters

Download Software

For Clients

Live Updates

Joel Prakken

President Trump has asked Congress to suspend federal fuels taxes temporarily in order to lower prices paid by drivers at the pump. Unfortunately, doing so probably won't produce the desired result, but energy companies certainly won't object.  Here’s why.

**A complete version** of this commentary is available [here](https://static.haver.com/Haver_Commentgary_Suspending_the_Fuels_Tax_051126_77972166ea.pdf).

Suspending the Fuels Tax: Be Careful What You Wish For

Paul L. Kasriel

Grinnin’ Kevin Hassett, a White House economic adviser, said on Fox Business on May 6, 2026: “Credit card spending is through the roof. They’re [households] spending more on gasoline, but they’re spending more on everything else, too.” Hassett went on to say that the spending surge was due to households having “so much more money in their pockets”. Well, if households are running up their credit card balances, yes, they temporarily have “more money in their pockets”. Although Hassett thinks that this is a good thing, I see it as a reason why the increase in energy prices will seep into the prices of non-energy goods and services.

Let’s look at some data that are consistent with Hassett’s credit-card spending hypothesis. Plotted in the chart below are the observations of the eight-week annualized percent changes in commercial bank credit card and other revolving loans. In the eight weeks ended April 29, these loans grew at an annualized pace of 12.7%. So, this is consistent with Hassett’s happy hypothesis about households running up their credit card balances.

260511PK1.jpg

But Hassett might not be grinnin’ so much if the higher energy prices start to be associated with higher prices for other goods and services. Why might this occur with the increase in household credit card borrowing? If households did not increase their credit card borrowing, all else the same, they would have to cut back on their nominal purchases of non-energy goods and services as they spend more of their nominal income on higher-priced energy goods and services. Sellers of non-energy goods and services would try to pass on their higher costs of production due to higher energy prices. But again, if households did not increase their credit card borrowing, they would have less nominal income left over to purchase non-energy goods and services. With a decline in the demand for non-energy goods and services, sellers of these would have difficulty passing on their higher energy costs of production. This would keep the prices of non-energy goods and services from rising.

But, if households maintain their nominal purchases of non-energy goods and services along with their higher nominal purchases of increased-price energy goods and services by running up the credit card balances, then the prices of non-energy goods and services need not remain the same. These prices would go up as sellers of these non-energy goods and services are able to pass on their higher energy costs of production. In sum, by households increasing their nominal spending in the face of higher energy prices by running up their credit card balances, not only will energy prices go up, but so, too, will the prices on non-energy goods and services.

Why do I say in the title of this commentary that Kevin Hassett is right for once? In September 1999, Hassett and his co-author, James Glassman, published a book entitled Dow 36,000: The New Strategy for Profiting From the Coming Rise in the Stock Market. The authors believed that the US equity market was significantly undervalued and would rise in value dramatically. At the end of September 1999, the Dow Jones 30 Industrial Stock Index closed at 10,337. In September 2009, the Dow closed at 9,712. The Dow did not hit 36,000 until December 2021. Hassett and Glassman followed the forecasting rule that if you forecast a number, don’t give a date associated with the forecast number. So, to be fair, to Hassett, he was not wrong. The Dow eventually did hit 36,000. All right, turn about is fair play. Hassett can remind me of one of my errant forecasts.

Kevin Hassett Is Right, For Once?

Movements in the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state coincident indexes in March were generally muted.  In the one-month changes, West Virginia led with a 1.12 percent gain,  with North Dakota the only other state with an increase above  .5 percent. Five states were down, but  Hawaii’s .62 percent drop was the only one larger than .10 percent.  Over the three months ending in March, while nine states were down, Hawaii was again the only one with a drop of as much as .5 percent. North Dakota, Indiana, and New Jersey were the only states seeing gains of 1 percent or more.   Over the last twelve months, four states were down—West Virginia, which has clearly been quite volatile recently, was off 3.42 percent, but no other fell as much as half that. No state had an increase higher than four percent, and only three were higher than three percent.

The independently estimated national estimates of growth over the last three and twelve months were, respectively, .50 and 1.76 percent. Both measures appear to be fairly consistent with the state numbers.

State Coincident Indexes in March 2026

Sharmila Whelan

India’s economic performance in 2025 exceeded expectations across the board. During our recent visit to Mumbai, nearly all contacts expressed surprise at the economy’s resilience. Despite the disruption from Trump’s tariff measures—under which Indian exports faced duties of up to 50% until an interim agreement was reached in February 2026—India still expanded by 7.6% in 2025, an improvement on 7.1% in 2024.

Growth did soften marginally in the final quarter, easing to 7.8% YoY from 8.3% YoY, largely due to weaker net exports. However, the more important takeaway for a domestically driven economy is that private demand strengthened (Figure 1). Consumption-led growth remained robust, and while export growth slowed, import volumes—a leading indicator of domestic demand—picked up significantly.

260507SW1.jpg

Source: Have Analytics & Westbourne Research

India also made notable progress on inflation. Headline consumer price inflation fell sharply from above 5% year-on-year in December 2024 to just 1.1% by December 2025. This paved the way for the Reserve Bank of India to cut policy rates by 125 bps.

Corporate performance has been equally encouraging (Chart 1, Figure 2). Strong domestic demand has driven profitability higher, with average return on equity (RoE) for listed companies rising to 15.2%, well above the pre-pandemic average of around 12%. This suggests that the corporate profit cycle remains firmly in an upswing.

Public finances have also improved (Chart 2, Figure 2). The fiscal deficit narrowed for the third consecutive year, falling to 4.5% of GDP, while public debt has stabilised at around 56% of GDP, supported by strong nominal growth. Together, these factors paint a picture of an economy with solid macroeconomic fundamentals.

260507SW2.jpg

Source: Bloomberg, Haver Analytics & Westbourne Research

**Precariously Balanced**

Yet beneath this strong performance lies a more fragile reality.

India’s growth model is becoming increasingly imbalanced. A sustained rebound in private investment remains elusive, and the country risks falling behind in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and next-generation manufacturing.

Traditional capital-intensive industries remain cautious following the boom-and-bust cycle of the mid-2000s. Many firms are still reluctant to commit to large-scale domestic investment and are increasingly looking overseas for expansion. Structural headwinds—including Chinese overcapacity, intense global competition, and regulatory uncertainty—continue to weigh on sectors such as steel, petrochemicals, and engineering procurement and construction (EPC).

At the same time, smaller firms are being squeezed as large conglomerates—such as Reliance, Tata, and Adani—expand aggressively into consumer-facing sectors. While corporate credit growth has picked up, it is largely being used for working capital rather than new capital expenditure.

The government’s flagship Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme has delivered mixed results. While it has succeeded in attracting investment in select sectors, its broader impact on private investment has been limited. Where investment is taking place—particularly in semiconductors, renewables, and data centres—it is not yet sufficient to offset weakness in traditional industries.

As a result, public investment continues to do the heavy lifting. Infrastructure spending has risen sharply since the pandemic and is set to reach a record US$133 bn (around 3.7% of GDP) in FY27, covering sectors such as transport, energy, and urban infrastructure.

However, public investment alone cannot fully compensate for weak private sector participation. The share of private corporate investment in total national fixed investment has declined, while the share of government spending has increased. This has deepened the investment cycle downswing (Figure 3).

260507SW3.jpg

Source: Haver Analytics & Westbourne Research

Concerns around governance and execution further complicate the outlook. Public-private partnership (PPP) models remain unattractive due to issues around risk allocation, delays, and uncertain returns. Some market participants also point to growing centralisation of decision-making, with project allocation increasingly influenced by the central government—reinforcing the dominance of large corporate groups.

**China Factor and Industrial Strategy**

China continues to exert a dual influence on India’s industrial landscape. On one hand, Chinese overcapacity discourages domestic investment in globally exposed sectors. On the other, India remains dependent on Chinese imports and expertise in areas such as EPC execution and low-cost components.

Looking ahead, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set an ambitious target to raise manufacturing’s share of GDP from around 16–17% to 25% over the next decade. This vision is supported by the PLI scheme and a series of trade agreements aimed at integrating India into global supply chains.

There are some early successes. Emerging sectors—including electronics, electric vehicles, solar photovoltaics, and defence—are seeing stronger investment momentum. The electronics PLI scheme, in particular, has been effective. India now assembles all iPhone 17 models, accounting for roughly 25% of global iPhone production. However, this remains the exception rather than the rule.

**Consumption: Strong but Questionable**

With investment weak, consumption remains the primary driver of growth. Household spending ended 2025 on a strong note, growing by 8.4% YoY.

Rural households have been central to this momentum. Real rural incomes have outpaced urban incomes, supported by a shift toward non-agricultural activities. Non-farm income now accounts for over 50% of rural earnings and is growing faster than agricultural income.

By contrast, urban income growth has been constrained by job losses in manufacturing and IT, as well as slower wage growth in services. The rise of the gig economy—across e-commerce, food delivery, and transport—has not fully offset these pressures. Moreover, the share of regular salaried employment has declined to around 25%, dampening consumption stability.

Rural consumption is now growing as fast as, or faster than, urban consumption across income groups (Figure 4). However, this strength is partly underpinned by fiscal support, raising questions about sustainability.

260507SW4.jpg

Government transfers have expanded significantly. The number of states providing unconditional cash transfers has risen from 11 to 16 in recent years. Transfers to women and farmers have increased by over 36% since FY19, reaching approximately ₹2.6 trn (~0.7% of GDP). Additional support through food programmes and agricultural schemes further reinforces consumption.

Tax policy has also played a role. The September 2025 GST rationalisation reduced rates on mass consumption goods, including automobiles and consumer durables. While this has supported spending, its impact is likely to diminish over time.

In sum, India’s economy appears finely balanced. Growth is expected to moderate to around 7% in FY27, down from 7.6% in FY26, as the effects of fiscal support fade and investment remains subdued. Inflation dynamics and external risks may also limit further monetary easing, with the Reserve Bank of India likely to remain on hold or potentially tighten if conditions warrant.

**Investment Implications**

Against this backdrop, we are shifting our stance on Indian equities from overweight to neutral.

While macro fundamentals remain solid, the lack of investment momentum and questions around consumption sustainability warrant caution. That said, structural shifts—particularly in rural incomes and consumption patterns—create selective opportunities.

We favour sectors leveraged to domestic demand, structural change and public infrastructure spending, including:
•	Fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) 
•	E-commerce 
•	Healthcare 
•	Airlines 
•	Cement

State Labor Markets in March 2026

Charles Steindel

More Viewpoints

Suspending the Fuels Tax: Be Careful What You Wish For

Kevin Hassett Is Right, For Once?

State Coincident Indexes in March 2026

India: Strong Growth, Fragile Balance