Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media.   Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

  • Germany
    | Mar 07 2022

    German Orders Rise But Slow

    German new factory orders rose 1.8% in January after rising by 3% in December and by 3.6% in November. Orders are up at a 39.2% annual rate over three months; that's a sharp acceleration from the minus 9.2% rate of change over six months and a solid acceleration from the 7.4% annual rate over 12 months.

    Foreign orders rose by 9.4% in January after falling 2.4% in December and rising 6.5% in November. Foreign orders are rising at a very strong 67% annualized rate over three months after falling at a 3.2% annual rate over six months and rising by 9.4% over 12 months. Domestic orders fell by 8.3% in January, blunting the increase in overall order gains. Domestic orders rose by 11.4% in December and fell by 0.7% in November. Over three months domestic orders are rising at a 6.1% annual rate, up from a minus 17.5% rate over six months compared to their 4.6% increase over 12 months. Domestic orders have been more volatile and weaker than foreign orders.

    Clearly German orders are being driven by their foreign component. This is not surprising since foreign orders have increasingly more important than domestic orders going back to at least 1990. Germany is highly trade-dependent, and its manufacturing sector continues to show that. Germany is highly exposed to international events although a lot of German trade occurs within Europe and within the EMU single currency area without clear foreign exchange consequences.

    Overall orders: Quarter-to-date and Covid-to-date In the quarter-to-date, total orders are rising at a 34% annual rate boosted by a 75.7% annual rate increase in foreign orders; domestic orders are falling at a 10.2% annual rate early in Q1 2022. Looking at orders back to January 2020 when COVID first struck, total orders are up by 8.8% on that timeline, foreign orders are up by 11% and domestic orders are up by 5.5%. These are reasonably firm results for real orders over a two-year period.

    Real sales trends Real sales in Germany show more of a mixed trend across its component sectors. For manufacturing monthly sales are up by 1.8% in January; that accelerates from 0.7% in December and compares to a 4.3% rise in November. However, consumer goods, consumer durable goods and consumer nondurable goods sales all decelerate month-to-month. Intermediate goods sales decelerate month-to-month as well. But those trends are dominated by capital goods that accelerate and grow 3.9% month-to-month in January, after being flat in December and surging by 8.3% in November alone.

    For the moment, capital goods are extremely strong and making up for some lost time. Manufacturing sales are also accelerating; they are accelerating to a 30.4% annual rate over three months from 8.3% over six months and 3% over 12 months. The manufacturing sector is gaining momentum.

    By sector, consumer goods output is less linear with a 3.2% gain over 12 months turning to a decline of 0.8% at an annual rate over six months but then climbing back in the plus column with a 5.3% annual rate gain over three months. Intermediate goods accelerate steadily, rising from a 0.3% gain over 12 months, to a 1.2% pace over six months and to a pace of 8.1% over three months. Capital goods show the strongest acceleration of all; real capital goods sales are up by 3.1% over 12 months rising to a 14.8% pace of expansion over six months. That increases to 60.2% at an annual rate over three months. Clearly capital goods are driving force in the German economy right now.

    Quarter-to-date and Covid-to-date Quarter-to-date real sales show strength for manufacturing where sales are up at a 24.1% pace; consumer goods are up at 3% pace; intermediate goods are up to 2.2% pace; capital goods sales are rising in the quarter-to-date at a massive 46.8% annual rate. Some of this clearly is ‘catch-up’ as sales have been weak since COVID struck. Looking at the change in sales since January 2020, total manufacturing sales are still somewhat weaker being 0.2%, below their January 2020 mark. Consumer goods real sales are 2.4% lower; intermediate goods sales are higher by 0.9% but sales of capital goods are lower by 0.7%. So, the manufacturing sector is just now beginning to gather momentum and post some pace.

    Caveat outlook This, of course, is time for us again to deal with suspicions about the future. After having to make caveats over the last two years about COVID and its effect on manufacturing in the economy, on orders and on trade, there is now a war going on in Ukraine. There are huge potential consequences for Germany and for Europe because of the dependence of this area on oil from Russia. There is an ongoing dialogue about whether Russian oil will be embargoed or not. This raises a huge question mark about Germany and its potential for growth looking ahead.

    So far, we have good strength in the countries that we summarize in the table: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Industrial measures stand in their respective 90th percentile ranking them in a data queue since 1990. Obviously, the future is clouded because of war in the Ukraine and because of European dependence on oil. For now, momentum looks good. Sector performance is solid. There are still ongoing supply-chain problems, but for now, these forces do not seem to be restraining Germany very much. However, the war in Ukraine is a new element that must be put in the uncertainty column looking ahead and it could become a huge fact and will likely restrain growth ahead.

  • The German trade surplus has generally been withering over the past year or so, but in January it has made a reversal and started to improve slightly. Nominal imports fell by 4.3% in January, dominating the trend for the trade account in the month. Exports also fell by 3.1%, but the bigger drop in imports caused the trade surplus to get larger. January was a race to the bottom and imports won.

    Sequential growth rates tell an uneven story with exports growing 7.6% over 12 months. The pace slows to 3.4% over six months, then exports go stagnant with no-gain over three months. That part of the story is clear enough and it's an ongoing export deceleration. But for imports, the growth rates have been stronger and relatively steady at 22.1% over 12 months, at 20.4% over six months, then falling sharply to 12.6% over three months. But paired up against the export growth rates, imports are stronger by a wide margin on each of those horizons. And despite the sharp deceleration in import growth over three months, imports still are quite a bit stronger than exports over three months.

    Much of what we see in these trends is related to price developments. We can make a comparison by looking at nominal versus real trade flows. However, to do that we have to look at data that are lagged by a month, since that is the most topical real trade flow data we possess. On that basis, exports appear much firmer, rising at a 12.1% pace over 12 months, at a 12.8% pace over six months, and culminating at a 31.7% pace over three months. Although those are enlivened flows on data updated through December (one-month lag; see shaded cells in the table), compared to imports they're still the weak ones. Imports are up at a 24.8% pace over 12 months, at 25.4% pace over six months and at a 59.1% annual rate pace over three months. Nominal import data continue to dominate export data even when we lag them by a month period and when exports 'wake up.'

    We look at the lagged nominal data so we can compare them to the real flow data which are available topically only through December. Real flow data lagged one month show exports are up by 1.1% over 12 months, falling at a 0.7% pace over six months and then rising at a 15.8% pace over three months. Those flows compare to imports where lagged real imports are up by only 0.7% over 12 months and are lagging exports that are up by 1.1% over 12 months. Real imports fall by 1.2% over six months, again putting exports on stronger ground since they fall by only 0.7%. Real exports pickup to grow at a 15.8% rate over three months, but real imports pick up by more and reach a growth rate of 21.3% putting imports back in the lead.

    Taking price out of the equation puts exports and imports on a much more even footing for growth. However, prices are in the equation. Rising oil prices and commodity prices have been part of the problem in this cycle and we can see that's one of the main forces that has been dogging the German trade deficit. Its pattern of deterioration reverses this month, not on revived exports but on weaker imports.

  • The PPI gain is strong The PPI in the European monetary area rose by 4.9% month-over-month in January. In December, the PPI rose by 2.7% m/m. The rate of growth for headline producer price inflation in the European monetary union is up at a 42.2% annualized rate over three months; that's an acceleration - but barely an acceleration- from its 40.6% annual rate increase over six months. Year-over-year producer prices are up at a 30.5% annual rate. These rates of growth compare to an inflation rate one year ago for the PPI that was up year-over-year at a 0.2% annual rate. This is a stunning and broad acceleration. Inflation is high… inflation is rising… inflation is accelerating broadly… and central banks, generally, still are waiting to make their first moves to head it off at the pass. That, at least, is true of the ECB and the Federal Reserve.

    The PPI gain is broad Statistics and acceleration show that the PPI is accelerating in about 38% of the EMU members (and others in the table) in January compared to December whereas in December it increased in about 50% of them compared to November. Over three months inflation is accelerating in 46.2% of them; over six months it is accelerating at 61.5% of them. Year-over-year it's accelerating in 100% of the currently reporting members and others in the table. One year ago, even though inflation was much lower, it also was broadly accelerating with 78.6% of the reporters in this table showing inflation higher. While inflation continues to increase broadly and accelerate widely, the increase in Brent oil prices carries on, but oil has been steadily decelerating. The push for inflation to show more broadly cannot placed at the feet of rising oil prices. This leads us to see inflation as becoming more deeply embedded in the economy apart from oil.

    Table 1

  • In February, manufacturing PMI results are mixed with 7 out of 17 reporters showing results that are worse than they were one month ago. Over three months nine countries or regions show worse PMI values than they had six months ago; there is net deterioration over six months. However, over 12 months all reporting areas except one show results superior to what it was 12-months ago with the exception being China.

    The table shows mixed momentum over three months and six months. But the queue or rank standings show that by and large conditions are still relatively firm across most of the regions for manufacturing. Only three countries have percentile standings of their PMI gauges below 50%; those are Mexico, China, and Russia. Turkey sits on the fence at its 50% mark. Queue and rank standings at 50% reflect the midpoint for each series. For the most part, countries have firm-to-strong readings for manufacturing well above their midpoints. These results are quite solid when compared to their recent history over the last four-plus years.

    The table also shows changes in manufacturing PMIs since January 2020 before the virus struck. What we see is only the euro area and Germany have double-digit improvements over this period. After that, the biggest improvement that we see comes from the U.K. at eight points and then a number of countries in the five-to-six-point gain region such as France, the U.S. and Canada. Showing weakness over this period; i.e., a decline -a weaker PMI gauge in February 2022 than in January 2020- are Mexico, China, Russia, India, and Turkey. That weakness indicates that there is still a significant risk in countries that have had no improvement in manufacturing PMIs in over two years and in countries where PMI stands are still low.

  • China's manufacturing PMI in February ticked up to 50.2 in February from 50.1 in January, continuing to hug that breakeven line between expansion and contraction at 50. At a reading of 50, manufacturing is stagnant. The 12-month average for this index is 50.4, the six-month average is 49.9, and the three-month average is 50.2. China has been on the borderline of expansion-contraction in a weak mode for well over a year – easily back to 2018.

    Zero growth is not nothing, but it's not much either Apart from a period in 2017 and early-2018 and another period in late-2020 and early-2021 when the index lifted more considerably, the index has been hugging the 50 level since early-2013. China's manufacturing sector simply been in a flat mode. The three-year average for the manufacturing PMI gauge hovers between 50 and 51 from late-2013 to date. Since February 2020, that average has not been higher than 50.3 – barely above pure stagnation. Essentially China's manufacturing sector has been stagnant for a long stretch now that precedes the arrival of Covid.

    Manufacturing is slogging through a long funk The ranking of China's overall manufacturing PMI back to 2005 stands in its 29th percentile that's in the lower third of its range and during period of extended weakness.

    • Orders also are weak at their 30th percentile in just about the same relative spot.
    • Output is extremely weak, at its 5.8 percentile standing.
    • Delivery lags at a 6.8 percentile standing indicate that there hasn't been any pressure on capacity so that firms have been able to deliver goods relatively rapidly because there's been considerable slack in the manufacturing sector and extremely weak output conditions.
    • Order backlogs now are only at their 35th percentile.
    • Employment, one of the stronger components, has crept up to its 55.5 percentile, putting it above its median reading. But rising employment and weak output mean that productivity in manufacturing has had a terrible performance in this period.
    • Input prices are relatively strong at their 70th percentile standing.
    • The purchases of inputs are at only about their 32nd percentile standing.
    • New export orders stand in their 38th percentile.
    • Imports stand in their 35th percentile.
      It is a wholistic picture of a weak sector. Only prices are stirring and that is a legacy of the global virus and the shifting sands of global supply chain problems. It also reflects rising global energy costs and war…

    PMI standings are poor across the board These standings show all of manufacturing be in a very weak mode or a place-holding mode. There isn't really anything that's strong outside of input prices and this is in a global environment where inflation forces have ramped up very strongly. In this environment China, of course, is different. It has been running this zero COVID policy, trying to keep the disease COVID from spreading at all and even trying to stamp out its very existence. But totalitarian policies work better against people who can be made complaint than against a virus that spreads at will – its own will not yours… And this approach has put a real damper on activity over the last six months or so since this policy has been in effect.

    Momentum is weak Looking at momentum in China, manufacturing only output, order backlogs, and stocks have momentum easing over three months compared to over six months. However, over six months, there are more categories easing: output, order backlogs, employment, import prices, and stocks all are showing weakness compared to their levels over 12 months. Comparing 12 months to 12 months ago, the signs of slowdown are much broader with only four categories showing momentum on an upswing including delivery speeds, employment, stocks of major inputs, and new export orders.

    Whether one chooses to look at China by looking at changes in the manufacturing PMI and its components or at their PMI index levels, the conclusion is still the same: weak.

  • Japan
    | Feb 28 2022

    Japan's IP Falls Again

    Japan's industrial output fell by 1% in January after tumbling 0.8% in December. Still, output has a strong 18.7% (annualized) gain over three months on the strength of a 6.3% monthly gain in November. However, output is falling by 1.3% over 12 months and by 6.8% over six months.

    In the quarter-to-date industrial output is up at a 2.6% rate, but that is all from the momentum generated back in November.

    Manufacturing is following the same pattern as overall IP on this timeline.

    Sectors show declines in consumer goods output and in output of intermediate goods in January as well as in December. Both also showed very sharp monthly gains in November. Both sectors show double-digit annualized growth rates of gain in the last three months while their growth rates are negative over six months and 12 months.

    Investment goods are off on their own tangent. The output of investment goods rose by 1.8% in January, fell by 2.7% in December and rose by 2.8% in November. Investment goods show a gain in output over 12 months, a fall in double digits over six months and a strong but single-digit annualized gain over three months.

    In the quarter-to-date, output falls for consumer goods but is rising for intermediate goods and for investment goods.

    The mining sector shows output increases in two of the last three months but logs a drop over three months, six months and 12 months. And those declines are increasing more severely. Mining output also is falling in the quarter-to-date.

    Looking at output changes since before Covid struck, the headline, manufacturing and all sectors are still lower on balance. Japan has not recovered to its pre-Covid level of activity and that means since that a two-year period there has been no growth either as would normally occur for a two-year period.

  • GfK's projection of Germany's consumer climate in March finds a drop to -8.1 in the index from -6.7 in February. February had increased slightly from January (-6.9) which had worsened considerably, falling 5.1 points from its December value. The current string of four negative readings follows two positive readings in a row in October and November of last year. In some sense, Germany is having a relapse. The March reading is the weakest reading for consumer climate since May 2021, ten months ago.

    The GfK index cratered at -23.1 in May 2020 and had a second downdraft in which it bottomed at a level of -15.5 in February 2021. The German economy has been on the virus rollercoaster, and it looks like the ride is continuing.

    Further details on the German climate situation expand on readings for expectations for the economy and for income expectations as well as look at the current buying climate. These readings lag the headline by one month.

    The economic situation improved in its most recent observation for February, rising to 24.1 from January's 22.8. The February reading is above its January and December levels, but it is below all readings from May 2021 to November 2021.

    Income expectations also for February backed off sharply, falling to 3.9 from January's 16.9. The February reading is below all expectation readings since February 2021. The last three months seem to represent a more striking drop compared to the earlier values.

    The buying climate also eroded in February. It fell to 1.4 from January's 5.2. It was also lower in December for that single month and was previously lower for a single month also in January 2012. It has not been lower except for one-off monthly readings since December 2008 that ended a 16-month period of greater weakness during the global financial crisis when the reading was persistently weaker. That means the current propensity to buy reading is at an unusual point of weakness.

    The percentile standings for the March headline and the February components tells the story in stark quantitative terms. The headline ranks as lower only 2.5% of the time- that is extremely weak. The economic expectation reading, at its 74.1 percentile, a much more solid position and well above its median. Income expectations, however, are weak at a 32.2 percentile standing placing them in the lower one third among all their historic readings. The propensity to buy at a 27.5 percentile reading also is in the lower one-third of all its historic readings.

    German data are somewhat at loose ends as we get to February and March as the IFO index released yesterday, and with more detail today, shows a good deal of variance across sectors. The Markit survey has showed a step down in German manufacturing and a sizeable step up for services in February. The improvement in services is in sync with Germany's infection roll-off but the roll-off is gradual and while services improve in February climate erodes in March.

    The outlook for the period three-months ahead (made as of February) in the fresh IFO release shows strength across the board in activity and orders in manufacturing and in orders for retailing at a rank standing in the 90th percentile – extremely strong. The lowest standings in the three-month outlook are from exports with readings in the 55th to 75th percentile on data back to 2002. Apparently, businesses and industry in Germany are more confident than are consumers.

    In other European economies whose data only are updated through January, we find some weakening in confidence for Italy, France, and the U.K. Still, Italy's confidence has a 90.2 queue percentile standing, France has a 68.5 percentile standing, and the U.K. has a 28.1 percentile standing.

  • The IFO business index climate readings all improved in February; the aggregates improved for current conditions and expectations as well. In fact, the lone monthly set back was to expectations in the construction sector.

    Climate readings stand above their pre-Covid (January 2020) level overall for manufacturing and in wholesaling. It is hard to see where the rebound has come from since it is not in any obvious way virus-related. In Germany, the infections rates continued higher through January, peaking in the second week of February and coming down slowly. The death rate curve, which is known to lag., reached a local low point in late-January and early-February but has since risen slightly. So the German revitalization either represents some autonomous increase in activity or it reflects less fear of the virus by the German population. The services reading for Germany in climate, current conditions and expectations all stepped up on the month, but also rising sharply was the Markit reading on the services sector. This is the sector that tends to respond the most to changes in the virus and we can expect that it also will be the litmus test for economic responses drive by changes in attitudes toward the virus.

    However, retailing, while improving, is also a lagging sector in the IFO framework that needs to improve to play catch-up. This limits the conclusion that the changing attitude on the virus may be driving these responses. Retailing climate did gain substantially month-to-month, but current conditions only made a modest rise (one tenth of a tick higher, rising to -1.2 in February from -1.3 in January) while the expectations reading pushed strongly higher rising in February to -5.5 from -16.9.

    There are two concepts at work here. One is the assessment currently of the change month-to-month. The other is the historic standing of activity levels in the various sectors. Overall, the standings show climate at a solid 78.5 percentile mark while the current standing is at its 51.2 percentile and expectations are only at their 51.7 percentile. The climate reading is quite solid by itself while the current and expectations readings are only at a thin margin above their respective median values on data back to 2005. The current standings for retailing and services are below their median with readings of 42.0 for retailing and 25.4 for services- their respective historic median occur at rankings of 50.0. Thus, both of these show below-par readings. Wholesaling and construction show solid/strong readings with construction at an 87.8 percentile standing and wholesaling at a 91.2 percentile standing. Manufacturing, once the strongman of this series, has a still solid reading at its 76.1 percentile.

    If you wonder where German businesses think they are going, apparently, they wonder too. Their overview ranking is only at the 51.7 percentile mark, just tad above its median (on data back to 2005). The outlook is weighed down by three standings below their medians: a 20.5 percentile standing for construction, a 34.1 percentile standing for services and a 35.6 percentile standing for wholesaling. Boosting expectations above the 50 mark that represents its median is the 58.5 percentile standing for retailing and the 68.3 percentile standing for manufacturing. The 'bad news' here is that no expectation reading is higher than its 68th percentile which suggests that there is no real pent-up optimism. There is some optimism but no significant optimism. And this, even though there are signs of the virus slowing, being less lethal, and putting fewer in the hospital.

    Over one, two and three months, climate readings have improved on back across all sectors as well as for current conditions and business expectations in the aggregate. But over four, six, seven and eight months, there are sector declines as well as mixed declines for the current and expectations indexes.

  • U.K. retail sales rose 2% in January after falling by 3.4% in December. Still, sequential growth rates for nominal sales decelerated from a 16.5% pace over 12 months to a 4.4% pace over six months to 2.2% over three months. Spending on beverages & tobacco as well as on clothing & footwear shows decelerating growth rates.

    Retail volumes also show sequential deceleration. Volume sales rise 1.9% in January after falling by 3.9% in December. The sequential pace of sales falls from a strong 9.1% annual rate over 12 months to -2.7% over six months and to -5.3% over three months.

    In the quarter-to-date, nominal sales rise by 2%, but sales volumes are falling at a 3.2% annual rate.

    We can also rank the year-on-year growth rates for sales; the rate ranks at a very high 98.8 percentile. For sales volumes, it ranks at the same high 98.8 percentile. That is good news, but it is undermined by the trends.

    The progression for sales shows a slowdown except for registrations for passenger cars. Car purchases have surged at a 48% rate over three months. Passenger car sales are strong in the quarter and rank high in terms of their year-to-date rate of growth. But it is only a partial offset to slowing retail sales overall.

    Surveys for retail sales are slightly less robust in terms of their long-term percentile standing. The CBI survey for retail sales for this time of year (a sort of seasonally adjusted view) has only a 19-percentile standing, in the lower one-fifth of its historic queue of data. Consumer confidence has a 26-percentile standing, at the border of the lower quarter of its historic queue of data. The volume of orders year-on-year does better with a queue standing at an 80.6 percentile.

    The surveys show quarter-to-date declines in all the survey metrics in the table including consumer confidence. The data on sequential changes are not getting worse at a progressively worsening pace, but the changes in the survey metrics do erode over six months as well as over three months- just not faster. The six-month erosion is a reversal of gains made over 12 months and over three months. That erosion continues at nearly the same pace. Only for consumer confidence is the pace of erosion lessened over three months.

    In January and December, however, there is ongoing erosion for the retail surveys and for consumer confidence.

  • Ireland's HICP rose by 0.4% in January, the same as its gain in February. Ireland is another piece in the puzzle that looks to discover what has caused this inflation; it is everywhere. Its domestic consumer price measure rose by 0.4% as well for the second month in a row\, but the core measure slowed to a gain of 0.2% in January after rising by 0.4% in December.

    Overall inflation is trendless, but both the six-month change at 7.1% and the three-month pace at 5.8% are ahead of the year-on-year gain at 5.0%. The domestic CPI and its core have the same set of features with an acceleration over six months and slowdown over three months but with both the three-month and the six-month pace more than the 12-month pace.

    However, the diffusion statistics are not worrisome. They show a breadth of inflation over 12 months (compared to 12-months ago) at 58.3. Over six months the diffusion measure that compares six-month to 12-month inflation is up to 0.66, which is a high reading for diffusion. That reading says inflation is accelerating in two-thirds of the categories. But then, over three months, which makes the comparison to the six-month pace, diffusion is only at 0.50, a dead neutral reading showing acceleration and deceleration forces are balanced.

    Still, there are some trends by categories: alcohol and clothing & footwear both show steady acceleration in prices – for alcohol it's a strong move higher. Health care costs show a minor acceleration tendency, rising from a 1.1% gain over 12 months to flatten at a higher 1.5% pace over three months and six months. Education costs also step up steadily but still post the second slowest three-month gain among all categories. The lone steady deceleration in price is from the catch-all ‘other' category.

    Four categories show weaker three-month gains than 12-month gains while one category shows the same pace for 12-months as for three-months. Seven three-month gains are at a pace that exceeds the 12-month pace. The headline shows a three-month gain more than the 12-month pace by 0.8%. For the domestic CPI the increment is only 0.4%, but for the core it is 0.9%- nearly one percentage point. The average gain across all components (unweighted) is 1% but the median is +0.4%. So, there is inflation in Ireland; it has accelerated somewhat broadly, but not all that strongly...yet.

    On balance, Ireland does not seem to have virulent inflation problems. The 12-month acceleration compared to 12 months ago is large at +5.2% and the domestic headline echoes that number. But the domestic core rate accelerates by 2.3% year over year-ago. The headlines clearly show the impact of commodity and oil prices that are still gaining but not by as much. Core gains remain more muted, but will they continue or step up in the wake of those headlines? That's the issue.

    Ireland poses the question of whether inflation is bad or was it bad? The three-month pace of 5.4% and 3.9% logged by the domestic headline and core, respectively, are well above target but do not look threatening. The momentum is not threatening either. The three-month diffusion is balanced.

  • EMU industrial production gained 1.2% in December after rising by 2.4% in November- a clear solid gain and offset after October's drop of 1.5% and a run of four previous months in which output fell in three of four months. In 2021, output declined in 5 of 12 months; it was a mixed year for manufacturing despite there being a solid net gain for output of 1.5%. All sectors saw year-on-year gains except for capital goods where output declined by 2.4% over 12 months.

    Overall output is not accelerating in a formal statistical sense, but output in manufacturing is over that hurdle with solid growth of 1.7% over both 12 months and six months that steps up to a pace of 10% over three months.

    The annotations in the table track the EMU manufacturing PMI. It has been somewhat erratic and is lower in December and was lower in October, but it rose in November. The PMI fell on balance over six months and three months but is stronger over 12 months.

    The quarter-to-date column is now for the completed fourth quarter that shows a decline in activity despite a strong final two months. This calculation (to remind you...) is executed on the Q3 quarterly average for the IP index vs. the Q4 average (it is not a three-month change). Weakness late in Q3 helped to depress the level for output in Q4 despite two strong monthly gains, leaving the average level in Q4 below the level in Q3. Manufacturing output also is weaker in Q4, falling at a 1.5% pace. The weakness is mostly on the back of weak consumer goods output and that is due to weak consumer nondurables output.

    By sector, consumer goods show sequential weakness created mostly by weakness in nondurable goods. Intermediate goods are without a formal trend- but do show a very strong gain over three months. Capital goods show a strong rising trend accelerating from 12-months to six-months to three-months and running at a double-digit growth rate of 22.8% over three months.

    All sectors in the EMU have recovered relative to their pre-Covid levels of activity. All are showing gains, albeit small ones over that nearly two-year period.

    Country trends The table also presents manufacturing IP data for 12 EMU members and two non-EMU members. Unlike the overall sector data for the EMU, some countries have not fully recovered from their Covid setback. Among the 12 EMU members, six still have output trailing its level of February 2020 before Covid struck. One of the two non-members (Norway) is also weaker on balance. Among those members that are weaker on balance are Malta, Germany, France, Portugal, Luxembourg, and Spain.

    On the month only four countries report weaker IP and three of those are EMU members: Austria, Italy, and Malta. Five EMU members showed declines in November and three showed declines in October.

    EMU member growth is solid over various periods as well with only three members that are net weaker over 12 months, four weaker on balance over six months and three showing declines over three months. However, in the quarter-to-date, there are six EMU members that show output declining relative to the third quarter.

    The chart at the top shows output is getting past its rundown deceleration phase in the wake of its Covid hammering then explosive rebound. But this is a nascent rebound. Capital goods, a sector that was hit hard, is now gathering a strong rebound. It has monthly growth of more than 1% for three months running. That is more impressive than having growth promoted by a single explosive month. Other indicators also suggest that investment demand may be picking up. In the early stages of Covid recovery, there was so much slack that capital investment was not on the front burner. Now, as supply issues continue to loom and demand continues firms, apparently, are ready to commit to new investment again for something other than hand-to-mouth survival.

  • Table ZEW Qualitative Assessment identifies the main trends of the month; colors help to discern general magnitudes of importance. The economic situation is shown to be stronger for the EMU, Germany and the United States in February, compared to January levels. However, Germany has a level of improvement that still leaves it below its historic median (below a rank standing of 50- hence the red color).

    Economic expectations are stronger for Germany and weaker for the U.S. where the Federal Reserve is making noises about being much more aggressive than the European Central Bank. However, the ECB has recently changed its tune from no new music in 2022 to perhaps a new note- but not a symphony like the Fed seems to be planning. So the ECB has abandoned its view that inflation - which is excessive- will slowly, organically, dissipate, and all will live happily ever after, while the ECB simply watches from a front row seat.

    And expectations for inflation are higher across the board although they all come with values well below their historic medians. In fact, inflation expectations, while higher in each case, are higher by very small amounts that leave those expectations at very low historic standings. The sense of increase is there; as always, we wonder if it is a turning point or just a point of inflection.

    Part of the reason for still low inflation expectations is the expected path of short-term rates, a euphemism for what central banks are expected to do. Short-rate expectations are stronger; in fact, are at a very high standing for both the U.S. and the EMU. Yet, long-term rate expectations are split- higher for German and weaker for the U.S. Still, that response is deceptive since both the U.S. and Germany have extremely high standings for their long rate expectations. The mixed changes on the month don’t seem to tell the real story. Part of that story is real since the level of rates in Europe generally is so low that ZEW experts may be espousing the view that even if the Fed hikes rates faster -and faster than in Europe- the impact on U.S. long rates will not be very pronounced.

    One thing that the Fed worries about is that if it hikes the Fed funds rate significantly the impact on U.S. long-term rates will be muted. Since U.S. rates are already higher than in Europe, further increases may spur capital flows into dollars to invest in rising U.S. long-term rates and that could cap the Fed’s ability to bring pressure on long rates reducing the efficacy of monetary policy. It certainly complicates the outlook, but that has always been the case. Long-term capital markets are connected, and such pressures are part of what domestic monetary policy must learn to live with. The ZEW experts seem to acknowledge it.

    Stock markets have been strong and have been the beneficiaries of interest rates so low that many investors have sought refuge in stocks as the only place to earn a real return on investment. Stock expectations by ZEW experts are mixed with the U.S. and Germany stronger and a weaker response for all of the EMU while Germany and the EMU lag below their historic medians. The U.S. itself is on the edge and barely above its own median.