Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Joel Prakken

Joel Prakken is former Chief US Economist of S&P Global and IHS Markit, co-founder of Macroeconomic Advisers, and past president and director of the National Association for Business Economics. He has served as an outside advisor to the Congressional Budget Office, on the Advisory Panel of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and as a consultant to the Joint Committee on Taxation. He holds a BA in economics from Princeton University and a PhD in economics from Washington University in Saint Louis.

Publications by Joel Prakken

  • To my thinking, the surefire marker for the adoption of artificially intelligent (AI) “agents” is a decline in labor’s share of income. Here’s the logic in terms of production theory.

    When I learned Solow growth accounting, the constancy of labor’s share of income was an accepted “stylized” economic fact. Cobb and Douglas demonstrated that if inputs are paid their marginal product in competitive factor markets, the constancy of labor’s share was consistent with a unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The logic was easy to grasp. A decline in the cost of capital relative to the wage rate encouraged a proportionate increase in ratio of capital to labor. Therefore, payments made to capital, relative to payments made to labor, remained unchanged.

    AI agents are near-perfect substitutes for workers in certain occupations. Hence, the introduction of AI agents raises the overall elasticity of substitution between capital and labor relative to the traditional unitary value. At the same time, the cost of AI agents, reflected in the price per “token” in LLMs, is falling rapidly. Given the high elasticity of substitution between AI agents and certain workers, the rapid decline in the relative cost of AI agents encourages an increase in the ratio of capital to labor that is more than proportionate to the decline in the relative cost of capital. Consequently, capital’s share of income rises, while labor’s share declines.

    After remaining fairly constant for decades following WWII, labor’s share fell unevenly between 2000 and 2022 by approximately 8 percentage points, from 69% to 61%. A plausible explanation of that decline was the initial emergence of agentic capital as the dot-com era evolved. Today there’s a widespread expectation that surging investment in AI will perpetuate this decline, perhaps dramatically. Maybe so, but it hasn’t happened yet.

    The chart shows the recent quarterly history (through 2026 Q1) of labor’s share of income in the private nonfarm business sector, adjusted to exclude sectoral taxes on production and imports from the denominator. This exclusion, required by theory, allows that revenues from “indirect” taxes are not received by producers, and therefore not allocable to either capital or labor. When calculating “labor share” for its report on productivity and costs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics doesn’t make this adjustment. However, given the recent surge in customs duties, almost all of which are levied on private nonfarm business, the correction is important.

    Perhaps aggregation conceals nascent effects in vulnerable sectors. Perhaps it will take more time for the ongoing “AI buildout” to affect the distribution of income noticeably in any sector. Perhaps the data will be revised. Be that as it may, more three and one half years after the introduction of ChatGPT in November of 2022, there has been no decline in labor’s share of income when correctly measured.

  • The Bureau of Labor Statistics was unable to sample prices during the government shutdown last October. Consequently, it assumed no change in shelter costs for that month. Given the particulars of how the BLS measures rents, the resulting understatement of the level of shelter costs was not corrected until April, when shelter costs jumped 0.6%, roughly double the true monthly increase.

    As we approach the next report on consumer prices, bear this in mind. Going forward, monthly changes in shelter costs will be correct. However, because we often examine inflation over longer intervals, the legacy effect of the government shutdown on shelter costs is not yet fully in the rearview mirror. From October through March the level of shelter costs was low by one month’s increase. Therefore, after March, any change in shelter costs calculated over an interval starting from the months of October through March will overstate the increase over that interval by one month’s increase in rents. The overstatement is magnified if the change is expressed at an annual rate.

  • Iran’s closure of the Straits of Hormuz on March 2 has sent fuel costs spiraling upwards. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation is of the price index for core personal consumption expenditures (PCE). These exclude consumers’ direct (or “final”) purchases of gasoline & other motor fuel. However, increases in the cost of fuel used to produce and transport core consumer goods & services may pass through to core prices. In a recent paper I present compelling empirical evidence that the pass-through of intermediate fuel costs to final core consumer prices is highly significant and could contribute as much as 0.8 extra percentage points to second-quarter annualized core inflation.

    I began by constructing a price index for the intermediate consumption of the three major fuels: diesel fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel. In doing so I assumed the domestic consumption of diesel fuel and jet fuel is all intermediate while treating as intermediate the domestic consumption of gasoline not included in PCE. The average (since 1979) shares of the three fuels in intermediate use are: diesel fuel (62%), gasoline (25%), and jet fuel (14%), but recently those shares are 66%, 13% and 21%, respectively.

  • President Trump has asked Congress to suspend federal fuels taxes temporarily in order to lower prices paid by drivers at the pump. Unfortunately, doing so probably won't produce the desired result, but energy companies certainly won't object. Here’s why.

    A complete version of this commentary is available here.

  • The report from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on the “core” inflation rate for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in March was concerning. The monthly change in that price index was 0.4% for the third consecutive month, for a 3-month annualized change of 4.4%! The 12-month change climbed from a recent low of 2.7% in October to 3.2% in March, well above the Fed’s 2% objective. And don’t forget: the 12-month change understates inflation, given how the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) treated shelter costs last October when a partial government shutdown prevented the agency from conducting its monthly survey of consumer prices.

    A refresher. Lacking data for many items, BLS assumed their prices in October were unchanged from September. For most items this understatement was corrected the following month when November’s prices were correctly recorded, except for the price index for shelter costs.

    BLS calculates the monthly percent change in shelter costs as the 6th root of the percent change in shelter costs over the previous six months reported for one of six rotating panels within a larger sample of housing units. So, lacking survey data for October, the BLS assumed that shelter costs in October were the same as in April – the last time the panel scheduled to be surveyed in October was in fact surveyed – and then calculated October’s change in shelter costs as the 6th root of 0…equals 0! This understatement won’t be corrected until that panel is surveyed again in April. Until then, any change in shelter costs calculated over a span that includes October is missing a month of shelter cost inflation. If that span is less than a year but the change is annualized, then the understatement is annualized as well.

    Let’s put numbers to this. The 6-month change in shelter costs was not recorded in October, but it was 1.65% (not annualized) in September. Let’s take that as an estimate of the true 6-month change in shelter costs for the panel that would have been surveyed had the government not been shut down. This implies that the price index for shelter costs has been low since October by 1.10651/6 – 1 ≈ 0.3%. Shelter costs have a relative importance of 35% in the consumer price index (CPI), implying that the CPI currently is low by 0.35*0.1% ≈ 0.1%, as is the 12-month percent change in the CPI.

    On May 12 the BLS will release the CPI for April. No doubt it will show pronounced effects of higher energy prices, both direct and indirect, resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. However, it will also include the correction of the understated level of shelter costs. That correction will add approximately 0.1% to both the monthly and the 12-month percent change in the CPI, and slightly more than that to the corresponding measures of core CPI inflation. The impact on the price index for core PCE is roughly half this, given the smaller weight of housing in PCE than in the items covered by the CPI. So not only will the correction for the understatement of shelter costs boost reported inflation, it also will push the monthly change in the CPI above that for the PCE price index. None of this is earth shattering, but it is another reason to expect May’s inflation numbers to be unfavorable.

  • On February 28 the US and Israel launched airstrikes on Iran. In retaliation, Iran closed the Straits of Hormuz. By early April the average US price of regular gasoline jumped to $4.11/gallon from $2.93/gallon in February, an increase of 40%.

    To put this price shock in historical perspective, I: defined the real price of gasoline as the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on gasoline (and other motor fuels) over the price index for total PCE; calculated monthly percent changes in this real price of gasoline; weighted each of those changes by the geometric average of the current and lagged monthly shares of nominal gasoline purchases in total nominal PCE; cumulated the weighted price changes from January of 1960 to the present.

  • In early 2025 the Trump Administration announced a base tariff of 10% on imported goods, additional steep “reciprocal tariffs” on goods imported from countries running large trade surpluses with the United States, and additional levies on specific imported commodities. The average tariff rate on all imports surged from approximately 2.5% to 10%. The increase would have been larger if not for the many “slips twixt cup and (dutiable) lip.” Indeed, it might surprise many that today only 40% of imported goods are subject to tariffs (Chart 1).

  • Because the federal government was shut down in October the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) did not conduct a survey of consumer prices that month but then reported two-month changes (for September-November) in prices with the following release of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). At the time I, in a commentary here (“A Dodgy CPI Rent Reading for November,” December 20, 2025), and others viewed the reported sharp two-month deceleration in the shelter component of the CPI with suspicion. Subsequent methodological clarifications from the BLS confirmed those concerns.

    In October, for price levels not surveyed, the BLS assumed (unreported) changes of zero from September to October. In principle, with price levels then correctly measured in November, the two-month changes reported for September-November are correct. It is as if (implied) price increases in November include catch up effects, but with one important exception: rent.

    The BLS stratifies its full panel of housing units into six subpanels that are surveyed in rotation. Each month the BLS assumes the monthly change in the shelter component of the CPI equals the sixth root of the six-month change in rent reported for the currently surveyed subpanel. Since a survey was not conducted during the shutdown, the BLS assumed that the rent for the subpanel that would have been surveyed in October was the same as in April when that subpanel was last surveyed. Because in October the six-month change in rent was thus assumed to be zero so, also, was the one-month change (i.e., the sixth root of zero).

  • On December 18 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for November. In October, when the federal government was partially shut down, BLS did not conduct its survey of prices, leaving most of them unrecorded for that month. Therefore, rather than reporting the usual 1-month percent changes in prices for November, BLS reported 2-month percent changes instead. For example, from September to November, the core CPI advanced at a 1% annualized rate – a surprisingly benign reading that, if accurate, significantly improves the current narrative on inflation and strengthens the case for easier monetary policy.

    Unfortunately, the potential impact of the shutdown on both the quality and timing of the November survey raises legitimate concerns about the reliability of its results. One particularly dodgy-looking element of the report was a quite sharp deceleration in the CPI for shelter, the 2-month annualized percent change of which dropped from 3.9% in September to just 1.1% in November (gold line in chart). An erroneous reading here could be of considerable importance given that shelter costs comprise nearly 18% of “core” personal consumption expenditures.

    The CPI-shelter reflects rents on tenant- and owner-occupied housing units. Imputed rents on owner-occupied units are inferred from observed rents on nearby comparable tenant-occupied units. Because shelter costs reflect average rents, they are highly inertial, lagging well behind current (i.e., marginal) market conditions for two reasons. First, rental contracts typically are for one year, requiring twelve months for all contracts to reflect a change in market conditions. Second, the BLS rotates through a panel of renters over a period of six months, adding another half year to the lag between marginal and average rents.

    However, these lags allow one empirically to relate the CPI-shelter to current and past new rental contracts. I did so by estimating a model that explains the CPI-shelter with current and lagged values of Zillow indices of observed newly contracted rents. These indices are available monthly through November. I then used that model to forecast the shelter costs for the months of October and November. The resulting projection of the 2-month change in the CPI-shelter is shown in the blue line in the chart.

    The model suggests that from September through November the CPI-shelter grew at an annualized rate of 2.9%, 1.8 percentage points faster than the number published by BLS. To me, the projection seems more believable than the reported figure. Replacing the latter with the former raises the 2-month annualized change in the core CPI by approximately 0.3 percentage points, to 1.3% - still a good reading, but not as good. And, of course, all this makes one wonder about the reliability of estimates of other prices in the report. So, before concluding prematurely that inflation is quiescent, it makes sense for one to await additional months of readings.

  • After forty-two days, the longest (partial) shutdown of the federal government on record, which began October 1, is finally behind us. Forecasters have scurried to gauge the shutdown’s impact on real GDP. The exercise is not simple. With savings as a buffer, delayed income is not necessarily delayed spending. With inventories as a buffer, delayed spending is not necessarily delayed production. Some delayed spending and production can be made up later, even within the current quarter. The task is further complicated because effects of the shutdown are not identified separately in the source data compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Nor does the BEA make special adjustments to GDP for the shutdown…with one important exception.

    In our National Accounts services produced by government are valued at cost, the variable component of which is the compensation of government employees. The BEA treats furloughed federal workers as if their real compensation is zeroed out. This makes it straightforward to compute the real value of government services forgone during the shutdown, as well as the associated negative contribution to fourth-quarter growth of GDP. With approximately 1/3 of federal civilian workers furloughed, each extra week of the shutdown reduced the contribution of government services to fourth-quarter annualized growth of GDP by approximately 0.14 percentage point. Hence, the reduction in government services during the six-week shutdown will subtract approximately 0.8 percentage point from GDP growth in the fourth quarter.

  • It is generally understood that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) does not include the value of imports. It is, however, less well appreciated that in the System of National Accounts tariffs are treated as domestic value added. That is, customs duties are included in GDP.

    From the first to the second quarter of this year customs duties surged $170.7 billion, from $97 billion at an annual rate to $267.7 billion -- an annualized growth rate of 5700%! -- as new tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration took effect. All else equal, if that increase in tariffs had immediately passed through to prices faced by final demanders of domestic product, the annualized rate of change in the GDP price index would have spiked nearly 3 percentage points in the second quarter. As it happened, GDP inflation in the second quarter was tame at 2.1%. Obviously, there were tariff slips twixt cup and lip.

  • From January to August the average tariff rate on all imported goods increased 9 percentage points, from 2.3% to 11.3%, while the price of those imports, recorded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) excluding tariffs, was essentially unchanged. Hence, the price of imports, including tariffs, rose 1.113/1.023 - 1 = 8.5%, reflecting the full amount of the increase in tariffs (Chart 1, solid lines). This suggests the cost of the tariffs has been borne entirely by American businesses and consumers, with none of that cost passed backwards to foreign suppliers.