Tom Moeller

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/041004a.jpg" width="353">
Unit sales of light vehicles rose 5.5% m/m in September to a 17.51M selling rate, just under the year&#39;s high of 17.71M set back in May. Consensus expectations had been for sales of 16.7M.
Sales of light trucks surged 7.7% m/m to the highest level in nearly three years. Domestic light truck sales of 9.0M were 10.8% higher than a year ago but imported light truck sales of 1.1.20M were down 3.6% y/y.
Total auto sales rose a moderate 2.5% m/m with domestics up 2.1% (-5.2% y/y) and imports up 3.5% (-0.5% y/y).
In September imports&#39; share of the US market for new vehicles plummeted to 18.7%, the lowest level this year.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/USECON/@ED/@ED09/@ED0901/@ED0901.HTM"> Light Vehicle Sales (SAAR, Mil.Units)</a></th>
<th scope="col"> Sept</th>
<th scope="col">Aug</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col"> 2003</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
<th scope="col">2001</th>
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<td class="firstcol">Total</td>
<td>17.51</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>16.69</td>
<td>16.81</td>
<td>17.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Autos</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>-3.9%</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Trucks</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>8.78</td>
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Unit sales of light vehicles rose 5.5% m/m in September to a 17.51M selling rate, just under the year's high of 17.71M set back in May. Consensus expectations had been for sales of 16.7M. Sales of light trucks surged 7.7% m/m to the [...]

Stronger Trucks Drove U.S. Light Vehicle Sales

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Nonfarm labor productivity fell 0.8% (SAAR) during Q1’25 after increasing 1.7% in Q4’24, revised from 1.5%. A 0.6% decline had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. It was the first productivity decline since Q2’22. The y/y increase during Q1 fell to 1.4% from 2.1% in Q4. It was below a 3.3% high in the first quarter of last year. Productivity fell as real value-added output dropped 0.3% last quarter (+2.2% y/y) after increasing 2.5% in Q4, and hours worked lengthened 0.6% (0.8% y/y) following a 0.8% gain.

Compensation per hour increased 4.8% last quarter following a 3.7% Q4 rise. Despite the strength of these last two increases, y/y growth decelerated to 2.7% from a 6.8% high one year earlier. Nevertheless, the productivity decline raised unit labor costs by 5.7% (1.3% y/y) in Q1 versus expectations for a 5.2% increase. It followed a 2.0% gain during Q4 and was the strongest quarterly increase in a year.

Factory sector productivity surged 4.5% (1.5% y/y) during Q1’25 following three consecutive increases of roughly 0.5%. This strength was accompanied by a 6.2% rise (2.2% y/y) in hourly compensation which came after two consecutive increases of approximately 4.1%. The strength in productivity lowered the rise in unit labor costs to 1.6% from 3.8% in Q4. The y/y gain fell to 0.7% from 2.0% in Q4 and stood below the 6.2% y/y increase in Q1’24.

The productivity and labor cost data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Productivity declines with lower output.
- Compensation surge exacerbates labor market stress.
- Factory sector productivity surge lessens cost pressure.

U.S. Productivity Declines in Q1’25; Unit Labor Costs Surge

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The National Association of Realtors' Fixed Rate Mortgage Housing Affordability Index (HAI) rose 0.6% (3.2% y/y) in March to 103.2 after rising 0.9% to 102.6 in February and rising 0.8% in January to 101.7. The level of home affordability has risen 14.8% from its low of 89.9 in October 2023. It remains 42.4% below the high of 179.2 in April 2020.

The rise in affordability in March occurred as the median price of an existing single-family home rose 1.8% (2.9% y/y) to $408,000 which was offset by a decline in mortgage rates to 6.73% from 6.92% in February. The price compared to the record $432,900 in June 2024. The decline in mortgage rates compared to a recent low of 6.26% in September of last year and a 7.70% high during October of 2023. It remained well above a December 2020 low of 2.73%. These changes lowered the principal & interest payment by 0.2% (+1.1% y/y) to $2,113 per month. That was well above the most recent low of $984 in February 2020. Monthly mortgage payments averaged a lessened 24.2% of income during March. They remained up from a low of 14.0% of income in April 2020.

The rise in housing costs in March was accompanied by improvement in median family income. It increased 0.4% (4.4% y/y) to a record $104,705 after rising 0.4% in February and 0.7% in January.

Housing affordability improved m/m across the country in March. The index edged 0.1% higher (2.8% y/y) to 134.5 in the Midwest. It remains the most affordable region of the country. In the South, the index 0.9% (5.4% y/y) to 106.6 and the affordability index in the Northeast increased 2.1% (-2.6% y/y) to 95.7. In the West, where homes are the least affordable, the index rose 0.8% (3.3% y/y) to 71.8 in March.

The Housing Affordability Index (HAI) equals 100 when a median-income borrower qualifies for an 80% mortgage on a median-priced existing single-family home. The HAI had exceeded 100 in each month since July 1990 and reached its all-time high of 213.3 in January 2013; since then, it fell below 100 for the first time in June 2022.

Data on Housing Affordability can be found in Haver’s **REALTOR** database. Median home sales prices are also available in **USECON**. Higher frequency interest rate data are found in **SURVEYS**, **WEEKLY**, and **DAILY**.

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- Home prices rise but mortgage rates decline.
- Median income improves.
- Affordability increases across the country.

U.S. Housing Affordability Improves Slightly in March

Carol Stone, CBE

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Initial claims for unemployment insurance were 228,000 seasonally adjusted in the week ended May 3, down from 241,000 in the previous week, which was unrevised. For the latest week, the Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected a smaller decline to 233,000.

In the week ended April 26, the total number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries – also known as “continuing claims” – was 1.879 million, down from 1.908 million in the April 19 week.

The insured unemployment rate, that is, the number of beneficiaries as a percentage of covered employment, returned to its longstanding rate of 1.2% in the April 26 week; this rate has held that amount since continuously since the week of January 6, 2024, except for the prior week’s 1.3%.

As we do highlight in every week’s discussion, economic conditions vary widely across individual states and territories. In the week ended April 19, the highest unemployment rates were in New Jersey and Rhode Island (both at 2.48%), California (2.26%), Washington (2.14%) and New York (1.85%). The lowest were in Florida (0.36%), South Dakota (0.37%), Alabama (0.41%), Virginia (0.45%) and Nebraska (0.47%). Rates in other notable states include Illinois (1.78%), Pennsylvania (1.53%) and Texas (1.14%). These state data are not seasonally adjusted.

Data on weekly unemployment claims are from the Department of Labor itself, not the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They begin in 1967 and are contained in Haver’s **WEEKLY** database and summarized monthly in **USECON**. Data for individual states are in **REGIONW** back to December 1986. The expectations figure is from the Action Economics Forecast Survey in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Continued claims for unemployment insurance decreased 29, 000 in the week ended April 26.
- Insured unemployment rate returns to longstanding 1.2%.
- Across the states, the insured unemployment rate ranges from 0.36% to 2.48%.

U.S. Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims Ease 13,000 in the May 3 Week

Andrew Cates

**The global business cycle** 
The recent sharp decline in the Future Output Balance in the global composite PMI survey reflects a sudden deterioration in global business expectations. The sweeping tariffs, introduced in April 2025, have generated heightened uncertainty around trade policy and sparked fears of retaliatory actions from key trading partners. As a result, businesses worldwide are scaling back their expectations for future output, wary of rising costs, disrupted demand flows, and a broader shift toward protectionism that could undermine global economic momentum.

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Note: The extreme declines in the Future Output Balance that were recorded in the early months of 2020 (at the height of the COVID pandemic) have been removed from this chart.

**Global supply chain pressures**
Still, despite the marked deterioration in global business expectations, this second chart below provides a reassuring counterpoint: as of now, there is little evidence that global supply chain pressures have materially intensified. Both the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index and the Baltic Exchange Dry Index remain relatively subdued, especially compared to the pandemic-era spikes of 2020–2022. While there has been heightened concern following the April 2025 US tariff announcements, these trade policy shifts have yet to translate into measurable physical disruption in logistics or freight rates. The stability of these indices suggests that although sentiment has taken a hit, global shipping networks and supply flows are, for now, absorbing the shock. However, this calm may prove fragile if the policy environment hardens further or retaliatory trade actions begin to compound the strain.

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**Expectations for central banks’ policy rates** 
Adding to the picture of mounting economic caution, the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey reveals that expectations for policy easing over the next 12 months have become even more pronounced than in previous months. While earlier surveys had already pointed to a further extension of the global rate-cutting cycle, the latest results suggest forecasters now anticipate a deeper and more aggressive round of monetary easing—most notably from the US Federal Reserve, which is now expected to deliver nearly a full percentage point in rate cuts over the next 12 months. The sharp deterioration in business sentiment is reshaping the macro narrative: central banks are no longer simply guiding inflation lower, but are instead preparing to confront the risk of a deeper, demand-driven slowdown.

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**Energy prices and inflation** 
Adding further context to the growing expectations for policy easing, oil prices have dropped sharply in recent weeks—driven by mounting concerns over global growth, as reflected in weakening business sentiment and softer demand indicators. The chart below provides a longer-run perspective on why this matters: energy prices have historically played a central role in shaping the global inflation trajectory. The strong positive correlation (r = 0.83) between median world energy price inflation and median core consumer price inflation underscores the powerful pass-through effects energy costs can have on broader price dynamics. While core inflation tends to be stickier, this historical relationship makes clear that sustained declines in energy prices often foreshadow broader disinflationary trends.

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**Intangibles versus tangibles** 
Shifting focus from short-term cyclical risks to longer-term structural dynamics, the next chart below underscores a fundamental transformation in the composition of US investment: the economy has increasingly been built on intangibles. Over the past several decades, investment in intangible assets—such as software, intellectual property, R&D, and brand equity—has steadily climbed and, since the mid-2010s, has overtaken investment in both structures and equipment as a share of GDP. This shift reflects the rise of a knowledge-based, innovation-driven economy, but it also introduces new forms of vulnerability. Unlike physical capital, intangible assets rely heavily on trust, reputation, legal protections, and global openness. In this context, escalating trade frictions and a more confrontational US economic stance—as signalled by the recent tariff wave—risk eroding the goodwill and institutional credibility that underpin much of the value created by intangibles. If geopolitical uncertainty undermines the perceived reliability of US intellectual property protections or weakens global collaboration, it could pose a deeper structural challenge to future growth than any immediate cyclical downturn.

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**Investment in Artificial Intelligence**
The centrality of intangibles to the US growth model is nowhere more evident than in the explosion of private investment in artificial intelligence. As this chart illustrates, global AI investment has surged over the past decade—reaching new highs in 2024—and the United States has consistently accounted for the lion’s share of that spending. This reflects not only America’s previous leadership in frontier technologies but also its dependence on intangible capital, from algorithms and data infrastructure to human expertise and institutional trust. However, this dominance also underscores the strategic stakes of current policy choices. In an environment of rising trade tensions and potential fragmentation, the foundations of US leadership in AI—cross-border collaboration, data openness, and global market access—could be at risk.

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Financial market sentiment has rebounded in recent weeks, buoyed by signs of de-escalation in the US-led trade war and growing confidence that central banks—particularly the Federal Reserve—will step in with more rate cuts to cushion any fallout. Yet beneath the surface, a more sobering picture of the global economy persists. For example, latest PMI surveys reveal that global business expectations have slumped to their lowest levels since the pandemic, reflecting widespread unease about the growth outlook (chart 1). While supply chain pressures have so far remained contained, suggesting no repeat of the logistical chaos seen during the pandemic (chart 2), the latest Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey reveals that forecasters are now pencilling in deeper and more widespread monetary easing than previously anticipated—an acknowledgment that demand is faltering (chart 3). Falling oil prices further reinforce this view: they are both a symptom of weakening global demand and a potential source of disinflation, reducing the urgency for central banks to maintain tight policy (chart 4). At the structural level, the US economy's increasing reliance on intangible assets—ranging from intellectual property to reputation—has made it more vulnerable to geopolitical frictions and the erosion of global trust (chart 5). This risk is compounded by America's dominant role in AI investment, a sector symbolic of both its economic strengths and its exposure to international perceptions (chart 6). The longer-term challenge, then, is not just navigating the current downturn, but ensuring that the institutional goodwill and cross-border openness that support the modern US economy are not sacrificed in a more fragmented and uncertain global order.

Stronger Trucks Drove U.S. Light Vehicle Sales

Summary

Tom Moeller

More Economy in Brief

U.S. Productivity Declines in Q1’25; Unit Labor Costs Surge

U.S. Housing Affordability Improves Slightly in March

U.S. Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims Ease 13,000 in the May 3 Week

Charts of the Week: Relief Rally Meets Recession Risk

Light Vehicle Sales (SAAR, Mil.Units)	Sept	Aug	Y/Y	2003	2002	2001
Total	17.51	16.60	3.1%	16.69	16.81	17.26
Autos	7.33	7.15	-3.9%	7.63	8.07	8.48
Trucks	10.18	9.45	8.9%	9.06	8.74	8.78