Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Andrew Cates

Andy Cates joined Haver Analytics as a Senior Economist in 2020. Andy has more than 25 years of experience forecasting the global economic outlook and in assessing the implications for policy settings and financial markets. He has held various senior positions in London in a number of Investment Banks including as Head of Developed Markets Economics at Nomura and as Chief Eurozone Economist at RBS. These followed a spell of 21 years as Senior International Economist at UBS, 5 of which were spent in Singapore. Prior to his time in financial services Andy was a UK economist at HM Treasury in London holding positions in the domestic forecasting and macroeconomic modelling units.   He has a BA in Economics from the University of York and an MSc in Economics and Econometrics from the University of Southampton.

Publications by Andrew Cates

  • Global| Jun 16 2022

    A More Challenging Consensus

    The latest June survey of Blue Chip professional forecasters is an uncomfortable read. Further downward revisions to growth expectations for 2022 have been accompanied by further upward revisions to inflation forecasts. That’s an unpleasant combination, suggesting stagflation risks are high and rising. That many policymakers moreover are now more actively engineering a tighter monetary policy in order to check inflation leaves global growth forecasts subject to further downward revision. The still-large - and growing - disconnect between forecasts for consumer spending growth and real household income growth in the meantime offers a stark reminder that the growth portion of the stagflation equation are subject to intense downward pressure at present. In other words, global recession risks are rising sharply.

    These conclusions are reinforced in the charts below.

    The evolution of consensus GDP growth forecasts for 2022 is shown in figure 1 below. These have been revised sharply lower over the last several months and most notably in large economies such as China, the US and the Euro Area. Their synchronized nature moreover hints that these revisions can be traced to global, not domestic, factors.

    Figure 1: The evolution of Blue Chip forecasts for GDP growth in 2022

  • Global| May 27 2022

    The Blame Game

    Bank of England policymakers have been slammed by UK newspapers in recent days for 'being asleep at the wheel'. Spiralling inflation, a 'cost-of-living crisis', a borrowing binge and an overheating labour market are being specifically pinned on lax UK monetary policy. And last week's UK data flow showing a further big jump in inflation, a steeper than expected drop in the unemployment rate and a record high for job vacancies have added more grease to the media's wheels.

    But are these criticisms really justified? Well the answer is not quite, and for a number of reasons. The most straightforward reason being that these criticisms are not just being levelled at the BoE. They're also directed at the Fed, the BoC, RBA, ECB, and at many other central banks besides. In other words, many of these issues are globally-rooted and don't have their origins in lax domestic monetary policy.

    Global roots

    On the other hand, perhaps all of these central banks have been similarly asleep at the wheel during this period? Global monetary policy settings may have been far too loose for too long, particularly during the pandemic period. This could have generated too much money, excessive private sector leverage, and soaring demand. This could have now yielded outsized price pressures, wage price spirals thanks to overheating labour markets and dislodged inflation expectations to boot. If this isn't a wake-up call for policymakers to tighten monetary policy swiftly and aggressively and squeeze these excesses out of the system, then what is?

    However, this global narrative and policy prescription doesn't quite hit the nail on the head either. There's no evidence – at the global level – for rampant money supply growth, for excess private sector leverage, or for economic activity more generally that's overheating. Price pressures have been, and still are, emerging due to acute supply side shortages that can mostly be traced to the pandemic or, more recently, to the conflict in Ukraine and China's zero COVID policy. And while a recovery in global demand has admittedly amplified these pressures, it has been fiscal policy – not monetary policy – that's been playing the supporting role.

    All things considered, if that analysis is accurate, shouldn't monetary policy now play a bigger role in ameliorating these price pressures and, at the very least, preventing a bad situation from getting worse? This scribe is dubious. If loose and unorthodox monetary policies throughout the post-financial-crisis era failed to generate any consumer price inflation, and isn't really responsible for high inflation levels at present, why on earth should we expect tighter monetary policy to play a restraining role now?

    More appropriate policy tools

    Fighting the current combination of weak growth and high inflation with higher interest rates will not restore the supply fabric of the world economy not least now that most governments are tightening their fiscal stance at the same time. Surely a far more apt policy response (which admittedly the UK government is leaning toward) would be to use the levers of fiscal policy to alleviate supply-side shortages (e.g. in energy markets), increase an economy's production capacity and shore up the purchasing power of households and companies. By raising the cost of borrowing, tighter monetary policy will impede a supply side investment drive and further derail private sector purchasing power. As such, central banks may well make a bad situation even worse if they were to more actively respond to the pressures facing them from so many opinion formers in the media.

    In what follows, we take a look at a few charts accompanied with (mostly) brief commentary reinforcing these messages.

    The first chart in figure 1 below shows the strong link between commodity prices and consumer price inflation in the advanced economies over recent years. In short, consumer prices have been rising because input cost pressures have been rising.

    Figure 1: Higher commodity costs have pushed up consumer price inflation

  • Central bankers would be the first to admit that domestic monetary policy is a blunt tool for steering economic growth and inflation. Alan Greenspan famously observed that setting policy can be like driving a car while looking in the rear-view mirror. He noted too that arriving sufficiently early “in order to take to away the punch bowl just as the party gets going” is often equally, if not more, challenging.

    To extend these metaphors a little further a big problem at present concerns the image in that rear view which is shrouded in fog. In the meantime there is much uncertainty about how many guests have arrived at the party. Even more debatable is whether the punch bowl that's been provided actually contains any punch!

    To elaborate on this let's look at a few charts. The first of these suggest the world economy's current inflation tensions are mainly rooted in global supply-side factors. Specifically figures 1 and 2 below show that higher commodity prices in recent months have been mostly responsible for the burst of positive global inflation surprises. That's incidentally as true in the US as it is in, say, Australia. Insofar as higher commodity prices are rooted in global supply-chain bottlenecks that have been choked by both the COVID pandemic and the Russia/Ukraine crisis combatting these inflation tensions via tighter domestic monetary policy will be challenging to say the least.

    Figure 1: Inflation surprises in the G10 have been heavily driven by moves in commodity prices

  • Global| Apr 22 2022

    Some Techno-Optimism

    The headlines remain full of negative news about the conflict in Ukraine, a cost-of-living crisis and lingering COVID-related issues not least in China. These factors are derailing consumer and business confidence on the one hand but aggravating inflation tensions on the other. And central banks are accordingly facing an acute dilemma with attendant risks of a policy error extremely high.

    One feature of the global economic scene, however, that is arguably receiving less attention than it should concerns the growing desire of companies to invest in new technology and the positive impact from this on productivity growth. As we discuss below the latest dataflow suggest global demand for technology products has been strong, that capex intentions remain firm, and that trends toward technology innovation - and productivity growth - have exhibited ongoing improvements.

    On the demand front we can see the evidence for this from surging orders from US companies for capital goods (see figure 1 below) and from surging exports of trade and technology bellwethers such as South Korea and Taiwan (figure 2).

    Figure 1: US capex orders continue to strengthen

  • Supply chain bottlenecks, disrupted trade flows and commodity price tension have been key hallmarks of the macroeconomic scene for some months now. But are these factors now moving into reverse? High frequency indicators of shipping costs – such as the Baltic Dry Index – certainly suggest this may be the case (see figure above).

    This index has enjoyed a fairly tight correlation with indicators of real economic activity in commodity markets in recent years. And unsurprisingly it has equally enjoyed a tight correlation with global inflation surprises. Indeed its steep decline over the last six months presages a period in coming weeks where inflation outcomes could elicit far fewer positive surprises and even a few negative surprises.

    This, in turn, could clearly be of some importance for policymakers and interest rate expectations in the period ahead. Indeed a relationship that may be worth watching closely against this backdrop is the evolution of activity in commodity markets and US Treasury yields (see final figure below).

  • Global| Mar 25 2022

    Does the Consensus Add Up?

    Economic forecasters have been paring back their expectations for households' living standards for several months now. Soaring prices for energy and food combined with a fading impulse from COVID-related fiscal support together - more recently - with higher borrowing costs have severely derailed households' disposable income growth in most major economies. At the start of last year, the Blue Chip consensus of US forecasters was centred on an advance in real household incomes of 1.1% in 2022. In the latest survey from March this year those same forecasters are now expecting real incomes to plunge by 3.5% (see figures 1 and 2 below). Similar arithmetic applies to consensus forecasts elsewhere.

    Figure 1: The evolution of consensus forecasts for 2022 for US consumption and real income growth

  • Figure 1: Average unit wage cost inflation in developed economies

  • Figure 1: Latest sentix survey suggests incoming economic data could disappoint

  • Figure 1: Heightened default concerns and a big interest rate response in Russia

  • Figure 1: Flash PMI surveys suggest global supply side congestion may be easing

  • With many Central Banks now more actively tightening monetary policy, financial markets have unsurprisingly been more unsettled in recent weeks. The dilemma for investors is obvious. Should they assume that policymakers are applying a gentle brake to a world economy that is barely breaching its speed limit and will now seamlessly guide it back to a more inflation-friendly speed? Or, are they slamming on the brakes far too hard, and far too early – and to mix the metaphors – now taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut?

    To this scribe the risks are tilted toward the second scenario. There is little question that monetary policy is still accommodative and that a slow normalisation campaign is warranted as the world economy normalises in a likely post-pandemic adjustment phase. But a growing number of Central Banks appear to be of the view that inflationary pressures have been building because their monetary policies have been too loose. A more active tightening campaign is therefore deemed necessary in order to squeeze out these pressures. But as we argue in more detail below this strategy carries tremendous risks. And global economic and financial stability are in danger at present of being sacrificed somewhat unnecessarily at the altar of Central Banks' inflation-fighting credentials

    This view is based on several messages from the analysis below. Firstly, that the inflationary pressures that have been building in recent months are globally - not nationally - rooted. Secondly, that those global pressures have largely been driven by COVID-related supply side congestion, not by excessively loose monetary policy and overheating demand. Thirdly, and to that last point, credit impulses in most major economies have moved into negative territory in recent months. That's not symptomatic of excessively loose monetary policy. Fourthly, nearly every major economy - including the US - is still operating below levels that would have been expected based on pre-pandemic trends. And that's not symptomatic of an overheating world economy. Finally, wage inflation in nearly every major economy is not yet even close to keeping pace with headline price inflation. Household purchasing power is therefore being significantly eroded even in the absence of tighter monetary policy and igniting recession risks as a result.

    Globally-rooted supply side pressures

    Let's start with those global roots and those supply-side roots. A recent paper from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (see The Global Supply Side of Inflationary Pressures) assessed in some detail the recent evolution of inflationary pressures in the US and Euro Area. One of the key findings is that globally-rooted supply factors – including those that pertain to the price of oil - are very strongly associated with the levels of - and persistence of - recent producer price inflation across countries, as well as with consumer goods price inflation (see figures 1, 2 and 3 below). This is noteworthy because all major advanced countries have experienced a large rise in goods price inflation during the initial pandemic recovery phase. Services inflation in contrast has been more muted.

    As the paper's authors additionally note if their analysis is accurate and the bulk of many major economies' inflation issues can be traced to global roots and to supply-side roots, it suggests that domestic monetary policy actions could have only a limited effect in containing inflationary pressures.

    Figure 1: US goods price inflation has been highly correlated with goods price inflation elsewhere

  • Global| Jan 13 2022

    What's the Consensus Call?

    The evolution of consensus forecasts can often yield useful insights about the plight of the world economy. And the latest Blue Chip survey of economic forecasters, published earlier this week, is no exception. The latest January survey, for example, suggest that global growth prospects remain hostage to the COVID pandemic. But inflation concerns are also mounting in some countries and taking a toll on their growth outlook at the same time. Those inflation concerns are now mapping more into the interest rate outlook as well in some of those countries following recent hawkish communications from, for example, the US Fed and the Bank of England. The absence of any material inflationary pressures in Japan and China has been noteworthy, however, as has the relatively dovish response to recent events in Europe from the ECB. And the implications of all this for expected interest rate differentials between the US and most other major economies has had some predictable implications for consensus forecasts for the US dollar as well.

    In what follows we briefly discuss some of these considerations with reference to a few exhibits.

    Growth forecasts pared back in the US and Europe, lifted in China and Japan

    We'll start with the outlook for economic growth. Consensus forecasts for GDP growth in most major economies for 2022 have been pared back in recent months (see figure 1 below). COVID considerations, inflation concerns and the policy response to both of these have been arguably to blame.

    Figure 1: The evolution of consensus forecasts for GDP growth for 2022