Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media. Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

Germany| Apr 24 2026
German Ifo Plunges Everywhere
The onset of the war in Iran appears to have hit the German economy extremely hard as the Ifo survey shows very substantial and broad-based decline across its survey in April. The Ifo survey features readings for five sectors as well as an aggregate reading, and it surveys them for climate, current conditions, and expectations. The decline in the Ifo survey is present for all three concepts and across all five sectors, marking the weakening in April as a highly significant and extremely disturbing development. Only manufacturing in the current conditions survey escapes a month-to-month decline.

The Ifo sequences: The climate reading fell both overall and across each of the five sectors. Current conditions declined for the overall and for four of the five sectors, with manufacturing the sole exception. Expectations declined for the overall and for all sectors. Several of the sector declines were for a very substantial magnitude, especially when compared to historic changes in these indexes.

Monthly changes in readings—severe broad deterioration The month-to-month change in the climate reading has weakened more month-to-month 19% of the time. That overall result, however, is boosted by manufacturing where the monthly change has been weaker 35% of the time (on data back to 2011). However, all other sectors have seen climate weaker m/m only 2.3% to 6.3% of the time! The current situation readings weakened, with the headline weakening more m/m 11% of the time. This was boosted by manufacturing, the only sector that improved on the month; its ranking on change was in its 85th percentile—quite good and truly stand-alone good news. The other current changes by sector ranged from construction being weaker 1.7% of the time, to retailing that has been weaker about 30% of the time in terms of m/m changes. Expectation changes were uniformly terrible, with the headline drop weaker only 6.3% of the time and sector change month-to-month weaker between 9% and 1.7% of the time. The monthly weakening was uniform and substantial. I document it with these calculations, but you can also see it on the chart above.

Climate: The bottom line is that the all-sector index for climate fell to -20.3 in April from -18 in March, placing it at a 10.5 percentile standing on data since 1993. The sector ranking is the highest for construction with a 42.2 percentile standing and the weakness for services at a 1.1 percentile standing—weaker than the table reading nearly 99% of the time. In terms of percentile standing levels or monthly changes, conditions are closing in on grim.

Current conditions: Current conditions saw the all-sector index slip to -5.3 in April from -2.4 in March. The headline ranking stands at a 9.8 percentile mark, making it—like the climate reading—weaker than its current reading only about 10% of the time. The strongest reading under current conditions is for construction which has a 60.6 percentile standing; it is the only ranking in the table above its historic median. Manufacturing, the only sector in the survey that improved month-to-month, has a 22.5 percentile standing, while services record the weakest percentile standing under current conditions, at an 8.4 percentile standing.

Expectations: The all-sector index for expectations fell to -25.3 in April from -19.9 in March, placing it at a 6.3 percentile standing. The percentile standings across sectors range from a high of 9.5% for manufacturing to a low of 1.5% for retailing. Up until earlier this year, the Ifo was showing signs of improvement; however, all of that has simply collapsed in the last month. Weakness is across economic concepts and sectors, as documented above. For reference, the table also gives a separate set of rankings on where the various indexes stand since the invasion of Ukraine, since that was another marked event that drove the index, that had been improving after Covid, down to lower levels. Ranked even on this reduced scale looking at conditions only since the invasion of Ukraine, when conditions have generally been weaker, the current rankings across the Ifo survey remained extremely weak. This is a very disturbing survey for the German economy.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Global| Apr 23 2026
S&P PMIs Show Mixed Fortunes
Manufacturing looks strong while service sectors weaken S&P's April flash PMI readings show some very mixed results. For the United States, India, Australia, and the United Kingdom, there is a strengthening in the readings month-to-month for services, manufacturing, and the composite.

For Japan, France, and the European Monetary Union as a whole, there is improvement in the manufacturing sector on the month but a weaker services reading and a weaker composite overall.

Germany is the only responding area in the table showing weakness all around—in all three sectors—a weaker composite, a weaker manufacturing sector, and a weaker services sector in April. For Germany, this follows a weaker composite and service sector in March as well.

Most reporters—France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and India—had weaker readings for all three metrics in March: the composite, services, and manufacturing. The March exceptions were the United States, Germany, and the European Monetary Union; in each case, the exception was that the manufacturing sector improved month-to-month, while the composite and services both weakened.

This has been a period of weakening—in March and April—since the war in Iran began. The 48 separate sector readings produced 30 readings that were weaker month-to-month in March and April. Among the 16 composite readings, 12 reported weaker conditions month-to-month. In March, the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of war brought instantaneous step backs across the PMI readings, while April, responding to at least a military success in the area, has shown a significant bounce back that is now more common than further weakness.

The sequential data over three months, six months, and 12 months are based only on completed data; therefore, they're up to date through March. On that basis, we have triple sector weakness in the U.S., India, and Australia, with only Japan and the United Kingdom showing triple-sector improvement over three months. However, if we look at six months compared to 12 months, we have triple sector strength in the Monetary Union, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia. India and the U.S. each show only one stronger sector over that comparison—services in India’s case and manufacturing in the U.S. case.

Ranking Peculiarity The ranking data take the current flash data and compare them to the history of observations back to January 2022. What is quite surprising is that, on that timeline, the manufacturing sectors of all the countries in the table—except for Australia and India—show manufacturing standings in their respective 80th to 90th percentiles. Meanwhile, services standings are typically in the 30th percentile or lower.

Odd Impact of War If the war in Iran has an impact on something, we would expect that to fall on the goods trade sector. We would expect this to have an impact on manufacturing although it's the opposite thing that's happening. Manufacturing is showing a revival, while services sectors are showing weaker performance across these countries generally. India is an interesting case, with manufacturing only in its 32nd percentile; however, India’s raw diffusion reading for manufacturing is the strongest raw diffusion reading in the table. What India's ranking is telling us is that India had been extremely strong over the period since 2022, and now compared to that past standard, it's relatively weaker. However, it's still strong in absolute terms, showing a great deal of strength based on its pure diffusion value, just not in comparison to historic performance.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Belgium| Apr 22 2026
National Bank of Belgium Consumer Survey for April
The National Bank of Belgium consumer survey for April registered -9, compared to a reading of -6 in March and +1 in February. Since the war in the Middle East began, confidence readings have declined steadily. However, the April consumer confidence reading of -9 still shows improvement from its level of -14 recorded 2 months ago. The index has a 37.8 percentile standing based on data back to 1991, which places it below its historic median: the median ranking occurs at a percentile standing of 50.

The responses to the survey are mixed and some of them are quite negative; however, a few also are quite upbeat. For now, the main message is that the survey is mixed. While most confidence readings tend to the weak side, there are a few that are actually quite encouraging.

Economic Situation A survey on the economic situation shows improvement for the next 12 months; its April reading rose to -43 in April from -45 in March. However, with the onset of war, the March reading had fallen to -45 from -25 in February, so the month-to-month uptick in April is really small potatoes. The 12-month change in the outlook for the economic situation over the next 12 months is a tick better in April 2026 than it was in April 2025. Continuing the back and forth on its “bad but not that bad” swing, the queue reading of the index on data back to 1991 has only a 1.8 percentile standing, marking it as weaker than its current level less than 2% of the time and ending the back-and-forth on whether the reading is poor or not. It is very weak.

The assessment of the economic situation over the last 12 months deteriorated to -57 in April from -42 in March, and it also worsened compared to its level of a year ago. In addition, its standing is in the bottom 8% of its historic queue data.

Prices Price trends give us some of the clearest and most negative views. Prices over the next 12 months improved slightly from March, moving to a reading of 50 in April from 53 in March. Still, the April reading of 50 is higher than its reading of 35 one year ago, and its standing is in the top 1% of all observations on data back to 1991. Those are dismal statistics. Price trends for the last 12 months are shown to have been slightly more stable but still with readings that had been historically worse, only about 15% of the time, marking the past inflation environment as having been poor as well.

Unemployment The consumers’ unemployment forecast went up in April to a reading of +6 from -3 in March; it had deteriorated to -3 in March from -11 in February. A rising unemployment response reflects deterioration. People are assessing the possibility of unemployment as getting higher, although at +6 the April reading is substantially reduced compared to what it was a year ago at +21. The standing for the unemployment forecast is only in its 16.7 percentile of its historic queue of data, meaning that the likelihood of unemployment has been lower than this, only about 16% to 17% of the time.

Major Household Purchases If you look at the environment to make major household purchases, the responses of consumers become slightly more convoluted since the question as to whether it's favorable to buy at present deteriorated sharply in April to -44 from -23 in March; that was a sharp deterioration from -20 a year ago. Ranking the current -44 reading on data back to 1991, this is the weakest or the worst favorability for spending on this timeline. So that particular sequence of data doesn't fit really well with the unemployment responses, although being unemployed and finding it's a favorable time to buy goods are different things; both do speak to the economic environment which we can see is somewhat touch and go.

The outlook for making major purchases over the next 12 months deteriorated slightly over the last few months, with a reading of -19 compared to -17 a year ago. That current reading has a 24.3 percentile standing, placing it in the lower quartile of its historic queue of data. This underlines that the spending environment has been poor throughout the last year compared to historic experience since the 1990s.

The Financial Situation of Households The financial situation of households over the next 12 months deteriorated slightly in April to -5 from -3, and it had deteriorated in March to -3 from -2 in February. Even so, the April reading of 5 was stronger than -8 recorded one year ago. Still, if we let the ranking on data back to 1991 be the arbiter of whether the assessment of conditions is weak, the 10.6 percentile standing for the financial situation ahead and the 12.2 percentile standing for the financial situation of households over the last 12 months both indicate decisive weakness.

The Current Situation The next reading is a bit of a surprise given the drumbeat of weakness that we see from the data above. The current situation appraisal did backtrack in April to 21 from 25 in March, but it's only slightly weaker than a reading of 22 in February. The April 2026 reading of 21 is slightly weaker than a reading of 25 one year ago. However, the April reading has a percentile standing on data back to 1991 at its 74.5 percentile, putting it right at the border of its top 25th percentile.

So, the current situation is appraised as a top 25-percentile standing, but the environment for making purchases over the next 12 months has a lower 24-percentile standing; and the current situation has a favorability for buying which is the worst that we've seen in the entire period. However, expectations of unemployment remain low. To round out this situation, the favorability to save over the next 12 months has a ranking in its 86-percentile, making it a top 15-percentile reading. The favorability to save at present has a 58-percentile standing, placing it above its historic median and slightly better than average. What we have are crosscurrents.

On balance, you see the consumers view their situation as having a lot of crosscurrents. In terms of the thing they fear the most, unemployment conditions are not considered to be at risk and the economic situation is appraised to be in the upper tier of where it has been since the 1990s even though the favorability of spending is the worst experience for consumers on that same timeline. But the inflation readings are unambiguously bad—and worsening.

It would appear from these crosscurrents that the Belgian consumer is ripe for being pushed one way or the other if events were to markedly either improve or to deteriorate.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
France| Apr 21 2026
Bank of France Survey Advances in March
The overarching survey indicator for March stepped up despite enhanced global challenges. The March headline index rose to 99.3 from 98 in both January and February.

The March level of the headline compares to a 12-month average of 97.2. Nearly all the components in March are above their 12-month averages. The exception is the output change, which is substantially weaker than its 12-month average. Expected production, at 3.1 in March, is just a tick below its 12 month average of 3.2. Finally, expected employment in March is tied with its 12-month average.

In addition, only 3 readings weaker month-to-month in March were output change, expected production, and expected employment.

On the month, output change is a weak reading, falling by 3.5 points month-to-month; it may be the clearest example of the report showing weakness ahead, affected by upcoming global issues related to the war and rising oil and energy prices.

In addition to output change, expected production slipped to 3.1 in March from 4.8 in February. There was also a step back in expected employment, a modest one to 0.8 in March from 1.0 in February.

But order books showed a 10.2 reading in March, up from 5.6 in February. Changes in new foreign orders and total orders both showed more strength in March than in February, with foreign orders at 5.5 in March compared to 5.2 in February. The change in total orders, at 10.2 in March, was much stronger than 5.6 in February. Inventories registered 0.6 in March, up from -0.3 in February.

However, capacity space is being used up as capacity use rose to 77.0 in March from 76.6 in February.

The employment metric at 2.6 in March was much stronger than its zero reading in February.

On balance, the components indicate the sector is moving ahead as the headline gain suggests in March. But the major question mark is probably the strength in orders—which we take to be forward-looking compared to the setback in output change.

The index in March has a 64.1 percentile standing. Only three components in March ranked below their respective 50% marks (below their medians). The strongest readings generated standings in the 90th and mid-80th-percentile levels. These included finished inventories, the change in total orders, and order books. The lagging components, below their median values, were output change, expected production, and capacity utilization.

The French industrial readings are surprising for their resilience.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Germany| Apr 20 2026
German PPI Takes Partial Flight
The German PPI rose by 2.4% month-to-month in March. That was, of course, boosted by oil prices as Brent crude soared, gaining 46.9% month-over-month (yikes!). However, very little of that got into German ex-energy prices, which did rise, but by only 0.4%. Still, do not be fooled by that ‘only.’ That 0.4% rise is the largest rise of that magnitude since February 2023—a period of about 2¼ years. So be wary of what might be in train here; 0.4% does not seem so large, but it annualizes to about a 5% pace.

In addition, 12 months to six months to three months, the headline PPI is accelerating—from a 12-month drop, to a well-behaved 2.1% pace of expansion over six months, and then to an elevated 3.9% annual rate over three months.

The core PPI is a bit more copacetic, but it shows clear acceleration, rising from a 12-month pace of 1.3%, to a 1.8% pace over six months, and to 2.4% annualized over three months.

Consumer prices in Germany The sky is not falling. So far, there is no evidence of inflation in consumer goods: the consumer goods index does not even rise over 12 months, six months, or three months—though it is flat over three months. Investment goods, by contrast, show clear price acceleration, rising from 1.9% over 12 months, to 2.6% over six months, and to 4.1% over three months. Intermediate goods show the inflation wallop as prices rise by 1.5% over 12 months, to a 5.1% pace over six months, and at an 8.1% annual rate pace over three months. That annualized intermediate goods gain is something to watch. It is driven by oil, but other commodities and goods are caught up in supply chain woes as well.

For reference, the headline CPI shows acceleration, rising from a 12-month pace of 2.7% to a 5% annualized rate over three months. The ex-energy CPI, however, remains subdued, rising 2.3% over 12 month and at a more modest 2% annualized pace over three months.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Europe| Apr 15 2026
Euro Area IP Makes Modest Rebound—or Does it?
The rebound that wasn’t Industrial production rebounded without vigor in February, gaining 0.4% after falling by 0.8% in January. Moreover, the trends are poor and show no sign of stabilization. 12-month to 6-month to 3-month overall output is sinking faster than is manufacturing output. And all the major manufacturing sectors show either clear signs or strong hints of progressively faster declines in output.

Half or more of the countries in the table report output falling in January and in February. This is not a stabilizing condition.

All sectors show quarter-to-date (QTD) declines in the unfolding Q1 output stream, and only six countries show QTD output increases in progress. The breadth of output increases is poor, and their trends for growth are extremely poor. So I have to brand this rebound as technically visible in February alone, but in a broader perspective, conditions are weakening.

In terms of sectors, only one EMU-wide sector has a 12-month growth rate above its median pace—that sector is capital goods, with a ranking in its 57th percentile compared to the median whose ranking is 50%. Only six countries in the table have manufacturing growth rates that exceed their historic median pace. That makes the breadth of IP growth as weak as well.

Not reassuring There is nothing reassuring about the February IP report, and it precedes the onset of the Iran war. We have since seen very broad weakness ahead in the S&P PMI indexes. We are certainly headed for a difficult period ahead. Since the period of international disruption has just begun in March, we are entering this difficult time in a weakened position. It would seem to be a good time to get defensive since inflation is bound to go up and high oil prices will weaken demand and already are creating some significant local chaos in developing economics that already were hand-to-mouth.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Japan| Apr 14 2026
Japan’s IP: A Step Back in February
Japanese industrial production in February declined by 1.1%, led by a 2.1% drop in manufacturing output. By sector, consumer goods output fell by 0.3%, intermediate goods output fell by 2.1%, while investment goods output dropped by a strong 2.5%, all on a month-to-month basis. Mining sector output fell by 1.5% in February, while utilities output fell by 3.8%.

Sequentially, however, Japanese output had been accelerating, up by 0.1% over 12 months, at a 4.5% annual rate over six months, and at a 7% annual rate over three months.

Manufacturing Manufacturing output is up at 0.3% over 12 months, at a 6.6% annual rate over six months, and by 11.7% annualized over three months.

Within manufacturing, consumer goods output is expanding at a strengthening pace, rising by 0.8% over 12 months, at a 4.8% annual rate over six months, and then at a 10.8% annual rate over three months. Intermediate goods output is flat over 12 months, rising at a 2.9% annual rate over six months, and at a 6.2% annual rate over three months. Investment goods output is up at a 7% annual rate over 12 months, at a 5.2% annual rate over six months, and at a 6% annual rate over three months. However, mining output is down year-over-year; output changes get progressively worse from 12 months to three months. Utilities show a 4.8% decline over 12 months, decline by 3.2% at an annual rate over six months, and then fall at a 4.7% annual rate drop over three months. Mining and utilities sectors are experiencing more in the way of contracting effects.

Quarter-to-date Reported on a quarter-to-date basis (two months into Q1), total industry output is up at a 7.3% annual rate, with manufacturing up at a 15.2% annual rate on the same basis. For sectors, however, the strength is in consumer goods and investment goods where output is increasing at an 11.9% annual rate in the quarter; intermediate goods output is up at a 9.3% annual rate quarter-to-date. Mining output shows a decline at an annual rate in the quarter-to-date, while utilities output posts an increase.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Netherlands| Apr 13 2026
Dutch Trade Trends Improve Goods Balance—for Now
As the chart makes clear, Dutch exports and imports are driven by very complementary forces and tend to track one another closely. Both flows boomed when COVID ended, slowed to a contraction in 2023, and then recovered to maintain steady levels (growth rates that hugged a zero-percent growth rate) from mid-2024 to late-2025. Recently, exports and imports have begun to weaken, with both flows showing contraction over 12 months. Goods imports are falling at a 5.5% pace as exports are falling at a 4% pace.

As for intra-year trends, the sequential growth rates show exports have transitioned into a progressively more contractive mode, while imports have declined over 12 months, six months, and three months, but without a clear signal on whether the trend is getting better or worse.

Of course, the trade flow depends on price trends and economic trends; both are under strain and uncertainty.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Germany| Apr 09 2026
German IP Is Weak in February
Germany’s industrial production slipped in February, driven lower by dropping output of consumer goods. Sequential growth rates over 12 months, six months, and three months show a confusing array of patterns, except for intermediate goods, where annualized growth rates for output sequentially weaken and show declines on each horizon. All German sector growth rates for the quarter-to-date are showing declines, and the growth rankings by sector are below 50% across the broad, indicating below median performance across German sectors. It’s a very unimpressive report.

Real manufacturing orders rose modestly in February against the backdrop of a very sharp drop in January. Real manufacturing sales have been erratic.

German output and industrial gauges, ranked on annual sales growth against historic norms, have been very weak. Only real orders post a standing above 50%, which represents the median.

France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway provide some perspective on European growth. The northern European non-EMU member countries are much stronger than the EMU reporters, two of which have standings below their median levels (rankings below 50).
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Europe| Apr 08 2026
EMU PPI Trends Are Chaotic; It Could Get Worse
Chaotic trends Producer price trends for the European Monetary Union in February show great deal of weakness. The headline measure in February for total PPI prices (excluding construction) fell 0.5% after rising 0.5% in January. The three-month annualized change was -1.3%, over six months it was -0.7%, and year-over-year it was -3.1%. The trend is not particularly conclusive although the table also produces the trend for the HICP-core on the same timeline where there is acceleration in train. Despite this report and any trends, it may show that the risk to inflation in the PPI is now through elevated Brent crude prices, which we see in the chart has been historically well correlated with changes in the PPI.

The past may not be prologue The chart offers some insight into this matter as we see that recently the spike in Brent crude is substantial—and the chart doesn't even take us up-to-date to what we're dealing with in the markets today! We can see that in 2021 when all prices went up sharply, that preceded a spike in the PPI as well. However, in 2017 when there was a short-lived spike, there wasn't much impact on producer prices at all. Then, later in 2018, when prices spiked not quite so high or suddenly, but had a bit more sustained growth, there also was a very small knock-on impact on producer prices. One of the key features for whether the Brent rise gets into producer prices or not is how long-lived the spike remains in force and how people perceive it. In this case, there's closing of the Strait of Hormuz and a war in place; there's a good chance that investors are going to treat this as a real event and one with potential longevity. That means that this spike will elevate producer prices.

Overall PPI is tempered but, by country...not so much However, the table is based on data through February, and so oil spiking prices really haven't entered the picture as far as the table is concerned. On that basis, we're seeing a lot of price declines: an annualized three-month decline of 7.9% in Spain, 7.3% in Portugal, 3.6% in Germany, and so on. These figures clearly do not reflect what will be the lasting effect on oil prices as we get deeper into 2026. Even despite this weakness in headline inflation across countries in the monetary union, and in Europe generally, inflation is tempered year-over-year where it only rises compared to a year earlier for 7.7% of the reporters, but then over six months inflation accelerates for all of the reporters compared to its 12-month pace, and then, over three months it accelerates for about 70% of the reporters compared to the six-month pace.

PPI headline vs. core... where available There are two observations at the bottom of the table for the PPI excluding energy—for France and Germany. In both cases, the difference between the excluding energy price and the headline price is remarkable. For Germany, the ex-energy price is rising and clearly accelerating; in contrast, the headline trends show prices declining or a tendency toward deceleration. For France, the ex-energy prices are rising and sustaining larger increases over six months and three months than over 12 months. However, for France, in the table, the total PPI headline inflation rate declines on all horizons although the pace of decline is undergoing erosion. Once we set aside the weighting scheme for the monetary union, the PPI is looking instead at the average result of the countries in the table (an average that includes some non-monetary union members) where the inflation rate is clearly headed higher, not lower.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
Global| Apr 07 2026
Composite PMIs Retreat Broadly
The S&P composite PMIs in March weakened decisively across the board, with only four of 25 reporters showing an improvement in March compared to February. February had been a strong month, with only 10 of 25 monthly composite indicators weaker on a month-to-month basis. In January, 11 of the composite indicators weakened month-to-month. So, between January and March, the proportion of countries showing composite indicators as weaker month-to-month went up from 40% to 44% and then all the way up to 80%, a huge shift for the worse.

Sequential trends Sequentially, looking at 12-months compared to 12-months ago, six-months compared to 12-months, and three-months compared to six-months, we see a similar progression. Over 12 months, 43.5% of the reporters were weaker; over six months, 39.1% of them were weaker period-to-period. And then over three months, that proportion jumped to 65.2% that were weaker month-to-month.

The war in Iran has been reflected in these numbers. We see it very clearly for the March data, the first full month after the attack. The average and median total PMI readings deteriorated from February to March: the average readings fell from 52.6 in February to 50.7 in March, and the median readings fell from 52.1 to 51.4.

The number of reporters with PMI values below 50, indicating contraction, jumped to 9 in March from 4 in February and 5 in January.

The data show that there has been broad weakening among these reporters. In addition, there has been a sharp rise in the number of them reporting outright economic contraction. The composite indexes are showing not just weakness month-to-month, but actual stepped-up contraction.

The queue percentile standings are also substantially degraded, with only eight of the 25 queue metrics that are reported above their historic medians on data back to January 2022. And the countries that are reporting good performance are often very small countries. Ghana and Zambia show very strong queue percentile standings. Sweden shows a high percentile standing. However, Japan and Hong Kong also show percentile standings in their 90th percentile, and Germany's standing has gotten to its 70th percentile. However, if oil prices climb and shortages in a variety of supply chains begin to be impacted because of the lack of oil, and in some cases, fertilizer and other commodities, we are going to start to see weakness spread.

In some developing countries, there's already a more generalized economic weakness being caused by fuel rationing because prices are so high. If the Strait of Hormuz is not open soon, these conditions are going to get demonstrably worse. Even though the U.S. economy has done relatively well and is unaffected by oil supply shortages—although prices in the U.S. certainly have risen—the U.S. composite PMI index has only a 19.6 percentile standing, not a terribly good place to say that the economy is largely unaffected by these events. The U.S. composite PMI has fallen for two months in a row.

Not surprisingly, three countries have reported the lowest composite PMI readings since 2022 when these rankings began. They are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, all of whom are in the middle of this Middle East conflict.

The European Monetary Union posted a queue standing above its 50th percentile, at 54.9. And its diffusion reading on the month at 50.5 is similar to the U.S. at 50.3, indicating that economic activity is still expanding in the community—but barely. Both France and Italy logged composite PMI readings below 50; France has generated three sub-50 diffusion readings in a row, and in addition, three more of them sequentially over three months, six months, and 12 months. The queue standings may overstate the case for resiliency in some instances. There was plenty of weakness to go around across economies in March.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief
France| Apr 03 2026
French IP Waffles
French manufacturing industrial production was flat in February after a January rebound; output rose by 0.2% following a 0.8% decline in December.

The components of industrial production in February showed 2.6% increase in consumer durables, a 0.4% increase in consumer nondurables, flat output from capital goods, and a 0.7% month to month decline in intermediate output.

Sequentially, French output had been growing at a slow, steady pace of 0.8% at an annual rate over both 12 months and six months, but then slipped to a 6.1% contraction at an annual rate over three months. Consumer durable goods output on this span shows consistent increases, but there are no trends to clear acceleration or deceleration. Consumer nondurables trace an accelerating path of moderate means from -1.8% over 12 months, to -0.4% over six months, and then rising at a 5.5% annual rate over three months. Capital goods output is moving in the opposite direction, growing by 3.4% over 12 months, slowing to a 0.7% annual pace over six months, and then contracting at a 9.5% annual rate over three months. Intermediate goods output is falling at 0.8% pace over 12 months, but then it switches to an expansion rate of 0.8% over six months and 0.6% and over three months. There's nothing remarkable about these patterns, except there's some acceleration, some deceleration, and a lot of mulling about at low growth rates.

As a separate item, French auto production is slipping and decelerating, falling by 7.1% at an annual rate over 12 months, falling at a 7.9% pace over six months, and then plunging at a 19.3% annual rate over three months. On these same horizons, motor vehicle registrations fall by 14.7% over 12 months; the weakness pares back to an 11.2% annual rate decline over six months, and then it steps up to a 22.1% decline at an annual rate over three months. French demand for autos is not in good shape.

In the quarter to date—now two months into the first quarter—manufacturing industrial production is falling at a 0.8% annual rate. That pace is boosted by 9.4% annual rate gain in consumer durables output but restrained by just a 0.2% annual rate increase in consumer nondurable goods. Capital goods output is falling at a 1.9% annual rate, while intermediate goods output is falling at a 1% annual rate. Also in the quarter to date, automobile production is plunging at a 24.3% annual rate, while on the demand side, motor vehicle registrations are falling at a 15% annual rate.

French manufacturing data are somewhat confusing. The chart shows that the industrial production trend has been showing consistent increases over 12 months, but it has recently been pulling back relatively sharply. On the other hand, the manufacturing PMI for France has been consistently negative going back to mid-2022 and only in early 2026 has the manufacturing PMI been posting some values above the 50% mark, indicating that output was starting to actually expand. In March, the PMI reading for manufacturing has slipped back by the thinnest margin below the 50% mark.
by:Robert Brusca
|in:Economy in Brief