Tom Moeller

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/070221c.jpg" width="353">
Unleaded gasoline prices at the pump rose for the third straight week to an average $2.30 per gallon. Since the late January low, prices have risen 13 cents (6.1%) but they are still well below the peaks of last year.
After rising with colder temperatures, fuel oil prices fell a nickel in the latest week to $1.64 per gallon (0.2% y/y) though natural gas prices rose further last week to $8.44 mmbtu (16.1% y/y).
Crude oil prices fell one dollar last week to $58.08 per barrel of WTI crude and have been trading plus or minus one dollar that level this week. 
The latest Short-Term Energy Outlook from the U.S. Energy Information Administration is available <a href="http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html">here</a>.

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<th scope="col" class="firstcol"><a href="http://www.haverselect.com/dlx/surveyw/@S2/@S2.HTM">Weekly Energy Prices</a></th>
<th scope="col">02/19/07</th>
<th scope="col">02/12/07</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y</th>
<th scope="col">2006</th>
<th scope="col">2005</th>
<th scope="col">2004</th>
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<td class="firstcol">US Retail Gasoline Price, Regular</td>
<td>$2.30</td>
<td>$2.24</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>$2.57</td>
<td>$2.27</td>
<td>$1.85</td>
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Unleaded gasoline prices at the pump rose for the third straight week to an average $2.30 per gallon. Since the late January low, prices have risen 13 cents (6.1%) but they are still well below the peaks of last year. After rising [...]

Gasoline Prices Firmed Further

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Tian Yong Woon

This week, we focus on the immediate impacts of the recent US-China trade escalation. As we discuss below these are already being exhibited in the data. While still within historical ranges, high-frequency estimates of US and China cargo trade volumes have begun to deteriorate (chart 1). In tandem with these volume declines, freight rates on certain Shanghai-to-US routes have fallen (chart 2), suggesting reduced shipping demand. This has been further corroborated by widespread reports of large-scale shipment cancellations from China to the US. A potentially clearer signal comes from South Korea’s trade data for the first 20 days of the month, often viewed as a bellwether for global trade. The figures point to a notable slump compared with a year ago (chart 3). More complete April data are expected later this week.

Turning to broader developments in China, we observe that the dominant shifts in the country's financial balances over the past decade have occurred between the general government and the private sector. In contrast, China’s foreign sector balance—essentially its current account—has remained relatively stable (chart 4). As we further discuss financial balances and the underlying causes of the US’ persistent current account deficit (chart 5) have been a recurring topic in recent conversations with clients in Asia. It is argued that the US dollar’s role as a global reserve currency effectively necessitates the US running a current account deficit. Consequently, attempts to narrow the deficit through tariffs may address symptoms rather than root causes. Finally, we revisit the China Plus One strategy adopted by firms since the initial US-China trade fallout in 2018. This approach has contributed to ballooning trade deficits between the US and some of its other major trading partners (chart 6), prompting renewed scrutiny under President Trump’s early “Liberation Day” trade actions.

**US and China cargo trade**
Financial markets have recently found some reason for relief, as both the US and China appear to be lowering the temperature on further trade tariff actions. Recent messaging has leaned more toward a de-escalation of trade tensions, though concrete details remain sparse, and it is unclear how or when formal negotiations might begin. That said, the substantial and mutually imposed tariffs between the US and China remain firmly in place, and a significant rollback does not seem likely in the near term. In the meantime the economic impact of these tariffs is beginning to surface in the data, as shown in charts 1 to 3. Chart 1, based on IMF estimates, shows a sharp decline in daily activity at several key ports involved in US-China trade. However, while the drop is notable, port activity still remains within historical ranges, so a more fundamental shift is not yet evident.

250429T1.jpg

**US-China freight rates**
Another indication of the impact of escalating US-China tensions is seen in global freight rates, as shown in chart 2. Freight costs on routes from Shanghai to New York and Los Angeles have dropped sharply—even before the most recent round of trade escalations—likely due to growing caution among shippers about what trade actions might come next for China. This decline contrasts with the year-end spike in shipping rates in 2024, which likely reflected front-loading of shipments in anticipation of potential US tariffs. Looking ahead, the outlook remains uncertain and potentially discouraging, especially following recent reports of widespread shipment cancellations from China to the US. These developments suggest that China-to-US shipping volumes may remain subdued or decline further over the near-term.

250429T2.jpg

**Trade indications from South Korea**
A perhaps firmer indication comes from South Korea’s trade figures for the first 20 days of April, widely regarded as an early signal of global trade trends. The data showed a notable slump compared to the same period last year, driven largely by a sharp drop in shipments to the United States. This move has made US-China trade increasingly difficult, aside from a few exemptions on key goods such as electronics and semiconductors. Even so, South Korea’s semiconductor export growth continued to slow in April, highlighting the broader fallout from ongoing trade tensions. More definitive trade data from South Korea are expected later this week.

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**Broader topics on China**
Next, we turn to broader structural trends in China’s economy, starting with chart 4, which depicts China’s financial balances based on its flow of funds accounts. Over the past decade, the general government has accumulated an increasingly large net deficit, as its sources of funds (liabilities) have consistently outpaced the uses of funds (assets). This has fuelled growing investor concerns over government indebtedness. In contrast, the private sector—particularly households—has seen a sharp rise in its net surplus, almost mirroring the government’s deterioration. Meanwhile, the foreign sector has continued to run net deficits with China, consistent with China maintaining a current account surplus with the rest of the world. That said, unlike in the 2000s and early 2010s—when private and foreign sector balances often moved closely together—recent shifts in the general government and private sector balances appear to have had a more limited effect on the foreign sector's position.

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**The US’ current account deficit**
Expanding on these themes, chart 5 highlights the persistent current account deficits of the US alongside the cumulative current account surpluses of its major trading partners. Some may advocate for reducing US imports—such as through tariffs, as President Trump is currently pursuing—as a way to close the current account deficit. However, such measures tend to address only the symptoms rather than the root causes. This topic featured prominently in client meetings in Singapore. Fundamentally, the persistent current account deficit in the US can be seen as a structural outcome of the dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve currency. The global demand for dollar-denominated assets drives sustained financial inflows into the US, which, by balance of payments accounting, necessitates a corresponding current account deficit.

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**What China Plus One?**
Lastly, we turn to the China Plus One strategy, a diversification approach adopted by firms and governments since US-China tensions began during Trump’s first term in 2018. However, even this approach may no longer offer a full hedge against additional US trade actions. As chart 6 shows, the shift away from China has contributed to a sharp rise in the US trade deficit with several alternative partners, particularly Asian economies such as Vietnam. In light of the broader scope of US trade actions—exemplified by Trump’s recent “Liberation Day” tariffs—businesses are being forced to rethink their global strategies. Some may find themselves needing to reshore production to the US, despite the fact that labour cost advantages, technical know-how, and manufacturing infrastructure for many goods remain more competitive abroad.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: How Freightening?

Robert Brusca

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**Retailing and Wholesaling continue to show wear and tear**
The United Kingdom’s distributive trades survey has four parts. There's a survey of retailing and a separate survey of wholesaling. Then for each one of these surveys, there's a module that addresses current conditions and another one that addresses expected conditions.

**Current Conditions vs. Expectations for the distributive trades**
In this month's report, the current conditions assessments improved in retailing but were mixed for wholesaling. Expectations in retailing and wholesaling were also mixed as to month-to-month changes, but the levels of the responses remained quite weak.

**The Specifics**
Current Retailing- Retail sales compared to a year ago improved sharply to a -8 reading in April compared to a draconian -41 in March. Orders compared to a year ago improved at a reading of -24 in April from -38 in March. Sales for the time of year improved to -31 from -36. Sales compared to a year ago have a below median 29.2 percentile standing, while orders compared to a year ago have a 16.9 percentile standing and sales evaluated for the time of year have a 12.3 percentile standing. In each case, the reading from April is below its median reading of the last 24 years. These readings as a collection are weak readings.

Expected Retailing- The expected results for retailing in the survey show mixed results. The reading for sales compared to a year ago at -33 in May is slightly weaker than -30 in April. Orders compared to a year ago improved to -29 in May from -41 in April. But the survey shows a deterioration in sales for the time of year at -38 in May compared to -35 in April. The rankings for these readings range between the 10.5 percentile and 4.2 percentile, range marking them as all extremely weak readings in their historic queue of standings.

Current Wholesaling- Wholesaling also generally shows slippage in April. Sales compared to a year ago fell to -33 in April from in -29 in March, while orders compared to a year ago improved to -32 from March’s -38. Sales for the time of year, which post a reading of -31 in April compared to a reading of -20 in March, demonstrated slippage again. The rankings for these readings range from 4.2 to 9.2 in percentile standing terms.

Expected Wholesaling- Turning to expectations, sales compared to a year ago nudged lower to -26 in May from -25 in April. Orders compared to a year ago improved nicely to a reading of -28 in May compared to -38 in April; expected sales for the time of year slipped to -28 from April’s -27. Several of these are small stumbles month-to-month. But these readings range from a low percentile standing of 7.7 percentile to a high standing at a 12.6 percentile – all weak metrics.

250428.jpg

**Summing up**
What is quite clear in all of these readings is that the standings are exceptionally low. There’s widespread, even if somewhat mixed, slippage in these readings. Current sales are somewhat of an exception with some monthly traction amid still very low readings. Yet, the United Kingdom has been an economy that has continued to fight against an inflation overshoot so that the Bank of England does not really have a great deal of flexibility in the conduct of policy. Still, the U.K. is geographically close to the European Monetary Union where rate reductions are still in train.

The U.K. continues to be at risk to the U.S. tariff plan even though the U.S. does not run a deficit with the U.K. in trade. Despite ‘The Formula’ that allegedly has been used to set reciprocal tariffs, the Trump administration has found some different wrinkle to generate a tariff on goods from the U.K. Given this evolving situation, it's not surprising that the expectations are continuing to erode in the U.K. distributive trades survey.

United Kingdom

U.K. Distributive Trades Survey: Weakness Lingers and Is Mixed

Andrew Cates

**Global growth**
Latest flash PMI readings reveal a widening gap in manufacturing performance across major economies. Europe remains mired in contraction, with both the UK and euro area registering PMI figures below the 50 threshold. The UK’s manufacturing sector is particularly under pressure, with the PMI dropping to a new low not seen in over a year—reflecting weak output and mounting challenges from both domestic uncertainty and external shocks, including the disruptive impact of recent US trade actions. While the euro area shows tentative signs of stabilization, with PMI readings inching higher, the recovery remains fragile. In sharp contrast, India’s manufacturing sector continues to outperform, with PMI figures climbing further and signalling resilient industrial momentum amidst global headwinds.

250425Z1.jpg

**US capex intentions**
The latest reading from the US Philly Fed survey suggests a sharp drop in capex intentions among manufacturers in the Philadelphia region, likely reflecting growing uncertainty in the wake of the US administration’s surprise announcement of sweeping tariffs on April 2nd, 2025. This abrupt policy shift has rattled business confidence, echoing past episodes—such as during the 2008 financial crisis and early stages of the pandemic—when capex sentiment similarly plunged. The downturn underscores how policy-induced trade disruptions can swiftly chill investment appetite, particularly in manufacturing sectors exposed to global supply chains.

250425Z2.jpg

**South Korean trade**
The fallout from President Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs and the rapid escalation of the trade dispute with China is also now becoming evident in Asia’s trade data. South Korea’s trade figures for the first 20 days of April—often seen as a bellwether for global trade—fell sharply compared to the same period last year. The drop was led by a steep decline in exports to the United States, where tariffs on Chinese goods have surged to as high as 145%, effectively choking bilateral trade flows outside a narrow band of exemptions for strategic goods like electronics and semiconductors. Even these sectors are feeling the strain: South Korea’s semiconductor exports continued to decelerate in April, highlighting the broader collateral damage of deepening trade tensions.

250425Z3.jpg

**Gold prices**
The latest escalation in US-China trade tensions is reverberating far beyond traditional trade channels. Market sentiment has deteriorated noticeably, weighed down by darkening global growth prospects and deepening uncertainty over the future of relations between the world’s two largest economies. The forced decoupling is also reshaping investor behaviour, particularly among Chinese investors, who are increasingly turning to stateless safe-haven assets like gold. This shift is evident in the surge in trading volumes on the Shanghai Gold Exchange and the steady climb in global gold prices—buoyed further by a weakening US dollar. The trend points to rising concern among Chinese investors about the geographic concentration of their wealth, as Washington’s increasingly hawkish posture prompts a reassessment of cross-border financial exposure.

250425Z4.jpg

**The US dollar and market volatility** 
Recent sweeping US-led trade actions and a broader turn toward protectionism have sharply eroded the goodwill and soft power long associated with the US and its financial assets. As Washington becomes an increasingly prominent source of global instability, investor confidence in the US dollar as a safe-haven currency has weakened. This loss of faith is reflected across asset markets, with the dollar’s persistent and more entrenched decline against major currencies standing out as a clear signal of a broader reassessment of the US’s global economic role. Elevated market uncertainty reinforces this shift, as underscored by still-high—albeit slightly moderated—readings on the VIX volatility index.

250425Z5.jpg

**Asia’s consumption**
Viewed in a broader context, the recent actions by the US may signal an effort to rebalance its economy—though whether this strategy is well-calibrated remains highly contested. As the issuer of the world’s dominant reserve currency, the US has long been ensnared in the so-called Triffin dilemma: global demand for dollar-denominated assets has sustained persistent trade deficits, gradually undermining the competitiveness of its domestic manufacturing and other tradable sectors. China, by contrast, grapples with the mirror image of this problem. Its growth model remains heavily anchored in manufacturing and external surpluses, and it is now under mounting pressure to pivot toward consumption-led growth—an imperative sharpened by the latest wave of US measures designed to curb Chinese export strength.

250425Z6.jpg

Financial market volatility has remained elevated over the past several days as investors attempted to weigh a modest improvement in sentiment—driven by a potential, if partial, retreat by the US administration from its aggressive tariff stance—against a still-cloudy global outlook. Signals from flash PMI surveys on global growth remain mixed: Europe continues to stagnate, with the UK particularly weak, while India stands out with resilient and rising manufacturing activity (chart 1). In the US, most of the incoming data suggest that business confidence has faltered, with capital expenditure intentions plunging particularly sharply in the wake of the April 2nd tariff announcement (chart 2). The drag from trade tensions is, moreover, becoming more evident: South Korea’s exports have slumped, especially to the US, and even sectors granted exemptions—like semiconductors—are showing signs of strain (chart 3). These pressures are reverberating through financial markets as well, where Chinese investors are shifting into gold as a hedge, fuelling record trading volumes on the Shanghai Gold Exchange and lifting global gold prices (chart 4). Meanwhile, a broadly-based decline in the US dollar and persistently high readings on the VIX index arguably reflect a deeper reassessment of US assets as reliable safe havens amid mounting policy unpredictability (chart 5). Beneath these short-term ripples lie more entrenched structural challenges: the US is seeking to rebalance away from external deficits linked to its reserve currency role, while China is under growing pressure to pivot toward consumption-led growth—an imperative sharpened by American efforts to choke off its export strength (chart 6). In short, the latest softening in US trade rhetoric may offer brief relief, but the underlying economic, geopolitical, and structural crosswinds remain very much in play.

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Charts of the Week: Dollar Dips and Trade Trips

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The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City reported that its index of manufacturing sector activity declined to -4 during April from -2 in March, indicating a continued decline in factory sector activity. The index has been at zero or below since October 2022. This survey was taken between April 16-21.

Haver Analytics calculates an index based on the Kansas City results which is comparable to the ISM series. This index eased to 50.0 (NSA) from 51.4 in March. It compared to a low of 43.7 last July.

The new orders index of -11 this month compared to -12 in March. Thirty percent (NSA) of respondents reported higher orders while 37% reported a decline. Shipments improved to -2 from -4 and remained above -12 in December. Thirty-three percent (NSA) of respondents reported higher shipments while 28% reported a decline. Employment fell to -11 this month from -4 In March. It has been negative for three straight months. Thirteen percent (NSA) of respondents reported more hiring while 25% reported less. The average workweek index fell to -6 from +6 in March. Supplier delivery times surged to 13 from -1 as a higher 18% (NSA) of respondents reported a quickening of delivery speeds and a lessened 2% indicated a slowdown. Finished goods inventories rose to +5 from -8 in March, indicating the greatest rate of inventory accumulation in four months. Materials inventories weakened to -5 in April from +4 in March.

Inflation indicators strengthened in April. The prices paid index for finished products jumped to 29 from 15 in March. It was the highest reading in almost three years, up from a low of -3 in July 2023. Thirty-four percent (NSA) of respondents reported higher prices while none paid less. The raw materials index held at 42, up from a low of -1 in October 2023.

The composite index of expectations six months ahead fell to 6 in April from 10 in March. It was below a high of 17 in December. Expectations for future shipments fell to 9 this month, down from 31 in December. Orders expectations also weakened significantly, with the index falling to a minimal 3 from 20 in March. The employment reading of 1 compared to zero in March and 19 in December. Expectations continue to be for higher prices. The expectations index for finished goods prices jumped to 59, a roughly three-year high, from 39 in March. Raw material prices jumped to 71 in April, also a three-year high, from 57 in March.

The latest survey was conducted between April 16-21, 2024 and included 97 responses from factories in Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyoming, northern New Mexico, and western Missouri.

The series dates back to July 2001. The diffusion indexes are calculated as the percentage of total respondents reporting increases minus the percentage reporting declines. The composite index is an average of the production, new orders, employment, supplier delivery time, and raw materials inventory indexes. Data for the Kansas City Fed Survey can be found in Haver’s **SURVEYS** database.

The Fed’s latest **Beige Book** covering regional economic conditions is available [here](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BeigeBook_20250423.pdf).

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- Index has moved sideways for over two years.
- Most components remain negative.
- Prices paid reading surges.

Gasoline Prices Firmed Further

Summary

Tom Moeller

More Economy in Brief

Economic Letter from Asia: How Freightening?

U.K. Distributive Trades Survey: Weakness Lingers and Is Mixed

Charts of the Week: Dollar Dips and Trade Trips

Kansas City Fed Manufacturing Activity Index Declines in April; Expectations Diminish