Sharmila Whelan

A soft landing has been achieved, and the world economy is in the expansion phase of the business cycle.  There will be greater geopolitical and pollical stability. However it is important to understand the headwinds and tailwinds that will shape the global economy in 2025.

**Headwinds**

**Global trade & a strong US dollar:** A strong US dollar is a negative for global trade. Figure 1 which shows movements in the dollar (on a reverse axis) against changes in global exports since 1974 is illustrative. When the US dollar is weak global trade thrives and vice versa. Even today 80% of global trade is settled in US dollars.


250113SW1.jpg

Source: Haver Analytics & Westbourne Research

**Trump’s trade tariff war:** There is no doubt that the US led trade war is set to escalate and there will trade retaliatory measures. A 10% US import tariff on global imports is almost a given. Some countries will be hit harder than others. Overall it will be a drag on global trade while companies incorporate higher market access costs and adjust other production costs and/or accept the profit margin squeeze. Whether the disruption will be short-term or medium term is unclear and depends on how drawn-out America’s negotiations with its trading partners are.

That said Trump sees America’s trade deficit as a leverage tool to be used to negotiate better terms for the country. Permanently raising tariffs to levels that hurt American consumers and companies directly contradicts Trump’s Make America Great Again mantra and are unlikely. So no 60%tariff rates.

**Inflation and monetary policy:** From here on monetary policy decisions will become more complicated. Headline inflation rates remain elevated compared with pre-Covid and is creeping up in the US, UK, Euro-area and in Japan (Figure 2). The exception is Asia.

250113SW2.jpg

The headwind is the pace at which the US Fed, European Central Bank and Bank of England can continue to cut policy interest rates.  The market is now discounting only two 25bps Fed Fund rate cuts this year. The BoE too will be slow to cut. The ECB is the exception and the expectation is that the central bank will continue to ease monetary policy as growth concerns take precedence over price stability.

**Europe:**  Subpar economic performance will persist. Germany is barely growing, while economic activity is slowing in France and Italy. The problem is the reluctance of European households to spend and take on leverage, despite falling interest rates and rising real incomes. This was the reason last year the corporate sector led profit and investment spending upcycles failed to translate into a broader economic recovery. Real retail sales growth remains lacklustre. The credit cycle is in a downswing, and household savings rates are rising as precautionary demand for rainy-day buffers grows. The other major headwind for Europe is Trump. The greatest cost will stem not from higher U.S. tariffs—only 8% of total EU exports in the twelve months to September 2024 went to the U.S.—or even from weaker exports, but rather from rising defence spending and mounting fiscal pressures.

**China:** Turning East, the biggest drag on global growth and financial markets in 2025 will be China. Figure 3 gives a gauge of the health of the economy and the success of the central banks and government’s monetary and fiscal policy stimulus measures. The chart shows that although Asia ex-Japan exports to China are still rising in absolute terms, the rate of growth is decelerating rather than accelerating which is what one would expect to see if the Chinese economy had turned around decisively.

250113SW3.jpg

**US equity market valuations:** The final headwind for international financial markets is the lofty valuation levels of U.S. equity markets, which heightens the risk of both healthy and unhealthy corrections. Figure 4 shows on a price-to-earnings the S&P500 is expensive. The market on other measures, including price to book and price to sales ratios is extremely elevated.

250113SW4.jpg

Source: National Sources and Haver Analytics

Now with all the gloom out of the way, let’s turn to the tailwinds.

**Tailwinds**

**US economy:** Within the developed world, the US will once again be the best performing economy in 2025, and the rest of the world stands to benefit from a strongly growing American economy. The US corporate profit cycle is in full upswing. US private sector balance sheet fundamentals are strong. Both corporate and household debt measured as percentages of GDP and disposable income, respectively have trended down since 2020.

Pro-business deregulation will be the cornerstone of Trump’s second-term domestic policies.  This should give a significant multi-year boost to the US economy, and corporate earnings. The U.S. corporate tax rate is set to drop from 21% to 20%, with a likely further reduction to 15% for domestic producers. Financial services, traditional energy sectors and pharmaceuticals are positioned to benefit the most, though companies across industries can expect reduced regulatory and compliance burdens.

Meanwhile employment growth is stable at around 1.4% YoY is more or less in line with the pre-pandemic average, and the unemployment rate well below. Hourly earnings are rising by 4% YoY while retail sales have been strengthening, growing by 3.8% YoY in November (Figure 5).

250113SW5.jpg

**Global crude prices:** Stable to declining oil prices is another positive tailwind for global economy, The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that global oil demand will increase from 840,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2024 to 1.1 million b/d in 2025, bringing total consumption to 103.9 million b/d. On the supply side there is  considerable uncertainty around when OPEC + will begin to unwind production cuts. Cuts, at the earliest are expected to be phased out from end March 2025 and to last through September 2026. However, despite stronger demand and slower cuts the IEA does not anticipate severe supply-demand balances that would push up crude prices. Their current market estimates still indicate a 950k b/d supply overhang in 2025.

**Government finances:** In 2022 five sovereigns defaulted on debt and another six the following year. In 2024 Argentina went through a major debt restructuring as did Sri Lanka. However, with interest rates falling the risk of debt defaults is declining. The health of Asian public finances stands out in particular (Figure 6). In most Asian countries there is scope to loosen fiscal policy to support growth, if need be.

We are also less pessimistic than consensus and the IMF about US public finances and expect significant fiscal spending consolidation in the second term of the Trump administration. The end of support to Ukraine, Israel and the Inflation Reduction Act will  also take pressure off government finances.

250113SW6.jpg

**Global election cycle:**  The final tailwind is the global election cycle. Currently attention is focused on Germany’s elections on February 27, political uncertainty persists in France, where the government remains in limbo, and in Canada, following the resignation of long-serving Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. However, 2025 will see far fewer elections globally, suggesting reduced political upheaval and greater domestic stability. So far, at least 12 national elections are confirmed, with only a few expected to be pivotal- Germany, Australia, Canada, and potentially Egypt.

Headwinds and Tailwinds in 2025

Mickey D. Levy

Household net worth, the value of all financial and nonfinancial assets net of all debt held by households and nonprofit organizations, reached an all-time high of $168.8 trillion in 2024Q3 (Chart 1). While GDP and its components that describe the flows of national expenditures and income receive the most attention from economic commentators and financial markets, the quarterly household net worth data collected and published by the Federal Reserve Board and Haver Analytics are nevertheless important.  They are both a reflection of economic performance and a significant contributor to it.

250103ML1.jpg

250103ML2.jpg

Consistent with its typically accentuated cyclical pattern, in the last two years household net worth has risen $25.5 trillion, or 18.8%, while nominal GDP has risen 11.8%.  The value of assets has risen 16.4% while liabilities have risen 6.1% (Chart 2).  Household net worth is now 7.8 times higher than disposable personal income, up from a low of 5.6 times following the Great Financial Crisis in 2010 (Chart 3). Of the total assets, $128.7 trillion is financial wealth that includes stocks and bond holdings, private equity and pensions, while nonfinancial assets, primarily real estate, are $61.3 trillion.  Household holdings of real estate net of outstanding mortgages is $35 trillion (Chart 4).

The two-year surge in wealth followed the 23.7% decline in the first three quarters of 2022 when the value of stocks and bonds and private equities fell as the Fed raised interest rates and bond yields soared.  The subsequent rebound in wealth as the Fed has eased rates a bit and bond yields remain several percentage points above inflationary expectations has been striking.

**The distribution of wealth.** Not surprisingly, data provided by the Fed’s quarterly report on household net worth and the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that the distribution of household net worth is very unevenly distributed, but the large majority of cohorts of households have benefited and a relatively large number of households have accumulated a lot of wealth. The Fed’s Household Net Worth data show that of the 133 million households in the U.S., the top 1% (1.33 million) hold 30.8% of total household net worth and the 90th-99th percentile of households (12 million households) hold 36% of the total wealth, the 50th-90th percentile (53.2 million households) holds 30.3% of the wealth and the lower half of households hold 2.4% of wealth.

The U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Report provides wealth data on households in specific percentiles of all households for 2022.  The median household had $176,500 in net wealth, the 75th percentile household had $614,700 and the 90th percentile household had $1,603,000 in net wealth. Based on the recent 2-year rise in household net worth and 133 million households, that means approximately 13.3 million households have net wealth above $1.9 million, and roughly 20 million households have net worth above $1 million.  Presumably, for many households, a sizable portion of their net wealth is the value of their home, but the data show sizable increases in financial assets as well.


250103ML3.jpg

250103ML4.jpg

**Economic impacts.** The rise in household net worth has had a material impact on the economy, boosting consumption, business investment and domestic demand. While the primary factor driving consumption is real (inflation-adjusted) disposable personal income that is determined by employment and wages, the sharp persistent rise in wealth has contributed to the resilience of the consumer.  This wealth-induced rise in the propensity to spend is reflected in the relatively low rate of personal saving in 2023-2024 which is several percentage points below the post-GFC period when the sharp decline in household led households to spend less and increase saving to replenish their depleted balance sheets (Chart 5).

Besides the wealth effect on consumption, the rise in wealth flows into the economy and affects economic performance in numerous ways.  The appreciation of real estate and financial assets has provided privately owned businesses the impetus and financial ability to expand, increase their capital expenditures and hiring.  This impact on small businesses is important, as 77% of all employment is in privately-owned firms, and 45% of all employment is in firms with less than 250 workers.  The opposite was true following the GFC when the sharp collapse in real estate undercut small business financing.


250103ML5.jpg

Charitable giving, which totaled $550 billion in 2023, flows directly into the economy, providing financial support for the operations and activities of non-profit organizations.  Gifting of household wealth is sizable.  Consider that 31.6% of all household net worth is held by people 70 years old and older, and 42% is held by people aged 55-69. Parents gift large sums to their children for down payments for home purchases, to pay for grandchildren education and a wide array of other activities.  Many make infra-family loans to family members.  Currently, assets in IRA and Keough accounts total $14.5 trillion, and required minimum distributions (RMDs) after-tax are direct additions to measured disposable income.

**Economic policy implications.**  Material declines in household net worth can have the opposite effect of dampening economic activity. Economic policymakers, in the U.S. and overseas, have occasionally ignored the sources and impacts of sizable changes in household net worth, contributing to misguided policies.  The sharp decline in U.S. household net worth during the GFC—its peak-to-trough fall of 16.4% reflected steep declines in the S&P500 and the Case Shiller Home Price Index—constrained the recovery of consumption and the economy, despite the Fed’s sustained zero interest rates and massive quantitative easing along with the fiscal stimulus of the Economic Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  The failure of aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus to lift aggregate demand resulted in a soft recovery and low inflation.  This had a lasting impression on policymakers.  Fueled by its belief that policy responses to the GFC were too timid, fiscal policymakers shifted toward hyper-stimulus in response to the pandemic, while the Fed incorrectly presumed that inflation would stay low like it did following the GFC, which contributed to its poor forecast and decision to maintain excessively easy monetary far too long, a costly mistake that still has lingering effects.

Decades earlier, Japan’s asset price bubble in the late 1980s that resulted from the Bank of Japan’s excessively easy monetary policies burst, and the resulting 75% collapse in real estate values and the Nikkei generated a massive loss in wealth and capital.  The Japanese government failed to acknowledge the problem, providing insufficient fiscal stimulus to offset the hit to wealth and delayed recapitalizing the severely damaged commercial banks until 1997.  As a result, the negative wealth effect resulted in insufficient aggregate domestic demand, bouts of mild deflation and a “lost decade”.

China’s recent collapse of its government-generated excesses in real estate have generated dramatic losses in wealth, widespread bankruptcies of major land developers and undercut local government finances that relied heavily on revenues from land sales.  Real estate had been the dominate portion of total household net worth in China—its share was more than double the U.S.’s 33% share—and its negative impacts on consumption and domestic demand have been quite severe.  The Chinese government has acknowledged and tried to the problem, but its government debt has soared, which has constrained the amount of stimulus it has provided.  To date the housing market continues to have excess supply, and cautious consumers tilt toward saving rather than spending.

The experiences of the U.S., Japan and China highlight the importance of sizable shifts in household net worth and suggest policy makers need to gain a better understanding of the sources and economic consequences of sizable shifts in wealth.

Household Net Worth and Economic Performance

AI boosting US investment in data centers

US productivity growth has been significantly faster than in other major economies

Consumers' short-term US inflation expectations still elevated while longer-term expectations of financial markets are steady

US financial markets have gotten used to elevated policy uncertainty

FOMC now expects more rate cuts going forward than in June

China gaining ASEAN exports while US exports slump

Job openings less than the number unemployed in July for first time since 2021

Reaccelerating goods price inflation along with sticky services inflation clouds the outlook

Falling oil prices aren't pulling down inflation expectations, pointing to a boost from increased tariffs

Equity market exuberance outpacing macroeconomic data

Apart from Japan, Blue Chip forecasters expect further sizable monetary easing

US production rebounded in Q2, but demand continued to slow

US leader, Germany trailer for real GDP growth over past 3 years

Negative US inflation surprises leading G10 down

Deflation continues in China

Incoming data surprising on downside in US; positive surprises elsewhere

FOMC expects more inflation and less growth than in March

With escalation of Israel/Iran conflict, geopolitical risk has recently surged while US trade policy uncertainty has ebbed

Renewed supply chain pressures point to a rebound in global inflation ahead

Apart from Japan, Blue Chip forecasters look for further significant monetary policy easing

Apart from the US, productivity is moribund

Financial market concerns ebb even though policy uncertainty continues to soar

US tariff revenues nearly doubled in April

Even with expected tariff-induced increases in inflation, BCFF forecasters look for a more aggressive round of monetary easing

USD/EUR exchange rate uncoupling from interest rate differential

Our global data offering is unparalleled in terms of coverage, quality, and organization. We offer 290+ databases from 2500 government and private sources, a wealth of key survey and forecast data covering the world’s economies, and a robust offering of archive databases that drive machine learning for big data applications.

Optimized for precision analytics, our data is seamlessly integrated with Microsoft Office and all leading statistical packages through our DLX® software and platform independent HaverView™ website. We further offer direct database feeds, client server or cloud-based delivery, and RESTful API.


Privacy Policy

Disclaimer

Contact us

A premier time series data platform for the global strategy, research, and quant communities. 

London

Singapore

Tokyo

New York

Economy in Brief

Viewpoints

Contact Us

Our Data

Our Products

What We Do

Our Authors

About Us

Data News

Resources

Release Calendars

Training Center

Webinars

Newsletters

Download Software

For Clients

Live Updates

**Europe recovery to continue**

The euro area’s economic performance in 2025 has been uneven. The year began on solid footing, with GDP expanding by 0.6% QoQ in Q1, only to lose momentum in Q2 as growth slowed sharply to 0.1% QoQ, with output contracting in both Germany and Italy. This slowdown coincided with the peak of the U.S.-led trade war, which weighed heavily on net exports after their strong rebound earlier in the year.

Despite the softer second quarter, Europe’s business cycle upswing remains intact. As shown in Figure 1, the average return on equity for listed European firms moderated in the first half of the year compared with the same period in 2024. Yet the corporate profit cycle, which began in 2021, continues to advance. Key indicators—EBITDA, free cash flow, and retained earnings—remain well above pre-pandemic averages. Although earnings per share and cash flow softened slightly in 1H25, corporate balance sheets remain healthy and capable of supporting further investment in production capacity and employment.

251008SW1.jpg

The investment cycle also remains in expansion. As Figure 2 shows, investment spending fell 1.8% QoQ in Q2 after a 2.7% jump in Q1, suggesting a short-term correction rather than the onset of a broader slowdown. The macroeconomic backdrop remains supportive: interest rates are falling, fiscal policy is accommodative, and the worst of trade-war uncertainty has passed. Encouragingly, momentum is building—particularly in Germany—to ease regulatory burdens and advance deregulation, improving the business environment and competitiveness.

251008SW2.jpg

Meanwhile, the European Central Bank (ECB) retains room to ease policy further. Inflation remains far better contained than in the U.S.: headline inflation in the euro area has held steady at 2.1% YoY, while a strong euro continues to dampen producer and import prices. There are no signs of pipeline inflation. By contrast, U.S. CPI rose to 2.9% YoY in August, well above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target.

The labour market remains resilient. Unlike in the U.S., where unemployment has edged higher, the euro area jobless rate continues to decline. Wage growth across services and manufacturing remains solid—up 4% YoY in 1H25, slightly slower than in 2024. In real terms, wages grew 1.9% YoY, down from 2.2% a year earlier but still consistent with sustained consumer spending. Real retail sales are rising about 2% YoY, with momentum easing in Germany, France, and Italy, while household credit demand is reviving as rates fall—pointing to firmer consumption ahead.

In summary, Europe’s cyclical recovery remains on track, but its growth will continue to lag the U.S., weighed down by deep structural challenges.

**Europe’s structural headwinds to weigh** 

The U.S.–EU trade war may have officially ended, but Europe has come away with a poor deal. Under the new framework, EU exports to the U.S. face a 15% import tariff—down from the previously threatened 30%, but still substantial. Only a few sectors—such as aircraft parts, chemicals, agricultural goods, and semiconductor equipment, worth roughly €70 billion in trade—enjoy zero tariffs. Tariffs on metals remain unchanged. In return, the EU agreed to eliminate tariffs on U.S. industrial goods and ease non-tariff barriers. As a result, the average U.S. trade-weighted duty on EU goods has surged to 16%, up from 1.36% at the start of the year, now affecting nearly all EU exports. The euro’s 17% appreciation against the dollar since January adds further pressure, eroding competitiveness.

Europe’s concessions go beyond tariffs. The bloc has pledged to invest €600 billion in the U.S.—around 3.3% of EU GDP—focused on energy, defence, and infrastructure, and to purchase at least €750 billion of U.S. energy through 2028. These commitments pose fiscal and balance-of-payments risks, diverting demand from domestic producers and straining external accounts. The tariff shock has exposed deeper structural weaknesses in Europe’s competitiveness, particularly in cost efficiency and productivity, suggesting a prolonged adjustment period for exporters already facing high input costs.

According to the European Commission’s 2025 Competitiveness Report, Europe’s position in advanced technologies continues to deteriorate. The EU’s share of global tech revenues has fallen from 22% in 2013 to 18% in 2023, while the U.S. share has risen to 38%. Energy prices in Europe remain two to three times higher than in the U.S., and R&D spending—at 2.2% of GDP—lags far behind global peers such as Korea (5.2%) and the U.S. (3.6%). Productivity stands at roughly 77% of U.S. levels, and SME productivity has fallen from 68% to 60% of large firms’ productivity since 2008. Regulatory fragmentation—with 270 regulators and over 100 tech-related laws—combined with limited access to financing, has stifled innovation. Europe’s share of global FDI flows has plunged from 34% in 2019 to 17% in 2024, while venture capital investment, at just 0.05% of GDP, is one-tenth that of the U.S.

At the same time, geopolitical pressures are intensifying. President Trump has largely disengaged from the Ukraine–Russia conflict, shifting responsibility to Europe. At the 2025 Hague Summit, NATO members pledged to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, including 3.5% for military spending and 1.5% for dual-use infrastructure. Europe’s ReArm Plan, aimed at closing capability gaps and strengthening defence industries, carries an €800 billion price tag.

Defence spending is already accelerating (Figure 3). European outlays are projected to reach €381 billion (2.1% of GDP) this year, up from €343 billion in 2024. Investment is up 23% YoY, with equipment procurement exceeding €100 billion. Real defence spending is expected to rise 14% this year after 19% growth in 2024, outpacing the U.S. While this underscores Europe’s determination to enhance security and autonomy, it also highlights the heavy fiscal burden facing a continent struggling with weaker competitiveness, a costly transatlantic trade deal, and the economic fallout of a shifting global order.

251008SW3.jpg

Fiscal pressures are also mounting. France’s budget crisis has dominated headlines, with Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu the latest to resign after failing to secure cross-party support for next year’s budget. Political uncertainty has deepened, and outcomes remain unclear.

At first glance, Europe’s fiscal position looks solid. According to Eurostat, the euro area’s budget deficit averaged 3% of GDP in Q1, with public debt at 86.5% of GDP—figures that compare favourably with the U.S., where the deficit reached 5.7% and debt 119% of GDP in 1H25. Yet these headline numbers mask growing fragility.

As defence costs rise and fiscal strains broaden, governments are likely to rely on creative accounting and debt mutualisation to avert another euro area debt crisis. The process is already underway. Following the precedent of the post-pandemic EU Recovery Fund, the European Commission has launched a new mechanism—the Security Action for Europe (SAFE)—to raise up to €150 billion in joint borrowing for defence investments. More such instruments are expected as fiscal demands expand.

Meanwhile, member states have been allowed to invoke the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, enabling them to exceed EU public spending limits by up to 1.5% of GDP for four years.

**Conclusion**

Europe’s cyclical upswing remains intact, but the region faces an uphill climb. Structural weaknesses in competitiveness, high energy costs, and escalating fiscal pressures risk constraining growth well below U.S. levels. While policy support and deregulation efforts may sustain the recovery, Europe’s long-term outlook will depend on whether it can rebuild productivity, technological capacity, and fiscal resilience in an increasingly fragmented global economy.

Europe’s Economy Holds Up, but Headwinds Mount

Joel Prakken

From January to August the average tariff rate on all imported goods increased 9 percentage points, from 2.3% to 11.3%, while the price of those imports, recorded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) excluding tariffs, was essentially unchanged. Hence, the price of imports, including tariffs, rose 1.113/1.023 - 1 = 8.5%, reflecting the full amount of the increase in tariffs (Chart 1, solid lines). This suggests the cost of the tariffs has been borne entirely by American businesses and consumers, with none of that cost passed backwards to foreign suppliers.

251001JP1.jpg

251001JP2.jpg

Ceteris, however, are not paribus. Over those same months - and somewhat paradoxically - the Federal Reserve’s broad, nominal, trade-weighted dollar index declined 6.7% (Chart 2), one of the steepest year-to-date depreciations on record. I say paradoxically because the textbook narrative is that tariffs, by reducing the demand for imports and hence the supply of dollars to the rest of the world, put upward pressure on the dollar that offsets the cost of the tariffs by putting downward pressure on the price of imports. In 2025, however, depreciation has re-enforced the inflationary impetus of the tariffs and, in the process, may have obfuscated a shift in the burden of tariffs backwards onto foreign suppliers.

We cannot observe the counterfactual path of the dollar, and we can certainly debate the causes of the recent depreciation. Perhaps it reflected the approaching, expected, late year easing of monetary policy. Yet given the timing of the dollar’s decline, the most reasonable explanation is that the uncertainty caused by the Trump Administration’s policies on immigration and (especially!) tariffs encouraged a shift away from dollar-denominated assets.

251001JP3.jpg

Be that as it may, using monthly data since 1989, I estimated the pass-through of fluctuations in the Fed’s dollar index to the BLS index of the price of imported goods. The results suggest that 85% of a persistent depreciation is passed through to higher import prices over 11 months, with the response front-loaded (Chart 3). Using this model I then simulated the recent path of import prices, assuming no decline in the dollar since January. The results (Chart 1, dashed lines) suggest that had the dollar not declined this year, the price of imports excluding tariffs would have fallen 4.7% by August, while the price of imports including tariffs would have increased only 3.7%, not the 8.5% reflecting the full amount of the new tariffs.

While the inference is indirect, the ratio of (8.5 – 3.7) / 8.5 = 57% can be interpreted as an estimate of the share of the cost of the new tariffs shifted backwards onto foreign suppliers.

**A PDF version** of this commentary is available [here](https://static.haver.com/Are_Foreigners_Paying_the_Tariffs_100125_384eec6fb9.pdf).

Are Foreigners Paying the Tariffs?

Charles Steindel

State real GDP growth rates in 2025:2 ranged from -1.1% in Arkansas (Mississippi fell at a 0.9% rate) to 7.3% in North Dakota. States in the Plains benefited from a turnaround in farm output after declines in the first quarter, and there were also increases in mining output in some of those. Arkansas and Mississippi were dragged down by losses in farm output. Strong increases in finance and information helped boost growth in states such as California, New York, and Massachusetts.

Personal income growth rates ranged from 10.4% in Kansas to 0.9% in Arkansas. In the majority of states, perhaps most notably Massachusetts, increases in transfer payments significantly swelled the income gains related to state GDP growth. Much of the transfer growth reflected the recent retroactive payments to some Social Security beneficiaries.

This release also included estimates of consumer spending by state for 2024. Given the marked lag in the release of these numbers, and their annual frequency, they are likely not of much interest in assessing current and perspective conditions, either for the nation as a whole or for individual states, though they may be of help in modeling state revenues.

Viewpoints: 2025

Jump to:

Headwinds and Tailwinds in 2025

Household Net Worth and Economic Performance