Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Joseph G. Carson

Joseph G. Carson, Former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein.   Joseph G. Carson joined Alliance Bernstein in 2001. He oversaw the Economic Analysis team for Alliance Bernstein Fixed Income and has primary responsibility for the economic and interest-rate analysis of the US. Previously, Carson was chief economist of the Americas for UBS Warburg, where he was primarily responsible for forecasting the US economy and interest rates. From 1996 to 1999, he was chief US economist at Deutsche Bank. While there, Carson was named to the Institutional Investor All-Star Team for Fixed Income and ranked as one of Best Analysts and Economists by The Global Investor Fixed Income Survey. He began his professional career in 1977 as a staff economist for the chief economist’s office in the US Department of Commerce, where he was designated the department’s representative at the Council on Wage and Price Stability during President Carter’s voluntary wage and price guidelines program. In 1979, Carson joined General Motors as an analyst. He held a variety of roles at GM, including chief forecaster for North America and chief analyst in charge of production recommendations for the Truck Group. From 1981 to 1986, Carson served as vice president and senior economist for the Capital Markets Economics Group at Merrill Lynch. In 1986, he joined Chemical Bank; he later became its chief economist. From 1992 to 1996, Carson served as chief economist at Dean Witter, where he sat on the investment-policy and stock-selection committees.   He received his BA and MA from Youngstown State University and did his PhD coursework at George Washington University. Honorary Doctorate Degree, Business Administration Youngstown State University 2016. Location: New York.

Publications by Joseph G. Carson

  • Kevin, in your role as Director of the National Economic Council, you carry the significant responsibility of advising the president on economic and fiscal policy matters, while also acting as an "honest broker." I was genuinely shocked and disappointed to hear that you argued the dismissal of the BLS Commissioner was an effort to "restore" trust in the BLS. This is entirely false. In reality, the removal of the BLS Commissioner sends the opposite message, indicating that the administration will attempt to manipulate the numbers for political gain.

    As you mentioned, the jobs data has indeed been "awful" for a while. But why is this happening? The statistical agencies, especially the BLS, have been lacking sufficient funding from Congress to produce the highest quality data for policymakers, businesses, individuals, and investors. Instead of seeking additional funding, the current administration has dismissed its leader, claiming this will lead to better statistics, which many now distrust.

    In the most recent employment figures, companies of all sizes have communicated to you and others in the administration that the erratic tariff policy has generated such confusion and uncertainty that managing a business on a day-to-day or weekly basis has become nearly impossible.

    Janet Norwood, the esteemed BLS Commissioner, remarked that "the professionals who compile the nation's statistics must be courageous enough to insist that their work remains free of political interference." The dismissal of the BLS Commissioner suggests that this is no longer feasible.

  • Several presidents have challenged governmental statistical agencies over the years, but these disputes typically involved the reporting and interpretation of economic data. Today, President Trump has crossed a "sacred red line" by firing the Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner, claiming the individual was "manipulating the jobs data." Employees of government statistical agencies operate with the highest integrity.

    The fact that Treasury Secretary Bessent and National Economic Council Chair Hassett did not prevent this firing is an embarrassment to everyone working in any government statistical agency. Bessent and Hassett should resign immediately, as they can never be trusted, and their failure to stop the firing of the BLS commissioner should disqualify them from any other position in the federal government, especially at the Federal Reserve.

    Those employed in the economic, business, and financial sectors must ensure that professionals responsible for collecting our national statistics remain independent of political influence. The best way to begin is by dismissing those currently in charge who failed to prevent the firing of the BLS Commissioner.

  • The Trump administration often highlights the revenue from tariffs, but hides the decrease in corporate income tax due to increased tariff-related expenses. By June 2025, covering three quarters of the fiscal year, corporate tax revenues have dropped by over $30 billion compared to the previous year.

    Therefore, while the government might be earning extra revenue from tariffs, it is US companies that are covering the costs, resulting in them paying less in taxes.

  • How significant is a 15% tariff on imported consumer goods? It's substantial enough to cause an increase in consumer inflation, yet not substantial enough to encourage a shift in production to the US. While investors might express "good cheer" over tariffs averaging 15% instead of a much higher rate, the end result will be higher inflation rather than an expanded U.S. manufacturing sector, which was the primary aim of Trump's tariff policy.

    The Trump administration recently reached several trade agreements with major trading partners, implementing a 15% tariff on a broad array of imported goods, many of which are consumer items.

    Is that significant? According to consumer price index data, prices for consumer goods, excluding food and energy, were unchanged from 2000 to 2020. However, they rose by nearly 15% in 2021 and 2022 due to product shortages and supply disruptions stemming from the pandemic. Consequently, a potential 15% price hike on non-energy and food consumer goods is notably large, as it matches the total price increase over the past 25 years. There is no doubt that consumer prices for these goods will increase over time as these tariffs are factored into the pricing structure.

    However, is the 15% tariff hike on consumer goods significant enough to compel companies to relocate production to the US? While it might attract some new investment, the cost difference between manufacturing in the US and other countries vastly exceeds 15%. Additionally, the expenses associated with new investments, as well as the time required to secure locations, acquire permits, and finish construction, are considerable. By the time these processes are completed, many of these tariffs might be eliminated under a new administration.

    Assessing the results of Trump's tariff policy will take months and years, but it is very probable will lead to increased consumer inflation and minimal changes in global manufacturing.

  • Federal Reserve Governor Christopher J. Waller's speech, "The Case For Cutting Now," delivered at the Money Marketeers of New York University, was intriguing from both political and policy perspectives. His economic rationale for a formal rate reduction at the July 29-30 FOMC meeting was, at best, puzzling, and the timing appeared politically motivated. With the Fed's independence facing substantial pressure, it is crucial for those making monetary policy decisions to remain apolitical.

    It is exceedingly uncommon for a Fed Governor to dissent at an FOMC meeting, as demonstrated by the fact that there have only been a few dissents by Fed Governors in the past decade or more. It is even rarer for the rationale behind a dissenting vote to be expressed and made public before the FOMC meeting.

    Considering the political pressure aimed at Fed Chair Powell in recent days and weeks, it is worth considering if there was a political agenda influencing the timing and content of Mr. Waller's speech, particularly because he was named by the current administration as a candidate for the Fed Chair role. (On CNBC last week, Mr Waller stated, "If the President asked me to do the Fed chair job, I would say yes.")

    Mr. Waller's rationale for a rate cut at this time is questionable, even when political factors are set aside. For instance, Mr. Waller asserts, "tariffs are one-off increases in the price level and do not cause inflation beyond a temporary spike." Yet, he offers no evidence to support this claim.

    Mr. Waller's assertion regarding tariffs being a one-time impact on inflation might hold some truth if the tariffs implemented by the Trump administration were consistent, even, and applied simultaneously. However, the tariff policy is erratic and uneven, with some of the largest increases affecting essential materials like steel, aluminum, and copper, which will continually elevate production costs and price pressures in the US.

    However, Mr. Waller states that even if tariffs have a greater effect on inflation, it will not alter or affect his perspective on the implications for monetary policy. Why? Mr. Waller contends that, despite recent increases in individual price expectation surveys, there is no evidence of an "unanchoring of inflation expectations." He considers surveys of people's inflation expectations, which have shown a significant jump in recent months, two or three times above the Fed's 2% inflation target, to be "unreliable." Rather, he relies more on those who predict inflation expectations in the financial markets. In other words, he trusts individuals who wager on future inflation rather than those who deal with it daily.

    Mr. Waller cites labor market trends as a reason to lower rates now, stating that "private sector job gains are near stall speed and flashing red." However, he overlooks that the Fed's labor market mandate focuses on the unemployment rate, not private sector jobs, which, at 4.1%, is below the Fed's long-term target. He mentioned that a significant slowdown in "net immigration" might be contributing to the sluggish growth in private sector jobs, but acknowledged that understanding its impact on employment will take time.

    Additionally, Mr. Waller does not address how "uncertainty" over tariff policy is affecting hiring decisions, despite it being a common theme in the Fed's July Beige Book report.

    Nevertheless, Mr. Waller is willing to wait and see how immigration affects the labor markets, but is not prepared to wait to evaluate the impact of Trump's tariff policy on current and future inflation.

    Mr. Waller has only one vote at the FOMC, but his vote could be very "LOUD" because the Administration is likely to use it as an additional tool to influence Fed policy. Federal Reserve independence can only be preserved if those responsible for implementing monetary policy decisions avoid political involvement.

  • Is the US economy on the verge of entering a new phase of "American Exceptionalism," or is it approaching the edge of another financial crisis?These two perspectives represent the extreme ends of potential outcomes. Certainly, the economic outlook for 2025 is not grounded in strong fundamentals, as it was in 1995 when America embarked on a long period of "exceptionalism." However, there are some parallels to 2005 (excessive risk-taking and borrowing) that culminated in a significant financial crisis.

    Between 1995 and 1999, over a span of five years, the US experienced an average real GDP growth of 4% per year, a feat unmatched since the 1960s. However, even more remarkable than this growth performance was the fact that America settled its "current bills," concluding that period with a balanced budget, and didn't pass legislation that increased future deficits.

    In 2025, the US is experiencing minimal growth and facing a budget deficit projected at $2 trillion, suggesting it is not covering its "current bills." Furthermore, Congress's passage of the "Big Beautiful Bill" (BBB) adds an additional $4 trillion over the upcoming decade, leading to an anticipated cumulative annual deficit nearing $25 trillion for the next ten years, as reported by the Congressional Budget Office. When it comes to federal borrowing, 2025 is fundamentally different from 1995 and the years that followed.

    However, 2025 resembles 2005. In 2005, American households borrowed trillions to purchase primary and secondary homes and took out additional home equity loans to fund their spending. Likewise, in 2025, the US government is borrowing unprecedented amounts, not only for the present year but also increasingly for the next decade, to maintain and support the economy's growth trajectory.

    As house prices declined, the excessive risk-taking and leverage by households resulted in a series of adverse effects on the financial markets and the economy. While the federal government has more borrowing options and capacity compared to the private sector, it is not limitless.

    In 2009, Kevin Hassett, who is the White House Director of the National Economic Council, co-authored an article titled "The Deficit Endgame" for the American Enterprise Institute. In this article, the authors noted "countries most at risk of defaulting on their government debts were those heavily dependent on foreign capital flows to finance their government deficits." The authors also that high levels of domestic debt could and have led to defaults.

    The US fits both of these descriptions; it is heavily reliant on foreign capital and operates with a current debt-to-GDP ratio well above the thresholds that have led to previous sovereign defaults in other countries.

    Financial markets currently perceive a very small risk of the US entering the "default bucket," unlike with other countries with a similar debt profile. However, the potential for another credit downgrade might change this view or at least raise funding costs. In April, S&P Global Ratings, mentioned that "the outcome of forthcoming fiscal negotiations...will be a key factor in our assessment of the US fiscal profile." The approval of "BBB" by Congress represents "fiscal expansion" as opposed to the "fiscal consolidation" typically preferred by credit ratings, which increases the likelihood of a credit downgrade.

    Two decades ago, the notion that home prices might fall was unimaginable for households, as a nationwide decline had never happened, nor did they anticipate challenges in refinancing their debt. Similarly, it's difficult to envision the US government being unable to roll over its debt. However, this scenario can occur at any time, often triggered by factors like the financially reckless 'Big Beautiful Bill'.

  • USA
    | Jul 01 2025

    The WSJ "Con" Job

    This is extremely embarrassing and a deceptive act by the WSJ editorial team. The current budget baseline relies on what is explicitly stated in the tax code, not on assumptions. According to the existing tax law, individual tax rates are set to return to pre-2017 levels in 2026. That is a fact. Where is written that "Congress was never going to allow" individual tax rates to revert back to pre 2017?

    If the "Big Beautiful Bill" (BBB) is projected to save $500 billion over the next ten years, as stated by the WSJ editorial team, then why does the BBB include a provision to raise the debt ceiling by $5 trillion? The WSJ editorial team, similar to members of Congress, is currently engaged in using deceptive "budget math".

    However, this will not fool global investors or credit rating agencies, who will soon confront a US debt approaching $50 trillion.

  • President Trump has stated that he "would not be disappointed" if a deal with China is not reached swiftly, as "not doing business is also a good deal for the United States." However, this perspective is flawed or his economic advisors are misinforming him. Trump's tariff approach failed to consider the US economy's heavy reliance on consumer imports and direct and indirect economic effects on importers, trucking and rail companies and retailers.

    The adverse effect on sales (or company revenue), employee earnings, and company profits might amount to approximately seventy percent of the total import value.

    Based on 2024 trade data, the US imported consumer-related goods valued at $1.5 trillion. The Federal Reserve's report on industrial production estimated domestic production of consumer goods at $2.18 trillion, for a combined total of roughly $3.7 trillion. However, as consumer goods progress through the economic chain from ports and shipping to retail, significant value is added to their production and importation value.

    Based on GDP data, consumer spending on goods in 2024 surpassed $6.3 trillion, which is $2.6 trillion more than the total value of imports and domestically produced goods. This indicates that for every dollar spent on imports and domestic production, there is nearly an additional 70 cents in value-added, associated with markup costs (such as shipping, distribution, labor, etc.) and profits.

    Distinguishing the profit margins between imported consumer goods and those produced domestically is not possible. However, even if these margins are the same, the potential impact on the economy's revenue stream (GDP) and income stream (GDI or wages and profits) remains significant. That's why a lengthy and expanding roster of companies, including Apple, GM, Ford, UPS, Walmart, and Procter & Gamble, among many others, have either reduced or withdrawn their profit estimates for 2025.

    It's crucial to recognize that the US imports over $1.6 trillion in industrial supplies and capital goods. To fully understand the economic impact of global trade flows, it's necessary to consider the potential loss of both consumer and business imports, though the latter are harder to assess. Even if the impact on business goods is only half as significant as on consumer goods, the overall effect on the US economy from China alone is about 2% of GDP. If imports from other key trading partners, such as Canada and Europe, are also lost, the impact doubles.

    In other words, contrary to what President Trump and his advisors has said, the "US Needs A Trade Deal," and soon.

  • Trump's tariff theory suggests that by placing substantial costs on imports, it can alter the competitive dynamics in manufacturing, especially in the automotive sector. However, he and his economic team are mistaken. The transition from being a net exporter to a net importer is a typical evolution of a mature industry like the automotive business. American prosperity has historically been fueled by creating new products and technologies and importing other goods that others produce more cheaply. Trump's tariff policy will not lead to better balanced growth or an increase in manufacturing jobs; instead, it will raise costs and harm American companies and consumers.

    Half a century ago, US companies dominated the motor vehicle industry, with General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, the big three, making up about 70% of total sales. Currently, only two of these companies remain, and their market share has dropped to less than one-third, despite significant direct and indirect support from the federal government over the past several decades.

    The US experiences a trade deficit in motor vehicles with both high-wage countries like Germany and Japan, as well as low-wage countries such as Mexico and South Korea, including those with which it has a free trade agreement.

    The transition to becoming a net importer of U.S. motor vehicles aligns with the product life cycle theory proposed by economist and Harvard Business School professor Raymond Vernon. His theory suggests that products are initially developed in countries with capital, demand, and income. Eventually, as production and technologies become standardized, they are adopted or replicated in other regions, leading the country that originally created the product to become a net importer. This is a common outcome—consider the product life cycles of cars, computers, televisions, textiles, and so on.

    Attempting to reverse this strong trend would lead to economic disruption, be extremely costly, and possibly the greatest disappointment is that it won't generate additional manufacturing jobs.

    In the early 2000s, I published a study on global manufacturing employment in the largest 20 largest economies. My research discovered that from the mid-1990s to the early 200s over 22 million manufacturing jobs were lost, and the biggest decline occurred in China, with a net loss of 16 million manufacturing jobs. Since that study was published the US lost another quarter of its manufacturing jobs but so did other countries.

    The study on manufacturing employment should send a straightforward message to Trump's economic advisors: improving the manufacturing sector is done by increasing production and quality with new technologies, rather than by elevating costs. Over the past 20 years, manufacturing output has grown by more than 40% with fewer jobs.

    Trump's tariff policy is expected to increase costs and raise the prices of both new and used vehicles, without necessarily boosting production or job creation. In essence, it will do more harm than good, and if fully implemented, it could certainly end America's exceptionalism.

  • Trump's trade war is essentially a conflict between his economic team and American businesses. This is because the Trump economic team, along with the president, holds an out-dated perspective on international trade. The "old" way of analyzing foreign trade with an export being a "win" and an import representing a "loss" for an economy is too simplistic nowadays since companies operate without national borders and many times are on both sides of the transaction. Compelling U.S. multinationals to relocate their operations domestically would cause major disruption, higher prices, considerable losses, financial market turmoil, and ultimately make U.S. companies less competitive globally.

    The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) constructs an ownership-based trade account, which incorporates the role multinational companies play in international trade. This framework adds the direct investment income and receipts that are associated with international transactions. The ownership-based trade account reduces the traditional trade measure by "Half". Is the Trump economic team even aware of the existence of this statistical measure of international trade? In politics, one can create a misleading narrative, but when developing economic policy, it's crucial to base decisions on "facts."

    The ownership-based trade measure offers a more accurate modern-day account of international trade, largely due to the substantial overseas investments by US companies over several decades. For example, US majority-owned foreign affiliates have $3.4 trillion in physical assets like property, plants, and equipment, with 50% of these investments in Europe and another 16% in Canada and Mexico. These assets have helped generate $6 trillion in gross sales and $300 billion in net income, according to the most recent data from 2022.

    US trade agreements have been crucial in encouraging American companies to grow internationally. Currently, the US has trade agreements with 20 countries, the most significant being the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico. Despite these agreements, the Trump administration intends to impose tariffs of up to 25% on a wide array of manufactured goods, even in cases where trade agreements are in place, to incentivize companies to manufacture products within the US.

    The reasoning behind Trump's tariff strategy is suspect. First, it implicitly recognizes a significant cost gap between domestic and international production that isn't solely to do unfair trade practices. Second, it does not acknowledge that higher product prices are inevitable, as producing goods in the US would be unprofitable without tariffs. Third, it overlooks the costs involved in creating a new manufacturing "ecosystem," including who will bear these costs and the time required to establish it. Fourth, it places US companies with global manufacturing operations in a situation where they may need to sell or cease some activities. Lastly, it overlooks the fact that simply having a trade surplus does not ensure a strong economy (as shown by Japan and Germany), nor does it necessarily lead to a better standard of living.

    The Trump tariff approach is 30 years behind the times. It may have yielded certain economic and financial benefits when exports and imports were associated with specific country names, but that world no longer exists.

    Nowadays, the economy, workers, and companies would benefit more if the Trump administration collaborated with US businesses to create a forward-looking manufacturing plan and invested in educating the youth or future workforce. Regrettably, the administration intends to prolong the 2017 tax legislation, which advantages high-income earners, prioritizes consumption over investment, leads to massive budget deficits, and simultaneously dismantles the education department.

    "Has the Era of American Exceptionalism Ended?" If Trump's tariff strategy is fully implemented, it raises the probability that it has.

  • In recent decades, the American economy has expanded more rapidly than other major economies, creating substantial wealth. This phenomenon is often called "American Exceptionalism." While the economic and financial results are not in dispute, the reasons behind them are. A deeper look shows that the period of "American Exceptionalism" was driven not only by fundamentals but also by large-scale and unconventional fiscal and monetary policies that were unprecedented in their reach and magnitude. The Trump administration, eager to extend America's exceptionalism, plans to impose taxes (i.e., tariffs) on our major trading partners. Will this strategy work or is the era of "American Exceptionalism" over?

    Advocates of "American Exceptionalism" often overlook or downplay the most extensive fiscal policy in history that has bolstered the economy in recent decades. For instance, the US federal debt has risen from $7 trillion to $36 trillion over the past twenty years. Essentially, the federal government has spent, on average, over $1 trillion annually beyond what individuals and businesses paid in taxes. Consequently, the US economy reaped the benefits of government spending without imposing equivalent taxes on its citizens or businesses. No other nation globally could maintain this for such an extended period.

    Unlike households, businesses, and other countries, the US government has a printing press that enables it to spend beyond its means. However, there are limitations to this ability. Niall Ferguson, a British historian, suggests that a government is no longer a great world power when it spends more on interest payments than on defense. The US surpassed this threshold last year, indicating that the story's script has already been written, with the conclusion possibly unfolding very soon.

    Also, monetary policy had a significant influence on the economic and financial outcomes over the last 20 years. For example, in half of those years, policymakers kept official rates near zero, and in about one-third of the years, the Federal Reserve spent over $8 trillion on securities purchases to stabilize financial markets and support economic recovery. These direct asset purchases, called quantitative easing, lead to demand-pull asset inflation by pushing investors to swap risk-free fixed income assets for risky assets, typically equities. Consequently, the surge in wealth was partly fueled by monetary policy.

    Although it may appear to be an obvious observation, if a nation increases its government debt five times over twenty years and its central bank follows a "crisis-type" policy for half of that period—spending a third of the time directly purchasing financial assets to artificially boost equity values—can this truly be considered an era of "American Exceptionalism"? Would it be more precise to call it a "folk tale"?

    The Trump team aims to extend the real or fabricated narrative for as long as possible. Their primary goal is to make the 2017 tax cut permanent. The challenge they encounter is that by only partially offsetting the cost with spending reductions, they lock in significant fiscal deficits. This heightens the likelihood that the so-called "Ferguson Law"—which suggests that when governments spend more on interest payments than on defense, they lose their status as a major power—becomes a reality.

    At the same time, Trump plans to increase federal revenues by implementing tariffs on a broad range of imports. Imposing tariffs on imports is seen as an easy way to raise revenue in the short run with the larger objective of increasing costs of imported products, thereby encouraging a shift in supply. This strategy aims to persuade importers to relocate production to the US or face the potential loss of sales.

    However, establishing a new ecosystem will be neither simple nor inexpensive. This is because it would require a substantial and lasting rise in tariffs to force a change in production sites. Even so, success is not guaranteed due to concerns about cost and profitability. If people cannot afford the increased prices caused by tariffs and the higher production costs in the US, they will buy less, resulting in decreased sales and profits for businesses. Moreover, US companies might risk losing international markets as other nations retaliate.

    Warren Buffett, a renowned investor, has consistently maintained the stance to "never bet against America." However, betting against "American Exceptionalism" is not the same as betting against America, particularly if the past was "exceptional" only because of unique and unrepeatable fiscal and monetary policy measures.

    Investors ought to be concerned about the "Ferguson Law," as the narrative is already set. The conclusion may arrive soon as the Trump administration either misunderstands or disregards the repercussions. If "American Exceptionalism" unravels, revealing it as more myth than reality, it could lead to significant and swift changes in US financial markets. This is because the value of US financial assets, especially stocks, is based on a growth narrative that is neither accurate nor sustainable.

  • With price stability as a key mandate, the Federal Reserve bears a significant responsibility to guarantee that the targeted price statistics accurately reflect people's experiences and are not influenced by political or statistical manipulation. However, the Fed's price targeting regime has become misleading and unbalanced since the price measure it targets has become less relevant to "actual" inflation. The Fed nowadays lacks a "Greenspan," or an individual who is both an expert in economic statistics and methodology and possesses the political power and influence to challenge the accuracy of published statistics or request their review. The matter of accurate price measurement is not just academic; it has real economic and financial effects.

    Years ago, the Price Statistic Review Committee (PSRC), a group of academics, economists and statisticians, stated that, “If a satisfactory rent index for units comparable to those that are owner-occupied can be developed" then the committee recommends that BLS to use this approach for house prices and related expenses.

    The General Accounting Office (GAO), which released a comprehensive report on how housing costs are measured in inflation metrics, made a similar suggestion. The GAO stated, "Most owner-occupied housing units differ significantly from many rental units. To apply rental equivalence in the CPI, a sufficient number of rental units must be identified that are comparable to owner-occupied units in terms of size, location, and quality, allowing the BLS to create a sample that accurately reflects owner-occupied houses."

    In 1983, based on recommendations from the PSRC, GAO and others, the Bureau of Labor Statistics introduced the owners' rental equivalence method to estimate housing costs of owner-occupied homes. This estimation procedure continued until 1998, when the BLS announced that it had to discontinue the owner-sample due to an insufficient sample of owner-housing units. Moving forward, they decided to link the rent estimates for owners' rent to the other rent series. Neither the PSRC nor the GAO provided any comments.

    The owners-occupied rent series constitutes roughly fifteen percent of the Fed's preferred price target, the personal consumption expenditure deflator (PCE). Combined with the thirty percent of the PCE that individuals do not buy, nearly half of the PCE deflator reflects an inflation rate derived from administered and non-market prices or imputations. How can this be regarded as a reliable or accurate measure of actual inflation people experience?

    Price data should represent "actual" inflation, not a statistical distortion. Considering its essential role in shaping both monetary and fiscal policy, it is crucial for the price data to be accurate, relevant, and objective. The general public benefits from "actual" sustainable low inflation. But who gains when inflation might be understated, or its cyclical fluctuations are dampened or eliminated due to a new statistical method?

    Over the past sixteen years, from 1998 to 2024, the average S&P 500 P/E ratio was 26.7. In contrast, during the preceding fifteen years, from 1983 to 1998, it averaged 15. Is this just a coincidence, or could the alteration in inflation estimation for housing costs, combined with the Fed's emphasis on an inflation measure representing only half of the actual inflation rate experienced by people, partly explain this shift? This misleading measure of inflation and policy approach has led to maintaining official rates lower than they might have been otherwise, which benefit finance, especially equity investments.

    According to history, "Washington" is unlikely to change it frameworks (price and policy) unless another crisis occurs. The financial press could increase public awareness of this issue, but it has not done so yet. As long as the existing price and policy frameworks remain in place, finance benefits while "Joe Six Pack" loses ground to "actual" inflation.