Louise Curley

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<img align="left" border="0" height="265" src="https://haver-commentaries.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/comments/031203e.jpg" width="353">
The mood of French consumers continues to be is one of pessimism. In the latest survey, consumer confidence fell to -30, a one point drop from October and 12 points below November of 2002.
Consumers are on balance, more pessimistic about their present and future living standards. Although there was an increase in the balance who have seen an improvement in their present financial situation, the balance seeing an improvement in their future financial situation declined. Consumers have not changed their outlook for unemployment. The balance of those who expect more unemployment over those who expect less is still a high 62.
In the past, consumer confidence has been an important factor in forecasting consumer spending, but it has seemed to have little influence recently. Consumers have continued spending in spite of their pessimism. For example, the trend of household consumption of manufactured goods shown in the attached chart has been generally upward. Such spending increased 1.6% in October and was 4.32% above October, 2002.
It may be that the drop in consumer confidence, intensified by 9/11, has resulted in a more than cyclical downward shift in the general level of overall confidence.

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<colgroup><col><col><col><col><col><col><col><col></colgroup>
<thead>
<tr>
<th scope="col" class="firstcol">Confidence of French Households (Balance of Positive over Negative Responses)&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">Nov 2003</th>
<th scope="col">Oct 2003</th>
<th scope="col">Nov 2002&nbsp;</th>
<th scope="col">M/M Chg</th>
<th scope="col">Y/Y&nbsp; Chg</th>
<th scope="col">2002</th>
<th scope="col">2001</th>
<th scope="col">2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Overall&nbsp;</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Improved past living standards</td>
<td>-70</td>
<td>-69</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Improved future living standards</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Increasing unemployment</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Improved past financial situation</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; Improved future financial situation</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">&nbsp; A good time to make purchases</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td class="firstcol">&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td class="firstcol">Household Consumption of Manufactured Goods</td>
<td>Oct 2003</td>
<td>Sep 2003</td>
<td>Oct 2002&nbsp;</td>
<td>M/M&nbsp; %</td>
<td>Y/Y&nbsp; %</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="firstcol">Monthly average (Billions 1995 Euros)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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The mood of French consumers continues to be is one of pessimism. In the latest survey, consumer confidence fell to -30, a one point drop from October and 12 points below November of 2002. Consumers are on balance, more pessimistic [...]

Consumer Confidence in France Declines

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Sandy Batten

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Job openings fell 288,000 to 7.192 million in March from a downwardly revised 7.480 million in February (previously 7.568 million), according to the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. This is the lowest level of openings since last September although openings have been relatively trendless for the past year. The number of openings continues to exceed the number unemployed, but by only 109,000, the smallest amount since the pandemic, and indicates a relatively balanced labor market. The job openings rate fell to 4.3% in March from 4.5% in February. The March figure was in line with those immediately prior to the pandemic and is well below a high of 7.4% reached in March 2022. This rate is calculated as the ratio of job openings to total nonfarm employment plus openings.

Private sector openings fell 229,000 to 6.359 million in March from 6.588 million in February. The March decline was widely spread with manufacturing (+4,000) and “other” (+20,000) the only major sectors experiencing an increase. Trade, transportation and utilities openings fell 62,000 on top of 198,000 plunge in February. Construction openings fell 38,000, their first monthly decline in three months. Private education and health services openings fell 61,000, their third monthly decline in the past four months. The private sector job openings rate edged down to 4.5% in March from 4.6% in February (revised down from 4.7%). It has fluctuated between 4.4% and 5.0% over the past 13 months without a noticeable trend.

Total hiring edged up 41,000 to 5.411 million in March. This was the second monthly gain in the past six months. Over the past year, hiring has fallen 61,000. Private hiring rose 30,000 to 5.050 million, its fourth consecutive monthly gain although it has fallen 41,000 over the past year. Hiring in leisure and hospitality increased 48,000, the first increase in three months. Private educational and health services hiring rose 36,000, also its first increase in three months. Finance hiring increased 28,000. In contrast, construction hiring fell 45,000, the first monthly decline in three months. And professional and business services hiring fell 43,000. Total government hiring rose 11,000 which included a 1,000 decline in federal government hiring. The total hiring rate was unchanged at 3.4%, where it has been for five of the past six months. The private hiring rate was also unchanged at 3.7% in March for the sixth consecutive month.

Total job separations fell 179,000 to 5.137 million in March. They have been little changed over the past year. Quits increased 82,000 to 3.332 million; layoffs fell 222,000, the largest monthly decline since February 2023; other separations fell 39,000 to 247,000. Quits are voluntary separations initiated by the employee and are often viewed as an indicator of workers’ willingness to leave jobs for other opportunities. Private quits (+91,000 in March to 3.145 million) have been on a modest uptrend since late last year, possibly pointing to a slight firming of the labor market. Private layoffs (separations initiated by the employer) appear to be reversing their uptrend from last year. They fell 229,000 to 1.451 million in March, also their largest monthly decline since Febuary2023, led by a 79,000 monthly decline in leisure and hospitality layoffs and a 56,000 drop in trade, transportation and utilities layoffs.

The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database.

- Job openings fell to 7.192 million from downwardly revised 7.480 million in February.
- The job opening rate slid to 4.3% from 4.5%.
- Hiring was little changed in March.
- Layoffs fell to lowest level since last June.

JOLTS: Openings and Layoffs Fall in March; Hiring Little Changed

Tom Moeller

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The advance estimate of the U.S. international trade deficit in goods deepened to $162.0 billion in March after narrowing to $147.8 billion in February, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau showed. A deficit of $143.0 billion for March had been expected by the Action Economics Forecast Survey. In Q1'25, the goods trade deficit widened to $463.2 billion after rising to $324.0 billion in Q4'24 from $305.1 billion in Q3'24. In real terms, the Q1’25 trade deficit is likely to have subtracted from real GDP growth, after having added 0.26 percentage point to growth in Q4'24.

Total goods imports jumped 5.0% (31.3% y/y) to $342.7 billion in March after a 0.3% February gain. Consumer goods imports surged 27.7% (54.1% y/y) following a 2.9% increase. Auto imports strengthened 6.6% (9.5% y/y) after a 1.2% rise while capital goods imports increased 4.0% in March (23.2% y/y) following a 1.7% February gain. Offsetting these increases, imports of industrial supplies & materials declined 13.3% (+39.9% y/y) after falling 3.7% in February. Foods, feeds & beverage imports eased 0.4% (+10.9% y/y) following a 2.1% decline and imports of “other” goods were off 5.6% (+13.7% y/y) after a 4.7% February increase.

Total goods exports rose 1.2% (6.9% y/y) to $180.8 billion in March, the fourth rise in five months, after increasing 3.7% in February. The rise reflected a 6.9% surge (-0.5% y/y) in foods, feeds & beverages after a decline of 2.5% In February. Industrial supplies & materials exports gained 3.2% (4.5% y/y) after increasing 4.6% in February. Exports of autos surged 7.9% (10.8% y/y) following a 2.7% increase. Exports of other goods edged 0.3% higher (2.4% y/y) after four straight months of decline. Offsetting these gains, consumer goods exports declined 1.6% (+1.9% y/y) following a 0.6% rise. Capital goods exports were off 2.6% (+13.3% y/y) after rising 4.8% in February.  

The advance international trade data can be found in Haver's **USECON** database. The expectation figure is from the Action Economics Forecast Survey, which is in **AS1REPNA**.

- Advance reading reflects higher consumer goods & auto imports.
- Other imports also are strong, while exports rise modestly.
- Exports growth held back by fall in nonauto consumer & capital goods.

U.S. Goods Trade Deficit Deepens to Another Record in March as Imports Surge

Winnie Tapasanun

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U.S. house prices edged up 0.1% m/m in February after rises of 0.3% in January (+0.2% initially) and 0.4% in December (+0.5% previously), according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) House Price Index. The February HPI at 437.32 was 13.3% above a low of 386.15 in August 2022. The February m/m reading was the 11th straight monthly gain but the smallest since May 2024. The year-on-year rate of increase decelerated to 3.9% in February, the lowest since June 2023, from 5.0% in January; thus, having remained lower than 7.3% in February 2024 and well below a high of 18.7% in February 2022.

House prices rose m/m in February (vs. January) in six of the nine census divisions. These included New England (1.3% vs. 0.1%), East North Central (0.8% vs. 0.5%), Middle Atlantic (0.6% vs. 1.0%), South Atlantic (0.3% vs. -0.6%), West North Central (0.2% vs. 0.8%), and East South Central (0.1% vs. -0.03%). To the downside, house prices fell m/m in three census divisions in February (vs. January): Pacific (-0.8% vs. 0.6%), Mountain (-0.7% vs. -0.02%), and West South Central (-0.1% vs. 0.9%).

Year-on-year house prices continued to gain in February. However, the pace of increase decelerated y/y in February (vs. January) in all of the nine census divisions. These were Pacific (0.9% vs. 3.6%), West South Central (2.1% vs. 2.8%), South Atlantic (3.2% vs. 4.1%), Mountain (3.5% vs. 4.3%), East South Central (3.7% vs. 4.4%), West North Central (4.2% vs. 5.0%), New England (6.1% vs. 7.5%), East North Central (6.5% vs. 7.0%), and Middle Atlantic (7.0% vs. 8.5%).

The FHFA house price index is a weighted purchase-only index that measures average price changes in repeat sales of the same property. An associated quarterly index includes refinancing the same kind of properties. The indexes are based on transactions involving conforming conventional mortgages purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Only mortgage transactions on single-family properties are included.

The FHFA data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database.

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- Feb. FHFA HPI +0.1% m/m (+3.9% y/y, lowest since June ’23); +0.3% m/m (+5.0% y/y) in Jan.
- House prices up m/m in six of nine census divisions but down in Pacific, Mountain, and West South Central.
- House prices up y/y in all of the nine regions, w/ the highest rate in Middle Atlantic (7.0%) and the lowest rate in Pacific (0.9%).


U.S. FHFA House Price Growth Continues to Decelerate in February

Tian Yong Woon

This week, we focus on the immediate impacts of the recent US-China trade escalation. As we discuss below these are already being exhibited in the data. While still within historical ranges, high-frequency estimates of US and China cargo trade volumes have begun to deteriorate (chart 1). In tandem with these volume declines, freight rates on certain Shanghai-to-US routes have fallen (chart 2), suggesting reduced shipping demand. This has been further corroborated by widespread reports of large-scale shipment cancellations from China to the US. A potentially clearer signal comes from South Korea’s trade data for the first 20 days of the month, often viewed as a bellwether for global trade. The figures point to a notable slump compared with a year ago (chart 3). More complete April data are expected later this week.

Turning to broader developments in China, we observe that the dominant shifts in the country's financial balances over the past decade have occurred between the general government and the private sector. In contrast, China’s foreign sector balance—essentially its current account—has remained relatively stable (chart 4). As we further discuss financial balances and the underlying causes of the US’ persistent current account deficit (chart 5) have been a recurring topic in recent conversations with clients in Asia. It is argued that the US dollar’s role as a global reserve currency effectively necessitates the US running a current account deficit. Consequently, attempts to narrow the deficit through tariffs may address symptoms rather than root causes. Finally, we revisit the China Plus One strategy adopted by firms since the initial US-China trade fallout in 2018. This approach has contributed to ballooning trade deficits between the US and some of its other major trading partners (chart 6), prompting renewed scrutiny under President Trump’s early “Liberation Day” trade actions.

**US and China cargo trade**
Financial markets have recently found some reason for relief, as both the US and China appear to be lowering the temperature on further trade tariff actions. Recent messaging has leaned more toward a de-escalation of trade tensions, though concrete details remain sparse, and it is unclear how or when formal negotiations might begin. That said, the substantial and mutually imposed tariffs between the US and China remain firmly in place, and a significant rollback does not seem likely in the near term. In the meantime the economic impact of these tariffs is beginning to surface in the data, as shown in charts 1 to 3. Chart 1, based on IMF estimates, shows a sharp decline in daily activity at several key ports involved in US-China trade. However, while the drop is notable, port activity still remains within historical ranges, so a more fundamental shift is not yet evident.

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**US-China freight rates**
Another indication of the impact of escalating US-China tensions is seen in global freight rates, as shown in chart 2. Freight costs on routes from Shanghai to New York and Los Angeles have dropped sharply—even before the most recent round of trade escalations—likely due to growing caution among shippers about what trade actions might come next for China. This decline contrasts with the year-end spike in shipping rates in 2024, which likely reflected front-loading of shipments in anticipation of potential US tariffs. Looking ahead, the outlook remains uncertain and potentially discouraging, especially following recent reports of widespread shipment cancellations from China to the US. These developments suggest that China-to-US shipping volumes may remain subdued or decline further over the near-term.

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**Trade indications from South Korea**
A perhaps firmer indication comes from South Korea’s trade figures for the first 20 days of April, widely regarded as an early signal of global trade trends. The data showed a notable slump compared to the same period last year, driven largely by a sharp drop in shipments to the United States. This move has made US-China trade increasingly difficult, aside from a few exemptions on key goods such as electronics and semiconductors. Even so, South Korea’s semiconductor export growth continued to slow in April, highlighting the broader fallout from ongoing trade tensions. More definitive trade data from South Korea are expected later this week.

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**Broader topics on China**
Next, we turn to broader structural trends in China’s economy, starting with chart 4, which depicts China’s financial balances based on its flow of funds accounts. Over the past decade, the general government has accumulated an increasingly large net deficit, as its sources of funds (liabilities) have consistently outpaced the uses of funds (assets). This has fuelled growing investor concerns over government indebtedness. In contrast, the private sector—particularly households—has seen a sharp rise in its net surplus, almost mirroring the government’s deterioration. Meanwhile, the foreign sector has continued to run net deficits with China, consistent with China maintaining a current account surplus with the rest of the world. That said, unlike in the 2000s and early 2010s—when private and foreign sector balances often moved closely together—recent shifts in the general government and private sector balances appear to have had a more limited effect on the foreign sector's position.

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**The US’ current account deficit**
Expanding on these themes, chart 5 highlights the persistent current account deficits of the US alongside the cumulative current account surpluses of its major trading partners. Some may advocate for reducing US imports—such as through tariffs, as President Trump is currently pursuing—as a way to close the current account deficit. However, such measures tend to address only the symptoms rather than the root causes. This topic featured prominently in client meetings in Singapore. Fundamentally, the persistent current account deficit in the US can be seen as a structural outcome of the dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve currency. The global demand for dollar-denominated assets drives sustained financial inflows into the US, which, by balance of payments accounting, necessitates a corresponding current account deficit.

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**What China Plus One?**
Lastly, we turn to the China Plus One strategy, a diversification approach adopted by firms and governments since US-China tensions began during Trump’s first term in 2018. However, even this approach may no longer offer a full hedge against additional US trade actions. As chart 6 shows, the shift away from China has contributed to a sharp rise in the US trade deficit with several alternative partners, particularly Asian economies such as Vietnam. In light of the broader scope of US trade actions—exemplified by Trump’s recent “Liberation Day” tariffs—businesses are being forced to rethink their global strategies. Some may find themselves needing to reshore production to the US, despite the fact that labour cost advantages, technical know-how, and manufacturing infrastructure for many goods remain more competitive abroad.

Consumer Confidence in France Declines

Summary

Louise Curley

More Economy in Brief

JOLTS: Openings and Layoffs Fall in March; Hiring Little Changed

U.S. Goods Trade Deficit Deepens to Another Record in March as Imports Surge

U.S. FHFA House Price Growth Continues to Decelerate in February

Economic Letter from Asia: How Freightening?

Confidence of French Households (Balance of Positive over Negative Responses)	Nov 2003	Oct 2003	Nov 2002	M/M Chg	Y/Y Chg	2002	2001	2000
Overall	-30	-29	-18	-1	-12	-16	-7	-1
Improved past living standards	-70	-69	-44	-1	-36	-40	-18	-14
Improved future living standards	-37	-35	-22	-2	-15	-18	-18	0
Increasing unemployment	62	62	56	0	-6	50	26	-16
Improved past financial situation	16	14	17	+2	-1	20	22	19
Improved future financial situation	-7	-5	1	-2	-8	2	3	5
A good time to make purchases	-18	-18	-12	0	-6	-12	5	8

Household Consumption of Manufactured Goods	Oct 2003	Sep 2003	Oct 2002	M/M %	Y/Y %	2002	2001	2000
Monthly average (Billions 1995 Euros)	17.8	17.5	17.1	1.60	4.32	17.0	16.8	16.2