Even with strong capex, US nonfinancial corporations are generating more cash than they are investing

Investor sentiment worldwide is positive, especially in AI-led Asia

Sectoral shift in US job openings

Meteoric rise in AI-related semiconductor exports fueling South Korea's export boom

Regional Fed surveys showing further manufacturing acceleration in August

Sharp drop in China demand for oil helping to limit impact of Middle East conflict on the price

Decades high real price of copper posing physical challenge to investment boom

Rising US long-term real yields point to strong demand for investment funding

US retail sales accelerate even as consumers remain gloomy

Retail gasoline price still well above pre-conflict level and now rising again

PMIs showing widespread revival of global economy

Crude oil price has returned to pre-conflict level but traffic through Hormuz still subpar

Surging orders for computers and electronics propelling durable goods orders

Next year's inflation forecasts are on the rise and above target

Disrupted global supply chains placing upward pressure on US goods prices

Construction of data centers has overtaken transportation construction in US

Elevated energy prices putting intense upward pressure on input prices around the globe

US is big leader in global surge in private AI investment

Larger-than-usual income tax refunds this year are supporting consumer spending

Sharply rising share of AI-related jobs

Inflationary impact of surge in oil prices larger in Europe than in the US

Futures market thinks the price of oil will recede significantly over the next six months

Recent pickup in US defense orders could help support overall growth ahead

Cost of transporting crude oil has soared to series high

Market-based inflation expectations have not yet reflected recent surge in oil prices

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Winnie Tapasanun

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New orders for durable goods were virtually unchanged m/m in August to $338.6 billion after rises of 0.9% in July (+1.1% initially) and 0.6% in June, according to today’s advance report from the U.S. Census Bureau. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected a 0.3% m/m August decline. The latest reading was still up 21.3% from a low of $279.1 billion in November 2022. The year-on-year rate decelerated to 8.5% in August from 11.8% in July (7.7% in August 2025), remaining positive since January 2025 except for May (-3.0%). Excluding transportation, durable goods orders grew 0.3% (11.2% y/y) in August, the 16th straight m/m increase, after a 0.7% rise in July. Durable goods orders excluding defense inched up 0.1% (7.9% y/y), the fourth m/m gain in five months, following a 1.4% July advance.

The m/m flat reading in August durable goods orders reflected a 4.3% m/m decrease in orders for nondefense aircraft & parts, following a 12.0% jump in July and a 2.9% decline in June. Orders for defense aircraft & parts rose 5.9% (-9.2% y/y), the first m/m rise since May, after drops of 13.0% in July and 7.0% in June. Orders excluding aircraft edged up 0.1% (11.2% y/y), the ninth successive m/m gain, after a 0.5% July increase.

Durable goods orders for transportation fell 0.6% (+3.4% y/y) in August, the third m/m fall in four months, following a 1.2% gain in July. In addition to August’s m/m decrease in nondefense aircraft orders and rise in defense aircraft orders, motor vehicles & parts orders slid 0.6% (+9.4% y/y) after a 0.8% July rebound. Orders for fabricated metal products dropped 1.3% (+8.6% y/y), down for the second time in three months, reversing a 0.3% July increase. Orders for computers & electronic products were essentially unchanged m/m (+16.5% y/y) following a 0.7% July decline and two consecutive m/m rises. To the upside, orders for primary metals climbed 1.2% (20.1% y/y), up for the ninth straight month, adding to a 2.1% July increase. Machinery orders grew 1.1% (15.1% y/y) on top of a 1.5% July rise, continuing a string of gains since March 2025. Orders for electrical equipment, appliances & components rose 1.1% (7.6% y/y) following a flat July reading and four successive m/m increases. Orders for all other durable goods were up 0.4% (4.0% y/y), the 12th straight m/m gain, after a 0.6% July rise.

Capital goods orders grew 0.7% (10.1% y/y) in August, the fifth m/m rise in six months, following a 0.6% increase in July. Nondefense capital goods orders rose 1.2% (6.0% y/y), up for the fourth time in five months, after a 2.3% July rise. Core capital goods orders (i.e., nondefense capital goods orders excluding aircraft) advanced 1.6% (14.1% y/y), the sixth m/m gain in seven months, following a 0.6% July increase. Defense capital goods orders, however, fell 1.5% (+34.6% y/y), the third m/m decline in four months, after a 6.4% July drop. Notably, core capital goods shipments (core capex shipments)—a reliable coincident indicator of business spending on equipment in the national accounts—rose 0.6% (11.4% y/y), the 11th m/m gain in 12 months, adding to a 1.4% July increase and pointing to a solid contribution to Q3 2026 GDP from business equipment spending.

Shipments of all manufactured goods held steady m/m (+8.6% y/y) in August following a 0.8% increase in July and no change in June. Durable goods shipments slipped 0.2% (+8.6% y/y), the first m/m decline since November 2025, after a 0.9% July rise. Nondurable goods shipments increased 0.3% (8.6% y/y), the eighth m/m rise in nine months, building on a 0.6% July gain.

Unfilled orders of durable goods climbed 0.6% (8.8% y/y) in August after rising at the same pace in July and June. Excluding transportation, unfilled orders rose 0.9% (7.1% y/y) after a 1.0% July gain. Both series posted the 13th consecutive m/m increase.

Manufacturing inventories advanced 0.5% (2.6% y/y) in August, up for the 10th month running, on top of a 0.4% rise in July. Durable goods inventories grew 0.5% (3.0% y/y), the 11th straight m/m increase, after rising at the same rate in July. Nondurable goods inventories rose 0.5% (1.9% y/y), up for the sixth time in seven months, following a 0.3% July rebound.

Manufacturers’ orders and shipments of durable and nondurable goods, along with unfilled orders and inventories, are compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. They are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics forecast data are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- August headline orders unchanged after two straight m/m rises; +8.5% y/y, positive since Jan. ’25 except for May; still up 21.3% from a Nov. ’22 low.
- Nondefense aircraft & parts -4.3% m/m vs. July’s +12.0%.
- Transportation orders -0.6%, third fall in four months; orders ex transp. +0.3%, 16th consecutive m/m increase.
- Core capital goods shipments +0.6%, 11th gain in 12 mths., pointing to a solid contribution to Q3’26 GDP from business equipt. spending.
- Durable goods shipments -0.2% (+8.6% y/y); unfilled orders +0.6% (+8.8% y/y); inventories +0.5% (+3.0% y/y).

U.S. Durable Goods Orders Flat in August on Nondefense Aircraft Weakness

Robert Brusca

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Globally, money growth is easing but the U.S. has become an exception to global trends.

In the EMU, money growth has been slowing within the last year as 12-month growth at 4.3% turns to 2.8% over six months and to 2.4% over three months. In addition, speaking more broadly, the three-month and six-month growth rates are slower than the cumulative pace over three years and two years.

The performance of credit growth in the EMU runs along very similar lines, with greater easing within the 12-month span and growth being broadly weaker over three months and six months than over the last two years and three years cumulatively.

EMU money growth in real terms—real money balances—show not just slower growth but contraction over both three months and six months. They show a broad slowing, with some irregularity compared to longer periods.

The U.K. is not a clear read on money trends, but its three-month nominal growth rate is weaker although there is a small pickup over 12 months and six months compared to previous periods. U.K. real money balances also show contraction over three months but have speeded up over six months and 12 months from very weak rates of growth in their performance in earlier periods.

Japan shows clear slowing in nominal growth from 12 months on. Its recent growth rates are slower than its already slow rates over two years and three years. Japan’s real balance growth also shows real balance contraction over three months and six months as well as more broadly.

The U.S. is an outlier, with slightly weaker three-month nominal growth but with accelerations over 12 months and six months, and with three-month growth that is stronger than over the longer horizons of two years and three years. Growth in real money balances in the U.S. has accelerated and is accelerating within the last year and over the longer horizon as well. U.S. real balance performance shows monetary stimulus running flat-out, marking the U.S. as a clear monetary outlier.

While tracking and relying on monetary signals has fallen “out of fashion,” a lot of that is because of monetary innovation. It is not clear that the finding that U.S. real balances are accelerating should be treated as a benign event. Money growth in the U.S. is strong in real and nominal terms.

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**Our convoluted future**
Oil prices (WTI in dollars) have broken lower over three months. But in “real time” oil has pressed higher. The contribution of oil to an incipient inflation rate may not have broken lower as much as this table suggests. It’s still a good time to remain wary about inflation. We are hearing all sorts of interpretations on this from people who are warning that diesel prices are going to stoke much more inflation to people who are convinced of the opposite that the push up in various prices will quickly weaken the economy, constrict supply, and lead to eventual Fed rate cuts. What seems clear is that inflation will come first. What is contentious is how much monetary policy should react to a supply shock and try to limit knock-on effects. Frankly, everyone has their own opinion, but it is really hard to nail down the consensus.

**Inflation is multi-dimensional**
In addition to those concerns, there are concerns about the availability of diesel, heating fuel for Europe this winter, and specialty synthetic oils needed by modern cars, as well as many other supplies, including ingredients for fertilizers for farmers. If ever you wanted an example of how little we really know about inflation, read the papers today. And that, of course, is all on top of arguments being made that fiscal policy will make monetary policy potentially ineffective if it is not brought to heel. Analysis has gotten wild and very open-ended on the economic front; beware. If you are not dogmatic about it, it should not be surprising to note that many different things feed into the inflation process. Money supply is important, as are interest rates, fiscal policy, and the economy’s ability to deliver goods & services as expected. But the precise weighting and calibration of these things remain contentious among economists and policymakers. On occasion, occasions like this one become sticking points.

Money Supply Growth Slows Except in the U.S.

Andrew Cates

**The Plumbing Tightens Again**
Euro area manufacturers reported a further lengthening of suppliers’ delivery times in this week’s flash survey, taking the index to its most stretched since the disrupted trading conditions of 2022. Dry bulk freight rates have risen in step, and the coincidence is not accidental. Neither series is signalling strong demand. Vessels diverted away from Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf are sailing considerably further to deliver the same cargo, which absorbs tonnage, extends voyage times and tightens the freight market without any increase in the volume of goods actually being moved. Manufacturers meet the same phenomenon as delay, and respond by ordering earlier and holding more, which tightens it further. Delivery times of this kind fed producer prices with a lag of two to three quarters after 2021, and there is little reason to expect a different sequence now. The more awkward feature for firms building plans for next year is that the friction is a function of route length rather than of order books, so it will not ease simply because activity slows.

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**A Very Narrow Base**
Consensus forecasts for growth this year have been marked down only modestly since February, which looks surprising set against six months of disrupted energy supply. The aggregate conceals an unusual degree of dispersion. Economies at the centre of the semiconductor supply chain have been upgraded substantially, Taiwan by several percentage points and Korea by more than one, on the strength of an investment boom in artificial intelligence whose physical apparatus they build. Almost everywhere else the revisions run from flat to negative, with Germany, France, Canada and Australia absorbing the energy shock without any equivalent windfall. Strip the chip exporters out and the world number reads considerably worse. That matters for anyone using the global aggregate as an input, because this year it carries less information about the typical economy than usual, and the handful of observations doing most of the work are levered to a single investment cycle.

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Sources: Blue Chip Economic Indicators, WTO and Haver Analytics

**Spending the Buffer**
The world has kept itself supplied with fuel through six months of disruption by drawing on the oil it had already stored, and the scale of that drawdown has no parallel in the available record. The starting position helped, since stocks were built up rapidly through late 2025 and the conflict arrived with storage unusually full. Two things follow. Inventories are a stock rather than a flow, and can be run down only once. And the apparent mildness of the macroeconomic damage so far has been bought with a buffer that is now largely spent, which leaves the system materially less able to absorb whatever arrives next. Some caution is warranted in reading the series, since implied stock change is the residual between estimated world supply and estimated world demand and therefore collects the measurement error in both. Neither the direction nor the magnitude is easily dismissed on those grounds.

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Sources: US Energy Information Administration and Haver Analytics

**Three Disturbances at Once**
Central banks are usually content to look through a commodity shock, and the justification for doing so rests on an assumption that the move will reverse. What has happened since February fits that description less well than usual. Crude and coal have risen because of the Middle East. Cereals, beverages and agricultural raw materials have risen because the World Meteorological Organization put the odds of an El Niño event near ninety per cent at the beginning of June, and West Africa, Southeast Asia and eastern Australia all dry out during the warm phase. Base metals have risen because artificial intelligence and rearmament have made them contested. Three disturbances of broadly comparable size, with different origins and little correlation between them, are therefore running at the same time. That is not a commodity cycle, in which the complex rises and falls together and a policymaker can reasonably wait. It is a queue of supply failures, each arriving before the last has cleared the annual comparison, and a queue is considerably harder to distinguish from a persistent inflation problem — for the policymaker, and for the public whose expectations the policymaker is trying to anchor. Assigning each sub-index to a principal source is a judgement rather than a decomposition, but the point about correlation survives any reasonable redrawing of the categories.

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**Where the Strain Registers**
Labour demand is the clearest evidence so far that the shock has reached the real economy, and it has reached it selectively. Online job postings in the United States drifted lower through last year but have stabilised and turned modestly higher since the spring. In the United Kingdom and Germany they have kept falling, and the British decline has been steep enough to leave postings far below where they began 2025. The official statistics point the same way. German unemployment has been above three million for most of this year, with the Federal Employment Agency describing labour demand as weak even as fiscal policy turns sharply expansionary, while British recruiters have reported falling permanent placements for months. The divergence follows the distributional logic of an energy shock. Economies that import their energy have transferred real income to those that produce it, and firms facing higher input costs and an uncertain demand outlook adjust first by not hiring rather than by dismissing, which is why the deterioration shows up in postings well before it shows up in unemployment. Loosening of this kind would ordinarily argue for easier policy. With the inflation coming from the supply side, it has not.

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**France Steps Away from the Core**
The French premium over Bunds crossed one hundred basis points last week for the first time since the euro crisis of 2011 and 2012, and it now trades wider than Italy’s. Spain, once the standard measure of peripheral stress, sits at less than half the French spread, and that reordering of the currency union’s credit hierarchy is the more telling development. The proximate cause is domestic. Public debt has reached around 119 per cent of output, the deficit remains close to twice the European ceiling, and the Lecornu government is attempting a consolidation of some fifty-four billion euros through a parliament that has already censured two of its predecessors, with a draft budget due at the end of this month. With a presidential election in 2027 and no obvious centrist majority beyond it, what investors are pricing is not the arithmetic of the deficit but the political capacity to act on it. The German side of the spread is no longer still either. Bunds stand at seventeen-year highs, reflecting a borrowing programme that runs to a five-hundred-billion-euro infrastructure fund and defence spending exempted from the debt brake above one per cent of output, and German politics has itself become much less predictable.

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Financial markets have spent this week weighing whether this year's energy shock has passed its peak, and have changed their minds more than once. Brent slipped below $99 as Hormuz shipments were reported recovering and Gulf leaders gathered in New York, only to recover above $100 within a day. The relief in the energy market has proved neither durable nor shared by the bond market. The Federal Reserve raised rates last week for the first time in three years, the ECB has tightened alongside it and the Bank of Japan has moved again, leaving ten-year Treasury yields at levels last seen in 2007 and Bunds at seventeen-year highs. This week’s flash purchasing managers’ surveys help explain the discomfort, with European supply chains lengthening once more as dry bulk freight rates climb (chart 1). The aggregate global growth picture has nonetheless held up better than the geopolitics would imply, though the latest Blue Chip consensus survey continues to suggest that this resilience is concentrated in only a small group of semiconductor exporters rather than shared across the world economy (chart 2). Part of the explanation for the wider containment lies in the oil balance, where a drawdown in stocks without precedent in the available record has substituted for the spare capacity that once cushioned disruptions of this kind (chart 3), and part lies in the character of the commodity shock itself, which now has at least three unrelated sources (chart 4). Labour markets are where the strain has begun to show, and it is showing very unevenly across the advanced economies (chart 5). In European bond markets, meanwhile, the consequences have turned political, with the premium demanded on French debt over German reaching levels not seen since the euro crisis (chart 6).

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Charts of the Week: Narrow Shoulders

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New single-family home sales rose 6.4% m/m (-2.0% y/y) to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 684,000 units in August, exceeding expectations, following an upwardly revised 4.3% decline to 643,000 in July (initially -10.5%, 607,000) and a downwardly revised 5.7% increase to 672,000 in June (previously +7.6%, 678,000), data from the U.S. Census Bureau showed, indicating that demand for new homes remained relatively resilient despite higher mortgage rates. The Action Economics Forecast Survey had expected August sales of 615,000. August marked the highest level since December 2025, down 9.6% from a high of 757,000 in November 2025 but up 27.9% from a low of 535,000 in July 2022. The August rise occurred alongside an increase in the average 30-year fixed mortgage rate to 6.67%, the highest since July 2025, from 6.54% in July, according to Freddie Mac.

Regionally, August new home sales showed a mixed performance. Sales in the Midwest surged 84.9% (22.5% y/y) to 98,000 in August, the first m/m rise in three months and the highest reading since December 2025, following a 32.1% plunge to 53,000 in July. Sales in the South climbed 6.9% (3.4% y/y) to 451,000, the third m/m gain in four months and the strongest level since November 2025, after a 3.7% July decline to 422,000. In contrast, sales in the Northeast plummeted 36.1% (-20.7% y/y) to 23,000, the first m/m decrease and the lowest level since February, after a 16.1% July advance to 36,000. Sales in the West dropped 15.2% (-26.8% y/y) to 112,000, matching the lowest level since October 2025, following a 5.6% July rebound to 132,000. Notably, the South remained the dominant region, accounting for 65.9% of total U.S. new home sales.

The median sales price of a new home rose 0.4% (-5.8% y/y) to $393,700 in August, the first m/m rise since April, after a 3.5% decline to $392,200 in July. The median sales price was 14.5% below its record high of $460,300 in October 2022 but 9.0% above a low of $361,100 in June 2021. The average sales price fell 9.1% (-8.8% y/y) to $478,700, the lowest since August 2024, following a 6.2% July gain to $526,400. The average price was 0.7% above a low of $475,600 in August 2024 but 11.5% below a peak of $541,200 in July 2022. These sales price data are not seasonally adjusted.

The number of unsold new homes on the market was unchanged (-2.0% y/y) at 483,000 in August and July following a 1.4% decrease to 480,000 in June. The latest figure was 13.9% above a low of 424,000 in May 2023. The seasonally adjusted months' supply of new homes for sale fell to 8.5 months in August, the lowest since December 2025, from 9.0 months in July, still above a low of 6.9 months in May 2023 but below a high of 10.3 months in July 2022.

The median number of months a new home stayed on the market held steady at 3.2 months in August and July after registering at 3.4 months in June, remaining the lowest since January. The latest reading was above its record low of 1.5 months in September and October 2022 but well below a peak of 5.1 months in March 2021. These figures date back to January 1975.

New home sales are recorded when the sales contract is signed. New home sales activity and prices are available in Haver's **USECON** database. The consensus expectation figure from Action Economics is available in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Sales +6.4% m/m (-2.0% y/y) to 684,000 in Aug.; up 27.9% from a July ’22 low.
- Sales m/m up in the Midwest (+84.9%) and South (+6.9%); down in the Northeast (-36.1%) and West (-15.2%).
- Median sales price +0.4% m/m to $393,700, first rise since Apr.; avg. price -9.1% m/m to $478,700, a two-year low.
- Unsold inventory unchanged (-2.0% y/y) at 483,000; months' supply down to 8.5 mths., lowest since Dec. ’25.

U.S. New Home Sales Rebound to an Eight-Month High in August

Michael J. Moran

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The US current account, a broad measure of trade and income flows between the US and the rest of the world, deteriorated in the second quarter, with the deficit widening by $33.4 billion to $246.0 billion. The shortfall was among the widest of the past several years, excluding observations in late 2024 and early 2025 when businesses rushed to import goods before the likely imposition of tariffs. The latest shortfall also is larger than the norm seen during the years before the pandemic (chart, upper left).

Measured as a share of GDP, the picture is a bit brighter. The latest shortfall is still in the upper portion of the recent range, but it is not as far out of line with pre-pandemic norms. In fact, it is about equal to observations in 2010 and early 2011. The deficit as a share of GDP was strikingly deep in the mid-2000s, when a general broadening in international trade and strength in the US economy led to sharper growth in imports than exports (chart, upper right).

The trade balance is the largest component of the current account, and in most quarters it is responsible for the lion’s share of the change in the current account. That was the case in Q2, as the trade deficit widened by $41.0 billion to $199.8 billion. The deepening in the trade deficit was sizeable—the second-largest in the history of the series, exceeded only by the tariff-related surge in 2025-Q1. However, the change was not surprising, as monthly figures on trade suggested noticeable deterioration.

Exports performed well during the second quarter, increasing at an annual rate of 14.0%, which followed a jump of 30.1% in Q1. However, imports also were strong, surging 29.1% in Q2 after a jump of 16.8% in Q1 (annual rates). These solid performances provided a lift to already-respectable upward trends (chart, lower left).

The income component of the current account consists of primary income and secondary income. Primary income consists of net investment income (receipts from abroad less payments abroad) and net employee compensation (remuneration received by US residents from foreign businesses while working temporarily in foreign countries, less remuneration received by foreign residents from US businesses while working temporarily in the United States). The compensation component of primary income is small; movements in total primary income are dominated by the investment component.

Historically, net investment income for the United States was strong, as US investors and businesses favored equity-related instruments and generally earned attractive returns. Foreign investors in the US, in contrast, leaned more toward fixed-income instruments, which typically yield less than equity. The US advantage in investment income began to fade in 2018, and net investment income shifted into negative territory in 2023-Q4. The deterioration was primarily the result of expanding volumes of foreign investment in the US (required to balance the trade deficit), which overwhelmed the rate-of-return disadvantage seen in years past. In addition, the strong US stock market in recent years most likely improved the returns earned by foreigners in the US.

Secondary income consists of net transfer payments between US residents and nonresidents. (Transfer payments are monetary flows that are not matched by a good or service or asset in return. Examples include pensions, personal insurance settlements, personal remittances, charitable donations, fines and penalties.) Secondary income for the US is nearly always negative (only one positive quarter in the history of the series). The softness deepened in late 2023, but it has recovered in the past year or so. The reasons for recent shifts are not clear, but a logical explanation would involve personal remittances. The strong performance of the US economy in 2023-24 may have led to strong personal remittances (foreign workers sending money home). The immigration policies of President Trump could be leading to a drop in remittances and an improvement recently in secondary income.

Balance of Payments data are in Haver’s **USINT** database, with summaries available in **USECON**. The expectations figure is in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- A widening in the trade deficit deepened the current account shortfall.
- Both primary and secondary income improved slightly (i.e. became less negative).


US Current Account in Q2: Additional Slippage

Economy in Brief: July 2003

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