Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Shashwat Indeevar

Shashwat Indeevar is a Senior Economic Data Manager at Haver Analytics, where he has been part of the Research Team since 2017, working in both the New York and London offices. He focuses on the organization and presentation of large-scale datasets, the improvement of database-building processes, and the management of daily workflow. His economic research interests include global energy use, environmental sustainability, and artificial intelligence.

He holds a Master of Science in Management of Technology from New York University, where he studied finance, economics, and operations management. He also earned a Bachelor of Engineering in Electronics and Communications from Panjab University, India.

Publications by Shashwat Indeevar

  • In recent months the maritime supply chain of oil and petroleum, especially via the Middle East, has come under immense strain. The ongoing disruptions to sensitive maritime chokepoints make the economics around it increasingly precarious. The Strait of Hormuz has been heavily restricted since March 2, 2026 and as of August 30, 2026 remains effectively closed. According to the EIA, prior to the conflict roughly a fifth of global oil consumption and LNG trade flowed through this chokepoint. There was a partial opening that lasted from June 17, 2026 to July 14, 2026. More recently on July 20, 2026 Yemen’s Houthi movement declared a naval blockade and maritime embargo on Bab el Mandeb strait. Together, the two disruptions have exposed the limited scope for rerouting and increased the risk of a more persistent energy-price shock. In this piece, we examine their impact on tanker shipping routes and Saudi Arabia’s oil trade, using IMF PortWatch data available in Haver’s TRANSPRT Database.

    A closer look at chokepoints: Limitations of rerouting

    In the month following the closure of Strait of Hormuz, tanker trade volume through Hormuz collapsed to 22.8 thousand tons from 1.97 million tons over the previous 30 days. This difference in lost volume was not absorbed by the aggregate of the remaining chokepoints – Suez Canal (Egypt), Bab el Mandeb (Yemen) and Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) – as the net volume through the alternate corridor remained nearly steady and has actually begun to fall off in the latest month (Figure 1 Blue line).

    There were some significant gains made during the partial reopening from June 17 to July 14, where Hormuz tanker volume regained 29.5 percent of its original value. However, the Houthi blockade (July 20) triggered a second, compounding decline, this time visible on all three lines (Figure 1). Hormuz dropped again, and the alternate corridor (which had shown slight gains at that time) dropped as well. These were not two independent shocks; the second disruption hit the very route ships had been relying on to cope with the first.

    The US has maintained a strong naval presence in the region and has led Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational coalition set up in December 2023, which aims to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The challenge is the asymmetry of the threat from the Houthis: cheap drone and missile attacks on tankers and naval escorts are hard to fully deter, so even a partial or a threatened blockade has proven effective.

  • The world has become more fragmented politically in the past decade, which has heightened global risk and uncertainty. The diminished sense of security has caused many countries to increase military spending. While this may be a rational response for individual countries, collectively, the rise in military spending has been alarming and seems to be leading the world toward even more risk and uncertainty. This in turn may feed the need for more security. In addition, the devotion of so much of the world’s resources to military spending may be damaging for the global economy.

    According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world annual military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion (in constant 2024 terms) in 2025. That figure represented a 41 percent increase in the past ten years. However, half of that rise occurred in the past three years. We looked at the SIPRI Military Expenditure dataset (available in Haver’s GLSECTOR database) to understand how and why military spending is changing across countries and regions.

    Worldwide gains in military spending The rise in military spending has been widespread. Between the years 2022 and 2025, 45 of the top 50 countries in terms of military spending posted increases, with an average gain among that group of 41.8 percent. NATO spending (excluding the US) jumped by 44.7 percent, while non-NATO military spending increased by 29.2 percent.

    Surprisingly, US military spending was essentially flat during this time. As a result, US military spending declined as a share of world spending by 6.6 percentage points to 33.5 percent. However, the Trump Administration has proposed a $1.5 trillion military budget for 2027, a roughly 60 percent increase from the 2025 spending listed in Figure 1. If that budget is enacted, then in 2027 the US's increase alone would be equivalent to 20 percent of 2025's entire world total. And we know that other countries both in NATO and Asia are ramping up spending as well.

  • Global| Aug 18 2025

    The Power of AI

    The global race in the field of Artificial Intelligence is becoming a priority for both nations and firms alike. However, we are concerned that the overwhelming energy needs of AI will force countries to compromise on the competing goal of environmental sustainability. In the second of his three-part Viewpoint series, The Age of Constraints, Andy Cates did an energy reality check. There he highlighted real energy prices and the ever-changing energy demands that are needed to power and cool the data centers supporting AI functionality. We further explore how leading economies have pursued energy generation over the past 20 years and deduce which directions they might take to power up AI.

    Specifically, we compare the forms of electricity generation across the three major players in the AI race – the United States, China, and Europe. This comparison shows the stark differences in total power needs as well as the contrasting compositions of power generation. These compositions reflect both physical capacities and societal goals across the three major economies.

  • The US current account deficit has nearly tripled over the past eight years, covering the previous two administrations. With the current account deficit now running at roughly $1.1 trillion per year or 3.7 percent of GDP, the new administration has announced across-the-board increases in tariffs in order to level the playing field on trade. We wondered how we got here and if the causes might highlight ways to solve the problem.

    In the April 3 Viewpoints article titled Liberating the Downside, Andy Cates and Kevin Gaynor discussed the prospects for narrowing the US current account deficit through tariffs in the context of the national accounts. One way to look at the national accounts is though the following identity

    (M – X) = (I – S) + (G – T)

    where (M – X) is the current account deficit, (I – S) is the private borrowing need, and (G – T) is the public borrowing need or the government budget deficit. This equation offers a valuable framework to identify the underlying causes of the undesirable rise in the US current account deficit.

    Based on a combination of Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Tables 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 (all these data can be found in the Haver USNA database), it is clear that the interplay between saving and investment drives the current account, with some small adjustments for the statistical discrepancy.