Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Viewpoints: March 2023

  • State real GDP growth in 2022:Q4 ranged from Texas’s 7.0 percent annual rate to declines in South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa. States in the West and South grew more rapidly, while agricultural states, as well as some older industrial states in the Middle West and Northeast, were weaker. Once again, states with large fossil fuel production sectors did well, with both West Virginia and Wyoming joining the oil producers in the top ranks.

    State personal income growth rates ranged from Massachusetts’ 15.3 percent to Colorado’s 2.5 percent decline. The Massachusetts number was an artifact of a 76.1 percent rate of increase in transfers, while Colorado saw a 38.5 percent rate of decline in that area (a correction for a freak surge in the third quarter). Growth of “net earnings” (employee compensation plus proprietors’ income) was evener, though Nevada saw a double-digit rate of gain there (Oregon was nearly as strong) while South Dakota eked out a 1.0 percent growth rate.

  • For the week ending March 15, bank lending to commercial, industrial, real estate, and consumers increased by $40 billion, following a slight increase of $10 billion in the prior week. The two-week increase was more than half the cumulative increase over the previous two months, January and February.

    It is far too early to assess the impact of additional changes in lending standards. But the early March lending data reflects the tighter lending standards and the rise in market rates over the past year. And even with those tighter lending and higher rate conditions, the banking system showed a willingness to lend and businesses and consumers an appetite for borrowing.

    A bank-driven credit crunch may eventually happen, and investors are betting something substantial will occur, given the sharp drop in yields. But a few things may mitigate its impact, if not limit, its duration.

    First, all the top commercial banks are well-capitalized and do not face any liquidity constraints. It is hard to see a broad, deep, and enduring credit crunch that does not involve the top banks.

    Second, the Fed's Bank Lending Program should ease mid-tier banks' liquidity issues, and that should limit any pullback in credit due to tighter standards. The program runs for an entire year.

    Third, market interest rates have dropped significantly, which could boost the demand for credit.

    It is instinctive for investors to rush to buy the safest and most liquid assets, even when there is a hint of a banking crisis. That's the playbook investors have used in prior financial crises. Still, a 125 basis points drop in two-year yields over a few weeks is far bigger than during the early months of the 2007-09 financial crisis. The economic and financial data must support that negative narrative on yields for them to stay.

    History has shown that the "price" of credit has been the main rationing factor for credit. And until the "price" of credit gets more expensive through market forces or Fed raising rates, any pullback in credit should prove to be "transitory."

  • In the wake of the FDIC-mandated closings of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, deposits at commercial banks have declined a net $161.0 billion in the two weeks ended March 15, 2023 (see Chart 1 below). In that same two-week period, money market funds that invest in US government securities and repurchase agreements collateralized with US government securities experienced a net inflow of $130.8 billion, according to the Investment Company Institute. These money market funds gained another $131.8 billion in the week ended March 22, 2023. Each share in these money market funds is valued at $1 or par. But there is no federal guarantee that these shares are redeemable at par. Yet there were large inflows of monies into these taxable government money market funds at the same time there were large outflows of deposits from commercial banks. Deposits at commercial banks are insured to be payable at par of up to $250 thousand per account ($500 thousand for joint accounts) by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It would seem that the nonbank public has more confidence in the full faith and credit of the US government than the FDIC (unless the federal government is forced to default on its debt because of Congress failing to increase the ceiling on Treasury debt issuance). To the best of my knowledge, no government-only money market fund has ever experienced a decline in its share value below $1. Assuming that the debt ceiling is raised in time to avoid a Treasury default, do we really need federal deposit insurance?

  • State labor markets in February were mixed. Only 6 states had statistically significant gains in payrolls, with Texas’s 58,200 increase the largest; Hawaii and Utah saw .6 percent increases. Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, and New Hampshire report insignificant declines.

    Nine states had statistically significant declines in their unemployment rates from January to February, while 3—and DC—had increases. None of the moves were larger than .2 percentage points. As was the case in January, the 2.1 percent rates in both Dakotas were the nation’s lowest, while Nevada’s 5.5 percent was far and away the highest (number two was Oregon). The Dakotas, Alabama, DC, Nevada, and Oregon were the only places whose unemployment rates were more than one point different than the national average of 3.6% (Alabama joining the Dakotas on the low side, DC and Oregon high).

    Puerto Rico’s job count was virtually unchanged in February, and the island’s unemployment rate was also unchanged at 6.0 percent.

  • The Federal Reserve reminds me of a fire chief who moonlights as an arsonist. The Fed aids and abets in the setting of inflationary fires and then runs to extinguish them. In this commentary I will argue that the Fed’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia exacerbated and prolonged the inflationary impulses of these events. Furthermore, I will hypothesize that the Fed is going to pursue a more restricitve policy longer than necessary to extinguish the inflationary fire it helped set, the result of which will be a deeper-than-necessary recession. The Fed is not malicious. Rather, it is ignorant. At his semi-annual appearance before the Senate Financial Services Committee on March 7, Fed Chairman Powell stated that the Fed does not know what the level of the “neutral” federal funds is now and that the neutral level is not constant through time. Yet, the Fed persists in conducting its monetary policy by setting the level of the federal funds rate, not knowing whether the level set is above or below the neutral level of federal funds rate.

    When it became obvious to all that there was COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, real production of goods and services in the US and in many other regions of the world collapsed as business shutdowns occurred. This represented a negative supply shock. If nominal aggregate demand remained the same in the face of this negative supply shock, higher prices would result. The changes in the sum of depository institution credit (loans and securities on the books of these institutions) plus the monetary base (the sum of currency in circulation and reserves held at the Fed by depository institutions) are postively correlated with changes in nominal aggregate demand. Let’s call the sum of depository institution credit plus the monetary base “thin-air” credit because both are created, figuarively, out of thin air. By this, I mean that the extension of thin-air credit does not necessitate anyone cutting back on their current spending in order to extend this credit. You can think of the creators of thin-air credit, the Fed and depository institutions, as legal counterfeiters. Plotted in Chart 1 are the annualized percent changes in quarterly observations of thin-air credit (the blue bars) and the annualized percent changes in the quarterly observations of output produced by the business sector (the red bars).

  • State labor markets in January generally showed some gains from December. 20 states had statistically significant gains in payrolls; California’s job count increase was 96,700 (about double number 2 Texas), and both Arizona and Tennessee saw .7 percent gains. Kansas, Rhode Island, and Wyoming had modest point declines. Over the last 12 months, 47 states had significant increases, with Texas having the highest numerical increase (654,100) and Nevada the highest percentage gain (6.0). the way in both numbers and percentage (650,100 and 5.0, respectively). There were no point declines.

    Unemployment rates were little-changed; a few states had statistically significant moves from December, but none larger than .2 percentage points (in either direction). The 2.1 percent rates in both Dakotas were the nation’s lowest, while Nevada’s 5.5 percent was far and away the highest (number two was Oregon). Only 6 states were more than one point away from the national average of 3.4%, and 3 of those (the Dakotas and Delaware) are small.

    Puerto Rico’s gained more than 5,000 jobs in January. The overall payroll count on the island is nearing its highest level in more than a decade, while the private-sector is approaching an all-time peak. The unemployment rate (which had not been reported for some months) was unchanged at 6.0 percent, despite a .9 percent gain in the labor force. Revised data show that Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate set a record low of 5.8 percent last June. Data are not released for Puerto Rico on the labor force participation rate or the ratio of employment to population, but considering that the population of Puerto Rico is roughly the as Iowa’s, and its labor force is no more than 70% as large, it is clear that despite good numbers in recent years, there is still a long way to go before the island’s labor market can be seen as comparable to mainland norms.

  • The Fed looks at bond yields as a gauge of long-term inflation expectations and its overall policy stance. Policymakers believe moderate and stable long bond yields are consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations and an appropriately configured policy stance. Yet, questions surround the current signal from long-bond rates after a decade-plus-long program of debt security purchases (quantitative easing, known as QE) by the Federal Reserve.

    Studies have shown that QE has lowered long bond yields by several hundred basis points. But, it needs to be clarified if the anchoring of long-bond interest rates via QE has also changed how the market price of long bonds adjusts to official rate hikes. Whatever the effect is, the Fed is not getting the market response it needs if it believes that higher borrowing costs are the main channel to break the inflation cycle.

    The core inflation and long bond yield picture that Fed faces today is something they have not encountered since the mid-1970s. One has to go back to the mid-1970s to find a similar alignment between long bond yields and inflation. The core inflation rate is approximately 200 basis points over the ten-year Treasuries yield, and that alignment has been in place for more than two years.

    That alignment raises several issues, all pointing to higher official rates.

    First, market rates adjusted for inflation have moved from "super" easy to still easy, indicating that the public's borrowing costs are still not sufficiently high enough to break the inflation cycle. That means the Fed has to hike official rates much more.

    Second, an inverted Treasury yield curve with market borrowing costs below the inflation rate has never occurred before. If borrowing costs matter more, as history has shown, curve inversion does not have the same adverse economic consequences. Consequently, the Fed will need to raise official rates well above market expectations creating an even greater curve inversion to get the inflation slowdown its wants.

    Third, the most significant risk to investors is if remnants of QE have permanently broken the links between long-term market borrowing rates and official rates. That would open the door to official rates moving to levels not seen in several decades. The risk of this scenario is low, but not zero, as the Fed has never faced an inflation cycle with QE in place.