Louise Curley

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<p><img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/040309c.jpg" width="353"></p>
<p>German Industrial production in January declined 0.1% from December, 2003 as a result of mixed trends in the economy. Construction fell by 7.37%, while total production, excluding construction managed a slight gain of 0.40%. Within the manufacturing sector, capital goods production rose 1.53%, but production of consumer goods declined 0.31%.</p>
<p>The industrial production news follows other recent reports suggesting difficulties on the path to a strong business upturn in Germany. Although retail sales in January actually rose for the first time in three months, manufacturing new orders declined. In February, unemployment rose and business confidence declined.</p>
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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><b>Recent Reports on the Economic Climate in Germany (2000=100, ex where noted)</b></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>Feb 04</b></u>&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>Jan 04</b></u></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>Dec 03</b></u></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>Jan 03</b></u></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>Feb 03</b></u></th>
<th scope="col"><b><u>M/M</u> %</b></th>
<th scope="col"><b><u> Y/Y</u>&nbsp;<br> %</b></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>2003</b></u></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>2002</b></u></th>
<th scope="col"><u><b>2001</b></u></th>
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<td class="firstcol">Total Industrial Production&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.32</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>99.7</td>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Total excl Construction</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>101.2</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>100.3</td>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Construction</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>-7.37</td>
<td>-4.44</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>92.4</td>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Capital goods</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>102.4</td>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Consumer goods</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>99.2</td>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
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<td class="firstcol">Manufacturing New Orders</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>98.3</td>
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<td class="firstcol">Retail Sales</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>102.0</td>
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<td class="firstcol">Unemployment (SA %)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<td class="firstcol">Business Confidence (IFO)</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>92.1</td>
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German Industrial production in January declined 0.1% from December, 2003 as a result of mixed trends in the economy. Construction fell by 7.37%, while total production, excluding construction managed a slight gain of 0.40%. Within [...]

German Industrial Production for January Adds to Doubts Over the Strength of the Recovery

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Andrew Cates

**China-US shipping activity** 
The economic fallout from escalating US-China trade tensions is becoming increasingly visible in the data. A clear example is the chart below, which highlights a sharp drop in vessel arrivals at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, along with a notable decline in ships waiting offshore. These trends point to a tangible weakening in bilateral trade flows, as the effects of tit-for-tat tariffs imposed by both countries begin to bite. Given the outsized role the US and China play in global commerce, this slowdown is likely to reverberate through global supply chains, weighing on trade volumes, dampening demand, and curbing economic growth worldwide.

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**GDP growth in Q1**
Data this week showed that the US economy contracted, albeit modestly, in Q1 even as the euro area recorded a modest expansion—an unusual divergence. The contraction in US GDP can be largely attributed to a sharp increase in imports, as firms rushed to front-load purchases ahead of anticipated tariff hikes. In addition, domestic demand was subdued, with weaker contributions from both consumer spending and government consumption. This decoupling between the US and euro area economies is particularly striking given the current global focus on the US dollar. While the euro area has shown unexpected signs of resilience, the US downturn raises important questions about its underlying momentum, especially as trade dynamics and policy uncertainty continue to cloud the outlook.

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**The US dollar versus yield differentials**
Chart 3 below illustrates a sharp breakdown in the correlation between the US-Germany 10-year yield differential and the EUR/USD exchange rate. Historically, the dollar has moved closely with interest rate spreads, as yield-seeking capital flowed into US assets. But since early 2025—and more acutely following the April tariff actions—the dollar has weakened markedly even as the yield spread has narrowed only modestly. This decoupling underscores a critical shift: capital markets are reacting not just to monetary policy, but to rising trade and geopolitical uncertainty. In other words, the exchange rate is now being driven as much by risk sentiment as by interest rate arbitrage.

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**The US economy’s structural outperformance and the dollar**
A second dynamic, captured in the next chart, reveals a tight correlation between the US real effective exchange rate and the potential GDP growth differential between the US and euro area over the past 50-60 years. This raises the question: has dollar strength (until recently) merely been a reflection of US growth leadership—or are capital inflows themselves helping to sustain this growth outperformance? In effect, the tail may be wagging the dog. Global investors have long allocated capital to the US, attracted by its macroeconomic resilience, technological leadership, and deep, liquid financial markets. The danger now is that the US trade war may disrupt this equilibrium. A sharp or sustained reduction in capital inflows could undermine growth, weaken the dollar, and trigger broader financial instability. Moreover, reversing this dynamic is not straightforward—barring a credible structural resurgence in European (or Asian) growth, the global investment landscape remains tilted toward the US.

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**US competitiveness versus Europe, China and Japan** 
The next chart below examines relative unit labour costs across major economies since 2011. The US and China have seen a broadly similar trajectory, with steady increases in relative cost structures, while the euro area has remained flat and Japan has seen dramatic improvement. This suggests that, from a cost competitiveness standpoint, the US is not uniquely disadvantaged vis-à-vis China. However, as we discuss further below, this parallel erosion of cost competitiveness is occurring at much higher nominal wage levels in the US, which blunts its ability to regain export share through tariff-related shifts alone. The trade war strategy—absent a corresponding improvement in productivity or structural reforms—risks imposing costs without delivering material competitiveness gains.

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**Average wages in selected developed and developing economies**
This point is reinforced by the final chart, which shows estimates for average monthly wages across countries in 2024. US labour remains much more expensive than in peer or emerging economies. So even if China’s costs rise in tandem with the US, the global supply chain has ample alternatives. 'China plus one' strategies are accelerating, and the US remains structurally misaligned with low-cost production hubs. Tariffs aimed at reshoring supply chains are unlikely to deliver sustained gains unless accompanied by deep supply-side reforms, and risk further disincentivizing foreign direct investment if global firms perceive US trade policy as erratic or punitive.

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Financial markets found a measure of calm this week, buoyed by some subtle shifts in tone from US policymakers. A softening in the administration’s rhetoric around trade tariffs coupled with a less confrontational stance toward Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, helped ease tensions that had roiled markets earlier in the month. Equities rebounded modestly, and volatility indicators edged lower, reflecting cautious optimism that the worst of the policy shocks may be behind us. But beneath the surface, significant downside risks persist. New shipping data point to a pronounced slowdown in US-China trade flows (chart 1), suggesting the damage from recent tariff escalations is already rippling through global supply chains. Meanwhile, incoming data for the US revealed an unexpected contraction in the economy in Q1 and further signs of weakness in the labour market (chart 2). The US dollar, in the meantime, while long supported by superior growth and yield differentials, has begun to decouple from traditional drivers (charts 3 and 4) suggesting growing pressure on capital flows. At the same time, structural imbalances are drawing renewed scrutiny: unit labour cost comparisons show the US steadily losing competitiveness (chart 5), while nominal wage disparities remain stark versus China and other Asian economies, further complicating any effort to restore trade balance without broader reforms (chart 6). In short, while markets may be drawing temporary comfort from a pause in tariff brinkmanship, the deeper economic and financial vulnerabilities exposed this month remain unresolved—and increasingly central to the global macro narrative.

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Charts of the Week: Tariff Truce, Tenuous Trust

Tom Moeller

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Real GDP eased 0.3% SAAR (+2.1% y/y) during the first quarter of 2025 after increasing 2.4% in Q4’24 and 3.1% in Q3’24. A 0.4% increase had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. It was the first decline since Q1 2022.

Foreign trade subtracted 4.83 percentage points from growth last quarter as imports surged 41.3% (13.4% y/y) ahead of tariffs, which began to come into effect in the first quarter. The rise followed a 1.9% decline in Q4’24. Exports rose 1.8% (3.0% y/y) after easing 0.2% in Q4. Inventories added 2.25 percentage points to growth after subtracting 0.84 percentage point from Q4 growth.

Real final sales to domestic purchasers grew 2.3% (2.9% y/y) in Q1 after rising 3.0% in Q4. Personal consumption expenditures rose 1.8% (3.1% y/y) following a 4.0% gain. Durable goods spending fell 3.4% (+5.3% y/y) after surging 12.4% in Q4. Motor vehicle purchases declined 11.1% (+5.5% y/y) after strengthening 19.7% in Q4. Spending on home furnishings & appliances gained 1.5% (6.1% y/y) following a 5.4% rise. Recreational goods & vehicle outlays rose 2.5% (7.0% y/y) last quarter after a 13.9% Q4 increase.

Nondurable goods outlays rose 2.7% (3.0% y/y) following 3.1% growth in Q4. Apparel spending increased 6.7% (2.5% y/y) following a 5.0% rise. Food & beverage buying gained 2.5% (2.3% y/y) after a 1.8% increase. Gasoline & fuel oil purchases increased 4.6% (3.4% y/y) after falling 2.0% in Q4.

Spending on services increased 2.4% last quarter (2.7% y/y) after a 3.0% gain. Outlays on housing & utilities increased 3.4% (1.8% y/y) after rising 1.1% in Q4. Health care expenditures rose 4.0% (4.8% y/y) following a 4.7% strengthening. Transportation outlays increased 5.3% (4.6% y/y) after a 3.7% rise while recreation spending rose 4.7% (2.8% y/y) following a 4.5% rise. Restaurant & hotel expenditures declined 2.1% (+0.5% y/y) following a 2.8% rise. Financial services expenditures rose 1.9% (2.0% y/y) after a 3.1% Q4 increase.

Business fixed investment increased 9.8% (3.6% y/y) following a 3.0% decline in Q4. Expenditures on structures rose 0.4% (-0.4% y/y) after a 2.9% increase. Expenditures on producers’ durable equipment jumped 22.5% (8.0% y/y) after falling 8.7%.  Outlays on information processing equipment soared 69.3% (18.9% y/y) following a 7.3% decline. Industrial equipment investment fell 1.4% (-0.3% y/y) after easing 0.9%. Intellectual property product spending rose 4.1% (1.8% y/y) following a 0.5% decline. 

Residential structures investment increased 1.3% (-0.1% y/y) in Q1 after a 5.5% Q4 rise.

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Government spending fell 1.5% (+2.4% y/y) after a 3.1% Q4 rise. Federal government expenditures declined 5.1% (+2.9% y/y) after rising 4.0% in Q4. National defense expenditures declined 8.0% (+4.0% y/y) after increasing 4.8% in Q4. State & local government spending rose 0.8% (2.1% y/y) following a 2.5% rise.

The GDP price index rose 3.7% (2.6% y/y) after increasing 2.3% in Q4. It was the largest increase since Q4’22. A 2.4% increase had been expected. The PCE chain price index increased 3.6% (2.5% y/y) following a 2.4% rise. The PCE price index excluding food and energy rose 3.5% (2.8% y/y) after increasing 2.6% in Q4. The business fixed investment price index rose 0.4% (1.8% y/y) after 1.5% rise. The residential price index strengthened 3.9% (3.2% y/y) after a 1.9% rise while the government price index increased 4.7% (2.8% y/y) following a 2.1% rise.

The GDP data can be found in Haver’s **USECON** and **USNA** databases. **USNA** contains virtually all of the Bureau of Economic Analysis detail in the national accounts. The Action Economics consensus estimates can be found in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Decline in GDP is first in three years.
- Foreign trade subtracts substantially ahead of tariffs.
- Domestic final demand growth weakens.
- Price index strengthens with higher core PCE prices.

U.S. GDP Unexpectedly Declines in Q1’25; Prices Strengthen

Michael J. Moran

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High-side readings on the price indexes for personal consumption expenditures in January and February caused some concern about emerging price pressure, especially with some policies of the Trump administration possibly adding to the upward force. However, March brought notable relief, with the headline price index falling slightly (-0.04%). A marked decline in energy prices was helpful (-2.7%), but core prices also were subdued, increasing less than 0.1%.  Year-over-year changes were still above the Fed’s target of 2%, but only barely so for the headline measure (2.3%). The core index backed away from the reading of 3.0% in February, but the latest reading of 2.7% was in line with observations in the past year, and still uncomfortably above target.

Consumers roused from a winter slumber in March, with nominal outlays increasing 0.7%. With inflation restrained, real outlays also posted a gain of 0.7%. Spending on durable gods stood out, with real outlays advancing 3.2%. Real outlays for both nondurable goods and services rose 0.4%, a solid pace. Signs of life were certainly welcome after an average decline of 0.1% in January and February. The March rebound left growth of 1.8% (annual rate) in the first quarter.

The brisk increase in spending in March was supported by a solid gain in personal income (0.5% in both nominal and real terms). Growth in wage income was firm at 0.5%, while proprietors’ income was robust with a gain of 1.8% (not annualized!). The farm sector led the advance in proprietors’ income, but the nonfarm sector also was strong (0.6%).

The personal income and consumption figures are available in Haver’s **USECON** database with detail in the **USNA** database. The Action Economics forecasts are in **AS1REPNA**.

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- Price pressure eases.
- Spending rebounds after two soft months.

Personal Income, Consumption, and Prices in March

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The Pending Home Sales Index, a forward-looking home sales measure based on contract signings, from the National Association of Realtors rose 6.1% to 76.5 (-0.6% y/y) during March after rising a little-revised 2.1% in February. These changes followed a 4.6% January decline.

The rise in March sales occurred as the rate on a 30-year mortgage eased to an average 6.65% from 6.84% in February. This rate was well above a low of 2.68% averaged in December 2020.

Pending home sales were up in most regions of the country. Sales in the Midwest rose 4.9% (1.4% y/y) last month after rising 1.8% in February. Sales in the South increased 9.8% (-0.4% y/y) following a 5.8% February rise. Sales in the West improved 4.8% (-2.0% y/y) after falling 3.0% in February. Sales in the Northeast were off 0.5% (-3.0% y/y) in March after falling 0.9% in February.

The pending home sales index measures sales at the time the contract for the purchase of an existing home is signed, similar to the Census Bureau's new home sales data. In contrast, the National Association of Realtors' existing home sales data are recorded when the sale is closed, which is usually a couple of months after the sales contract has been signed. In developing the pending home sales index, the NAR found that the level of monthly sales contract activity leads the level of closed existing home sales by about two months.

The series dates back to 2001 and are available in Haver's **PREALTOR** database. Weekly mortgage interest rates from the Mortgage Bankers Association can be found in the **WEEKLY** database.

- Sales rise to highest level in four months.
- Strength is evident throughout most of country.

German Industrial Production for January Adds to Doubts Over the Strength of the Recovery

Summary

Louise Curley

More Economy in Brief

Charts of the Week: Tariff Truce, Tenuous Trust

U.S. GDP Unexpectedly Declines in Q1’25; Prices Strengthen

Personal Income, Consumption, and Prices in March

U.S. Pending Home Sales Surge in March

Recent Reports on the Economic Climate in Germany (2000=100, ex where noted)	Feb 04	Jan 04	Dec 03	Jan 03	Feb 03	M/M %	Y/Y %	2003	2002	2001
Total Industrial Production		100.1	100.32	98.8		-0.10	1.32	98.6	98.3	99.7
Total excl Construction		101.6	101.2	99.9		0.40	1.70	99.6	99.1	100.3
Construction		81.7	88.2	85.2		-7.37	-4.44	85.1	88.9	92.4
Capital goods		106.5	104.9	103.0		1.53	3.40	102.1	101.1	102.4
Consumer goods		96.2	96.5	96.0		-0.31	0.21	95.3	97.0	99.2

Manufacturing New Orders		100.7	102.8	99.7		-2.04	1.00	98.8	98.3	98.3
Retail Sales		101.3	99.0	101.5		2.32	-0.20	101.5	101.4	102.0
Unemployment (SA %)	10.3	10.2	10.4	10.3	10.5	0.1	-0.2	10.5	9.8	9.4
Business Confidence (IFO)	96.4	97.5	97.0	87.4	89.3	-1.13	7.95	91.7	89.4	92.1