Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Joseph G. Carson

Joseph G. Carson, Former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein.   Joseph G. Carson joined Alliance Bernstein in 2001. He oversaw the Economic Analysis team for Alliance Bernstein Fixed Income and has primary responsibility for the economic and interest-rate analysis of the US. Previously, Carson was chief economist of the Americas for UBS Warburg, where he was primarily responsible for forecasting the US economy and interest rates. From 1996 to 1999, he was chief US economist at Deutsche Bank. While there, Carson was named to the Institutional Investor All-Star Team for Fixed Income and ranked as one of Best Analysts and Economists by The Global Investor Fixed Income Survey. He began his professional career in 1977 as a staff economist for the chief economist’s office in the US Department of Commerce, where he was designated the department’s representative at the Council on Wage and Price Stability during President Carter’s voluntary wage and price guidelines program. In 1979, Carson joined General Motors as an analyst. He held a variety of roles at GM, including chief forecaster for North America and chief analyst in charge of production recommendations for the Truck Group. From 1981 to 1986, Carson served as vice president and senior economist for the Capital Markets Economics Group at Merrill Lynch. In 1986, he joined Chemical Bank; he later became its chief economist. From 1992 to 1996, Carson served as chief economist at Dean Witter, where he sat on the investment-policy and stock-selection committees.   He received his BA and MA from Youngstown State University and did his PhD coursework at George Washington University. Honorary Doctorate Degree, Business Administration Youngstown State University 2016. Location: New York.

Publications by Joseph G. Carson

  • During the June 17 press conference after the FOMC meeting, the new Fed Chairman, Warsh, announced the establishment of five task groups. These groups will address various topics, such as Fed communications, balance sheet policy, inflation framework, employment and productivity, and data sources that assist policymakers. The proposed changes to policymakers' practices could significantly affect how the Fed plans to achieve its objectives, compelling Wall Street to adapt to a new approach.

    Fed Communication: Policymakers usually prioritize items based on their significance, which is why Fed Warsh considers Fed communication as the foremost concern. Fed Warsh has publicly stated that the "Fed" communicates excessively and too frequently. A notable shift in Fed communication was evident during his initial FOMC meeting. The press release was short, with no forward guidance, and Fed Warsh did not engage in offering forecasts for growth, unemployment, inflation, and policy rates. It wouldn't be surprising if the Fed decides to drop the "dot plot" and "forward guidance" in upcoming meetings. Wall Street might protest, but how many companies receive a "roadmap" every six weeks? Reducing risk and speculation in the financial markets is a good thing.

    Fed's Balance Sheet Policy: Fed Warsh has long argued that the Fed's balance sheet is too big. It is unclear if Mr. Warsh would change the size, composition, or both, but he wants to reduce the Fed's footprint. At the June press conference, when asked if he thought Fed policy was restrictive, he argued if you look at what is happening in the financial markets, it is hard to say policy is restrictive. Financial markets run on liquidity, and Fed Warsh thinks the Fed balance sheet is providing too much liquidity.

    Existing Data Sources: Fed Warsh attempts to imitate former Fed Chairman Greenspan in various aspects, yet unlike Greenspan, who was a "data junkie," Warsh does not share this trait, particularly regarding economic data. Fed Greenspan spent a lifetime studying microeconomic data and was a big fan of survey data from the purchasing managers and others. However, the most reliable and hardest data originates from government statistical agencies, including the Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Bureau of Economic Analysis. If Mr. Warsh wants to get a more accurate account of the economy, he would be wise to ask Congress to increase funding for the statistical agencies.

    Productivity and Jobs: Mr. Warsh is of the opinion that "AI" will have a positive impact on output, employment, and productivity, although the extent and timing of these benefits are unpredictable. If Fed Warsh takes a similar approach to Mr. Greenspan, he will allow the economy and financial markets to guide him.

    Inflation Frameworks: Mr. Warsh has argued that "trimmed inflation" measures offer a better guide of underlying inflation versus widely used "core measures". Yet, if Mr.Warsh is serious about revisiting inflation frameworks, then there should be a serious discussion about inflation measurement. The Fed's price target, the PCE deflator, is not a direct measure of inflation, as nearly a third of it comes from non-consumer, non-market prices. The CPI has its flaws, and both measures include an implied rent series for homeowners. Price statistics need to be relevant, objective, and reflective of people's actual experiences. Currently, price measures do not meet these standards.

    As Mr. Warsh stated, a change in leadership is a "timely opportunity to review current practices" and review what still works and what should be changed. Wall Street must adapt as the operation of monetary policy could change significantly under Fed Warsh's leadership.

  • Kevin Warsh returns to the Federal Reserve as the new Fed Chair. His return occurs at a crucial time for the Federal Reserve, as its independence has been threatened multiple times over the past year. However, Mr. Warsh's greatest challenge may be preserving the Fed's credibility.

    Mr. Warsh joins the Fed with controversial views on inflation measurement. Mr. Warsh advocates that policymakers move away from conventional inflation metrics and instead focus on "trimmed averages." This approach excludes the "tails," or the items with the highest and lowest price changes in a given month.

    "Trimmed" inflation-like core measures are attempts to remove price outliers from the rest. However, inflation cycles are not linear; they include outliers and the composition changes over time.

    But any effort by the Fed to alter the targeted measure would damage its credibility, as investors and analysts recall the Fed's actions in 2020.

    In 2020, in response to criticism for consistently falling short of its 2% inflation target, the Fed introduced an "inflation-averaging targeting" framework. This approach would allow inflation to surpass the 2% mark to compensate for times when it was below target.

    During the five years before inflation-averaging was implemented, the personal consumption core deflator was below target in four of five years, averaging 40% below target. Meanwhile, the consumer price index exceeded the target in three out of those five years, averaging just under 2%.

    However, over the past five years, inflation trends have notably reversed, with both the personal consumption deflator and the consumer price index averaging several hundred basis points above the 2% target. This trend persists in 2026.

    If the Fed opts to alter its inflation target while inflation is significantly above the target, especially after modifying the framework to promote more inflation and persistently low official interest rates when inflation was below target, it would set a bad precedent. Critics would argue that the new Fed Chair is adjusting the inflation target to squash calls for a rate hike, while opening up the possibility of an official rate cut later, which is what President Trump is seeking from his nominee.

    Credibility is built by consistently following its mandate without retreating or changing targets, which can falsely suggest that you are taking the necessary actions to control inflation.

    If Fed Warsh urged the FOMC to implement a new inflation target, he would risk significantly damaging both his and the Fed's credibility. Additionally, the bond market would strongly express its disapproval by substantially increasing long-term interest rates. What choice will Fed Warsh make: satisfy the individual who nominated him or prioritize the most important people, the investors?

  • Fed Chair Nominee Kevin Warsh intends to link the Fed's inflation target to median or "trimmed" price measures. These measures are a statistically manipulated version of reported inflation, creating an "alternative reality." They are the 2000s version of Arthur Burns' 1970s core inflation. If implemented, this would be the fourth time inflation measures used for policy have been dumbed down, primarily benefiting the finance sector, as it would create the impression of a lower underlying inflation rate, thus justifying low official rates.

    Median and "trimmed" price measures remove the tails, or the items that record the highest and lowest price changes in a given period. These price measures are deceptive because they remove the extremes in the price distribution. During inflation cycles, the upper tail for items with significant price increases is much larger than the lower tail.

    Median and "trimmed" price measures represent a more extreme version of former Fed Chair Arthur Burns' "core inflation," which excluded energy and food prices from the overall measure.

    Government statisticians, with the help of Congress, have already removed the largest and most volatile core inflation items, house prices, mortgage and consumer loan interest rates, in the early 1980s and the late 1990s.

    Under Greenspan's leadership, the Fed made another effort to dumb down inflation for policy purposes by selecting a hybrid price measure, the PCE deflator, as its preferred price target. The Fed never admitted that nearly one-third of the PCE price index is not derived from market prices or consumer-paid prices.

    Choosing the PCE over the CPI was a convenient and potentially political method to produce a lower price index. This choice made it easier for the Fed to say it was achieving or close to its inflation target, thereby allowing it to maintain lower official rates than would otherwise be possible.

    Price indexes are intended to accurately reflect the changes in the prices of the "conditions" they measure. However, government statisticians and Congress, with assistance from the Fed, continually alter these "conditions," not to enhance accuracy, but to create a lower index.

    If Mr. Warsh is chosen to head the Fed, he is likely to succeed in adjusting the Fed's inflation target to these price indicators. The main beneficiary would be "finance," where Mr. Warsh previously worked, on and off, for the past 20 years.

    The Fed advocates for its independence, yet how can it defend its "independence policy" when it implements or alters policies that mainly benefit industries where numerous members have worked or might work after leaving the Fed?

  • The US economy is currently facing a major energy shock, and the Federal Reserve needs to apply strategies designed for supply shocks. Yet, the Federal Reserve appears to be operating under the belief that they are still dealing with the long-term impacts of a demand shock. The projections from the March 17-18 Federal Open Market Committee meeting suggest a long-term forecast of official rates at 3% and inflation at 2%, resulting in a real official interest rate of 1%. In today's world, that projected rate is much too low.

    Although demand and supply shocks may share characteristics like job losses and wealth destruction, the primary distinction lies in their impact on inflation. Demand shocks generally result in a significant drop in inflation, whereas supply shocks have the opposite impact, leading to price hikes from production through to distribution and retail, which in turn causes both headline consumer inflation and core inflation to rise.

    Before the two demand shocks of the early 2000s (the tech bubble and financial crisis), the Fed maintained a real longer-run official rate of 2%, sometimes reaching as high as 3%. Following the demand shocks, particularly the financial crisis, the Fed maintained very low and even negative real official rates, after factoring in the stimulative impacts of the quantitative easing policy.

    However, those economic conditions are now a thing of the past. Currently, with core inflaiton at 3% and managing with a nominal official rate in the low mid-3% range during the initial phases of an energy shock, it places monetary policy in a precarious situation, as it increases the risk of prolonged higher inflation. Policymakers aim to avoid the policy errors made after the COVID supply shock, but the political climate might leave them with no alternative.

    Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the bond market is sensing more inflation.

  • USA
    | Jan 21 2026

    The Flaws of GDPNow

    The GDPNow model has several shortcomings, and here's an example. After the Census Bureau released October's construction spending data, the GDPNow model increased its Q4 GDP estimate to 5.4%, up from the previous 5.3%. However, a closer look at the detailed construction data suggests that the Q4 GDP estimate should have been revised downward, not upward. The GDPNow estimate for Q4 residential investment was adjusted from -5.7% to -1.0%. Yet, October's construction data indicates spending declines in new single and multi-family construction, alongside an increase in reported spending on remodeling and improvements. The latter relies on a survey that the BEA does not incorporate into its GDP calculations. Instead, the BEA uses retail spending data from building materials and hardware stores to estimate home modeling. In October, consumer spending in that retail category decreased by 1.3%.

    In summary, GDPnow estimates have several shortcomings and should not be considered a definitive measure of economic activity.

  • If you rely on the GDP estimates from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's team, the US economy is performing the improbable by growing well beyond its potential, despite two key sectors experiencing no growth and minimal new job creation. The Atlanta Fed's GDPnow estimate suggests that Q4 GDP growth is at an annualized rate of 5.1%. However, that estimate of output growth is at odds with the weak growth picture depicted by data from manufacturing, housing, and employment. That data indicates that GDP growth is occurring at, at best, half the rate.

    The US economy is composed of three primary sectors: goods, structures, and services. The Federal Reserve's industrial production metric shows that manufacturing output in Q4 through November is lower than in Q3, suggesting minimal, if any, growth in goods output for Q4.

    The structures component includes three sectors: housing, nonresidential, and state and local. Housing starts in October are significantly below the Q3 average, indicating a decrease in residential construction activity. Nonresidential construction has been weak throughout 2025, with data indicating a decline in Q4. Meanwhile, state and local construction spending shows minimal growth. Thus, the structures component is likely to weigh on Q4 GDP.

    This leaves the service sector, the largest of the three. The service sector doesn't seem to be expanding rapidly enough to support the GDPNow estimate either. For instance, private sector service job growth amounted to just 112,000 in the three months ending in December.

    Moreover, for the GDP output to increase by more than 5%, the income side must show a similar rise. However, the data on jobs, wages, and hours indicate a very modest increase in labor income in Q4. To align with the GDP output growth estimate, there would need to be an extraordinary increase in operating profits to offset the weak labor income. Companies would have to register a record increase in margins to do that, which is unlikely given the price data.

    The government shutdown, which lasted over 40 days, affected and delayed several economic reports to such an extent that it's currently very challenging to obtain a reliable assessment of the Q4 economic performance. Nevertheless, if the data on jobs, manufacturing, and housing accurately represent the situation, then GDPnow is more than 50% off.

  • USA
    | Nov 30 2025

    Monetary Policy Mistakes

    Monetary policy mistakes are often self-inflicted. Sometimes, policymakers cling to an official policy for too long, necessitating a swift and sharp reversal to mitigate economic harm. At other times, they try to address or reduce economic imbalances that aren't caused by monetary policy. That's when policy mistakes happen, and it seems that policymakers are about to make another mistake soon if they react to recent job data. Policymakers are tasked with an employment and inflation mandate, yet they are not mandated to correct or counteract the "stupidity" or "misguided" decisions of fiscal policy.

    Several policymakers have publicly expressed concern that the weakness in labor markets, particularly the sharp slowdown in job growth, justifies another official rate cut at the upcoming FOMC meeting in December. However, before deciding to change its monetary policy stance, policymakers should investigate whether the weakness in the job market is connected to their official interest rate stance or to other factors beyond their control, which could result in a policy mistake.

    For the week ending November 22, jobless claims fell to 216,000, the lowest level since April. The long history of jobless claims shows that this weekly indicator is a reliable leading indicator of labor market activity. This low number of claims suggests that the limited job creation is not due to weak business activity or restrictive monetary policy. If that were the case, jobless claims would be much higher, possibly double.

    Small businesses, which are responsible for most of the new job creation, have experienced negative job growth throughout most of 2025. A major factor contributing to this is the uncertainty and increased costs associated with Trump's tariff policy. The increasing "cost of doing" business and the uncertainty about whether tariffs will rise or be eliminated ultimately pose substantial challenges for small businesses with thin profit margins.

    The retail trade sector, one of the largest private employers and primarily consisting of small businesses, has been both directly and indirectly affected by tariffs on imported goods. This sector has seen nearly 100,000 job cuts in the first nine months of 2025. Tariff-related?

    Since the tariff policy was announced in April, the unemployment rate, which is one part of the Fed's dual mandate, has risen from 4.2% to 4.4%, a relatively small increase. In response to this slight rise, the Fed has reduced overall official rates twice, totaling 50 basis points.

    However, Trump's tariff policy has a more direct effect on inflation, which is the other half of the Fed's dual mandate. Since April, CPI inflation has increased to 3%, up from the 2.3% rate that existed before the tariff announcement. The Fed targets a 2% inflation rate, and despite current inflation rising considerably above this target since tariffs were introduced, policymakers have not considered changing their policy approach to tackle the increase.

    If businesses are reluctant to hire due to the tariff policy under Trump's administration and inflation is moving higher due to the imposition of tariffs, and further away from the Fed's target, why should monetary policy address one part of its mandate, which is unrelated to its official rate stance, while ignoring the second part of its mandate? A dual mandate is effective only when policymakers address both sides equally.

    A growing number of the current generation of Fed policymakers appear to be considerably more political in their approach to monetary policy, disregarding data and their mandates. According to public statements, this group of policymakers intends to vote for another official rate in December, despite job and price data suggesting that another rate cut is unnecessary.

    The political dynamics of the Fed are likely to become more divided as President Trump is set to announce a new chair to succeed Fed Chair Powell in May 2026. A policy error in December 2025 might quickly lead to additional mistakes in 2026, making bond yields and the dollar more volatile and unpredictable factors for investors.

  • Kevin, in your role as Director of the National Economic Council, you carry the significant responsibility of advising the president on economic and fiscal policy matters, while also acting as an "honest broker." I was genuinely shocked and disappointed to hear that you argued the dismissal of the BLS Commissioner was an effort to "restore" trust in the BLS. This is entirely false. In reality, the removal of the BLS Commissioner sends the opposite message, indicating that the administration will attempt to manipulate the numbers for political gain.

    As you mentioned, the jobs data has indeed been "awful" for a while. But why is this happening? The statistical agencies, especially the BLS, have been lacking sufficient funding from Congress to produce the highest quality data for policymakers, businesses, individuals, and investors. Instead of seeking additional funding, the current administration has dismissed its leader, claiming this will lead to better statistics, which many now distrust.

    In the most recent employment figures, companies of all sizes have communicated to you and others in the administration that the erratic tariff policy has generated such confusion and uncertainty that managing a business on a day-to-day or weekly basis has become nearly impossible.

    Janet Norwood, the esteemed BLS Commissioner, remarked that "the professionals who compile the nation's statistics must be courageous enough to insist that their work remains free of political interference." The dismissal of the BLS Commissioner suggests that this is no longer feasible.

  • Several presidents have challenged governmental statistical agencies over the years, but these disputes typically involved the reporting and interpretation of economic data. Today, President Trump has crossed a "sacred red line" by firing the Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner, claiming the individual was "manipulating the jobs data." Employees of government statistical agencies operate with the highest integrity.

    The fact that Treasury Secretary Bessent and National Economic Council Chair Hassett did not prevent this firing is an embarrassment to everyone working in any government statistical agency. Bessent and Hassett should resign immediately, as they can never be trusted, and their failure to stop the firing of the BLS commissioner should disqualify them from any other position in the federal government, especially at the Federal Reserve.

    Those employed in the economic, business, and financial sectors must ensure that professionals responsible for collecting our national statistics remain independent of political influence. The best way to begin is by dismissing those currently in charge who failed to prevent the firing of the BLS Commissioner.

  • The Trump administration often highlights the revenue from tariffs, but hides the decrease in corporate income tax due to increased tariff-related expenses. By June 2025, covering three quarters of the fiscal year, corporate tax revenues have dropped by over $30 billion compared to the previous year.

    Therefore, while the government might be earning extra revenue from tariffs, it is US companies that are covering the costs, resulting in them paying less in taxes.

  • How significant is a 15% tariff on imported consumer goods? It's substantial enough to cause an increase in consumer inflation, yet not substantial enough to encourage a shift in production to the US. While investors might express "good cheer" over tariffs averaging 15% instead of a much higher rate, the end result will be higher inflation rather than an expanded U.S. manufacturing sector, which was the primary aim of Trump's tariff policy.

    The Trump administration recently reached several trade agreements with major trading partners, implementing a 15% tariff on a broad array of imported goods, many of which are consumer items.

    Is that significant? According to consumer price index data, prices for consumer goods, excluding food and energy, were unchanged from 2000 to 2020. However, they rose by nearly 15% in 2021 and 2022 due to product shortages and supply disruptions stemming from the pandemic. Consequently, a potential 15% price hike on non-energy and food consumer goods is notably large, as it matches the total price increase over the past 25 years. There is no doubt that consumer prices for these goods will increase over time as these tariffs are factored into the pricing structure.

    However, is the 15% tariff hike on consumer goods significant enough to compel companies to relocate production to the US? While it might attract some new investment, the cost difference between manufacturing in the US and other countries vastly exceeds 15%. Additionally, the expenses associated with new investments, as well as the time required to secure locations, acquire permits, and finish construction, are considerable. By the time these processes are completed, many of these tariffs might be eliminated under a new administration.

    Assessing the results of Trump's tariff policy will take months and years, but it is very probable will lead to increased consumer inflation and minimal changes in global manufacturing.

  • Federal Reserve Governor Christopher J. Waller's speech, "The Case For Cutting Now," delivered at the Money Marketeers of New York University, was intriguing from both political and policy perspectives. His economic rationale for a formal rate reduction at the July 29-30 FOMC meeting was, at best, puzzling, and the timing appeared politically motivated. With the Fed's independence facing substantial pressure, it is crucial for those making monetary policy decisions to remain apolitical.

    It is exceedingly uncommon for a Fed Governor to dissent at an FOMC meeting, as demonstrated by the fact that there have only been a few dissents by Fed Governors in the past decade or more. It is even rarer for the rationale behind a dissenting vote to be expressed and made public before the FOMC meeting.

    Considering the political pressure aimed at Fed Chair Powell in recent days and weeks, it is worth considering if there was a political agenda influencing the timing and content of Mr. Waller's speech, particularly because he was named by the current administration as a candidate for the Fed Chair role. (On CNBC last week, Mr Waller stated, "If the President asked me to do the Fed chair job, I would say yes.")

    Mr. Waller's rationale for a rate cut at this time is questionable, even when political factors are set aside. For instance, Mr. Waller asserts, "tariffs are one-off increases in the price level and do not cause inflation beyond a temporary spike." Yet, he offers no evidence to support this claim.

    Mr. Waller's assertion regarding tariffs being a one-time impact on inflation might hold some truth if the tariffs implemented by the Trump administration were consistent, even, and applied simultaneously. However, the tariff policy is erratic and uneven, with some of the largest increases affecting essential materials like steel, aluminum, and copper, which will continually elevate production costs and price pressures in the US.

    However, Mr. Waller states that even if tariffs have a greater effect on inflation, it will not alter or affect his perspective on the implications for monetary policy. Why? Mr. Waller contends that, despite recent increases in individual price expectation surveys, there is no evidence of an "unanchoring of inflation expectations." He considers surveys of people's inflation expectations, which have shown a significant jump in recent months, two or three times above the Fed's 2% inflation target, to be "unreliable." Rather, he relies more on those who predict inflation expectations in the financial markets. In other words, he trusts individuals who wager on future inflation rather than those who deal with it daily.

    Mr. Waller cites labor market trends as a reason to lower rates now, stating that "private sector job gains are near stall speed and flashing red." However, he overlooks that the Fed's labor market mandate focuses on the unemployment rate, not private sector jobs, which, at 4.1%, is below the Fed's long-term target. He mentioned that a significant slowdown in "net immigration" might be contributing to the sluggish growth in private sector jobs, but acknowledged that understanding its impact on employment will take time.

    Additionally, Mr. Waller does not address how "uncertainty" over tariff policy is affecting hiring decisions, despite it being a common theme in the Fed's July Beige Book report.

    Nevertheless, Mr. Waller is willing to wait and see how immigration affects the labor markets, but is not prepared to wait to evaluate the impact of Trump's tariff policy on current and future inflation.

    Mr. Waller has only one vote at the FOMC, but his vote could be very "LOUD" because the Administration is likely to use it as an additional tool to influence Fed policy. Federal Reserve independence can only be preserved if those responsible for implementing monetary policy decisions avoid political involvement.